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Foreword: Constitutional Courts in the European Legal System
After the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis'
By Maria Dicosola, Cristina Fasone," & Irene Spigno*
A. Are Constitutional Courts the "Most Disparaged Branch" in the EU Constitutional
System?
When debating the constitutionalization of EU law, different views emerge regarding the
role of Constitutional Courts. Some scholars see these Courts as the institutions that, since
the 1970s, have marked turning points in the construction of the European legal system,
thanks to their case law on the protection of fundamental rights, democratic principle, and
constitutional "counter limits". Constitutional Courts have provided and can provide
invaluable inputs into the activity of the European institutions, particularly to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), so as to reconcile the national and the
supranational.1
According to other scholars, however, Constitutional Courts can be seen as "the most
disparaged branch" in the process of European integration, very often criticized for their
The articles published in this Speciallssue have been selected, presented, and discussed on the occasion of the
call for papers and the conference on The preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union by
Constitutional Courts, held at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome on 28-29 March 2014 in memory of Gabriella
Angiulli, a PhD candidate who worked on this topic at LUISS University and at the University of Siena. The
organization of the conference was possible thanks to the funds kindly provided by the Center for Parliamentary
Studies, LUISS Guido Carli University, and the invaluable support of Carmela Decaro, Tania Groppi, Nicola Lupo,
Enzo Moavero Milanesi and the contribution of the invited speakers: Thomas Beukers, Raffaele Bifulco, Eleonora
Ceccherini, Jean-Philippe Derosier, Filippo Donati, Solange Fatal, Daniele Gallo, Janek Tomasz Nowak, Alice
Pisapia, Oreste Pollicino, and Robert Schutze.
Maria Dicosola is Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law, University of Bari.
Cristina Fasone is Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law, Department of Political Science, LUISS Guido
Carli University, Rome.
Irene Spigno is Professor of Constitutional Law at the Universidad Aut6noma de Coahuila and Director of the
Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies of the Inter-American Academy of Human Rights.
1 See Marta Cartabia, Europe and Rights. Taking Dialogue Seriously, 5 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 5, 23-
29 (2009); Christoph Grabenwarter, National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union, in PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83, 95-129 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast eds., 2nd ed., 2011).
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EU-related judgments, even if they are probably the institutions whose authority has been
2
challenged most since 1957. National executives have certainly been the institutions who
gained most in terms of powers and visibility in the EU; at the same time, while national
parliaments have traditionally been depicted as the main losers in the European inter-
institutional game, their role has been partially rehabilitated by the Treaty of Lisbon, not to
mention ordinary judges, who have gained substantial powers thanks to European
integration and who are in charge of the daily enforcement of EU law. The marginalization
of Constitutional Courts in EU integration is partly attributable to structural principles of EU
law, like primacy and direct effect, along with the implementation of European human
rights law, not always in line with national constitutional provisions, and thus to elements
beyond the original control of the Courts themselves. Constitutional Courts have never
been formally involved in EU Treaty-making (although in many countries these Courts have
been involved in checking the compliance of Treaty revisions with national Constitutions),
and nor has there ever been a top-down mechanism of preliminary reference from the
CJEU to Constitutional Courts or national judges in place.
On the other hand, many Constitutional Courts have, thus far, failed to engage in a
"structured" conversation with the CJEU, by far the most active engine of the development
of EU law. Ordinary judges have become the most important interlocutors of the CJEU
through the preliminary reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU) and hence have provided
the CJEU with the most significant opportunities to deliver its judgments; this is not
certainly the case of most Constitutional Courts in Europe. Out of 18 Constitutional Courts
in the EU, only 9 have resorted to preliminary reference.4
2 The expression "most disparaged branch" - in opposition to the image of the US judiciary as the "least
dangerous branch" depicted by Alexander Bickel in 1962 - has been drawn from the title of a symposium held at
the Boston University School of Law on 14-15 November 2008, on "The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of
Congress in the Twenty-First Century" then published by the Boston University Law Review. Jan Komarek, The
Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW, 420, 421 (2013), has recently
pointed to the problem of the threat coming from EU law for the supremacy of Constitutional Courts by quoting
the words of the President of the Czech Constitutional Court, Pavel Rychetsk . Very similar concerns can be
inferred from the reports published on the website of the XVIth Congress of the Congress of European
Constitutional Courts, available at .
See Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Neo-Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European
Constitutional Order, XLIV POLITICAL STUDIES, 517, 532-533 (1996); Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of
Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary Ruling, in this Special Issue.
4 Member States with Constitutional Courts, by which it is meant institutions established outside the judicial
branch ad hoc for carrying out constitutional review of legislation, are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. They follow the Kelsenian ideal of the concentrated model of constitutional review.
In this regard, although Portugal has a mixed model of constitutional review of legislation, the Portuguese
Constitutional Court does play a centralized role insofar as all decisions of ordinary judges declaring an act
unconstitutional are usually appealed against before the Constitutional Court by the Public Prosecutor. The
Maltese Constitutional Court, in spite of the name, is part of the judiciary. The Constitutional Courts that have
used the preliminary reference procedure are those of: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovenia, and Spain.
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It must be noted, however, that even if Constitutional Courts do not use Article 267 TFEU,
for years they have been involved in a more informal dialogue with the CJEU and with
constitutional judges of other Member States, for example through the Conference of
European Constitutional Courts or through regular meetings for exchanging views and best
practice.5 By the same token, the mere fact of making a preliminary reference to the CJEU
does not imply that we witness a friendly use of this device by the Constitutional Court in
6question.
To some extent, the caution displayed by most Constitutional Courts towards engaging in a
formal and open dialogue with the CJEU is not only understandable but also reasonable.
Constitutional Courts are not courts like others. Constitutional Courts had only been
recently established - compared to century-old institutions, like legislatures, governments
and ordinary courts - entrusted with the role to enforce new and rigid Constitutions when,
either at the beginning of the process of European integration or following subsequent
accessions, they were forced to start managing EC/EU law. They did not have time to
consolidate as new institutions shaped within each national constitutional system when
they were called to apply a body of law that could potentially challenge the autonomy of
their own Constitutions.
Constitutional Courts are enabled to perform a specific task within the national
constitutional landscape - namely constitutional review of national legislation. Because of
their close relationship with the legislative branch, the validity of whose action they are
called to assess, and due to their composition and appointment structures, Constitutional
Courts are particularly sensitive to political issues. Furthermore, since these Courts are
empowered to oversee compliance with fundamental and supreme constitutional
principles, they are guardians of the constitutional identity of a polity. It is unavoidable
that their activity is deeply rooted in a specific national context.
The CJEU represents a potential threat to the legitimacy of Constitutional Courts as well as
to their very special jurisdiction. This is by no means explicitly acknowledged by the CJEU,
See Maartje De Visser & Monica Claes, Courts United? On European Judicial Networks, in LAWYERING EUROPE:
EUROPEAN LAW ASA TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD 79-80, 75 (Antoin Vauchez & Bruno De Witte, eds., 2013).
6 See Giuseppe Martinico, The "Polemical" Spirit of European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of Conflicts in
EU Law, in this Special Issue and Franz C. Mayer, Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe's Misguided Attempt to
Draw the CIEU into a Game of "Chicken" and What the CIEU Might do About It; Dagmar Schiek, The German
Federal Constitutional Court's Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) - Another Step towards National
Closure? 15 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL- Special Issue, OMT (2014).
' MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 53-74, 93-154, and 205-222 (2013).
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which deals with these courts as if they were ordinary courts of last resort. With its claims
for primacy, for uniform implementation, and for the unity of EU law, the CJEU challenges
the very assumption on which the work of Constitutional Courts is based.
Nevertheless, while constitutional conflicts between the CJEU and Constitutional Courts
are probably unavoidable, their relationship has very often been a cooperative one. To this
purpose, the reference to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States by
the CJEU, now enshrined in Article 6 TEU, is a sign of openness towards Constitutional
Courts. Likewise, the "message of war" occasionally launched by some Constitutional
Courts through the weapon of the "counter limits" doctrine has never been turned into a
proper nuclear attack.9
B. The Rise of Preliminary References by Constitutional Courts
There are many reasons as to why the past six years can be depicted as a period of deep
constitutional transformations. This should drive scholars to investigate whether and how
the preliminary reference by Constitutional Courts has undertaken crucial developments in
the formal and substantive European Constitution, by which we mean both national
constitutional law and EU constitutional law.10 Given this ongoing transformation, how can
the role of Constitutional Courts be assessed? Is it possible to find a common trend among
Constitutional Courts towards EU law? Can their recent case law be seen as a sign of their
protagonism or of their marginalization?
First of all, there is quantitative evidence. From 2008 to date, the number of Constitutional
Courts issuing preliminary references has doubled. The Constitutional Courts of France,
Germany, Italy - EU founding Member States -, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain have joined
the club." Second, there are qualitative elements - such as the entry into force of the
Eastward enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-crisis - that push towards a
8 See Enzo Cannizzaro, Rinvio pregiudiziale e Corti costituzionali nazionali, in SCRITTI IN ONORE DI GIUSEPPE TESAURO,
819 (2014). Even from a procedural point of view, when it was necessary to ascertain the priority between the
preliminary reference to the CJEU and the question prioritaire de constitutionnalite (QPC), it was the former that
prevailed over the latter: see Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R. 1-05667. See also
Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08015 and Case C-416/10, Kriian, (Jan. 15, 2013),
htt!:~cunraeu ro.eul.
By contrast, in Italy the "counter limit" doctrine has recently been used by the Constitutional Court against
international law: see decision no. 238/2014 of 22 October 2014.
10 See ROBERT SCHUTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1-8 (2012).
"The Constitutional Court of Italy issued its first preliminary reference to the CJEU in an incidental proceeding in
2013 (order no. 207/2013), while in 2008 the preliminary reference was issued in a principaliter proceeding. See
Giorgio Repetto, Pouring New Wine Into New Bottles? The Preliminary Reference to the CJEU by the Italian
Constitutional Court, in this Special Issue.
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reconfiguration of the preliminary reference's rationale. The first group of elements is
united by the time. Indeed, one can wonder why national Constitutional Courts embedded
within the EU legal system for almost sixty years have decided only now to change their
mind on the preliminary reference, thus eventually recognizing themselves more or less
explicitly as courts of last resort (Article 267(3) TFEU).
I. A Matter of "Time"
1. The Entry into Force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
The period in question is characterized by at least two "constitutional moments": the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-crisis.12 The Treaty of Lisbon entered into
force on 1 December 2009, and has in itself triggered many changes. For example, the
formal incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU primary law has given
rise to a debate about the potential expansion or limitation in the protection of rights. 13
The reference by the Spanish Constitutional Court in the Melloni case, and the saga of the
Data Retention Directive, which ended up with annulment by the CJEU upon the
preliminary references by the Irish High Court and the Austrian Constitutional Court, 14are
significant examples.
Similarly, the new national identity clause (Article 4(2) TEU), although never invoked by a
Constitutional Court as the main standard to adjudicate the validity of EU law or in seeking
the correct interpretation of EU law by the CJEU, is certainly a contended issue.1-5 The
questions of what is inside and what is outside the national identity of a Member State, of
who is entitled to decide, and of whether such a clause will increase constitutional conflicts
12 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE. FOUNDATIONS 307 (1993).
13 See Anneli Albi, Erosion of constitutional rights in EU law: A call for "substantive co-operative
constitutionalism", 9 VIENNA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (forthcoming 2015). In this Special Issue
see Ludovica Benedizione & Eleonora Paris, Preliminary Reference and Dialogue between Courts as Tools for the
Reflection on the EU Multilevel Protection of Rights. The case of the Data Retention Directive; Andreas Orator, The
Decision of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: An Instrument of
Leverage or Rearguard Action?; Miryam Rodriguez-lzquierdo Serrano, The Spanish Constitutional Court and
Fundamental Rights Adjudication After the First Preliminary Reference. In particular, since 2012 the Austrian
Constitutional Court has recognized the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a standard for constitutional review of
national legislation implementing EU law (VfSlg 19.632/2012, Decision U 466/11-18 and U 1836/11-13, of 14
March 2012). The English translation of the judgment is available at https://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-
site/attachments/9/6/0/CH0006/CMS1353421369433/grundrechtechartaenglishu466-11.pdf.
14 Case C-399/11, Melloni, (Feb. 26, 2013); Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland, (Apr. 8, 2014),
htt!://cunra.eu rora~eu.
15 The clause has been used, however, by other courts, like the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court in the
order for a preliminary reference to the CJEU in Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, 2010 E.C.R. 1-13693.
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or not remain unresolved. 1 What cannot be neglected is that since 2009, the clause forms
part of the Treaties and is sometimes invoked in the case law of Constitutional Courts as a
potential leeway against the EU's most 'oppressive' measures and judgments.
Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon has further enlarged EU competence in criminal law,
particularly as regards judicial cooperation in criminal matters. As the troublesome
implementation of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) has
already proved, this field is one of the most sensitive for Constitutional Courts; the Czech,
the German, and the Polish Constitutional Courts have, amongst others, warned about the
recourse to "counter limits" against the EAW Framework Decision. Further expansion of
EU law in this domain could trigger a reaction by Constitutional Courts and a more active
use of the preliminary reference procedure in the future, as is indicated by the first case of
a preliminary reference by the French Conseil constitutionnel.' 9
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon has opened the door to EU accession to the ECHR (Article 6(2)
TEU). Should the EU accede to the ECHR, despite the CJEU's Opinion 2/13,20 this would add
complexity to the existing legal framework of the judicial dialogue between Constitutional
Courts and European Courts. In some Member States, the already challenging relationship
between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU is perhaps even more contentious when
16 For example, while some authors see the new identity clause as a cooperative tool between the European and
national levels of government. See Barbara Guastaferro, Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts:
The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause, YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 263 (2012); Armin von Bogdandy &
Stephan Schill, Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON
MARKET LAW REVIEW 1417 (2011). Others do not share the view that the identity clause will necessarily support a
process of "pacification" in the relationship between the CJEU and national courts. See also FRAN OIS-XAVIER-
MILLET, L'UNION EUROPIENNE ET ['IDENTITI CONSTITUTIONNELLE DES ETATS MEMBRES (2013); Giuseppe Martinico, The
"Polemical" Spirit of European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of Conflicts in EU Law, in this Special Issue.
17 See Lisbon judgment of German Constitutional Court, Second Senate, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2
BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09, Judgment of 30 June 2009; the English translation is available at
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bveOO0208en.html. However, even in
the only case in which a decision of the CJEU has been declared ultra vires by a Constitutional Court - PI. US 5/12:
Slovak Pensions of 31 January 2012 -, the Czech Constitutional Court did not make any reference to Art. 4(2) TEU
and to the national identity clause. Indeed this decision has been described as "an unmeasured and poorly-
reasoned response to a domestic conflict between the Constitutional and Supreme Administrative Court" rather
than a "declaration of war against the CJEU." See Jan Komarek, Playing with matches: The Czech Constitutional
Court declares a judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU ultra vires, 8 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW, 323
(2012).
1s See MARTINICO, supra note 6.
See Jeremy F. Case, Decision n. 2013-314P QPC, of 4 April 2013; Frangois-Xavier Millet & Nicoletta Perlo, The
First Preliminary Reference of the French Constitutional Court to the CJEU: Revolution de Palais or Revolution in
French Constitutional Law?, in this Special Issue. The role of the CJEU in criminal matters, however, is subject to
limitations; for example, the CJEU cannot rule on the validity of police operations under EU law (Art. 276 TFEU).
20 Opinion 2/13, pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, (Dec. 18, 2014), http:J/curiaeuropaeu/.
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looking at constitutional judges vis-h-vis the European Court of Human Rights, because of
the lack of direct interaction between them akin to that provided by the preliminary
reference procedure. In this regard, at least at first sight, the prospective EU accession
appears to have adapted the model of the preliminary reference procedure both to the
relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU, when the EU is a
co-respondent and the CJEU has not yet had the opportunity to assess the compliance of
EU law with the ECHR and its protocols (Article 3(6) draft accession agreement); 21 and to
the relationship between a Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights
22through the mechanism of the advisory opinions (Article 1, Protocol no. 16 to the ECHR).
Although the combination of prior involvement and advisory opinion mechanism has been
considered by the CJEU as a challenge to the EU preliminary reference procedure, the need
to accommodate the trilateral relationship between Constitutional Courts, the CJEU and
the European Court of Human Rights solicits the setting up of new mechanisms that could
improve the quality - in terms of stability and effectiveness - of the interplay amongst
courts placed at different levels of government in the European constitutional system.
2. The Euro-Crisis
The second "constitutional moment" providing an input for a more active use of the
preliminary reference procedure is the Euro-crisis. Unconventional legal measures - "new
form of law" 23 - have been adopted in reaction to the Eurozone crisis, driving
Constitutional and Supreme Courts to question their compliance with existing EU Treaties,
like the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) programme announced by the European Central Bank. The latter
pushed the German Constitutional to issue its first ever preliminary reference to the CJEU
24
on 7 February 2014. By contrast, the validity of the ESM was assessed by the CJEU in the
Pringle case, upon referral by the Irish Supreme Court.25 Other Constitutional Courts - the
Austrian, the German, and the Polish ones - decided not to make a reference to the CJEU.
The urgency and complexity of the mechanisms behind the operation of the ESM and the
announcement of the OMT have proved to be a valuable test for the use of the preliminary
21 See Francesco Cherubini, The Relationship Between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
European Court of Human Rights in the View of the Accession, in this Special Issue.
22 See Maria Dicosola, Cristina Fasone, & Irene Spigno, The Prospective Role of Constitutional Courts in the
Advisory Opinion Mechanism Before the European Court of Human Rights. A First Comparative Assessment with
the European Union and the Inter-American System, in this Special Issue.
23 See Samo Bardutzky, Constitutional Courts, Preliminary Rulings and the "New Form of Law": The Adjudication of
the European Stability Mechanism, in this Special Issue.
24 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2728/13. See the judgment of the
CJEU on this referral, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others, (June 16, 2015), http://curiaeuropa.euL. See also the
Special Section: The CJEU's OMT Decision, 16 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2015).
25 Case C-370/12, Pringle, (Nov. 27, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/.
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reference procedure by Constitutional Courts and of their different reactions in spite of the
26desirability of judicial dialogue in this field. Last but not least, on 6 November 2014, the
setting up of the Banking Union, an inherent part of the EU constitutional response to the
Euro-crisis, triggered the first preliminary reference by the Constitutional Court of Slovenia
on the EU Commission's "Banking Communication".27
11. A Matter of "Space"
The second element that leads us to reconsider the tool of the preliminary reference to the
CJEU is space. The reference in the EU Treaties to the ECHR, not only with regard to EU
accession, but first of all with regard to the protection of rights, has forced us to rethink
the virtual boundaries of EU law. The fact that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
ECHR, 'shall constitute general principles of the Union's law', according to Article 6(3) TEU,
implies that the relationship between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU must be placed
within the broader context of the Council of Europe and of the European Court of Human
Rights' case law, in spite of the EU territory.
Moreover, the space that constitutes the point of reference for embarking on the Article
267 TFEU procedure on the part of Constitutional Courts was extended even prior to the
Treaty of Lisbon. Whilst in 1957 only two Member States had established Constitutional
Courts, over the years constitutional reforms and accessions to the EU have brought about
an increase in the number of Constitutional Courts established. From 2004 to 2007, the EU
Eastward enlargement brought 11 new Constitutional Courts into the European legal
space, thus expanding the "club" of EU Constitutional Courts that can potentially make a
preliminary reference to the CJEU and, in turn, the variety of constitutional traditions.
The fact that none of these new Constitutional Courts, but the Constitutional Courts of
Lithuania 28, Slovenia29 and, recently, in July 2015, Polandso have yet used the preliminary
26 See Editorial Comments, An unintended side-effect of Draghi's bazooka: An opportunity to establish a more
balanced relationship between the ECl and the Member States' highest courts, 51 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 375
(2014).
27 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support
measures in favor of banks in the context of the financial crisis ("Banking Communication"), OJEU C216/1, 30 July
2013. See the Slovenian Constitutional Court's case, Case U-1-295/13, Order of reference of 6 November 2014
(still pending before the CJEU, Case C-526/14, Kotnik and Others) and the comment by Samo Bardutzky, The first
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU by the Slovenian Constitutional Court: the case of the
Commission's Banking Communication, available on the CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE TROUGH EURO-CRISis LAw website
(2015), at
the-slovenian-constitutional-court-the-case-of-the-commissions-bankine-communication/.
28 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas case, decision no. 47/04 of 8 May 2007.
29 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Case U-1-295/13, of 6 November 2014 (note 27).
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reference device should not necessarily be regarded as an issue of concern. While some of
them, for example in the Czech Republic and Romania, have occasionally shown some
hostility towards EU law and the CJEU, they are relative newcomers in the EU and have had
to cope first with challenges that their colleagues in the Old Europe have had decades to
deal with, like building up their legitimacy, defining the status of EU law in constitutional
review of legislation, and tackling the conflict between the primacy of EU law and the
supremacy of the Constitution after the regained independence from the Soviet Union. 1
Nonetheless, that Central and Eastern European Courts share the same concerns as other
EU Constitutional Courts was confirmed by the cases of the EAW and the Data Retention
Directive. The latter case illustrates quite clearly that while the preliminary reference is not
yet an option for these Courts, the authority of the CJEU is accepted. Thus, for instance,
while the decision on the constitutionality of the Data Retention Directive's implementing
measures was pending before Constitutional Courts, awaiting the preliminary decision of
the CJEU (finally delivered on 8 April 2014), the Constitutional Court of Slovenia opted to
suspend its judgment and the Constitutional Court of Slovakia decided to postpone its
ruling until after the CJEU had its final word.
C. The Need to Improve the Quality of the Preliminary References and the Preliminary
Rulings
Some of the abovementioned transformations, in particular those deriving from the Treaty
of Lisbon, are likely to affect the content of the orders for preliminary reference addressed
to the CJEU. For example, while questions on interpretation have traditionally been much
more frequent than those on validity, the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights has made the referral of questions of validity more likely, as indicated by the CJEU
landmark judgments in the Pringle and in Data Retention cases.
Indeed, crucial elements to compare are the nature of the preliminary questions referred
by Constitutional Courts as against those coming from ordinary judges, with consideration
of whether there are any significant variations, and, if so, their content, and taking into
" Constitutional Court of Poland, Case K 61/13, of 7 July 2015; the Case C-390/15 is pending before the CJEU. The
preliminary reference originated from a constitutional complaint filed by the Polish Human Rights Defender
(Ombudsman) because the tax regime on ebooks - if compared with that on normal books - was suspected to
violate the constitutional principle of tax equality (Art. 32 of the Polish Constitution). At the same time, since the
contested tax legislation on ebooks aimed to implement the Council Directive 2006/112/EC, on the common
system of value added tax, the Polish Constitutional Court asked the CJEU whether this Directive was invalid as for
how the legislative procedure for its adoption had been carried out (first preliminary question) and/or because it
violates the principle of tax neutrality (second preliminary question). See Aleksandra Kustra, Reading the Tea
Leaves. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Preliminary Ruling Procedure, in this Special Issue.
31 WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE 45-90 (2014).
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account also constitutional case law dealing indirectly with EU law. In other words, from
the preliminary references of Constitutional Courts, as well as from what these Courts
purposely omit to do or say, it is possible to get a clearer picture of how constitutional
judges perceive themselves in their dialogue with the CJEU. What has been substantially
overlooked so far is the different attitudes shown by Constitutional Courts using the
preliminary reference tool. Indeed, the mere fact that 9 Constitutional Courts have applied
Article 267 TFEU as referring judges does not mean that they do so in like manner. The
reasoning applied, the number, the frequency and the nature (interpretation or validity) of
references, as well as the fields in which a preliminary reference is issued can make a
difference. The attitude of the Constitutional Courts depends on the strategy they pursue,
for instance as regards the message they want to send to ordinary courts via a preliminary
reference procedure.
The quality of the preliminary references issued by Constitutional Courts could be
improved through a process of mutual learning in which Constitutional Courts and the
CJEU consider how to make their dialogue more effective. Increased effectiveness here
means both enhancing the clarity of the questions raised and reducing, as a consequence,
the workload of the CJEU by means of "pilot judgments" 32- in addition to keep on applying
the long standing CILFIT doctrine. By receiving a lower number of preliminary questions,
but ones which are more carefully drafted and which provide the CJEU with viable
solutions to the case, the CJEU would be enabled to focus on the most relevant and new
issues. At the same time, the input for these "pilot judgments" should come from
Constitutional Courts. For if Constitutional Courts were willing to set the path for CJEU
judgments on the constitutional substance of EU law (e.g., on the protection of
fundamental rights and the enforcement of the Charter), with these in turn being followed
by ordinary judges, then there could be positive outcomes for both Constitutional Courts
and the CJEU. Constitutional Courts could thereby break the almost exclusive relationship
between ordinary judges and the CJEU, from which they have voluntarily remained at the
margins; the CJEU, meanwhile, would be asked to judge a lower number of cases, but with
these cases being of greatest constitutional significance. The CJEU would, moreover, be
judging these cases on the basis of a set of possible answers already provided by
Constitutional Courts.
For a long time, the CJEU has advocated the use of a "green light procedure" when dealing
with preliminary questions.34 This procedure allows for swift conclusion of the case. It
32 See Koen Lenaerts, The Unity of European Law and the Overload of the CJEU - The System of Preliminary Rulings
Revisited, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 211, 212 (Ingolf Pernice et al.,
eds., 2005).
Case C-283/81, CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanita, 1982 E.C.R. 03415.
34 See CJEU, Information Note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling, OJ C 143/1 of 11 June
2005, para. 23, and CJEU, Information Note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling, OJ C
297/1 of 5 December 2009, para. 23; more recently the Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European
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means that when the referring court drafts a preliminary question, it also foresees an
answer to it, to which the CJEU can, if it agrees, simply give a "green light". If the CJEU does
not agree with the proposed answer, then it should provide detailed explanations and
reasons as to why alternative solutions are necessary.
Whilst the use of the "green light procedure" is not mandatory, it is recommended as an
option to establish a mutually beneficial dialogue between the CJEU and national courts.3S
A good illustration of a constructive use of this procedure was the referral of the Spanish
Constitutional Court in the Melloni case in 2011.36 On that occasion, the Constitutional
Court offered the CJEU many different and possible interpretations. It offered also what
could appear as the preferred solution: the interpretation of the Framework Decision on
the EAW in conformity with Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution and the right to defence,
which could prevail over the protection offered by Articles 47 and 48 of the EU Charter.
This proposed interpretation was, however, disregarded by the CJEU in the name of the
primacy and the unity of EU law.
By contrast, an example of uncooperative, if not coercive, use of the "green light
procedure" by a Constitutional Court is provided by the German Constitutional Court's
referral to the CJEU on the OMT. The German Constitutional Court offered a pre-packed
solution to the CJEU:37 it seems that either the CJEU had to buy the German Constitutional
Court's interpretation of EU law or it is considered to act ultra vires by the German
38Constitutional Court likewise the ECB has been accused to do. This testifies that what
appears to be an inherently cooperative mechanism, like the preliminary reference
procedure, can be used in many ways, and can even be turned into an instrument of
conflict. This requires a careful assessment of the implications that stem from different
Union, to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, OJ C 338/1 of
6 November 2012, para. 24. The proposal for using the 'green light procedure' has also been supported in a
Report by the Association of the Councils of State and of the Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU in
2007, available at httD://wwwiuradmin.eu/seminrs/DenHaa2007/Final rer~rtidf. See Daniel Sarmiento,
Amending the Preliminary Reference Procedure for the Administrative Judge, 2 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 29, 34 (2009). Even the European Parliament "urges consideration of a <<green light) system." See the
European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2008 on the role of the national judge in the European judicial system,
para. 31.
MORTEN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCESTOTHE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 28 (2nd ed.
2014) (Pointing out that there are many different forms of "green light procedure," up to the point of allowing the
referring Court to send a draft judgment to the CJEU that becomes final after a certain time limit.).
36 Although not the follow up of the CJEU decision. See RODRIGUEZ-IZQUIERDO SERRANO, supra note 13.
See Thomas Beukers, The Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Reference on the OMT Program: "In the ECB
We Do Not Trust. WhatAbout You?", 15 GERMAN LAWJOURNAL-Special Issue, OMT 343, 344 (2014).
It remains to be seen what will be the reception of the CJEU judgment, Case C-64/12 (note 24) by the German
Constitutional Court in its final decision expected in December 2015.
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modes of handling Article 267 TFEU.
D. The Background and Content of the Special Issue
Whilst the topic of preliminary references to the CJEU by the highest jurisdictions is
certainly not new,40 a comprehensive study of its management by Constitutional Courts of
the EU Member States in the current period of 'constitutional turbulence' is lacking. These
issues would have been addressed by Gabriella Angiulli in her PhD dissertation entitled The
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union by Constitutional
41Courts, which unfortunately she did not have the opportunity to complete. Hence, in her
memory and with a view to keeping her contribution alive and developing her research
further, a conference on the topic was organized at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome
on 28-29 March 2014, aiming to foster the scholarly debate on a topical, though often
overlooked, subject-matter in European and constitutional law. The attempt of this Special
Issue is to bring together expert scholars from different Member States on this matter in
order to analyze the developments that have occurred in the case law of Constitutional
Courts, the approach of these Courts in relation to the preliminary reference procedure,
and the CJEU from the standpoint of national constitutional law in the light of the
transformations that have occurred in the European constitutional system over the past
few years.
The Special Issue is devised as follows. Following an introduction based on a comparative
analysis of the status quo and the potential of the use of the preliminary reference by
Constitutional Courts (Monica Claes), Part One is devoted to the multilevel system of
constitutional adjudication in which Constitutional Courts are requested to act so as to
include the national level, the EU, and the system of the ECHR. The analysis begins with an
assessment of the role of the preliminary reference procedure in the hands of
Constitutional Courts to cope with constitutional conflicts (Giuseppe Martinico), proceeds
to focus on the relationship between the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights in
view of the accession (Francesco Cherubini), and ends with a comparison of the role of
Monica Claes, Luxembourg, Here We Come? Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference Procedure, in
this Special Issue.
40 THE EUROPEAN COURTAND NATIONAL COURTS - DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet
and Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 1998); MONICA CLAEs, THE NATIONAL COURTS' MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
(2006); GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE's LEGAL SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE
AND THE CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS (2012); CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE: ACTORS, TOPICS AND
PROCEDURES (Monica Cleas, Maartje De Visser, Patricia Popelier etal. eds., 2013).
41 Gabriella Angiulli, 11 rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea do parte dei Giudici
costituzionali degli Stati membri, available at h11p:/www.gru odi isaitw -
content/upIoads/2011/05/SIENA Scuoa dottorale in -Diritto -ed -econopmia.lf (2011).
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Constitutional Courts in the prospective advisory opinion mechanism before the European
Court of Human Rights, the preliminary references procedure in the EU, and the advisory
opinion mechanism of the American Convention on Human Rights (Maria Dicosola, Cristina
Fasone, and Irene Spigno).
Part Two of the special issue is devoted to long-standing or (newly) stabilized relationships
between the CJEU and Constitutional Courts. It presents assessments of the cases of
Austria (Andreas Orator), Italy (Giorgio Repetto), and France (Frangois-Xavier Millet &
Nicoletta Perlo).
Part Three deals with Constitutional Courts that have referred preliminary questions to the
CJEU and that pose the most challenging questions in terms of how to conceive of their
constitutional role in the EU. This challenge may arise because of the subject matters
covered and the way the referral has been managed, as in the case of the German
Constitutional Court (Eva Lohse), the Spanish Constitutional Court (Miryam Rodriguez-
lzquierdo Serrano), and the Polish Constitutional Court (Aleksandra Kustra), the latest
newcomer in the cohort of referring Courts, on the very sensitive issue of taxation for the
EU-Member States relationships. Or it may stem from the contested institutional role
undertaken, and irrespective of whether this role could be fully compared to a
Constitutional Court or not, as in the case of the UK Supreme Court (Alessia Fusco).
Part Four analyzes the cases of Constitutional Courts that have not yet issued a preliminary
reference to the CJEU, but whose "silence" on this point is equally telling about the
approach they adopt. It is particularly so if it is read in the light of the case law of these
courts on the primacy of EU law and on those providing alternative solutions and
explanations to the referral of preliminary questions. The Constitutional Courts considered
in this Part are those of Hungary (Fruzsina Gdrdos-Orosz), Bulgaria (Mihail Vatsov), and
Romania (Viorica Vit6).
Part Five includes a series of comparative analyses of how Constitutional Courts perceive
their role in the "dialogue" with the CJEU (Pierre-Vincent Astresses) and on their use of the
preliminary reference procedure in crucial sectors. These areas include the challenging
relationship between these Courts and ordinary highest Courts (Clelia Lacchi), the Data
Retention Directive (Ludovica Benedizione & Eleonora Paris), and the ESM Treaty (Samo
Bardutzky).
In the final paper, new questions about the use of the preliminary reference tool by
Constitutional Courts are put forward and lead to a depiction of "Europe" as a space of
constitutional interdependence (Marta Cartabia).
1329
German Law Journal Vol. 16 No. 061330
Luxembourg, Here We Come?
Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference Procedure
By Monica Claes*
A. Introduction
As is well known, Constitutional Courts have for a long time been reluctant to use the
preliminary reference procedure and to "engage in a formal dialogue" with the European
Court of Justice (CJEU).' Several explanations have been put forward for this reluctance,
some of which have been found in legal arguments, others in behavioral factors. The initial
refusal of the Italian, French, and Spanish Constitutional Courts is illustrative of the former
type of arguments. The Italian Corte costituzionale has, for a while, denied that it qualified
as a 'court or tribunal' in the sense of the Treaties, since it exercised special functions of
constitutional review, guaranteeing that the Constitution was observed by the Italian state
and sub-state bodies and institutions.2 Similarly, the French Conseil constitutionnel most
likely did not consider itself an ordinary court of European law, given its peculiar position in
the French legal order and its a-typical competences to review legislation only a priori and
outside any case or controversy. In addition, the Conseil acts under very short and strict
time limits, which for a long time excluded any references to the CJEU. Its conception of a
strict division between its responsibilities (to review the constitutionnalit6 of legislation)
and those of the ordinary courts (to review their conventionnalitd) made it highly unlikely
Professor of European and Comparative Constitutional Law, Maastricht University.
1 will here use the notion of "Constitutional Court" in a limited sense, referring only to those specialized
"kelsenian" courts that have been established with a view to reviewing the constitutionality of primary legislation,
and excluding those highest or supreme courts that have jurisdiction to review questions of constitutionality, in
addition to their function of supreme court of legality, such as the Irish Supreme Court, the Cypriot Supreme Court
or the Danish Hojesteret, even though they too are members of the Conference of European Constitutional
Courts. In the EU, the following courts qualify: the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, the Belgian Cour
constitutionnelle, the Bulgarian constitutional court, the Croatian Ustavnisud, the Czech Ostavnisoud, the French
Conseil constitutionnel, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Hungarian Kbzt6rsas6g Alkotm6nybir6s6ga,
the Italian Corte costituzionale, the Latvian Satversmes tiesa, the Lithuanian Konstitucinis Teismas, the
Luxembourg Cour constitutionnelle, the Polish Trybunal Konstytucyjny, the Portugese Tribunal Constitucional, the
Romanian Curtea Constitufionald, the Slovakian Ostavny sud, the Slovenian Ustavno Sodike, and the Spanish
Tribunal Constitucional, totaling a number of 18 specialized constitutional courts, or possibly 19 if one includes
also the Maltese Constitutional Court. Interestingly, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts has
admitted in 2014 the Dutch Hoge Road, which does not have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of
primary legislation.
2 See Corte costituzionale, decision 13/1960 of 16 March 1960 and decision 536/1995 of 29 December 1995.
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that it would make a reference. The same argument has been put forward in the context of
the Spanish Tribunal constitucional, which has always left EU law to the ordinary courts,
whilst concerning itself only with reviewing the constitutionality of Spanish laws.
The behavioral explanations are usually concerned with allegations of "judicial ego",3
"judicial jealousy", and of courts being protective of their own position of "highest court"
of the land.4 Constitutional Courts have supposedly been reluctant to make use of the
procedure, because making a reference implies a voluntary subjection to the authority of
an external court, given that it must be presumed that the sender of the question will
consider itself bound by the answer. That is the consequence of playing by the rules.s
Constitutional Courts would avoid such a situation. Instead, some of them have insisted
that ordinary courts act on their obligation to make references, with some even making it a
constitutional obligation. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for instance, made it a
breach of the constitutional right to a lawful judge for a highest German court not to make
a reference without explanation. As a result, making references and engaging with the
CJEU was a constitutional obligation imposed on the other courts, not on the
Constitutional Courts.
For a long time, Constitutional Courts could thus stay out of the game, but at the same
time, they had to watch the ordinary courts apply EU law and engage with the CJEU.
Engaging with EU law and with the CJEU comes with the mandate to review national law
and makes all courts review courts, thus empowering them. Ordinary courts become
competitors to Constitutional Courts. Sometimes, lower courts have used EU law and the
preliminary reference procedure to challenge decisions of higher domestic courts,
Famously, see Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial: Judicial Ego, 9 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 1-4 (2011).
4 Of course, the CJEU has on several occasions exhibited similar signs of a tendency to jealously guard its
competences and of "judicial ego", as most recently in Opinion 2/13 on accession to the ECHR (Opinion 2/13,
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/). See generally Bruno De Witte, A
selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the design of international dispute settlement beyond the European Union,
in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 33 (Marise Cremona &
Anne Thies eds., 2013).
It is obvious that what the Bundesverfasssungsgericht did in its referral on the OMT, reserving the right not to
follow the decision of the CJEU and declare the OMT not applicable in Germany, even if the CJEU would save the
decision under EU law, is in clear breach of the system as set out in the Treaties.
This has not been the case for those supreme courts that have jurisdiction to conduct constitutional review, such
as the Irish High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court or the Danish Hojesteret, or for highest courts that,
while not having jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of national law strictly speaking, come close
substantially, such as the UK Supreme Court, the Estonian Riigikohus or the Dutch Hoge Road and Road van State.
They do regularly make references including also on questions that could be termed "constitutional", such as
fundamental rights issues.
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including also Constitutional Courts. For a long time, however, EU law was for the most
part not concerned so much with the main business of Constitutional Courts, such as
fundamental rights protection or complex societal issues, but rather with free movement
and technical issues of economic law. During that time, an "unofficial" division could
accordingly be made between the business of Constitutional Courts and that of EU law.
With the entrance of EU law into fields that used to be those of Constitutional Courts,
especially fundamental rights, this became more and more problematic, since it meant
that Constitutional Courts could become sidelined in their own core business. This is
particularly evident in the cases of France and Belgium, be it that in those countries, the
competition between the Constitutional Courts and the ordinary supreme courts (Cours de
cassation and Conseils d'htat) over the final say in the area of fundamental rights
protection mostly concerned the ECHR and the Constitution.
This should not be taken to mean that national constitutional issues never reached
Luxembourg: they were often referred by ordinary courts, as in Intern ationale
Handelsgesellschaft, Simmenthal, Michaniki, Landtovd, or X, Y, Z v Statssecretaris van
Veiligheid en Justitie and many more.8 After all, it is not only Constitutional Courts that are
confronted with "constitutional issues."
The above should also not be taken to mean that Constitutional Courts have had no
business at all with EU law. Quite on the contrary: While they may have left the routine
application of EU law to the ordinary courts, they have played a key role in designing the
European legal space, in regulating the relations between the national and the European
legal orders, and in addressing the more systemic legal and constitutional issues of
European integration. This role of the Constitutional Courts can be further sub-divided into
a number of different and sometimes competing roles that they play within the overall
European legal space.9 First, Constitutional Courts have facilitated the process of European
legal integration, by allowing for accession and for the ratification of European Treaties,
and by anchoring European law within the national legal order. In doing so, they have
often had to develop new conceptions of the relations between national and international
law, to reinterpret old concepts such as sovereignty to adapt to the circumstances of
' A recent example of the latter situation is the reference made by the Czech Highest Administrative Court in the
Slovak pensions case, leading to the Landtov6 decision of the CJEU: Case C-399/09, Landtova, 2011 E.C.R. 1-5573.
On the feud between the Czech courts and the involvement of the CJEU therein see Michal Bobek, Landtov6,
Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court: Implications for the Preliminary Rulings Procedure, 10 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 54, 54-89 (2014).
8 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629;
Case C-465/11, Michaniki, 2012 E.C.R. 801; Case C-399/09, Landtova, 2011 E.C.R. 1-5573; Case C-148/13, C-
149/13 and C-150/13, A, B and C v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2014 E.C.R. 2406.
This point is further developed in Monica Claes & Bruno De Witte, The Role of National Constitutional Courts in
the European Legal Space, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A CONTEXT OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 79-104 (Patricia Popelier,
Armen Mazmanyan, & Werner Vandenbruwaene eds., 2012).
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membership, and to make it possible for EU law to be applied directly and with priority
over conflicting national law. In many cases, the Constitutional Courts have convinced the
ordinary courts to accept their European mandate to apply EU law, even if this has entailed
a shift in their traditional constitutional position.10 In this respect, therefore, Constitutional
Courts can be said to have been "Euro-friendly" and cooperative with the CJEU.
Second, Constitutional Courts have also contributed constructively to the
constitutionalization of Europe, by feeding the principles and values of constitutionalism
into EU law, thus acting as catalysts for rather than as obstacles to European integration.
Constitutional Courts have thus contributed to the development of a "common European
constitutional heritage", most conspicuously in the area of fundamental rights protection.
According to common wisdom, the CJEU developed its fundamental rights jurisprudence
on the instigation of the German and Italian Constitutional Courts, who were unwilling to
unconditionally accept the primacy of European law as long as the EU did not have an
adequate system of fundamental rights protection of its own. While this line of Solange
and "contro limiti" cases has often been interpreted as Euro-skeptic, on a broader view of
the constitutionalization of Europe as developing European constitutionalism, national
Constitutional Courts should be seen as the CJEU's natural allies, rather than its enemies.
European courts and national Constitutional Courts share the responsibility of protecting
fundamental rights and basic principles and values against governments, political
institutions, and the administration. Together, they are the guardians of the values of
constitutionalism in Europe.
Third, and despite the friendly picture just painted, Constitutional Courts do still retain
their constitutional mandate to uphold the Constitution: to defend the values of
constitutionalism as laid down in the national Constitution, to protect the rights of
individuals under the national Constitution, and for some, to protect the State and
statehood itself, as well as the sovereignty, identity, and primacy of the national
Constitution. In other words, these courts do not, on this view, act to protect
'constitutionalism' itself, but rather a particular version and form thereof: national
democracy, national fundamental rights, the national perception of what the limits of
European integration are and should be, and the national version of what should be
essential to the national society. This has led them to develop various doctrines imposing
10 Take, for example, the French Conseil constitutionnel convincing the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d'Etat
that the review in the light of EU law did not amount to a review of the constitutionality and was therefore
something they could, and should, do under the (re-interpreted) French Constitution; or the decision of the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht accepting, without any hesitation and despite the dualist traditions, that the
ordinary German courts could directly apply EU law, thereby even setting aside conflicting national law, even if
this meant that they would challenge the monopoly formerly held by the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
11 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 [hereinafter
Solonge /]; 22 Oct. 1986, 16 BVerfGE 73, 339 [hereinafter Solonge /l]; Corte costituzionale, Sentenza of 18
December 1973, n. 183/73, Frontini.
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limits on the effect of EU law in the domestic legal order, typically in three main areas:
fundamental rights review, competence review (ultra vires review) and, more recently,
identity review and democracy review.12 In this respect, the Constitutional Courts do
challenge EU law and the CJEU's case law, which does not endorse such national and
unilateral reservations to the application of EU law. And yet, it is mainly in these situations
of possible constitutional conflict that Constitutional Courts have announced that should
the day come that they will act on their retained jurisdiction to review EU law, they will
make a reference for a preliminary ruling or will at the very least make sure that a
reference is made by ordinary courts involved in the case. The Bundesverfassungsgericht,
for instance, has recognised the primary role of the CJEU in the framework of fundamental
rights protection and it has indicated that it would make a reference before declaring a
measure ultra vires.13 In the Gauweiler decision on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT),
it has acted on that promise.14
The relationship between national Constitutional Courts and the CJEU is thus a highly
complex one that cannot be captured in a simple pro- or anti-European matrix, and should
not be seen exclusively in terms of "conflict" or "cold war": Constitutional Courts and the
CJEU are not simply pitted against each other. Moreover, the relationship between the
CJEU and national Constitutional Courts is part of broader and highly complex political and
legal dynamics and processes, with Constitutional Courts engaging with various actors at
different levels: legislatures, parliaments, and governments, and various layers of
government in systems of territorial division. The CJEU, in turn, engages with the European
institutions and the Member States acting through their governments, as well as the
parties to the cases brought before it, national institutions, and the wider audience.
12 According to Peter M. Huber, currently a member of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the "democratic principle"
and "the sovereignty of the people" have since the 1990s become the new Archimedic point of the German
court's case law, as concerns over fundamental rights have decreased. In his view, "the concretization of the
democratic principle by Article 20 (1) and (2) GG comprises two central ideas. First, the German concept of
democracy substantially amounts to the proposition that the principle of democracy and the sovereignty of the
people (Article 20(1) and (2) GG) are based on the individual right to political self-determination which itself is
based on human dignity (Article 1(1) GG). (...) Second, though based on the guarantee of human dignity in Article
1 (1) GG, which is applicable to every man and every woman, the Grundgesetz itself, as a constitution of a nation
state and like most other European constitutions reserves - with some exceptions for EU citizens at the level of
local communities - democratic participation to German citizens." And "the concept of democracy as described
above is not only laid down in Art. 20(1) and (2) GG but it is part of the constitutional identity in terms of Art.
79(3) GG and therefore inalienable for the ordinary and the constitution amending legislator, as well as for the
legislator in European affairs." It is obvious thus that the Bundesverfassungsgericht protects German democracy
and German human dignity in its political form. See P. M Huber, The Federal Constitutional Court and European
Integration, 21 EUR. PUB. L. 83-108 (2015).
1s Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339 and Order of 7 June 2000, BVerfGE 102, 147 (Bananenmarktordnung); Order of 6
July 2010, BVerfGE 126, 286 (Honeywell). The Bundesverfassungsgericht has regularly spoken of a
"Kooperationsverhliltnis" with the CJEU.
14 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13.
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More recently, Constitutional Courts have been considered as being "gradually
marginalized" by the CJEU's case law.'s On this analysis, it is not national parliaments, but
Constitutional Courts, who are the losers of European integration. Jan Komdrek has even
spoken of a "doctrine of displacement" of the CJEU, with national Constitutional Courts
being removed from their place in constitutional law and politics, and with ordinary courts
instead acting in cooperation with the CJEU. Komdrek calls on national Constitutional
Courts to be more cautious when accepting their "European mandate" too readily, as
manifested in some recent decisions. 1 There may be some truth in this. But, as Komdrek
agrees in the end, it seems that 'constitutionalism' is best served when all actors
participate in the process, including also Constitutional Courts who should refer questions
for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. For instance, had the questions challenging the validity
of the Data Retention Directive been referred to the CJEU earlier, so that it could have
reviewed the directive in the light of fundamental rights, rather than Constitutional Courts
limiting their review to the exercise of discretion left to the national institutions, would the
CJEU not have had the occasion to declare the directive invalid a long time ago, to the
benefit of our rights to privacy and data protection?
B. Talking to the European Court of Justice
As much as it requires nuance that Constitutional Courts have not engaged with EU law, it
would be an overstatement to say that Constitutional Courts have not engaged at all with
the CJEU. They have, but usually not by using the channel of the preliminary reference
procedure. Rather, they have done so in their decisions, sending (sometimes) dark signals,
15 Jan Komarek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 420 (2013); Jan Komarek,
National Constitutional Courts in the European Constitutional Democracy, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 525 (2014). See
Marc Bossuyt & Willem Verrijdt, The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France
after the Melki Judgment, 7 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 355 (2011); Anneli Albi, Erosion of constitutional rights in EU law:A
call for "substantive co-operative constitutionalism", 9 VIENNA J. INT'L CONST. L. (forthcoming 2015); Anneli Albi,
From the Banana saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond: Could the Post-communist Constitutional Courts Teach the EU
a Lesson in the Rule of Law?, COMMON MKT. L. REV. 791 (2012).
16 KOMAREK, supra note 15.
17 Of course, the context has changed dramatically since then, but still. For a comment on the decision, see Orla
Lynskey, The Data Retention Directive is incompatible with the rights to privacy and data protection and is invalid
in its entirety: Digital Rights Ireland, Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitlinger and
others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, nyr, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1789
(2014). On the Data Retention Directive before national Constitutional Courts, see Eleni Kosta, The way to
Luxembourg: national Court decisions on the compatibility of the Data Retention Directive with the rights to
privacy and data protection, 10 SCRIPTED 339 (2013); Ludovica Benedizione & Eleonora Paris, Preliminary
Reference and Dialogue between Courts as Tools for the Reflection on the EU Multilevel Protection of Rights. The
case of the Data Retention Directive, in this Special Issue. For a strong plea in favor of Constitutional Courts using
the preliminary reference procedure to act as agents rather than recipients of the European constitutional
construction, see Marta Cartabia, Europe and rights: taking dialogue seriously, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 5 (2009).
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expressing their expectations of the Court, and agreeing or disagreeing with the directions
it has taken. The CJEU is very well aware of the case law of the Constitutional Courts, as the
bulletin Reflets, produced by the Courts' DG Library, Research and Documentation,
containing abstracts of decisions of Constitutional Courts (and other national courts as well
as the ECtHR) clearly shows. Members of the CJEU regularly participate in the events of the
Conference of European Constitutional Courts. There are regular visits from the CJEU to
Constitutional Courts and vice versa. Members of Constitutional Courts and of the CJEU
often take part in academic debates, as judges or as law professors, and meet at academic
conferences or engage with each other in academic writings. And quite a few members of
the CJEU have, before or after their appointment to Luxembourg, served as constitutional
judges. So, it is fair to say that there is quite a bit of mutual engagement taking place. But
what has been missing, and is still the exception rather than the rule today, is indeed the
use of the preliminary reference procedure. With all its imperfections, the preliminary
reference procedure offers a couple of unique qualities that "hidden" or "silent" dialogues
do not. The procedure forces national courts to submit constitutional arguments to the
CJEU, to make it more aware of constitutional sensitivities, and to urge it to argue its
decisions carefully (or so one would expect). Moreover, and of no less importance, the use
of the procedure brings hidden and informal conversations out into the open, to the
benefit of constitutional deliberations and negotiations, both at the European level and
nationally.
C. Enter the Preliminary Reference Procedure
As is well known, the Belgian Constitutional Court was the first Kelsenian court to make a
reference to the CJEU, and is until today by far the most regular user of the procedure,
with twenty-six references to its name thus far. That Court never seems to have made an
issue of it: it merely assumed that it qualified as a court in the sense of the Treaties, and
made its first reference in a case of limited constitutional importance.19 Neither the CJEU
nor its Advocate General made mention of the fact that it was a Constitutional Court
making a reference; perhaps they even did not fully realize, given that the Constitutional
Court still went under its old name of "court of arbitration." So, the Belgian Constitutional
Court's entrance onto the preliminary reference scene was smooth and painless. Many
18 The website of the Constitutional Court has a special section on "preliminary references to the Court of Justice,"
which lists twenty-six references; the CJEU Annual Report 2013 counts twenty-eight references. The first
references dates from 1997.
19 The questions arose in the context of an annulment action against a decree of the Flemish Community relating
to specific training in general medical practice, adopted primarily in order to transpose the provisions of Title IV of
Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to the Flemish Community. The Constitutional Court asked about the
correct interpretation of the directive, in order to be able to assess the issue of constitutionality, Cour
constitutionnelle (Belgium), decision 6/97 of 19 February 1997, Federation Belge des Chambres Syndicales de
Medecins ASBL v. Flemish Government, Government of the French Community, Council of Minister (Training in
general medical practice).
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explanations can be put forward as to this. It is a young and unpretentious Constitutional
Court, which was established after the Belgian Cour de cassation had developed Belgian-
style monism inspired by the European Court's van Gend en Loos, Costa v. ENEL, and
Simmenthal case law.20 The court was not, like, for instance, its counterparts in Italy,
Germany, and France, involved in the "design phase." EU law was already considered to be
part of the law of the land, and it was natural for the Cour constitutionnelle to apply it,
both as a standard for review and as applicable law. In fact, given its initially restricted
jurisdiction, applying EU and ECHR law implied an empowerment, at least as much as it had
been for the ordinary courts. Participating in the application of EU law thus was a natural
thing to do, and prevented the Court from being sidelined. Making references to the CJEU
was the next logical step. This should not be taken to imply that the Belgian Constitutional
Court "slavishly follows" Luxembourg, and makes references whenever EU law is involved;
it carefully chooses its cases, applies the CILFIT doctrine to reject requests for references,
and has at times refused to ask questions which may well have been called for under EU
law.21 The Court has asked questions on interpretation and validity alike, simply to be able
to apply EU law correctly, or to challenge the validity of EU law (which could be together
termed the "regular use of the procedure"). Sometimes, it has an ulterior motive, for
instance to outsource tricky questions concerning sensitive societal and political issues
22
which it is unable or unwilling to solve on its own. But overall, the Court seems rather
23
comfortable with the procedure.
The Austrian Verfassungsgerichthof has referred five preliminary references since 1999.
Unlike the Belgian Cour constitutionnelle, it does not consider EU law to serve as a
24 2 5standard for its own constitutional review, but in some cases it merely applies EU law.
In these instances, the Verfassungsgerichthof considers itself bound by Article 267(3)
20 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 English Special Edition, 1; Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, 1964 English Special
Edition, 1129; Case 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
21 See Elke Cloots, Germs of pluralist judicial adjudication: Advocaten voor de Wereld and other references from
the Belgian Constitutional Court, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645 (2010).
22 Cases in point are the Flemish Care Insurance Case, Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium), decision 51/2006 of 19
April 2006; Case C-212/06 Government of Communaute frangaise and Gouvernement wallon v Gouvernement
flamand, 2008 E.R.C. 1-01683, and Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium), decision 2009/11 of 21 January 2009; and the
Libert case, Cour constitutionnelle(Belgium) decision 49/2011 of 06 April 2011; Joined Cases C-197/11 and C-
203/11, Libert v Flemish Government; Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium), 144/2013 of 7 November 2013.
23 See also the report submitted by the Belgian Cour constitutionnelle to the XVIth Congress of the Conference of
European Constitutional Courts on Co-operation of Constitutional Courts in Europe - Current Situation and
Perspectives, available at www.confeuconstco.org.
24 But see the recent position on the Charter, explained below.
25 On the distinction between EU law as "standard of review" and EU law as applicable law, see Reinhard
Klaushofer & Rainer Palmstorfer, Austrian Constitutional Court Uses Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union as Standard of Review: Effects on Union Law, EUR. PUB. L. 1 (2013).
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TFEU.26 In a 2012 asylum case, however, the Verfassungsgerichthof held that all this was
different for the EU Charter: unlike the rest of EU law, the Charter is a standard for its own
constitutional review, as it would be inconsistent if the court that reviewed whether
constitutional and ECHR rights were respected could not do so with respect to Charter
27
rights. In those situations too, the Court will, where appropriate, make preliminary
references to the CJEU, but it will not do so if a constitutionally guaranteed right, especially
an ECHR right, has the same scope of application as a Charter right. In such a case, the
Constitutional Court will base its decision on the Austrian Constitution without making a
reference to the CJEU. So, despite the fact that the Austrian Verfassungsgericht, by purely
28
numerical standards, seems to be one of the most cooperative Constitutional Courts, and
despite the praise it received from the former EU Commissioner for Fundamental Rights,
Viviane Reding, its positions on the preliminary reference procedure and on the application
29
of EU law and the Charter are at least questionable from an EU perspective. In A v. B and
Others, the CJEU corrected the Verfassungsgericht at the request of the Oberster
Gerichtshof, confirming that ordinary courts must always be free to make a reference to
the CJEU and that an obligation to first make a reference to the constitutional court
violates EU law.3 o
The Lithuanian Konstitucinis Teismas (1 in 2007), the Italian Corte costituzionale (2, in 2008
and 2013),31 the Spanish Tribunal constitucional (1 in 2011), the French Conseil
constitutionnel (1 in 2013), the Slovenian Ustavno Sodike (1 in 2013) and the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht (1 in 2014, pending) have also made references. So whereas the
Belgian and, to a lesser extent perhaps, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, make regular
use of the procedure as it was designed in the Treaties, the other references are very
recent and almost accidental. Some commentators have interpreted the recent references
as the beginning of a new era of "real constitutional dialogue," ending the reluctance of
26 See id. at 1-11; Andreas Orator, The Decision of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights: An Instrument of Leverage or Rearguard Action?, in this Special Issue.
27Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, 14 March 2012, U 466/11-18 and U 1836/11.
28 Even though this is relative, of course the Verfassungsgerichtshof decides 5,000 to 6,000 cases per year.
29 Viviane Reding, Observations on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the future of the European Union,
speech to the XXV Congress of FIDE, Tallinn, 31 May 2012.
'0 Case C-112/13, A v B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. 1-2195
"1 Corte costituzionale, Order nos. 102 and 103 of 2008; Order no. 207 of 3 July 2013. On these cases see Stefano
Civitarese Matteucci, The Italian Constitutional Court Strengthens the Dialogue with the European Court of Justice
Lodging for the First Time a Preliminary Ruling in an Indirect ("Incidenter") Proceeding, 20 EUR. PUB. L. 633 (2014);
Giacinto Della Cananea, The Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice: From Separation to
Interaction?, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 523 (2008); Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico, Between Procedural
Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the
European Court of Justice, 16 EUR. L. J. 345 (2010).
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Constitutional Courts towards European integration. This is often attributed to the new
binding force of the EU Charter, which shifts the balance between the European courts,
Constitutional Courts, and ordinary courts, and which forces Constitutional Courts to enter
the arena in order to avoid being sidelined. So, is this a turning point? Are Constitutional
Courts developing a new strategy, pushed by the entry into force of the Charter?
On closer analysis, it seems that what is happening is more mundane, and is rather a
consequence of the ever-wider reach of EU law, and the particular circumstances of the
relevant cases, rather than a revolutionary change of mentality of these courts. After all,
32there are still many missing players. The change is more incremental, and almost
accidental, but it does seem promising.
It is fair to assume that as a consequence of its scope entering the domain of fundamental
rights protection, but also the fields of criminal law, asylum, sensitive societal and ethical
questions, and the EU's actions to tackle the crisis, EU law has reached the "habitat" of
Constitutional Courts more than before, and that it has become difficult for them to
maintain their position of "splendid isolation." The unofficial division between
"constitutionality" and "EU law" is no longer tenable. The entry into force of the Charter
cannot, however, offer the sole plausible explanation. Some of the new referring courts
made their first reference prior to the entry into force of the Charter (the Lithuanian and
Italian Courts), and while several of the most recent cases did indeed concern fundamental
rights issues (the Spanish Melloni case and the French Jeremy F. case), others did not (the
Lithuanian reference, the Italian first reference, and the Gauweiler reference of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht). In several cases, the referring courts are "merely" asking
questions on the correct interpretation of EU law, in order to be able to answer fairly "run-
of-the mill" cases (such as the Lithuanian reference).
In several instances, the reference was used to challenge the validity of EU law, as was the
case in Advocatenvoor de Wereld (on the European Arrest Warrant), Tests-Achats, the
references on the Data Retention Directive, and Melloni. In these cases too, Constitutional
Courts made "ordinary use" of the preliminary reference procedure, which allows all
courts to challenge the validity of EU law. More research is needed into the actual practice
of the preliminary reference procedure by Constitutional Courts, but at first sight, it shows
a wide range of questions and of reasons for making a reference.
32 See the following in this Special Issue: Fruzsina Gardos-Orosz, Preliminary Reference and the Hungarian
Constitutional Court: A Context of Non-Reference; Aleksandra Kustra, Reading the Tea Leaves. The Polish
Constitutional Tribunal and Preliminary Ruling Procedure; Mihail Vatsov, European Integration Through
Preliminary Rulings? The Case of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court; Viorica Vip, The Romanian Constitutional
Court and the Principle of Primacy: To Refer or Not To Refer?.
Case C-239/07, Sabatauskas et al., 2008 E.C.R. 1-7523; Lithuanian Constitutional Court, decision no. 47/04 of 4
December 2008, available at www.Irkt.It.
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Looking then at the "tone" of the references, it seems that only the reference of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht is rather antagonistic and openly challenges or even threatens
the CJEU and the EU. The other references are fairly regular references, with some
standing out in terms of quality of drafting. The Melloni reference of the Spanish Tribunal
constitucional, for instance, is elaborate and well-drafted, setting out the dilemma facing
the Tribunal and presenting three possible avenues for the CJEU to address the issue. The
reference of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the Data Retention Directive also
illustrates how instructive these references can be and how instrumental they are for the
development of European constitutional law.34 The Verfassungsgerichtshof drew the
attention of the CJEU to the need for a comparative study of national constitutional
systems, and if such a study were to reveal that they provided a more extensive protection
than that of the Charter, then the Union courts should be compelled to interpret the
Charter as not falling below the common level of protection offered by national
constitutions. The Belgian Cour constitutionnelle meanwhile often sets out the position
under the Belgian Constitution, describing, for instance, how a particular fundamental
rights issue is approached under the Constitution, or explaining the constitutional context
(e.g. Belgian federalism).3s These examples show how useful these references can be to
bring national and common constitutional traditions, as well as specificities, to the CJEU's
attention, and to demand respect for them. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht also
made reference to the position of several of its European counterparts in the OMTreferral
decision, but it did so with another objective, as if wanting to present itself to the CJEU as
"the leader of the pack"-as representing other constitutional and highest courts that do
not accept the absolute primacy of EU law and the final authority of the CJEU. This seems
less constructive, to say the least.
So, how has the CJEU reacted to these references? The CJEU has never shown itself to be
very impressed with national constitutional law in general. From the very beginning, since
Costa v. ENEL, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Simmenthal, and Factortame, it has
repeatedly stated that EU law takes precedence over all national law, including
constitutional law, and that whatever its nature and rank, conflicting measures have to be
set aside. Defenses based on grounds of constitutional infrastructure are not accepted in
enforcement actions. Like other international courts, the CJEU simply regards
constitutional law as part of the broader category of national law. That a particular issue is
deemed to be of constitutional importance in one Member State does not automatically
34 Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision G 47/12-11 G 59/12-10 G 62,70,71/12-11 of 28 November 2012 (Data
Retention Directive).
Examples can be found in CLOOTS, supra note 21.
6 For a critical appraisal, see M. Claes and J. H. Reestman, The Protection of National Constitutional Identity and
the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, GERMAN L.J. 917-970 (2015).
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imply that the CJEU will treat it with special care, as is clear from a case like Michaniki.37
Nor has the Court ever demonstrated much sympathy for the special status of
Constitutional Courts in the domestic setting, as is clear from cases like Simmenthal, Krilan,
Winner Wetten, and Melki. This seems to be the natural position of the Court as an
international court. Of course, the Court may have good reason to take this position, as it
does not have any say over national law and has to treat all Member States in the same
manner. But the Court could distinguish "constitutional cases" in a subtler manner, by
simply being more responsive to those cases that appear crucial to the countries involved
and by truly engaging with the arguments put forward by the referring courts and taking
their concerns seriously. Of course, there is a difficulty here: Once the reference has been
made, the referring court disappears from the procedure, and the Member State is for the
remainder represented by the Government, which may even find itself in a very
uncomfortable position, as, for instance, in the OMT case. So, the particular set-up of the
preliminary reference procedure allows only for a rather rudimentary question-and-answer
type dialogue between the national courts and the CJEU, and may not sufficiently facilitate
proper engagement on constitutional issues.
Has the CJEU been sufficiently responsive to Constitutional Courts making references? In
many cases, the CJEU decisions on preliminary references from Constitutional Courts have
been criticized precisely for not sufficiently engaging with the national courts, and for not
demonstrating full awareness of the importance of the issues involved for the referring
381
courts. Several authors have framed their critique in terms of "pluralism." But whether
one subscribes to the idea of "constitutional pluralism" or approaches constitutional
conflict in traditional hierarchical terms, whereby each system leaves openings to the
other, deliberation, judicial diplomacy and mutual engagement are essential to both. For
the system to function properly, national Constitutional Courts will have to continue on the
path that several have taken over the past years. The CJEU will have to demonstrate, more
than it has hitherto done, that it understands the position of Constitutional Courts, and it
will have to truly engage with their concerns. Only then will Constitutional Courts be
prepared to continue to make references.
37Though there are other cases as well, where the CJEU does appear to be sensitive to constitutional concerns of
particular Member States and referring courts, even if these concerns may seem of limited interest to others, for
instance in Case C-36/02, Omega, 2004 E.C.R. 1-09609, Case C-391/09, Runevid Vardyn, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03787, or
Case C-208/09, Sayn Wittgenstein, 2010 E.C.R. 1-13693.
On Melloni, see, e.g., Leonard F.M. Besselink, The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni, 4 EUR. L.
REV. 531 (2014); Aida Torres Perez, Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue, 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 308
(2014). On Advocatenvoor de Wereld, the Money Laundering case and Flemish Insurance Case, see CLOOTS, supra
note 21.
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The "Polemical" Spirit of European Constitutional Law: On the
Importance of Conflicts in EU Law
By Giuseppe Martinico*
A. Introduction
Recently, scholars have argued of the necessity of going beyond "judicial dialogues" and
"conflict-and-power" approaches to the analysis of the role of national Constitutional
Courts in the Union. On the one hand, there are risks connected to a "too welcoming an
approach by national constitutional courts to EU law";2 on the other hand, it is possible to
criticize both the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and some national Constitutional Courts
for other, less cooperative, decisions. I share this cautious approach for many reasons, and
primarily because the preliminary ruling mechanism does not exhaust all the possible
means of communication between constitutional courts and the CJEU. For instance, what
Komdrek calls "parallel references" 4 can serve, in some circumstances, as a technique of
alternative (or hidden) dialogue,s that has favored a sort of "remote dialogue"6 over the
years. My sole point of disagreement with this scholarly position is over the role of
conflicts in this scenario. Whilst Komdrek seems to confine conflicts to phenomena of mere
* Article completed on 1 November 2014. Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at the Scuola Superiore
S.Anna, Pisa. Fellow at the Centre for Studies on Federalism, Turin. Many thanks to Samo Bardutzky, Marco Dani,
Giacomo Delledonne, Victor Ferreres Comella, Luis Gordillo, Katarzyna Granat, Giulio Itzcovich, Nico Krisch,
Leonardo Pierdominici, Marta Simoncini, Anna Margherita Russo, Aida Torres Perez, Simon Toubeau, Sabrina
Ragone, Evangelos Liaras, and Maria Caterina La Barbera for their comments.
1 Jan Komarek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 420 (2013).
2 Id. at 449.
See Giuseppe Martinico, Judging in the Multilevel Legal Order: Exploring The Techniques Of 'Hidden Dialogue', 21
KING's L. J. 257 (2010).
4 Komarek, supra note 1, at 436.
Martinico, supra note 3; Giuseppe Martinico, Multiple loyalties and dual preliminarity: The pains of being a judge
in a multilevel legal order, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 871 (2012).
6 This is the formula ("dialogo a distanza") used by Gabriella Angiulli, 1/ rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di giustizia
dell'Unione europea do parte dei Giudici costituzionali degli Stati membri, http://www.gruppodipisa.it/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/SIENAScuoladottorale in -Diritto -ed -economia.pdf(2011).
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resistance or to "'cold' strategic considerations,"7 in this work I am going to adopt a much
broader idea of conflict, which goes beyond mere "conflicts and power games."
My intuition is that the idea of judicial conflicts is, in a way, unavoidable, and always
present even in those decisions which appear prima facie exquisitely cooperative. A good
example of this is the reference raised by the German Constitutional Court to the CJEU and
concerning the Decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6
September 2012 on Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). As
Gerstenberg has written, in this case "the deployment of the reference procedure is
anything but an act of European-friendliness and judicial comity." 9
B. The Topicality of Constitutional Conflicts: Why They Are Still There and Why We Need
Them
On 26 February 2013, the CJEU decided Melloni,0 a very important case triggered by a
preliminary question raised by the Spanish Constitutional Court.
This preliminary question drew the attention of scholars for at least two reasons. First, the
question was raised by the Spanish Constitutional Court, which, for the first time, had
decided to use Article 267 TFEU. In this respect, at that time Melloni represented the latest
Komarek, supra note 1, at 422. The author was referring to the view expressed by Arthur Dyevre, European
Integration and National Courts: Defending Sovereignty under Institutional Constraints? 9 EURO. CONST. L. REV. 139
(2013).
8 Orders of 17 December 2013 and of 14 January 2014, 2 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] 1390/12; 2 BVERFGE 1421/12; 2 BVERFGE 1438/12; 2 BVERFGE 1439/12; 2 BVERFGE 1440/12;
2 BVERFGE 1824/12; 2 BvE 6/12, available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
Oliver Gerstenberg, An End to European Multilateralism: A Comment on the German Bundesverfassungsgericht's
OMT decision, available at http://eutopialaw.com/2014/02/19/an-end-to-european-multilateralism-a-comment-
on-the-german-bundesverfassungsgerichts-omt-decision/ (2014); Giacomo Delledonne, La 'prima volta' di
Karlsruhe: il rinvio pregiudiziale relativo alle outright monetary transactions (2014), available at
http://http://www.csfederalismo.it/it/pubblicazioni/commenti/797-la-prima-volta-di-karlsruhe-il-rinvio-
pregiudiziale-relativo-alle-outright-monetary-transactions.
10 Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, available at http://curia.europa.eu/. Mr. Melloni, an Italian
citizen living in Spain, was convicted in absentia for bankruptcy fraud by a sentence delivered by the Tribunale of
Ferrara and arrested by the Spanish police. On the basis of the Council Framework Decision on the European
Arrest Warrant (2002/584/JHA as amended by the Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA) the Italian authorities
asked for the activation of the mechanism. Mr. Melloni opposed surrender to the Italian authorities, by arguing
the violation of the right to defence. The Audiencia Nacional (a special Spanish high court) decided to surrender
Mr. Melloni to Italy since it considered the right to defence was respected (Mr. Melloni, in fact, was aware of the
trial, opted for the asbentia and appointed two lawyers to defend himself). Against the order of the Audiencia
Nacional, Mr. Melloni opposed a recurso de amparo (a direct action for the protection of constitutional rights
guaranteed by the Constitution) before the Spanish Constitutional Court.
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link in a longer chain of preliminary questions raised by national Constitutional Courts.
Second, the CJEU was expected to say something important about Article 53 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the EU, concerning the burning issue of the relationship between
the standard of protection accorded to the same right at different levels.
In Melloni, the CJEU refused a minimalist interpretation of Article 53, saying that such an
interpretation "would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law inasmuch as it
would allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with
the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State's
constitution. 12 It added that:
It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that,
where an EU legal act calls for national implementing
measures, national authorities and courts remain free
to apply national standards of protection of
fundamental rights, provided that the level of
protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted
by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness
of EU law are not thereby compromised.
This was seen as a return to an absolute conception of primacy,14 and in general it sounded
very tough. More recently, on 13 February 2014, the Spanish Constitutional Court, in its
follow up to the Melloni decision of the Luxembourg Court, reversed its case law and
abided by the indications of the CJEU.1 s The Spanish follow up to the Melloni case was a bit
ambiguous because: "[W]hile the outcome does fulfil the mandates of EU law, the
reasoning proves quite unsettling."
11 After the delivery of this Article, two other Constitutional Courts raised preliminary questions ex Art. 267 TFEU
to the CJEU: the Ustavno sodike (Slovenian Constitutional Court), Order U-1-295/13) available at http://www.us-
rs.si/aktualno/novice/sklep-ustavnega-sodisca-st-u-i-29513-z-dne-6-11-2014/ and the Trybunat Konstytucyjny
(Polish Constitutional Court) decision K 61/13, available at
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/OTK/otk odp.asp?droga=%28otk odp%29&sygnatura=K%2061/13.
12 Melloni, Case C-399/11 at para.58.
13 Id. at para.60.
14 To quote the formula used, also recently, by some scholars: Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming
absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417 (2011).
15 Tribunal Constitucional (Spanish Constitutional Court), sentencia No. 26/2014 of 13 February 2014, available at
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/restrad/Paginas/JCCJCC262014en.aspx.
16 Aida Torres Perez, Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue, 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 308 (2014).
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More generally, this case gives an idea of the very difficult role played by national
Constitutional Courts and of the part relativization, for certain aspects, of their mandate.
This decision is in line with other recent rulings of the CJEU in which the Luxembourg Court
has not shown great deference towards national Constitutional Courts; I am referring to
the Filipiak 17 and the Winner Wetten18 cases, for instance, which will be considered later in
this article. This tendency does not seem to cohere with another recent trend which sees
Constitutional Courts as being increasingly open to Article 267 TFEU, nor with another
series of decisions which has been traced back to a sort of margin of appreciation doctrine
of the CJEU."
However, despite this new trend, conflicts are still at the heart of EU law. This Article is
about these conflicts, and the role that they play as potential engines for the
transformation of EU constitutional law.20 This work aims to stress the origin, structure,
and necessity of these conflicts in the current phase of EU constitutional law.
I am not going to deal with all the possible conflicts present in EU law. Rather, I shall focus
on those conflicts that I call "conflicts by convergence": conflicts due to the (partial)
convergence among levels. Then I shall turn to consider "constitutional conflicts": conflicts
21between the primacy of EU law and the supremacy of national constitutions.
The Article is divided into three parts. In the first part, I shall briefly present my view on
Article 4(2) TEU. This provision has been described as the codification of a new concept of
primacy22 and as a basis for a more cooperative phase among courts. I think this clause
represents the apex of a broader process, but at the same time I do not perceive this
process (of partial convergence) as one of a progressive route towards pacification in the
17 Case C-314/08, Filipiak, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11049.
18 Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08015.
19 "The ECtHR's margin of appreciation doctrine plays a role similar to that of the reverse Solange jurisprudence of
Schmidberger and Omega-allowing the court to acknowledge and defer to national specificities in the
understanding of common principles-while the BVG's Gorgulu doctrine corresponds to Solange-allowing the
national court to defer to judgments by the ECtHR, as long as the latter provides, in general, equivalent protection
of fundamental rights." Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The
ECI and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order, 16 EUR. L. J. 511 (2010).
20 On the importance of constitutional transformation in European constitutional law, see JOHN ERIK FossuM
& AGUSTIN JosE MENINDEZ, THE CONSTITUTION's GIFT. A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR A DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN UNION 28
(2010). See also Joseph H. H. Weiler, The transformation of Europe, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 10 (Joseph H. H.
Weiler ed., 1999).
21 Using the distinction employed by the Spanish Constitutional Court: Tribunal Constitucional, declaraci6n 1/2004
of 13 December 2004, available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es.
22 von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, supra note 14.
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relationship between constitutional poleS23 (or levels, to employ another terminology).24
On the contrary, in my view constitutional conflicts are and will remain central in the
evolution of EU law. Starting from this premise, in the second part of this article I shall
offer a classification of constitutional conflicts.
In the final part of the Article, I will present some concluding thoughts on the destiny of
these conflicts.
C. Constitutional Conflicts and the Treaty of Lisbon
In 2011, von Bogdandy and Schill25 described Article 4(2) TEU26 as being one of the most
important novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, reading this provision as being an exception to
primacy provided for under EU law itself.27 They suggested that this Article could "guide
the way to a more nuanced understanding beyond the categorical positions of the CJEU on
23 On constitutional pluralism, see Neil MacCormick, Beyond the sovereign state, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993); Neil
Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002); and Miguel P. Maduro, Contrapuntal low:
Europe's constitutional pluralism in action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 501 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).
24 Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution Making
Revisited?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 703 (1999); Franz Mayer & Ingolf Pernice, La costituzione integrata
dell'Europa, in DIRITTI E COSTITUZIONE NELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 49, 43 (Gustavo Zagrebelsky ed., 2005); Ingolf Pernice,
Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 27 EUR. L. REV. 511 (2002). On multilevel constitutionalism, see
also LEONARD BESSELINK, A COMPOSITE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION/EEN SAMENGESTELDE EUROPESE CONSTITUTIE (2007).
25 von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 14.
26 Article 4 TEU states,
1. In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States. 2. The Union
shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions,
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining
law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular,
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member
State. 3. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other
in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member
States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member
States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of
the Union's objectives.
27 von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 14, at 1,418.
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the one side ... and that of most domestic constitutional courts."28 Their argument is based
on the pluralistic spirit of Article 4 TEU and on the importance of judicial cooperation and
loyalty (principles recalled in Article 4).
Article 4(2) TEU represents the apex of a "crescendo" and is in natural continuity with the
progressive "constitutionalization" of the EU that has occurred over the years. This
constitutionalizing process is one in which the EU has gradually come to partly overcome
its purely economic nature, becoming something more: a union based on fundamental
rights as acknowledged in the national constitutions.29 This provision should be read,
therefore, as the confirmation of a long process which commenced after Solange /; 30 it
should be read as a direct product of the dialectic which exists between the national
Constitutional Courts and the CJEU. The rapprochement31 between the national and the
supranational legal orders which exists in this context has been extensively studied and I
am not going to recall such a well-known story.
The important point for the purposes of this article is that this process of rapprochement
has created a shared zone of principles between the national and supranational legal
orders, and is also confirmed by the reference made in Article 6 TEU to the "constitutional
traditions common to the Member States." 3 2 Further evidence of this is to be found in the
clauses of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU which refer to the "national laws
and practices" that have been introduced in order to avoid a breach of the national
constitutions. However, on closer analysis one could argue that neither Article 4 TEU nor
28 Id.
29 I developed this thesis in Giuseppe Martinico, What lies behind Article 4.2 TEU?, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
IDENTITYAND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 93 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013).
30 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case 2 BvG 52/71 Bundesverfassungsgericht:
Federal Constitutional Court [1974] 2 CMLR 540.
31 On this process, see LUIs 1. GORDILLO, INTERLOCKING CONSTITUTIONS TOWARDS AN INTERORDINAL THEORY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND UN LAw 66 (2012). The Author describes a process, consisting of two stages-"the establishment of
the red lines" and "the rapprochement of positions."
32 Alessandro Pizzorusso, Common constitutional traditions as Constitutional Law of Europe? SANT'ANNA LEGAL
STUDIES (STALS) RESEARCH PAPER, 1/2008, http://stals.sssup.it/files/stals_Pizzorusso.pdf (2008).
See, for instance, Articles 9 ("right to marry and right to found a family"), 10(2) ("freedom of thought,
conscience and religion"), 14(3) ("right to education"), 27 ("workers' right to information and consultation within
the undertaking"), 28 ("right of collective bargaining and action"), 30 ("protection in the event of unjustified
dismissal", and 34-36 ("social security and social assistance", "health care" and "access to services of general
economic interest"). A possible effect of such provisions might be to increase the reference to the national
traditions of Member States, a sort of margin of appreciation doctrine spread at EU level-especially when the
reference to national legislations and practices is not accompanied by that to EU law-but of course this also
implies the risk of an erroneous reference to national legislations. Title IV, devoted to "Solidarity," is particularly
rich in such references and perhaps it is not a coincidence, since in this field the EUCFR is more innovative than in
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its predecessors or successors will (automatically, at least) lead to greater cooperation.
Indeed, these open provisions could increase rather than decrease the risk of conflicts in
the multilevel system.
My argument to this effect is that the progressive attention paid by the EU to fundamental
rightS 34 has created new causes of conflicts rather than extinguishing such conflicts
entirely. In fact, the product of this convergence gave birth to new kinds of conflicts among
interpreters-conflicts due to the existence of legal sources (the principles concerning the
protection of fundamental rights) that are now shared by the CJEU and national
Constitutional Courts. Such a scenario has produced dynamics of interpretive competition.
It is sufficient to look at Article 4(2) TEU for confirmation of this. Who, for example, is in
charge of defining what belongs to the idea of national identity or constitutional structure
of Member States? National Constitutional Courts or the CJEU?35 Similar considerations
apply to other open provisions (i.e., provisions referring to national law in the
interpretation of EU law)36 present in recent EU constitutional politics. Here it suffices to
recall the Lissabon Urteil,37 where the German Constitutional Court specified the sensitive
sectors that embody national constitutional identity. In so doing, the German
other cases (with the exceptions of the title devoted to "Citizens' rights", for obvious reasons) compared with the
ECHR.
34 After the delivery of this article, this attention paid to fundamental rights has been somehow questioned by
Opinion 2/13 delivered by the CJEU and concerning the accession of the EU to the ECHR. CJEU, Opinion 2/13,
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/. However, despite this Opinion, I still
think that the EU has not abandoned its project to transform itself into a Europe of Rights.
See Antonio Ruggeri, Trattato costituzionale, europeizzazione dei 'controlimiti' e tecniche di risoluzione delle
antinomie tra diritto comunitario e diritto interno (profili problematici), available at www.forumcostituzionale.it
(2005). See also, Mattias Kumm, The jurisprudence of constitutional conflict: Constitutional supremacy in Europe
before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11 EUR. L. J. 262 (2005).
36 For instance, the many provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. I reflected on these clauses in
another piece: Giuseppe Martinico, Chasing the European Court of Justice: On Some (Political) Attempts to Hijack
the European Integration Process, 14 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REv. 243 (2012).
"European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may, however, not be
realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient space for the political formation of the
economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens'
circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own responsibility and of political and social security,
which is protected by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly depend on previous
understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political
public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. Essential areas of democratic formative action comprise,
inter alia, citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including
external financing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights,
above all as regards intensive encroachments on fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in the
administration of criminal law or the placement in an institution. These important areas also include cultural
issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the
ordering of the freedom of opinion, of the press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or
ideology." Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], cases 2 BvE 2/08 at para. 249.
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Constitutional Court made an important contribution to the definition of Article 4 TEU, in
its problematic concept of "national identity." However, one can see the risk of proceeding
in this way. The risk is of interpretive anarchy-of a context in which each Constitutional
Court can express its own view on the notion of constitutional identity while pretending to
participate in a "pluralist" interpretation. This episode confirms the risks present in a
clause like Article 4(2) TEU and confirms also the impossibility of neutralizing conflicts in
general by means of such clauses.
To summarize, norms like these are the outcome of a process of partial convergence which
began in the aftermath of the early conflicts between national and supranational
interpreters. These were conflicts which arose due to the absence, at supranational level,
of provisions comparable to those aimed at protecting "fundamental rights" at national
level. In other words, they were conflicts by divergence or conflicts by absence of a
comparable discipline in EU law. The new conflicts-the conflicts characterizing the current
phase-seem to be, on the contrary, conflicts due to the existence of an area of overlap
between the national and supranational level. In other words, they are conflicts by
convergence or conflicts by presence of an EU law discipline. I have elsewhere39 described
this overlap zone between legal orders as the core of the complex (complexus in Latin
means "interlaced") structure of European law. 4 0 This structure favors the emergence of
particular antinomies (conflicts), due to the consequent and inherent difficulty in
distinguishing among the different legal levels.
In this sense, one could say that an antinomy is complex if it cannot be resolved by looking
at the relations between legal orders: in other words, starting from the assumption of the
More recently see a decision of the Czech Constitutional Court which did not have to do with constitutional
identity but which demonstrates the permanent risks of conflicts even after the entry into force of Article 4(2)
TEU. Ostavnf soud (Czech Constitutional Court, judgment of 31 January, PI. OS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII. The
English translation is available at http:// http://www.usoud.cz/.
3 GIUSEPPE MARTINICO, THE TANGLED COMPLEXITY OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: THE FRUSTRATING KNOT OF EUROPE
(2012).
40 The mot-problme (EDGAR MORIN, INTRODUZIONE AL PENSIERO COMPLESSO, 1993, and EDGAR MORIN, CONOSCENZA DELLA
CONOSCENZA, 1989) complexity is polysemous. Millard, for instance, recalls at least four different meanings of the
word 'complex' (Eric Millard, Elements pour une approche analytique de la complexite, in DROIT ET COMPLEXITE POUR
UNE NOUVELLE INTELLIGENCE DU DROIT VIVANT 141 (Mathieu Doat, Jacques Le Goff, & Philippe Pedrot eds., 2007).
Complex, in fact, is often used as a synonym of "complicated" and in this sense an antinomy may be understood
as complex given its difficulty in being solved because of the legal abundance caused by the coexistence of so
many legislators in the EU and of the consequent difficult manageability of the several materials, languages and
meanings present in the multilevel system. Secondly, complexity may refer "a la situation d'un objet fragmentee,
decoupee. ['ensemble social n'est pas simple, au sens d'une theorie des ensembles: il resulte de I'addition ou de
I'interaction entre une pluralite d'ensembles partiels, eux- mimes sans doute s'entremiles (ld. 143)." Thirdly,
complex is understood as non-aprioristic/pragmatic; in this respect a reason is complex when it cannot infer
choices and decisions from general, clear and abstract principles which were defined aprioristically. On Europe as
a complex system, see EDGAR MORIN, PENSARE L'EUROPA (1988).
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prevalence of order A over order B, we cannot say that norm x always prevails over norm y
because x belongs to order A while norm y succumbs because it belongs to order B. This
occurs because in an integrated and interlaced system x and y could belong to both legal
orders, A and B.
This situation is also characterized by the absence of a clear and univocal supremacy
clause. The absence of univocal norms of collision influences the "reducibility" and the
"resolvability" of the constitutional conflict in a multi-layered system. Looking at this
scenario, multilevel constitutionalism in fact suffers from the absence of an unambiguous
primacy clause.41 The antinomies can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis, and not by
an unequivocal solution offered by a precise rule for collision norms (such as a clear and
undisputed supremacy clause), because in a context like this a provision which seems to
belong to the national level could actually be the repetition of another norm existing at
international or supranational level.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, I shall sketch a classification of different
types of constitutional conflicts present in the European complex order. A caveat should,
however, be introduced at this point. I am fully aware that the typology presented is not
exhaustive of all the conflicts existing in the European legal arena. At the same time, I am
42
also conscious of the fact that some conflicts by divergence are still present in EU law.
This is due to the fact that in spite of the aforementioned rapprochement, there is still a
relevant "distance" (as so-called by Gabriella Angiulli 43 ) between the positions of the
different levels. However, in this piece I shall not be taking these kinds of conflicts into
account.
D. The Idea of Agonistic Pluralism
41 Scholars have identified at least four different meanings of primacy/supremacy in CJEU case law. Moreover, the
notion of primacy enshrined in Art 1-6 of the Constitutional Treaty seems to be different from that used by the
CJEU. See, e.g., MONICA CLAES, THE NATIONAL COURTS' MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 100 (2006). In order to
find a solution to this ambiguity, some scholars have devised a 'law of laws'; see Willem Tom Eijsbouts & Leonard
Besselink, Editorial: The Law of Laws-Overcoming Pluralism, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 395 (2008).
42 See, for instance, the piece by Marco Dani, Economic and Social Conflicts, Integration and Constitutionalism in
Contemporary Europe, LSE 'EUROPE IN QUESTION' DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, 13/2009, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1518629 (2009). See also the special issue of the European
Law Journal (Volume 18, Issue 5) devoted to this subject and edited by Damian Chalmers and Marco Dani with
contributions by Michelle Everson, Christian Joerges, Alexander Somek, and Floris de Witte. See also MARCO DANI,
IL DIRITTO PUBBLICO EUROPEO NELLA PROSPETTIVA DEI CONFLITTI (2013).
43 Angiulli, supra note 6.
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Traditionally, Constitutional Courts have been deemed "enemies" 44 of the CJEU. More
recently, however, a growing number of Constitutional Courts have been progressively
accepting the cooperative mechanism established by Article 267 TFEU.
The Constitutional Courts of Germany,45 BelgiuM46 Austria,47 Lithuania,48 Italy,49 Spain,so
France,51 Slovenia,52 and Poland,ss have made preliminary references to the CJEU. I shall try
to capture the essence of the relationship between these Constitutional Courts and the
CJEU by using Mouffe's idea of "agonistic pluralism. 54
44 This was, for instance, the word used by Christian Tomuschat, La Union Europea en el marco constitucional de
los Estados Miembros. El caso de Alemonia, at a conference given at the Complutense University on 17 April 2013.
See also Sabrina Ragone, Las relociones de los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros con el Tribunal
de Justicia y con el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos: una propuesta de closificaci6n, REVISTA DE DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO, available at http://www.ugr.es/-redce/REDCE16/articulos/02SRagone.htm (2011).
45 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], orders of 17 Dec. 2013 and of 14 Jan. 2014, 2
BvR 1390/12; 2 BvR 1421/12; 2 BvR 1438/12; 2 BvR 1439/12; 2 BvR 1440/12; 2 BvR 1824/12; 2 BvE 6/12, available
at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
46 Among others, see Cour d'Arbitrage [Belgian Court of Arbitration], 19 February 1997, no. 6/97, available at
www.arbitrage.be/fr/common/home.html
47 Among others, see Verfassungsgerichtshof VfGH [Austrian Constitutional Court], 10 March 1999, B 2251/97, B
2594/97, available at www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site
48 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas [The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania], decision of 8
May 2007, available at www.Irkt.It
49 Corte Costituzionale [Italian Constitutonal Court], sentenza no. 102/2008 and ordinanza no. 103/2008, available
at www.cortecostituzionale.it. The preliminary reference was raised during principaliter proceedings. More
recently the Italian Constitutional Court extended its revirement to incidenter proceedings, see: ordinanza
207/2013,http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/CONTENZIOSO/comunicazione/allegati/ordinanza_207_2013_comp
leta.pdf
50 Tribunal Constitucional [Spanish Constitutional Court] Auto 86/2011, available at
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/.
5' Conseil Constitutionnel [French Constitutional Council], Decision n' 2013-314P QPC 4 April 2013, available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-
depuis-1959/2013/2013-314p-qpc/decision-n-2013-314p-qpc-du-04-avril-2013.136588.html.
52 Ustavno sodike [Slovenian Constitutional Court], Order U-1-295/13) available at http://www.us-
rs.si/aktualno/novice/sklep-ustavnega-sodisca-st-u-i-29513-z-dne-6-11-2014/.
Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Polish Constitutional Court] decision K 61/13, available at
http://otk.trybunal.gov.pl/OTK/otk odp.asp?droga=%28otk odp%29&sygnatura=K%2061/13.
54 Among her works, see CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL (1993); CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC
PARADOX (2000); CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL (2005) ("I use the concept of agonistic pluralism to present a
new way to think about democracy which is different from the traditional liberal conception of democracy as a
negotiation among interests and is also different from the model which is currently being developed by people
like Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls. While they have many differences, Rawls and Habermas have in common
the idea that the aim of the democratic society is the creation of a consensus, and that consensus is possible if
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Before doing that, it is necessary to recall the main features of Mouffe's thought. Her
considerations start from the nexus existing between democracy and conflicts in the
attempt to describe an "agonistic" public sphere conceived as the "sine qua non for an
effective exercise of democracy." 55
Another feature of her thought is the skepticism towards those reconstructions based on
ideas of universal consensus that claim to "establish the privileged rational nature of liberal
democracy and consequently its universal validity 56 and which perceive conflicts as mere
irrationalities.57
Conflict is crucial in democratic life and denying it, as Mouffe says, has dangerous
consequences. Such denial can lead to authoritarian results, since it may be inspired by the
belief in a universal and right order. Mouffe's criticism of what she defines as the
"optimistic anthropology" is strong and leads her into a confrontation with the principal
contemporary thinkers Habermas, Rawls, Giddens, Held, and Beck.
Fundamental in this respect is the legacy of Carl Schmitt, whose thought has been
"domesticated" by Mouffe, who tries to extract from his conception of the political (his
contraposition friend/enemy) a version of this thought which might be compatible with
democratic premises.sa Mouffe is clear in shutting the door of her pluralism to all those
positions that deny democratic premises: "A democratic society cannot treat those who
put basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries.",59
people are only able to leave aside their particular interests and think as rational beings. However, while we
desire an end to conflict, if we want people to be free we must always allow for the possibility that conflict may
appear and to provide an arena where differences can be confronted. The democratic process should supply that
arena."); CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEARTS, MINDS AND RADICAL DEMOCRACY, available at
http://www.redpepper.org.uk/hearts-minds-and-radical-democracy/ (1998).
CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 3 (2005).
CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 84 (2005).
"Because for me that is what politics is about. If there is politics in society it is because there is conflict [...] I
started to look at Freud. He does not really develop this idea from the perspective of the collective subject; he
develops it more in terms of the individual. I consider the idea of the division of the subject-Eros and Thanatos-
and the way the concept of the drive is linked to conflict, very important for politics. I have also been interested in
the work of Elias Canetti, in 'Masse und Macht', when he insists that there is a tension between the individuality
and the drive to be part of the mass. Again, the idea that we are divided is predominant." Chantal Mouffe,
Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe, 7 JOURNALISM STUD. 964
(2006), http://eprints.Ise.ac.uk/3020/1/Hegemony,_democracy,_agonismand journalism_%28LSERO%29.pdf.
JEFF NOONAN, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND HUMAN NEEDS 193 (2006).
5 CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 120 (2005).
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Although the concept of agonistic pluralism was conceived of for social conflicts in general,
and not specifically for constitutional conflicts, the concept may explain cases in which the
CJEU has reached conclusions that one could define as "aggressive" (perhaps especially if
compared to the solution reached in Omegaso). I am referring here to such cases as
Michaniki, Zambrano,62 and Elchinov."
Mouffe's theory, and her notion of "conflictual consensus," can explain the CJEU's judicial
64
schizophrenia here. In other words, the partial convergence in the field of fundamental
rights has favored the emergence of a context characterized by the sharing of some
fundamental rules between supranational and national actors. Such fundamental rules
work as the natural premise of every form of interaction between the actors of the
multilevel legal order, but their existence does not preclude the presence of different
interpretations or other forms of disagreement. Thus there may be consensus on some
basic premises but disagreement on interpretations.
To explain this situation, Mouffe uses the notion of "agonism." This is to be distinguished
from "antagonism"; the difference is based on the transformation of the Schmittian figure
of the "enemy" into that of "adversary", who is to be conceived as "somebody whose ideas
we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question."s
According to this construction, many of the clashes occurring between Constitutional
Courts and the CJEU should be understood as an example of conflict in these terms,
produced by one of these interpretative disagreements described by Mouffe.
60 Case C-36/02, Omega, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9609.
61 Case C-213/07, Michaniki, 2008 E.C.R. 1-9999.
62 Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office National de I'emploi, 2011 E.C.R. 1-01177.
63 Case C-173/09, Eichinov, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08889.
64 "It needs what I call a 'conflictual consensus.' We need to accept a common symbolic framework, but within
this symbolic framework, of course, there is room for disagreement. Let me give you an example of what I mean
by that. The common symbolic framework of modern pluralist democracy is the expression of 'liberty and equality
for all'. Those are its 'ethico-political principles'. Citizens in a pluralist democracy need to agree that those are the
principles that are going to inform their coexistence. But, of course, those shared principles can be interpreted in
many different ways. After all, what is liberty? What is equality? And who belongs to this 'all'? There are many
different interpretations of this last term alone, and we should accept the legitimacy of those different
interpretations." Chantal Mouffe, Which Public Space for Critical Artistic Practices?, http://
https://readingpublicimage.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/chantal_mouffecorkcaucus.pdf (2005).
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 102 (2000). On the Schmittian influence, see Onur Ulas Ince, The
Return Of The Schmittion: Radical Democratic Theory At Its Limits, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1675583 (2009).
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In fact, following initial collisions with national Constitutional Courts, the CJEU seemed to
gradually get the point, by incorporating the concept of fundamental rights as a premise of
the primacy of EU law. New and important provisions were, in addition, introduced into
the Treaties, namely former Articles 6 and 7 of the TEU. Despite this convergence, the
progressive expansion of CJEU activity into national fields has meant that tension between
the CJEU and the Constitutional Courts has not been lacking. Moreover, convergence has
given birth to new kinds of conflicts among interpreters-conflicts due to the existence of
legal sources (the principles concerning the protection of fundamental rights) that are now
shared by the CJEU and the national constitutional Courts. This has produced dynamics of
interpretive competition.
All this is consistent with Mouffe's theory. Although the actors of this complex legal system
now share the need to respect those constitutional goods conceived as fundamental rights
according to the multilevel case law, the possibility of interpretative disagreements
remains. This description arguably best explains the current state of the relationship
between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU. They are competitors and antagonists, but
66this is not pathological, as it also occurs in other contexts.
67
The clearest confirmation of this is the Solange saga. With this saga, what was potentially
a crisis of the European process came to serve as a turning point, marking the beginning of
a new period in the case law of the CJEU and the Constitutional Courts.
The Solange decision paved the way for a long-lasting confrontation between the CJEU and
national Constitutional Courts. Over the years, the CJEU seemed to take the point by
incorporating the concept of fundamental rights as a premise of the primacy of EU law. It is
too early to foresee what will happen next and nobody has a crystal ball; but in this respect
681it is worth mentioning how the Melki case, which could, on first glance, be described as
having been inspired by a generosity of spirit on the part of the CJEU towards the national
courts, actually represents a reaffirmation (although in a "milder" version) of the
Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United
States, in IN RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 326 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff
& Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) ("In one important sense, however, the relationship between the European Union
and its Member States is, of course, different from that between the United States and the several states. In the
United States, the relationship between federal and state law, and, in particular, between the federal Supreme
Court and the state judiciary, are fully ordered...In the European Union, by contrast, the relationship between the
central and component state legal orders is fundamentally unsettled.")
Started with the famous Solonge 1, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No.
2 BvG 52/71 Bundesverfassungsgericht: Federal Constitutional Court [1974] 2 CMLR 540.
Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R. 1-05667.
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Simmenthal doctrine,6 and how the CJEU probably declined to go a step further since the
corresponding constitutional interlocutors had already solved the issue. At the same time,
as Millet pointed out, the CJEU took the chance to point out and strengthen the Foto Frost
doctrine.70
On the other side, Constitutional Courts have not entirely given up their original position,
as is demonstrated by ambivalent decisions like Honeywell and the OMT reference. For
instance, although in Honeywell, the German Court acknowledged the possibility of margin
of error to the CJEU, at the same time, it has not renounced its role of counter-power to
the Luxembourg Court in the process of European integration, even in extraordinary
72
circumstances, and perhaps only after having "consulted" with the CJEU. This indeed
occurred in the OMT decision case, where, as we saw earlier on in this article, the German
Constitutional Court referred a preliminary question to the CJEU for the first time in its
history.
Even, then, in national decisions that seem "friendly" at first glance, one can find the
"germ" of new constitutional conflicts. This will not, however, necessarily lead to the
disintegration of the Union. On the contrary, my idea is that constitutional conflicts (or,
rather, some constitutional conflicts) may sometimes play a systemic role in the changing
nature of the EU legal order.
In other words, constitutional conflicts are functional to the transformation of EU law. This
is consistent with the idea of "disorder" present in complexity studies, where disorder
and conflict are not seen as a disturbing element but rather as an element of dynamism,
Frangois-Xavier Millet, La 'question prioritaire de constitutionnalit' e il dialogo a singhiozzo tra giudici in Europa
(Unione europea, Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea, grande sezione, sentenza 22 giugno 2010, cause C-
188/10 e C-189/10), 17 GIORNALE DI DIRITTOAMMINISTRATIVO 139 (2011).
70 Case C-314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199.
71 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 26 Aug. 2010, Case No. 2 BvR 2261/06.
72 As Mayer pointed out: "[A]n ultra vires-control of European acts by the German Constitutional Court would only
occur in extraordinary circumstances and obvious cases, and apparently a preliminary reference to the ECJ would
have to take place first." Franz Mayer, Rashomon in Karlsruhe-A Reflection on Democracy and Identity in the
European Union, JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER, 5/10, available at http://
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/rashomon-in-karlsruhe-a-reflection-on-democracy-and-identity-in-the-
european-union/ (2010).
As Le Goff put it when writing about the relation between complexity and labour law: "Comme si s'on optait
pour la technique homeopathique de lutte contre le mal par le mal lui-mime, le desordre devenant
paradoxalement vecteur d'ordre", Jacques Le Goff, Le droitdu travail, terre d'election de la complexite, in DROIT ET
COMPLEXITE POUR UNE NOUVELLE INTELLIGENCE DU DROIT VIVANT 106 (Mathieu Doat, Jacques Le Goff & Philippe Pedrot
eds., 2007).
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which allows the system to transform its main features. 74 Order and disorder thus interact,
favoring the emergence of social changes and the renewal of the organization.
In this sense "order" should be understood as the whole of the interactions and
intersections among "ensembles juridiques.,75 Order is, above, all the process triggered by
these interactions (that may be competitive, cooperative, or conflictual) between
76interdependent legal systems.
It is important to clarify that for the purposes of this article conflicts are understood as
disorder, but that not all the differences among levels (or constitutional poles) lead to
conflictual relations. This is because there are times when EU law may tolerate different
standards of protection (in cases different from Melloni, for instance). In these cases,
variety in standards does not undermine the primacy of EU law, and an example of such a
case would be Omega.
E. Back to the Case Law: A Possible Typology of Constitutional Conflicts
In the light of this theoretical framework, I shall move back to the cases.
As was earlier stated, the kinds of conflicts in question can be traced back to the structure
of the European legal order. They are due to the constitutionalization of the EU
understood as a complex order-that is, as an order characterized by a sort of constitutive
interlacement of norms.
Applying the scheme laid out by Chantal Mouffe, one can identify some examples of
"disagreement over interpretations":
74 This is also consistent with a certain branch of political science scholars: JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL
CONFLICT (1992). See also the importance of the relationship between conflicts and order in MACHIAVELLI, especially
in the DISCOURSES ON THE TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LivY. On this see: ALBERTO GIACOMIN, La 'roba' e gli 'onori': conflitto
distributivo e ordine politico nel pensiero di Machiavelli, NOTE DI LAVORO,
http://www.unive.it/media/allegato/DIP/Economia/Notedilavorosc_economiche/NL2007/NLDSE_Giacomin_
11_07.pdf (2007).
MIREILLE DELMAS MARTY, LE PLURALISME ORDONNE ET LES INTERACTIONS ENTRE ENSEMBLES JURIDIQUES, RECUEIL DALLOZ 951
(2006).
For a different but very convincing idea of order, see Giulio Itzcovich, Legal Order, Legal Pluralism, Fundamental
Principles. Europe and Its Law in Three Concepts, 18 EUR. L. J. 358 (2012). For a stimulating reading on the relation
between order and disorder see: Neil Walker, Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids: Mapping the global
disorder of normative orders, 6 INT'LJ. CONST. L., 373 (2008).
Omega, Case C-36/02.
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(1) Conflicts over the interpretation stricto sensu understood and
concerning the interpretation of the same and shared principle
(Rodriguez Caballero, Cordero Alonso).
(2) Conflicts due to the dual role played by national common judges
(Winner Wetten, Filipiak, Krilan).
(3) Conflicts over the interpretative monopoly caused by an 'octroybe'
interpretation of the national constitutional materials (Mangold,
Kaciikdeveci).
(4) Constitutional conflicts concerning the contrast between EU law as
interpreted by the CJEU and provisions in national constitutions (Kreil,
Michanicki).
Whilst this classification is not exhaustive, and some of these cases could be placed in
more than one category, the classification itself is useful in analyzing what is going on after
the partial convergence described above.
I. Conflicts over the Interpretation Stricto Sensu Understood and Concerning the
Interpretation of the Some and Shared Principle (Rodriguez Caballero, Cordero Alonso)
The Cordero Alonso case is emblematic of the disagreement caused by the different
interpretations given to a shared principle by two different interpreters. It confirms that
the mere sharing of principles that are, from a literal point of view, common, does not
mean that the interpreters will agree on the interpretation to accord it.
781
In Cordero Alonso, the Spanish judge referring the question to the CJEU asked about the
necessity of disapplying a national provision (Article 33 of the Workers' Statute). This
provision had already been acknowledged as inconsistent with the EU principle of non-
discrimination by the CJEU in a previous judgment,79 but it had also (and following the first
CJEU judgment on this matter) been interpreted in a way consistent with the constitutional
principle of non-discrimination by the Spanish Constitutional Court.ao
Since the general principle of equality and non-discrimination is a principle of Community
law, Member States are bound by the Court's interpretation of that principle. This "applies
Case C-81/05, Cordero Alonso, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7569.
Case C-442/00, Rodriguez Caballero, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11915.
80 Tribunal Constitucional [Spanish Constitutional Court], decision No. 306/1993 of 25 October 1993, available at
www.tribunalconstitucional.es
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even when the national rules at issue are, according to the constitutional case law of the
Member State concerned, consistent with an equivalent fundamental right recognised by
the national legal system.""'
In this case, the national judge was unable to decide which court to follow and, in order to
avoid a decision which would have been seen as challenging the case law of the Spanish
Constitutional Court, decided to refer an interpretive question to the CJEU about the
meaning and scope of the principle of non-discrimination in EU law. The CJEU confirmed its
previous interpretation, recalling how the Simmenthal doctrine and the principle of the
autonomy of EU law required the disapplication of national law conflicting with European
legislation. In this manner, the CJEU offered an interpretation of the principle which was
very different to that provided by the Spanish Constitutional Court: although a provision is
consistent with the national Constitution it has to be disapplied if it contrasts with the EU
law as interpreted by the CJEU.
Such kinds of conflicts, exemplified in Cordero Alonso and caused by the dual loyalty of
national judges to the CJEU and to their own Constitutional Courts, have been nourished
over the years by the progressive constitutionalization of the EU. In this sense, the
referring judge in the CorderoAlonso case was merely a collateral victim of the interpretive
competition between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU-an interpretive competition
that paradoxically increased with the progressive constitutionalization of the EU. The CJEU
began to increasingly grant an important role to national constitutional materials in its
decisions, leading to a "partial" appropriation of the fundamental rights discourse by the
CJEU which emerges in a long series of judgments, and is most evident in cases such as
82 83Omega8 and Dynamic Medien. As some authors have pointed out, it is possible, in these
cases, to perceive a certain concern over the "octroyde methodology of construing
common constitutional traditions."8 4 The Cordero Alonso case, however, is simply one
example of a case in which the CJEU has challenged judgments given by national
Constitutional Courts. In the following pages I shall move to other examples of
constitutional conflicts.
81 Cordero Alonso, Case C-81/05 at para. 41.
82 Omega, Case C-36/02.
Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien, 2008 E.C.R. 1-505.
84 Marco Dani, Tracking Judicial Dialogue-The Scope for Preliminary Rulings from the Italian Constitutional Court,
JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER, 10/2008, available at http://
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/erpjeanmo/p0207.htm (2008). See also the reactions to the Mangold case
(Case C-144/04, Mangold, 2005 ECR 1-9981), Roman Herzog & Luder Gerken, [Comment] Stop the European Court
ofJustice, available at http://euobserver.com/9/26714 (2008). This piece is the translation of an article originally
published in German, Stoppt den Europdiischen Gerichtshof, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 8 September 2008.
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IL Conflicts due to the Dual Role Played by National Common Judges (Winner Wetten,
Filipiak, Kriian, Melki)
Some of the constitutional conflicts which fall into this category are strongly related to the
multiple loyalties characterizing the actors working in a multilevel context and in this
respect other examples of constitutional conflicts are represented by the Filipickas and the
Winner Wetten cases. The Winner Wetten case originated from a preliminary reference
raised by a German court. In 2006, the German Constitutional Court acknowledged that
legislation on the public monopoly on gambling on sporting competitions existing in two
Lander violated Paragraph 12(1) of the Basic Law. At the same time, it decided not to
declare the legislation in question unconstitutional; instead, it decided to maintain it in
effect until 31 December 2007, thereby sending a "message" of sorts to the legislature to
push it to intervene by that date and to amend the legislation through the use of its
discretionary power, in order to save the legislation from breaching Basic Law. Despite this
judgment, the CJEU decided to push the referring judge to disapply the legal provision
"saved," for a transitional period, by the German Constitutional Court. It concluded that:
By reason of the primacy of directly-applicable Union
law, national legislation concerning a public monopoly
on bets on sporting competitions which, according to
the findings of a national court, comprises restrictions
that are incompatible with the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services,
because those restrictions do not contribute to limiting
betting activities in a consistent and systematic
manner, cannot continue to apply during a transitional
817period.
A very similar case is Filipick, which originated in a preliminary question raised by a Polish
judge with regard to proceedings on tax issues between Mr. Filipiak, a Polish national
engaging in economic activity in the Netherlands (where he regularly paid the social
security and health insurance contributions required by Dutch legislation), and the Director
of the Poznar6 Tax Chamber. What is interesting for the purposes of this article is that the
referring court recalled a previous decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. On that
occasion the Polish Constitutional Tribunal had ruled that the income tax law in question
infringed the principles of equality and social justice enshrined in the Polish Constitution
8 Case C-314/08, Filipiak, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11049.
Winner Wetten, Case C-409/06.
87Id.
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but, at the same time, had decided to postpone the loss of validity of the legislation until
30 November 2008, by exploiting its powers ad hoc. The CJEU concluded that:
the primacy of Community law obliges the national
court to apply Community law and to refuse to apply
conflicting provisions of national law, irrespective of
the judgment of the national Constitutional Court
which has deferred the date on which those provisions,
held to be unconstitutional, are to lose their binding
force.""
Another case is Kriian," which originated in a preliminary reference sent by the Supreme
Court of Slovakia. Among other things, the a quo judge asked whether Article 267 TFEU
requires or enables the supreme court of a Member State to use the preliminary ruling
mechanism:
even at a stage of proceedings where the constitutional
court has annulled a judgment of the supreme court
based in particular on the application of the EU
framework on environmental protection and imposed
the obligation to abide by the constitutional court's
legal opinions based on breaches of the procedural and
substantive constitutional rights of a person involved in
judicial proceedings, irrespective of the EU law
dimension of the case concerned that is, where in
those proceedings the constitutional court, as the court
of last instance, has not concluded that there is a need
to refer a question to the [Court of Justice] for a
preliminary ruling and has provisionally excluded the
application of the right to an acceptable environment
and the protection thereof in the case concerned?90
The answer given by the CJEU in this case presented further evidence of the strong
conception of EU law employed by the CJEU in its relationship with national constitutional
judges, stressing the autonomy to be left to the a quo judge to refer to the CJEU.
8 Filipiak, Case C-314/08.
89Case C-416/10, Kriian & Others, (Jan. 15 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
90Krilan, Case C-416/10 at para. 47.
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The national rule which obliges the Supreme Court of Slovakia to follow the legal position
of the Constitutional Court of Slovakia cannot, therefore, prevent the referring court from
submitting a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU at any point in the proceedings
which it judges appropriate, and to set aside, if necessary, the assessments made by the
Constitutional Court which might prove contrary to EU law.91
The need to preserve the direct relationship between the CJEU and national judges was
also at the heart of a different decision, the Melki case.92 This case originated in the reform
introduced in France by Article 61-1 of the French Constitution by which the incidenter
control of constitutionality was introduced. This provision was implemented by Organic
Law No. 2009-1523, which amended Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958. After
this reform, Article 23-5 of the Ordinance, second paragraph, provided for the priority of
the question of constitutionality over the review concerning conformity with EU Law.
Doubting the compatibility of this provision with the CJEU's jurisprudence, the French Cour
de Cassation 94 referred a preliminary question to the CJEU, asking whether Article 267
TFEU precludes legislation such as that resulting from the French reform:
" Finally, as a supreme court, the Najvyllf s~d Slovenskej republiky is even required to submit a request for a
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice when it finds that the substance of the dispute concerns a question to be
resolved which comes within the scope of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. The possibility of bringing,
before the constitutional court of the Member State concerned, an action against the decisions of a national
court, limited to an examination of a potential infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
national constitution or by an international agreement, cannot allow the view to be taken that that national court
cannot be classified as a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law within the
meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question
is that Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court, such as the referring court, is
obliged to make, of its own motion, a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice even though it is
ruling on a referral back to it after its first decision was set aside by the constitutional court of the Member State
concerned and even though a national rule obliges it to resolve the dispute by following the legal opinion of that
latter court." Id.
92 "The Court has concluded therefrom that the existence of a rule of national law whereby courts or tribunals
against whose decisions there is a judicial remedy are bound on points of law by the rulings of a court superior to
them cannot, on the basis of that fact alone, deprive the lower courts of the right provided for in Article 267 TFEU
to refer questions on the interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, Rheinmhlen-
Dbsseldorf, paragraphs 4 and 5, and Cartesio, paragraph 94). The lower court must be free, in particular if it
considers that a higher court's legal ruling could lead it to give a judgment contrary to EU law, to refer to the
Court questions which concern it (Case C-378/08 ERG and Others 2010 E.C.R. 1-0000, paragraph 32)." Melki and
Abdeli, Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 at para. 42.
Article 61-1states, "If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a statutory
provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the
Conseil d'Etat or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council, within a determined period. An Organic
Law shall determine the conditions for the application of the present article." On this, see Federico Fabbrini,
Kelsen in Paris: France's constitutional reform and the introduction of a posteriori constitutional review of
legislation, 9 GERMAN L.J., 1297 (2008).
94 The saga is indeed multilevel: during a proceeding initiated by Mr. Melki and Mr. Abdeli, two Algerians,
unlawfully present in France. They were arrested and put into detention after a police control carried out in an
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in so far as those provisions require courts to rule as a
matter of priority on the submission to the Conseil
Constitutionnel of the question on constitutionality
referred to them, inasmuch as that question relates to
whether domestic legislation, because it is contrary to
European Union law, is in breach of the Constitution.9 s
Before the CJEU pronounced on this, the French Conseil Constitutionnel had interpreted
this provision in a manner consistent with the Simmenthal and Cartesio8 doctrines. In
June 2010, the CJEU decided to take into account the decision of the Conseil
Constitutionnel99 which had in the meantime attempted to give an interpretation of the
legislation consistent with EU law and with the CJEU's case law. In Melki, the CJEU pointed
out the need to respect the "essential characteristics of the system of cooperation
between the Court of Justice and the national courts."100 It specified that in no case is it
possible to infer from the judgment of a constitutional court declaring national legislation
unconstitutional (in proceedings regarding the constitutionality of national legislation
implementing a directive, for instance) the invalidity of the supranational directive, since
area close to the Belgian border, on the basis of Art. 78-2, p. 4, of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. The
judge deciding on provisional detention decided to refer to the Court of Cassation (as we know the French
Constitutional Reform gave the Court de Cassation and the Conseil d' Etat a role of filter of the questions raised by
the lower courts) a question concerning the consistency with the French Constitution of the possibility to check
the identity of persons in a border area. The referring judge had in mind Art. 88-1 of the Constitution, which reads
'The Republic shall participate in the European Union constituted by States which have freely chosen to exercise
some of their powers in common pursuant to the [Treaties]', in so far as Union law ensures the absence of
internal border controls for persons. The Court de Cassation deciding on the possibility to pass the question to the
French Conseil Constitutionnel, aware of the consequence on European Union law of a decision like that and
doubting the mechanism of the priority of the constitutional question devised by the French Reform, raised a
preliminary reference to the CJEU.
9 Melki, Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 at para.22
Conseil Constitutionnel [French Constitutional Council], Decision no. 2010-605 DC of 12 May 2010, available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2010/2010-605-dc/decision-n-2010-605-dc-du-12-mai-
2010.48186.html.
Case C-106/77, Simmenthal, 1977 E.C.R. 1-62.
Case C-210/06, Cartesio, 2008 E.C.R. 1-9641.
Conseil Constitutionnel [French Constitutional Council], Decision 2010-605 DC, available at http://www.conseil-
constitution nel.fr/decision//decision-n-2010-605-dc-du-12-mai-2010.48186. html. Francis Donnat, La Cour de
Justice et la QPC: chronique d'un arrdt imprivisible et imprivu, RECUEIL DALLOZ, 1640 (2010); Federico Fabbrini, La
Corte di Giustizia si pronuncia sulla "legittimita comunitaria" del nuovo modello di giustizia costituzionale
francese, QUADERNI COSTITUZIONAU 4 (2010), Daniel Sarmiento, L'affaire Melki: esquisse d'un dialogue des juges
constitutionnels eteuropdens sur toile de fond frangaise, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 588 (2010).
100 Melki, Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 at para. 51.
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this would result in a violation of the Foto Frost doctrine.101 Concluding on this typology, it
is possible to recall other cases that could be traced back to this group, for instance
Chartry102 and, more recently, A v. B.103
///. Conflicts over the Interpretative Monopoly Caused by an "Octroyde" Interpretation of
the National Constitutional Materials (Mangold, Kucukdeveci)
Another group of cases concerns those conflicts triggered by decisions detrimental to the
interpretative sovereignty of Constitutional Courts.
The Mangold104 case is one such example. There, in order to react to the impulse for
flexible labor markets by following a framework agreement reached by the social partners,
the German legislation in question authorized fixed-term employment contracts for a
maximum of two years. The German legislature also added that within that maximum limit
of two years, a fixed-term contract could be renewed up to three times.
The fixed-term employment contracts were accepted without the above-mentioned
condition, if the worker had reached the age limit of sixty-lowered to fifty-two years in a
second moment-at the commencement of his employment term. In Mangold, the CJEU
was asked to verify the compatibility of the German law with EU Directive 2000/78, and in
particular with the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age drawn from it.
The CJEU recalled that Community law (specifically Article 6, n. 1 of the Directive) should
be construed as precluding:
a provision of domestic law such as that at issue in the
main proceedings which authorizes, without restriction,
unless there is a close connection with an earlier
contract of employment of indefinite duration
101 C-314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199 ("It should also be observed that the priority nature of an interlocutory
procedure for the review of the constitutionality of a national law, the content of which merely transposes the
mandatory provisions of a European Union directive, cannot undermine the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
alone to declare an act of the European Union invalid, and in particular a directive, the purpose of that jurisdiction
being to guarantee legal certainty by ensuring that EU law is applied uniformly.").
102 C-457/09, Chartry, 2011 E.C.R 1-00819.
103 Case C-112/13, A v. B., (Sept. 11, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/. On the differences between Melki and A v. B,
see Andrea Guazzarotti, Rinazionalizzare i dirittifondamentali? Spunti a partire da Corte di Giustizia UE, A. c. B. e
altri, sent. 11 settembre 2014, C-112/13, available at www.diritticomparati.it (2014).
104 Mangold, Case C-144/04. See Roberta Calvano, 11 caso "Mangold": la Corte di giustizia afferma (senza dirlo)
l'efficacia orizzontale di una direttiva comunitaria non scaduta?, available at
www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it (2006).
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concluded with the same employer, the conclusion of
fixed-term contracts of employment once the worker
has reached the age of 52.105
The term for the implementation of the Directive had not yet expired, and in fact the
Mangold case is interesting for the way in which the CJEU resolved the conflict between EU
and national laws. The Court recalled that "during the period prescribed for transposition
of a directive, the Member States must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to
compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive."
106
Later, however, the CJEU seemed to "change" its parameter, shifting its focus from the
Directive to general principles of Community law. This shift is confirmed by the words of
the Court, in which it is evident that the conflict at stake is that between national
legislation and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age, a principle which
would find its source "in various international instruments and in the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States.",
107
The CJEU concluded by recalling the duty to disapply of the national judge:
It is the responsibility of the national court, hearing a
dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination in
respect of age, to provide, in a case within its
jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals
derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure
that those rules are fully effective, setting aside any
provision of national law which may conflict with that
law [...] It is the responsibility of the national court to
guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle
of non-discrimination in respect of age, setting aside
any provision of national law which may conflict with
Community law, even where the period prescribed for
transposition of that directive has not yet expired.10a
1os Mangold, Case C-144/04 at para. 78.
106 Id. at para. 67.
107 Id. at para. 74.
108 Id. at paras. 77-78.
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Hatzopoulos,109 one of the first commentators on this judgment, read it together with
other cases like Corpenterto and Karner."' These cases are all characterized by material
reference to the legal material of the ECHR and to general principles. The conclusion
reached by Hatzopoulos is that the mix between hard and soft law sources influences the
legal reasoning of the CJEU by affecting its linearity. The CJEU cannot solve these cases by
appealing to a clear legal parameter but rather has to appeal to a vague parameter (a
general principle), hence why it refers to general principles and the case law of other
courts (other elements sometimes testifying the lack of a strong legal reasoning of the
judge) so much:
Since EC hard legislation will be rare in fields in which
some EU coordination takes place, the Court will be
obliged to control national measures by reference to
general principles and fundamental rights, in order to
effectively protect the latter. This, however, is not a
commendable development, at least by currently
applicable legal standards, and all the judgments above
have been strongly criticised.11
However what is interesting to us is the way in which
the CJEU took inspiration from national constitutional
materials in order to construct this general principle.
German scholars reacted harshly to Mangold, questioning the viability of inferring such a
principle from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. For example, in
an article published in English on EUobserver, Herzog and Gerken argued that:
However, this 'general principle of community law' was
a fabrication. In only two of the then 25 member states
namely Finland and Portugal is there any reference to a
ban on age discrimination, and in not one international
treaty is there any mention at all of there being such a
ban, contrary to the terse allegation of the ECJ.
Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the ECJ
dispensed with any degree of specification or any proof
1o9 Vassilis Hatzopoulos, Why the Open Method of Coordination is Bad for You: A Letter to the EU, 13 EUR. L. J. 309,
337 (2007).
110 Case C-60/00, Carpenter, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6279.
111 Case C-71/02, Karner, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3025.
112 Hatzopoulos, supra note 109, at 337.
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of its allegation. To put it bluntly, with this construction
which the ECJ more or less pulled out of a hat, they
were acting not as part of the judicial power but as the
legislature. 113
Mangold is thus emblematic of that "octroybe methodology of construing common
constitutional traditions" 1 14 according to which the CJEU has been jeopardizing the
interpretive sovereignty of national Constitutional Courts.
The CJEU recalled Mangold in Kacakdeveci.11s There, it confirmed the existence of a
general principle of non-discrimination based on age and conceived this general principle
as its parameter, although the term for implementing the directive had already expired at
that time. It also recalled the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights only to "prove" the later
codification of this general principle despite the fact that the EU Charter was already in
force at that time.
It is no coincidence that, following Mangold, the German Constitutional Court indirectly
responded to the CJEU with the famous Lisbon decision and then directly with the
Honeywell decision.
IV. Constitutional Conflicts Concerning the Contrast between EU Law-as Interpreted by the
CJEU-and Provisions Included in the National Constitutions (Kreil and Michanicki)
This final category of constitutional conflicts refers to cases of judgments where the CJEU
found there to be incompatibility between a national constitutional provision and EU law.
The conflicts here are not conflicts of "interpretation" in a narrow sense, but rather cases
of real contradiction between EU law and national law.
The most famous case which falls into this category is, perhaps, Kreil. In Kreil, the CJEU
de facto affirmed the prevalence of EU law over a national constitutional provision, by
holding that a general exclusion of women from military posts involving the use of arms (as
113 Herzog & Gerken, supra note 84.
114 Dani, supra note 84.
115 Case C-555/07, Kucukdeveci, 2010 E.C.R. 1-365.
116 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 123, 267 - Treaty of Lisbon, 2009,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.
117Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 2 BvR 2661/06,
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de
11s Case C-285/98, Kreil, 2000 E.C.R. 1-69.
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provided for in Article 12a.4 of the Grundgesetz) was in conflict with the content of the
Equal Treatment Directive (76/207). Subsequently, the Grundgesetz was amended. 9
The Kreil decision concerned the case of Tanja Kreil who, in 1996, had applied for joining
the weapons electronic maintenance service of the German Federal army. Her application
was rejected on the basis of Article 12a.4 of the Grundgesetz, and she subsequently went
before the Hannover Administrative Court, claiming that the rejection on the basis of her
sex only was contrary to Equal Treatment Directive (76/207). The local court made a
preliminary reference to the CJEU in order to verify the consistency of the national
provisions with the Directive in question.
Another interesting case is Michaniki.120 The Michaniki case stemmed from a constitutional
reform of 2001, whereby Article 14 of the Greek Constitution was amended. After this
reform, Article 14, paragraph 9121 provided a sort of irrebuttable presumption of general
incompatibility between the media sector and the sector of public contracts, in order to
promote transparency in the public works sector. On the basis of this provision, a
company, Michaniki AE, failed to win the contract at the end of the tendering procedure
and it consequently brought an action before the Greek Council of State, which referred a
preliminary question to the CJEU concerning the interpretation of Directive 93/37/EC on
public works contracts. The CJEU recalled that the assessment of the compatibility of EU
law with national law goes beyond its jurisdiction in preliminary ruling proceedings and
also said that the Directive does not per se forbid a Member State from providing other
exclusionary measures in order to ensure transparency and equal treatment of the
tenderers if these measures are consistent with the proportionality principle.
n1 Article 12a 4 states: "If, during a state of defence, the need for civilian services in the civilian health system or
in stationary military hospitals cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between the age of eighteen and fifty-
five may be called upon to render such services by or pursuant to a law. Under no circumstances may they be
required to render service involving the use of arms."
120 Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos Epikratias, 2008 E.C.R. 1-9999.
121 Article 14, p. 9 provides: "The ownership, financial standing and means of financing of the media must be
disclosed, as stipulated by law. The measures and restrictions necessary to ensure full media transparency and
pluralism shall be specified by law. It is prohibited to concentrate control of several media of the same or
different form. In particular, it is prohibited to concentrate control of more than one electronic medium of the
same form, as specified by law. The status of owner, partner, main shareholder or management executive of a
media undertaking shall be incompatible with the status of owner, partner, main shareholder or management
executive of an undertaking which undertakes with the State or a legal person in the public sector in the broad
sense to perform works or provide supplies or services. The prohibition in the previous subparagraph shall also
extend to any form of intermediary, such as spouses, relatives or financially dependent persons or companies. A
law shall set out the specific regulations, the sanctions (which may go as far as revocation of a radio or television
station's licence and an order prohibiting the signature of, or cancelling, the contract in question), the system of
supervision and the guarantees to prevent circumvention of the foregoing subparagraphs."
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The Luxembourg Court also stated, however, that:
Community law must be interpreted as precluding a
national provision which, whilst pursuing the legitimate
objectives of equal treatment of tenderers and of
transparency in procedures for the award of public
contracts, establishes an irrebuttable presumption that
the status of owner, partner, main shareholder or
management executive of an undertaking active in the
media sector is incompatible with that of owner,
partner, main shareholder or management executive of
an undertaking which contracts with the State or a legal
person in the public sector in the broad sense to
perform a works, supply or services contract.122
Finally, it is worth noting that, in his Opinion, Advocate General Maduro used the old
Article 6(3) TEU to recall how it was among the EU's obligations to respect the
constitutional identity of the Member States. This, in my view, confirms that there exists a
continuity between the pre-Lisbon Article 6(3) TEU and the post-Lisbon Article 4(2) TEU.
F. On the Future of Constitutional Conflicts
My final thoughts thus concern the issue of constitutional conflicts in a context that is
characterized by a new openness towards the preliminary ruling mechanism on the part of
national Constitutional Courts.
As earlier stated, the progressive openness shown by Constitutional Courts does not per se
lead to greater cooperation with the CJEU, and this is confirmed by the fact that the CJEU is
alternating between very "sensitive" decisions (those decisions based on Article 4(2) TEU,
for instance)123 and "muscular" decisions (the majority of decisions now, I would say). At
the same time, there are many hot issues, related, for instance, to the former third pillar,
where there is already precedence for some Constitutional Courts using the counter-limits
124
weapon.
122 MichanikiAE, Case C-213/07 at para. 69.
123 On this case law, see Barbara Guastaferro, Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary
Functions of the Identity Clause, 31 Y.B. EUR. L. 263 (2012).
124 As we know, while in the first pillar the counter-limits bomb never exploded (and this might be seen as a
confirmation of the particular strength of the interpretative position of the CJEU in this context), the third pillar
knew some episodes of tension between the Constitutional Courts and the CJEU: the decisions of the Polish
(Trybunal konstytucyjny, P 1/05, available at www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/index.htm) and German (BVerfG, 2 BvR
2236/04, available at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/enl) Constitutional Courts (but also see the decisions of
the Cypriot Avebraro ALKacrrjpto, 294/2005, available at www.cylaw.org and Czech judges Ostavni Soud, PI. US
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Confirmation of the very real tensions existing between the CJEU and national
Constitutional Courts comes from the East, and is exemplified by the moves of the Czech
Constitutional Court following the Landtovdl2 decision of the CJEU. In that case, the
Luxembourg Court challenged the case law of the Czech Constitutional Court, by
concluding that "the Ostavnf soud judgment involves a direct discrimination based on
nationality and indirect discrimination based on nationality, as a result of the residence
test, against those who have made use of their freedom of movement. 12 6 In reaction to
this, the Czech Constitutional Court surprisingly decided to apply the ultra vires control,
devised by the German Constitutional Court, to the CJEU's decision; and it went on to
declare the CJEU's decision ultra vires.127 It made this declaration without firstly referring a
preliminary question to the CJEU, and this marks it as importantly different from the
German case and as going beyond the menace set by the German Constitutional Court in
the Lisbon decision (and mitigated in the Honeywell case).129 This in itself proves that
conflicts are still on the everyday agenda and why some of the most evident
transformations in the European legal order have been driven on by these conflicts,
especially in the field of fundamental rights protection.
The use of Article 267 TFEU by Constitutional Courts does not help in overcoming these
tensions between national guardians and the CJEU but this conclusion is not necessarily
pessimistic.
Even going beyond the relationship between the EU and Member States it is possible to
see how conflicts have played a systemic function, by favoring confrontation and change in
the global context. In this sense it has been argued that it is possible to compare
judgments such as Bosphorus 1o with the famous Solonge case. According to some
66/04, available at http:// http://www.usoud.cz/), which have recalled the question of the ultimate barriers in
the field of the European arrest warrant. Jan Komarek, European constitutionalism and the European Arrest
Warrant: In search of the limits of contrapunctual principles, JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER, 10/05 available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/erpjeanmo/p0250.htm (2005).
125 Case C-399/09, Landtova, 2011 E.C.R. 1-05573.
126 Id. at para. 49.
127 Ustavnf soud [Czech Constitutional Court], judgment of 31 January, PI. OS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII. The
English translation is available at http:// http://www.usoud.cz/.
128 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08,
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en.
129 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 26 Aug. 2010, 2 BvR 2261/06,
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en.
130 Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, (June. 30, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
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authors, another application of the Solange method is the Kadi case,132 in which, to use
Zucca's terminology, the CJEU stated the prevalence of the principle Jura Sunt Servanda
over that of Pacta Sunt Servanda.
Before concluding this article, it is worth recalling why the "constitutional conflict" will
continue to play a central role in the life of the EU.
Aside from the aforementioned risks connected with open provisions like Article 4(2) TEU,
other factors also confirm the centrality of conflicts. The financial crisis, for instance, has
led to the introduction of some problematic clauses like that, which is included in Article 3
of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union (TSCG).
Article 3(2), in particular, sets out the need for States to codify the budget rule in national
law "through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably
constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to". It is
debatable whether this is consistent with Article 4(2) TEU, which sets out the need to
respect the national identity and constitutional structure of EU Member States. Does this
Article imply a constitutional obligation for Member States? Who is in charge of respect for
this Article?
Even in this case there will be an overlapping zone since the golden rule laid out in Article
3(2) will be, at the same time, both part of the TSCG and of some national constitutions,
leading to the possibility of increased interpretative competition between courts.
It is not a coincidence that, more recently, Constitutional Courts (or Supreme Courts in
other cases) have been progressively involved in this ambit of economic governance - an
area which has traditionally been a domain of the political institutions.134
1 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The Solonge Argument as a Justification for Disobeying the Security Council in the
Kadi Judgments, in KADI ON TRIAL: A MULTIFACETED ANALYSIS OF THE KADI TRIAL 121 (Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli &
Giuseppe Martinico eds., 2014). See also Andrea Gattini, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah
Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 3
September 2008, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 213, 234 (2009); GORDILLO, supra note 31, at 235-57, 311-13.
132 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission, Council, United Kingdom v. Yassin
Abdullah Kadi, (July 18, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation, 2008 ECR 1-6351. On the Kadi saga, see THE MULTIFICATED ANALYSIS
OF THE KADI TRIAL, supra note 131.
133 Lorenzo Zucca, Monism and Fundamental Rights in Europe, available at http://
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734602 (2011). A slightly different version was published
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU LAW 331 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis, eds., 2012).
134 On this, see Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in
Comparative Perspective, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328060 (2013);
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More generally, the contemporary significance of conflicts can be confirmed by the legacy
(one might say, the aftermath) of the mega-constitutional politics of the period of the
Conventions. This point has been raised by Roberto Bin: "The Constitutional Treaty has
discovered a nerve - that of constitutional symbolism - using "words" that have come to
recall dangerous and misleading domestic analogies (law, constitution, Minister), causing
real worry about the existence of a plan to transform the EU into a state."13S This argument
relies on the scholarship that views the silence present in constitutions (referring to
elements "of dormant suspension" 137) positively, since silence could serve as a way to
avoid the emergence of conflicts. On this view, "abeyances are valuable, therefore, not in
spite of their obscurity, but because of it", 13 since they are essential in order to "preserve
constitutional settlements from conflicts and crises."139
In other words, the periods of the Conventions would have broken a sort of silent pact
between the EU and its Member States, recalling dangerous (for the states' sovereignty)
analogies and paving the way for new conflicts.
This reconstruction captures only a part of the phenomenon: conflicts have always been a
part of the EU constitutionalization process, even when some "F-words" had not been
pronounced; but, of course, the fear of the domestic analogy is at the heart of some
140 141judgments of the German Constitutional Court, especially after the Lissabon Urteil.141 As
Giacomo Delledonne, Financial Constitutions in the EU: From the Political to the Legal Constitution?, SANT'ANNA
LEGAL STUDIES (STALS) RESEARCH PAPER 5/2012, http://stals.sssup.it/files/Delledonne%20Stals%205%202012.pdf
(2012).
135 Roberto Bin, Gli effetti del diritto dell'Unione nell'ordinamento italiano e il principio di entropia 363, 372-73
(2010), http://www.robertobin.it/articoIi/scrittimodugno.pdf.
13 MICHAEL FOLEY, THE SILENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS: GAPS, 'ABEYANCES', AND POLITICAL TEMPERAMENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF
GOVERNMENT 198 (1989).
137 Id. at 3.
138 Id. 10.
1s Leonardo Pierdominici, Fear of activity, fear of activism, the silence of courts. The docket and the legitimacy of
the ECl and its "Passive Virtues", paper presented at the seminar 'Comparative Law and Comparative Institutional
Analysis', European University Institute, 23 April 2012. On file with Author.
140 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 28 Feb. 2012, 2 BvC 4/10 and BVerfG, 2 BvE
8/11. "It is in this sense that integration cannot be well understood as an autonomously "constitutional"
phenomenon in its own right, as some of integration's most fervent advocates like to maintain. Rather, despite
the EU's extensive normative power, the process of integration lacks the autonomous capacity to legitimize itself
in democratic and constitutional terms. For that, the integration process still very much needs the nation-state
and national constitutional oversight, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. The most recent decision of the
German Federal Constitutional Court regarding national-parliamentary oversight is simply a concrete expression
of this continuing dependence." Peter Lindseth, National parliaments in European integration: Europeanization,
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I have argued, conflicts belong to the life of constitutional polities. This has been
demonstrated by scholarship in sociology and political science, and particularly with regard
to social conflicts.142 But conflicts also belong specifically to the essence of
constitutionalism, which has a 'polemical' (and not irenical) nature, since it is founded on a
never-ending friction between liberty and power, as Luciani wrote.143 This indicates that
the mega-constitutional politics of the period of the Conventions has not only failed to
magically solve (and indeed it could not) all the democratic problems of the EU, but, on the
contrary, has opened another "fracture". This could have serious effects on the future of
the EU, paving the way for possible new conflicts and confirming, therefore, the 'polemical'
spirit of European constitutional law.144
renationalization, or reconciliation? (2012), available at http://eutopialaw.com/2012/03/01/national-
parliaments-in-european-integration-euro pea nization-ren ation a lization-o r- reco nci I iatio n/.
141 123 BVERFGE 267.
142 JACK KNIGHT, supra note 74; ALESSANDRO PIZZORNo, LE CLASSI SOCIALI (1959); ALESSANDRO PIZZORNo, LE RADICI DELLA
POLITICAASSOLUTA (1993); COLIN CROUCH & ALESSANDRO PIZZORNO, CONFLITTI IN EUROPA (1977); Ralf Dahrendorf, Toward
a Theory of Social Conflict, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 170 (1958); RALF DAHRENDORF, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIETY (1968).
143 Massimo Luciani, Costituzionalismo irenico e costituzionalismo polemic (2006), available at
http://archivio.rivistaaic.it/materiali/anticipazioni/costituzionalismoirenico/index.html.
144 GIUSEPPE MARTINICO, Lo SPIRITO POLEMICO DEL DIRITTO EUROPEO. STUDIO SULLE AMBIZIONI COSTITUZIONALI DELLUNIONE
(2011).
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The Relationship Between the Court of Justice of the European
Union and the European Court of Human Rights in the View of
the Accession
By Francesco Cherubini*
A. Introduction
The jurisdictional control systems (or, to be more accurate, the quasi-jurisdictional control
systems) created within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1 and the
European Union (EU)2 considerably differ one from each other, besides reflecting the
different origin of the treaties in which they have been fashioned; the first, in fact, is a
"third system" with respect to States Parties, a system whose unique competence is the
subsidiary protection of fundamental rights; the second is instead in charge of
safeguarding the uniform implementation and interpretation of norms being mainly
targeted at the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, developed from the
original idea of a "common market" envisaged in the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
Admittedly, the contact between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and
human rights happened almost accidentally, when the Court of Justice (CJEU) assumed
competence over the latter in order to avoid serfdom to domestic judges, and specifically
to Constitutional Courts. Since 1965, when the Italian Constitutional Court first outlined
the theory of "counter-limits" in the Acciaierie S. Michele ruling, the CJEU has radically
Assistant Professor of EU Law, Luiss "Guido Carli" (Rome, Italy).
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November
1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953, UNTS, vol. 213, 221.
2 As is commonly known, the process of European integration (apart from sector-based treaties, such as the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community) started with the Treaty of Rome (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
adopted Rome 25 March 1957 and entered into force 1 January 1958, UNTS, vol. 294, 17), then coupled with the
Treaty on European Union, adopted Maastricht 7 February 1992, OJ 1992 C 191/1, both lastly modified by the
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community,
signed Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ 2007 C 306/1.
Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 27 December 1965, no. 98, Acciaierie S. Michele, IL FORO ITALIANO,
vol. 1, 8 (1966). On this point, see Ugo Villani, I diritti fondamentali tra Carta di Nizza, Convenzione europea dei
diritti dell'uomo e progetto di Costituzione europea, IL DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA, 73 (2004), now in UGo VILLANI,
STUDI SU LA PROTEZIONE INTERNAZIONALE DEI DIRITTI UMANI 131, 132 (2005).
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modified its case law, introducing human rights into the (then) community law and taking
upon itself the competence to assess the conformity of the (then) community acts with
such rights.4
From then on, the issue of the protection of human rights in community law (and then in
EU law) has marked a share of the debate on the potential developments of European
integration, even though the major efforts have been concentrated on how to guarantee
respect of the democratic principle. In fact, the circle connecting the law-making process
and its source of legitimacy - popular sovereignty - was still far from coming full, for two
main reasons. First, the European Parliament (EP) - the institution representing that
popular sovereignty - did not participate in the legislative process, instead only being
assigned a merely advisory role. Second, the very nature of the EP, whose members were
not elected by direct universal suffrage, was problematic. The resulting so-called
"democratic deficit", which characterized the original institutional structure of the EEC,
was filled, though only partially, by the introduction of direct elections to the EP in 19766
(firstly implemented during the elections of 1979) and by the strengthening of its powers
(perfected with the Maastricht Treaty), in particular by the adoption of the co-decision
procedure.
Following the consolidation of this process - and particularly following the codification of
the human rights-related jurisprudence of the CJEU, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty7
- and with a view to its further enhancement, attention has been directed to the system of
rights protection. This has involved determining the formal inclusion of a binding
catalogue of rights in the treaty framework (which only occurred with the reform of Article
6 TEU introduced by the Lisbon Treaty), on the one hand, and the development of a
4 Case 29-69, Erich Stauder v. Stadt Ulm - Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
See Ugo Villani, Principi democratici e diritti fondamentali nella "Costituzione europea," LA COMUNITA
INTERNAZIONALE 643 (2005).
See decision of the representatives of the Member States meeting in the Council relating to the Act concerning
the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom, OJ
1976 L 278/1.
7Article F(2) of the Maastricht Treaty reads, "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law."
8 See, at the outset, European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COM (79) 210 final 2 May 1979,
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1 (Supplement 2/79).
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regulation aimed at bridging the EU legal order and the specialized system of human rights
protection centered on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), on the other. 10
Pending the conclusion of the process of EU accession to the ECHR, which was initially
ruled out by the CJEU 11 and then made feasible by the Lisbon Treaty reform of Article 6
TEU,12 the interplay between the two Courts has been inspired by a tendency to avoid
open conflicts on the occasion of decisions involving adjudication on the scope of
fundamental rights. Since the EU is not yet party to the ECHR, what is seen more
ostensibly than open conflict is State Parties difficulty with compliance when the courts of
the EU and ECHR legal systems take different stances on an issue.
In the following pages, we will outline the relationship between the two Courts in three
different scenarios: 1) prior to the EU's accession to the ECHR; II) following the (possible)
accession; and Ill) pending the accession process, particularly in the light of the negative
opinion given by the CJEU in December 2014.
B. The Relationship Between Luxembourg and Strasbourg
I. Pre-Accession
In the vast majority of cases thus far, the CJEU has sought to avoid the risk of conflict. This
has often inspired an alignment of its interpretation of human rights with the
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court; one may bear in mind, in this context, the ruling in
the Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission case.14 There, the CJEU aligned its case law to
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was solemnly proclaimed at Nice by the EP, the
Council, and the Commission on 7 December 2000 (OJ 2000 C 364/1). A second version of the Charter (with few
modifications) was then again proclaimed by the same institutions at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007 (OJ 2007 C
303/1), with a view to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, whose Article 1(8) has replaced Art. 6 TEU so as to
make the Charter binding ("[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007,
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties," (emphasis added)).
10 Article 6(2) TEU reads: "[t]he Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the
Treaties." On alternative (and then set aside) solutions, different from the accession, see Jean Paul Jacque, The
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
COMMON MKT. L. R. 995, 998 (2011).
1 See Advisory Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759.
12 See supra footnote 10.
13 See PAUL GRAGL, THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs 50(2013).
14 Case C185/95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, 1998 E.C.R. 1-8417.
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the jurisprudence of the ECtHR not only regarding the reasonable duration of legal process,
but also regarding Article 41 ECHR - the provision that foresees the possibility for the
ECtHR to afford just satisfaction to the applicant whose fundamental rights have been
violated. In fact, the CJEU reduced the amount of the fine which had initially been imposed
on the appellant by the (then) Court of First Instance, following its decision that the
procedure before that Court had violated Article 6 ECHR.
15
Another case worthy of mention is the ruling in Krombach v. Bamberski, in which the
CJEU recalled the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the right of every person charged with an
offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer. It did so in order to endorse the possibility
for a domestic judge to deny the enforcement of a ruling passed by a judge of another
State on the basis of Article 27(1) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 16
Another significant example is the Carpenter judgment, in which the CJEU resorted to the
case law of the Strasbourg Court on Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family
life) to declare that the removal of a third country national, married to a provider of
services who was a national of a Member State, was contrary to Article 49 TEC (freedom to
provide services).
More recently, and stressing the necessity of jurisdictional supervision over the United
Nations Security Council system of targeted sanctions against alleged Al-Qaeda terrorists,
the CJEU invoked the Strasbourg jurisprudence which made the same point, and it
considered the inadequacy of that system of sanctions with particular reference to the
effectiveness of its judicial review.
Whilst these cases are all instances of CJEU deference to - or alignment with - the
Strasbourg Court, there are, at the same time, also instances of ECtHR deference to the
Luxembourg Court. This can be noticed in its numerous cross-references to CJEU
jurisprudence, used ad adiuvandum, such as the one concerning the non-retroactivity of
judicial decisions to the detriment of the principle of legitimate expectation, and that
regarding the notion of "civil right" set forth in Article 6 ECHR, in which the ECtHR made
15 Case C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v. Andre Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1935.
16 According to which "[a] judgment shall not be recognised: 1) if such recognition is contrary to public policy in
the State in which recognition is sought."
17 Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6279.
18 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, European Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah
Kadi, 2013 E.C.R 518.
19 Eur. Court H.R., Marckx v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A, No. 31.
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explicit mention of the notion of "public service" elaborated by the CJEU.20 Most
importantly, this deference is demonstrated by the great caution exercised by the ECtHR
when ruling on EU actions, which, of course, fall virtually outside its jurisdiction. Indeed,
although the ECtHR has (rightly) always avoided any direct judicial review of EU acts, it has
sometimes found itself adjudicating on the conduct of EU Member States implementing EU
legislation. At such times, the Strasbourg Court has, on one hand, resorted to self-restraint,
by elaborating the "equivalent protection" criterion (which, where not satisfied, opens to
an indirect judicial review of EU law);21 on the other hand, the ECtHR did not even
acknowledge the prerequisites of this criterion, consequently proceeding with such an
indirect judicial review very rarely. 22
In reality, as legal scholars have emphasized,23 there have been cases in which the attitude
of reciprocal deference manifested by the two Courts has given way to an evident contrast
between their interpretations of certain human rights. This occurred, at least initially, with
reference to the extension of the right to respect for private and family life to business
premises, which was excluded by the Luxembourg Court and subsequently upheld by the
Strasbourg Court.24 It also happened in relation to the prohibition to disclose information
on foreign medical clinics practicing abortion, which was deemed legitimate by the CJEU in
the light of the dispositions on the free movement of services, but was judged illicit by the
ECtHR, on grounds of conflict with Article 10 ECHR.25 Finally, a conflict has emerged
between the two Courts over the issue of the impossibility for parties to submit written
observations in response to the Advocate General's submissions. Whilst the Luxembourg
20 Eur. Court H.R., Pellegrin v. France, Judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-
Vill.
21 Eur. Court H.R., Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Judgment of 30 June 2005,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI, and, quite before it, Eur. Comm. H.R., M. & Co. v. Germany,
Decision of 9 February 1990, Decisions and Reports 64. On this issue see Alessandra Gianelli, L'adesione
dell'Unione europea ala CEDU secondo il Trattato di Lisbona, IL DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 678, 681 (2009);
Nicola Napoletano, L'evoluzione della tutela dei dirittifondamentali nell'Unione europea, in LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI
UMANI IN EUROPA 3, 40 (Andrea Caligiuri, Giuseppe Cataldi, & Nicola Napoletano eds., 2010).
22 To tell the truth, the ECtHR has scrutinized indirectly EU law only in cases where Member States had a certain
discretionary power in implementing it. See Eur. Court H.R., Matthews v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 18
February 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-1.
23 Villani, supra footnote 3, at 152.
24 See, respectively, Joined Cases C-46/87 and C-227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, and Eur. Court H.R., Niemitz v. Germany, Judgment of 16 December 1992, Series
A, No. 251-B.
25 See Case C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Stephen Grogan and
others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685; see Eur. Court H.R., Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Judgment of 29
October 1992, Series A, No. 246-A.
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Court has held this to be in line with the right to a fair hearing, in a similar case (concerning
the reply to an opinion of the Public Prosecutor before the Belgian Court of Cassation), the
Strasbourg Court declared it to be contrary to the right to adversarial proceedings. 26
The risk of divergent interpretations, albeit not destined to materialize systematically, has
not been erased by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which became binding
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 52(3) of the Charter27 does not
guarantee with absolute certainty the complete consistency of the jurisprudence of the
CJEU with that of the ECtHR.28 As is well known, the criterion of the more extensive
protection is not always a feasible way to resolve a contrast deriving from the potentially
different scopes of the conflicting human rights in question. In fact, they are often in a
relation of reciprocal opposition, so that a broader expansion of one right implies a heavier
limitation of the other (one may consider, for example, the interplay between freedom of
expression and the right to privacy),29 thus rendering the criterion of the more extensive
protection an indecisive one.
IL Accession Scenarios
Confronted with this situation, which is at most inadequate to guarantee the full respect of
human rights by the EU (and by its Member States, when implementing EU law), its
Members opted, after a long and laborious route, for (EU) accession to the ECHR. This was
going to be regulated, at first, by the Draft Revised Accession Agreement elaborated by the
EU and the Council of Europe.30 It raises the question of the kinds of effects that accession
would have had on the relationship between the two Courts, and of whether accession, as
set out in the Agreement, was capable of finally and completely settling the existing lack of
external control over the respect of human rights by the Union.
26 See Case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. 1-665; see Eur. Court H.R., Vermeulen v.
Belgium, Judgment of 20 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-1.
27 "In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same
as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection."
28 See Villani, supra note 3, at 151.
29 Id. at 159.
30 Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in Fifth Negotiations Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group
and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human
Rights, Final report to the CDDH, 10 June 2013, 47+1(2013)008rev2, at 4, available atwww.coe.int/cddh.
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EU accession to the ECHR has unquestionable advantages that, nonetheless, presuppose a
new balance of interplay between the two Courts. The relationship between the two
Courts could not, for instance, only be based on so-called "cross-fertilization", even if this
has been and will be fundamental. Whilst the two Courts would continue to influence each
other, from the moment of accession the last word would surely rest with the Court of
Strasbourg, and it would be for the EU to implement its judgments under the supervision
of the Committee of Ministers. This is a fundamental premise, since the norms of the ECHR
- to which Member States have resolved to make the EU accede and which acknowledge
the ECtHR as ultimate judge of human rights norms - do away with any doubt as to the
"supremacy" of the Court of Strasbourg. It suffices to look at the effect of the Strasbourg
jurisprudence on the legal systems of Member States to understand that the latter have
undergone adjustments to comply with the former and not vice versa. As far as Italy is
concerned, for example, one may mention, among many instances, the case law regarding
the reasonable duration of process, the case law concerning the so-called reverse
accession in the expropriation procedure,32 and, perhaps even more significantly, the case
law on the overturning of final decisions following a later ruling by the ECtHR. 33
Nevertheless, the "primacy" of the ECHR system should not be exaggerated. On one hand,
the ECtHR, as it is commonly known, has a subsidiary nature, with the primary
responsibility for the enforcement of human rights norms resting on High Contracting
Parties. On the other hand, Strasbourg judges have the use of a tool that allows them to
avoid imposing excessive pressure on the monitored legal orders (included the EU one),
providing national (and Union) authorities with a relevant discretionary space, or - in other
words - with a margin of appreciation. After all, in case of irreparable conflicts (that in any
case happen very rarely), the constitutional jurisprudence of domestic courts has deemed
it possible to resort to the theory of counter-limits, even towards the ECHR, as interpreted
by the Court of Strasbourg. This happened recently - and, as far as we know, for the first
31 See Michelangela Scalabrino, L'irragionevole durata dei processi italiani e la L. 24 marzo 2001, n. 89: un
commodus discessus, RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DEI DIRITTI DELL'UOMO 365 (2001); Anton Giulio Lana, I tempi del
processo e /'equa riparazione a quattro anni doll'entrata in vigore della c.d. legge Pinto, in LA TUTELA INTERNAZIONALE
DEI DIRITTI UMANI. NORME, GARANZIE, PRASSI 496 (Laura Pineschi ed., 2006).
32 See Ugo Villani, L'occupazione acquisitiva dinanzi al/a Corte europea dei diritto dell'uomo, STUDI
SULL'INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA 23 (2006).
3 Andrea Saccucci, Obblighi di riparazione e revisione dei processi nella Convenzione europea dei diritti umani,
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 618 (2002); Pietro Pustorino, Esecuzione delle sentenze della Corte europea dei
diritti umani e revisione dei processi penali: sviluppi nella giurisprudenza italiana, DIRITTI UMANI E DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE 678 (2007); Marina Castellaneta, La riapertura dei processi penali a seguito di pronunce della Corte
europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in STUDI IN ONORE DI V. STARACE vol. 1, 59 (2008); Gli effetti del giudicato italiano dopo
la sentenza n. 113/2011 della Corte Costituzionale, Roudtable with contributions by Giovanni Canzio, Roberto E.
Kostoris, Antonio Ruggeri, RIVISTA AIC (2011), available at www.rivistaaic.it.
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time - in the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court, which held that a disposition
of the Finance Law 2007 on the pension calculation was compliant with the principle of fair
trial, notwithstanding that the same disposition had been judged contrary to Article 6
ECHR by the ECtHR in Maggio. 34 The CJEU, which is no stranger to recourse to the theory
of counter-limits, has also, as the Kadi case has clearly shown,35 availed itself of this last-
resort defense mechanism.
Having said that, the Court of Strasbourg will be able to shed light on certain aspects of EU
law that are still in the shade, at least in connection with respect for human rights. There
are multiple examples and they are far from being of ancillary nature. In some cases, the
same competences of the CJEU within the EU represent an impediment to its supervision
over the respect of such rights; in these instances, the contribution of the ECtHR (virtually
the only judge enabled to hold a pronunciation) will be fundamental. This is the case of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a field in which the Luxembourg Court is
(almost) deprived of any competence. It is also the case of the activity of the Agencies,
which with difficulty could be brought to the consideration of the Court of Luxembourg. An
example is Frontex, the European Agency charged with managing operational cooperation
34 Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 28 November 2012, n. 264, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, 616
(2013), with a comment of Benedetto Conforti, La Corte costituzionale applica la teoria dei controlimiti (see also
Pietro Pustorino, Corte costituzionale, CEDU e controlimiti, GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 769 (2013)); Eur. Court H.R.,
Maggio and others v. Italy, Judgment of 31 May 2011.
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351. On the use of
counter-limits by the CJEU see, among others, Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Kadi Case-Constitutional
Core Values and International Law-Finding the Balance? EUR. J. INT'L L. 1015, 1017 (2012).
According to Article 24(1) TEU, "[...] [t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with
respect to these provisions [in matters of CFSP], with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with
Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of
Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." Article 40 TEU refers to the dividing line
between CFSP and the remaining competences of the EU ("]t]he implementation of the common foreign and
security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions
laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall
not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the
Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter"); Article 275 TFEU to the "restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty
on European Union"-measures whose implementation is devolved upon Article 215 TFEU ("1. Where a decision,
adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or
reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It shall inform the European
Parliament thereof. 2. Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on
European Union so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in
paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities [...]").
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at the external frontiers of EU Member States, and that, as further proof of the
powerlessness of the CJEU, has only recently been subject to an investigation by the
European Ombudsman - which highlighted the non-compliance with human rights of
certain aspects of its activities.37
In other cases, the jurisprudence of the Court of Luxembourg has caused concern
regarding its conformity with human rights, meaning that an external check by the Court of
Strasbourg would be useful here too. One may think of the case law concerning the
standing of natural and legal persons to challenge EU acts, often accused - even by the
same Advocates General of the CJEU - of curtailing the right to jurisdictional protection of
rights; or, again, of the jurisprudence on the direct effect of EU rules that, at least with
regard to directives, has been narrowed by the CJEU so as to cover only vertical legal
relationships, leading to a potential violation of the non-discrimination principle; or,
eventually, of the case law on the illegitimacy of a norm of EU secondary law in contrast
with a disposition set forth in an EU agreement, which the CJEU has made contingent upon
the circumstance in which the latter is provided with direct effect.40
Nonetheless, EU accession would also imply some risks linked to the new relationship in
which the two Courts would find themselves. First of all, notwithstanding all the
precautions set out in the Draft Revised Accession Agreement, one may not exclude that
the Court of Strasbourg could interfere in the structure of the division of competences
between the EU and its Member States. Indeed, the co-respondent mechanism does not
fully protect against this risk; Article 3(5) of the Draft Revised Accession Agreement
foresees the putting in place of a filtering mechanism by the Court of Strasbourg which, in
accepting a request of a High Contracting Party to become co-respondent, would have to
consider whether some criteria (set out in Article 3, paragraphs 2 or 3 as appropriate) are
met.41 The ECtHR would, in other words, determine whether an alleged violation by a
17 On this point we take the liberty to refer to our La cooperazione fra Unione europea e paesi del Nordafrica nella
lotta all'immigrazione irregolare, in ATLANTE GEOPOLITICO DEL MEDITERRANEO 15 (Francesco Anghelone & Andrea
Ungari, 2014).
SUGO VILLANI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 345 (3 ed. 2013).
9 Id. at 287.
40 Id. at 354.
41 "When deciding upon such a request [to become co-respondent], the Court shall assess whether, in the light of
the reasons given by the High Contracting Party concerned, it is plausible that the conditions in paragraph 2 or
paragraph 3 of this article are met." According to para. 2, "[w]here an application is directed against one or more
member States of the European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings in
respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the
compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols to which the European Union
has acceded of a provision of European Union law, including decisions taken under the Treaty on European Union
and under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, notably where that violation could have been
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Member State results from the implementation of an obligation imposed by the Union, or
whether an alleged violation by the EU is consequential on the implementation of an
obligation stipulated in the Treaties, which have been agreed upon by Member States. This
means that the ECtHR could incidentally end up evaluating the division of competences
between the EU and its Member States, which is exactly what the Draft Revised Accession
Agreement seeks to avoid.
In addition, proceedings regarding alleged violations by the EU would last longer than
those regarding potential breaches by Member States. Indeed, in instances in which the
conduct of the EU could not be brought directly before the Luxembourg judges to
challenge its compatibility with human rights,42 and in which there is then eventually
resort to the subsidiary protection under the ECHR, it would be necessary to satisfy not
only the prerequisite of the full exhaustion of domestic remedies but also the request of a
preliminary ruling before the Court of Luxembourg. Indeed, the Draft Revised Accession
Agreement (Article 3(6)) stipulates that where (for whatever reason)43 the case has not yet
been referred for a preliminary ruling before being brought to the Court of Strasbourg, the
latter shall adjourn the examination of the case to await the pronunciation of the Court of
Luxembourg. All in all, (certain) proceedings involving the protection of human rights
against EU breaches would have to pass through both domestic judges and the
Luxembourg Court before finally reaching the Court of Strasbourg. Such lengthy
proceedings would almost certainly result in a potential (and paradoxical) violation of
Article 6 ECHR. And this is in the best case scenario; for the length of the process could,
indeed, be further stretched by other incidental procedures, such as the deferment of the
case to the Constitutional Court by a trial judge doubting that a EU act whose conformity
avoided only by disregarding an obligation under European Union law." While paragraph 3 reads, "[w]here an
application is directed against the European Union, the European Union member States may become co-
respondents to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such
allegation calls into question the compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the
protocols to which the European Union has acceded of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union or any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those
instruments, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under
those instruments."
42 One may refer, for example, to an action for annulment against an act of the Commission on the safeguard of
competition.
43 The reference for preliminary ruling is not compulsory in the case of the lower courts and even, in some cases,
for the upper courts, although where it is compulsory there is always the possibility that the judge will rule the
matter not relevant and therefore not refer it for preliminary ruling. On this point, see VILLANI, supra note 38, at
373.
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to human rights has been already asserted by the Luxembourg Court can also stand the
domestic obstacle of "counter-limits". 44
1/. In the Aftermath of Advisory Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU
As is well known, the Draft Revised Accession Agreement was submitted to the scrutiny of
the CJEU, which was called, by virtue of Article 218(11) TFEU, to give its opinion.
Predictably, it was negative,45 though the range and depth of the doubts expressed by the
Court of Justice was unexpected. However, in the Opinion handed down by the CJEU, it is
possible, from many points of view, to discern a validation of the crucial point of the
analysis presented in this article.
What emerges in the Opinion is the CJEU's clear perception of the role that the Strasbourg
Court would play upon accession. The CJEU isolates, with surgical precision, the spaces left
open by the Agreement to possible intrusions of the ECtHR, acting as a judge of "last
resort". These are spaces created in the absence of a coordination between Article 53
ECHR and Article 53 of the Charter;46 in the decisions with which the ECtHR decrees (i) on
44 This scenario is most likely to further complicate with the entry into force of the ECHR Protocol No. 16 that
allows Constitutional Courts (and, more generally, high courts and tribunals indicated by the High Contracting
Parties) to request the Strasbourg Court to give advisory opinions in the context of a case pending before them.
45 Opinion 2/13, pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/. For the first
comments, see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a Christmas bombshell from
the European Court of Justice, U.K. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BLOG, available at ukconstitutionallaw.org (2014); Henri
Labayle, La guerre des juges n'aura pas lieu. Tantmieux? Libres propos sur l'avis 2/13 de la Cour de justice relatifa
l'adhesion de l'Union a la CEDH, RESEAU UNIVERSITAIRE EUROPEEN DEDIEA ['ETUDE DU DROIT DE L'ESPACE DE LIBERTE, SECURITE
ET JUSTICE, available at www.gdr-elsj.eu (2014); Tobias Lock, Oops! We did it again-the CJEU's Opinion on EU
Accession to the ECHR, VERFBLOG, available atwww.verfassungsblog.de (2014); Walther Michl, Thou shalt have no
other courts before me, VERFBLOG, available at www.verfassungsblog.de (2014); Steve Peers, The CJEU and the
EU's accession to the ECHR: a clear and present danger to human rights protection, EU LAW ANALYSIS. EXPERT INSIGHT
INTO EU LAW DEVELOPMENTS, available at eulawanalysis.blogspot.it (2014); Lucia Serena Rossi, 1/ Parere 2/13 della
CGUE sull'adesione dell'UE alla CEDU: scontro fra Corti?, SIDIBLOG, available at www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/ (2014);
Martin Scheinin, CIEU Opinion 2/13-Three Mitigating Circumstances, VERFBLOG, available at
www.verfassungsblog.de (2014); Simone Vezzani, "Gl' tutto sbagliato, gl'd tutto do rifore!": la Corte di giustizia
frena l'adesione dell'UE alla CEDU, SIDIBLOG, available at www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/ (2014).
46 Opinion 2/13, 187-195, 189, which reads, "[i]n so far as Article 53 of the ECHR [stating that 'Nothing in this
Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
party'] essentially reserves the power of the Contracting Parties to lay down higher standards of protection of
fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the ECHR, that provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of
the Charter ['Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law
and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States'
constitutions'], as interpreted by the Court of Justice, so that the power granted to Member States by Article 53
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the request of Member States or the EU to become co-respondent,47 (ii) on the
apportionment of responsibility between the Union and its Member States in the presence
of an ostensible identity of views between the latter,48 (iii) on the nature of the question of
law at issue in the proceedings before the ECtHR which, if identical to a question which has
already been solved by the CJEU, prevents the latter to be priory involved;49 and finally,
and most of all, insofar as the CJEU affirms that, exactly in a field which is taken away from
its scrutiny - and, therefore, in which the ECtHR can play an incisive role, in respect to the
protection of human rights -, the exclusive nature of the control the latter would exercise
could jeopardize "the specific characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial review of
acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU in CFSP matters." 5 0
The Opinion of the CJEU, aside from its content (which is destined to create many
problems on the way to the accession), has many chances to negatively influence even the
current relationship between the two Courts, most of all due to the animus it shows. As
legal scholars have not failed to point out, the horizon perhaps conceals a break in the
spirit of reciprocal deference that, as we earlier noted, has characterized their relationship.
This could involve, firstly, the possible desertion, by the Court of Strasbourg, of the
doctrine of equivalent protection, which has, thus far, prevented it from scrutinizing
(indirectly) acts of the Union. Moreover, it has to be considered that this "narcissistic"
Opinion has been delivered by the CJEU in the midst of what is a very critical climate for
the Union, whose detractors have now been supplied with another element of disapproval:
the fact of facing a legal order which shelters behind its uniqueness, certified by "its"
Court, with the purpose of escaping an external system of control - a system which, on the
contrary, has been accepted, and with many advantages for the protection of human
rights, by the very same States which have given life to the European legal order.
of the ECHR is limited [...] to that which is necessary to ensure that the level of protection provided for by the
Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised", emphasis added.
47 Id. at 222-25, 224 ("[.] in carrying out that review, the ECtHR would be required to assess the rules of EU law
governing the division of powers between the EU and its Member States as well as the criteria for the attribution
of their acts or omissions, in order to adopt a final decision in that regard which would be binding both on the
Member States and on the EU.").
48 Id. at 229-35.
49 Id. at 236-41.
5o Id. at 249, 257.
51 Rossi, supra note 45. On this point see, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, Bosphorus Post-Accession: Redefining the
Relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the Parties to the Convention, in THE EU ACCESSION
TO THE ECHR 177 (Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris, & Vassili P. Tzevelekos eds., 2014).
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A. Preliminary Remarks
On 2 October 2013, Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). The
protocol, that has so far been signed by sixteen States and ratified by Albania, Georgia,
Lithuania, San Marino and Slovenia,' will enter into force in case of ratification by at least
ten Member States. If the protocol becomes effective, it will expand the European Court of
Human Rights' competence to give advisory opinionS upon request by domestic high
courts and tribunals.
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1 According to the chart of signatures and ratifications, as of 20 April 2015 and since the date of opening for
signatures, Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,
Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine had signed Protocol no. 16, while Albania, Georgia,
Lithuania, San Marino, and Slovenia also ratified it.
2 Prior to the adoption of the protocol, a very limited advisory competence was already conferred on the Court,
on the basis of Article 47 ECHR. However, an advisory opinion could be requested only by the Committee of
Ministers and could be delivered by the Court only on issues not involving the interpretation of the rights
provided in the Convention. The strong limits, ratione personae as well as ratione materiae, in order to request
and obtain an opinion, made the clause ineffective: in fact, since the adoption of the Convention, the Court has
only delivered two opinions re Article 47. On this point, see Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Noreen O'Meara, Advisory
Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: A Magic Bullet for dialogue and docket-control?, 3 LEGAL
STUDs. 444-68 (2014).
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Indeed, the aim of the protocol is to guarantee greater involvement of domestic judges in
the Convention system. It aims at securing the correct interpretation and implementation
of Convention rights through a strong interaction with the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR). The protocol, in fact, is perfectly in line with the final telos of the ECHR and
of the CoE in general, which was established in the aftermath of one of the most brutal
conflicts in world history in order to provide legal mechanisms for the implementation of
the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
However, there is a danger that a mechanism established to fulfill such prominent
objectives might collide with some concrete problematic aspects, concerning, in particular,
the interaction between national and supranational judicial systems. The fulfillment of
these objectives might be frustrated by possible conflicts over the competences of
ordinary and Constitutional Courts, at the domestic level, as well as between constitutional
judges and the ECtHR, and over the complex triangular relationship between Constitutional
Courts, the ECtHR, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), at the
supranational level. In particular, the reaction of Constitutional Courts is a matter of
concern. This is particularly so given that these Courts have, since the end of the Second
World War, been considered to be the main actors in the protection of fundamental rights
in Europe, and are now sidelined by supranational courts and by the direct relationship the
latter have either with ordinary judges or citizens.
In the following article it is argued that, on the one hand, and also in the light of the
experience accrued within other supranational systems, Protocol No. 16 could represent a
challenge for Constitutional Courts' autonomy when dealing with constitutional review of
legislation. This is because the advisory opinion mechanism might trigger a centralization in
the interpretation of fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR in the hands of the ECtHR -
fundamental rights that are likewise enshrined in national Constitutions. On the other
hand, the effective enforcement of the new mechanism largely relies on the attitude that
will be shown by national courts, first of all by constitutional judges, as well as the ECtHR
itself in using this device. In the end, not only are the Contracting Parties of the ECHR free
to decide on whether to sign Protocol No. 16 and to determine which national courts
constitute "highest courts and tribunals," but the (authorized) national judges also enjoy
discretion about the extent to which they want to resort to the ECtHR's advisory opinions.
In other words, the degree of engagement in the European judicial conversation depends
primarily on national Constitutional Courts and on the extent to which they see themselves
As stated by the judges of the European Court of Human Rights-and in particular by Frangois Tulkens, vice-
President of the European Court of Human Rights at that time-at a Seminar held in Strasbourg, on 27 January
2012, How can we ensure greater involvement of national courts in the Convention system? The report of the
seminar is available on the ECtHR's website at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2012_ENG.pdf.
Among the scholars, see Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L'6largissement de la compdtence consultative de la Cour
europdenne des droits de l'homme-A propos du Protocole no 16 a la Convention europdenne des droits de
l'homme 97 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 9-29 (2014).
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as "agents" shaping European constitutional space.4 The attitude of the ECtHR, in terms of
its activism or, rather, self-restraint, in exploiting the requests for advisory opinions for
strengthening its authoritative interpretation of the ECHR, can also make a critical
difference.
However, for a Constitutional Court that decides to use the new mechanism, it might be
difficult for it to disregard the opinion of the ECtHR, as well as the opinions rendered to
other Courts on the same grounds and on similar factual situations. Given the dominant
model of centralized review of legislation in Europe, this could limit the inclination of a
Constitutional Court to employ the advisory opinion mechanism extensively.
Nevertheless, it cannot be neglected that Protocol No. 16 has the merit to support, at least
formally, the strengthening of the relationship between the ECtHR and the highest
domestic judges, albeit that it does so only in one direction. For whilst national courts seek
guidance from the ECtHR on the interpretation of ECHR rights, the ECtHR cannot seek
guidance from national Constitutional Courts on the interpretation of the same rights
under national Constitutions.
This article aims to analyze both the strengths and the weaknesses of the new mechanism
introduced by Protocol No. 16. It attempts to foresee what the attitude of Constitutional
Courts vis-h-vis the new advisory opinions could be, by drawing inspiration from a
comparative analysis with the practices of the preliminary reference procedure by
Constitutional Courts before the CJEU and with the advisory opinion mechanism of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR). The article proceeds as follows. Section B
considers the practice of judicial interaction between domestic courts and the ECtHR. It
starts from the context in which the "dialogue protocol" was drafted-a context
characterized by the changing role of domestic judges in the control of conventionality and
in the relationship with Constitutional Courts, in particular where constitutional review of
legislation is centralized, as in most European countries. Section C then analyzes the
differences and similarities of the new ECtHR advisory opinion mechanism in the light of
the EU preliminary reference procedure, aiming to highlight the potential reception of the
former by Constitutional Courts. Section D focuses on the jurisdiction of the ICHR to render
advisory opinions upon referral by national authorities, as a case study that can allow for
some predictions regarding the foreseeable impact of Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR on
Constitutional Courts. Finally, Section E sets out the conclusions of this Article, and
considers the results of the comparative analysis.
4 On this point, see Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about
the Preliminary Ruling, in this Special Issue.
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B. Protocol no. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights: A New Role for
Domestic Judges?
I. The Evolving Role of Domestic Judges in the Convention System
The expansion of the role of domestic judges in the implementation of the ECHR, through
interaction among judges as well as with the ECtHR, was already underway before the
adoption of the protocol. After all, this was a legal requirement of the principle of
subsidiarity, which is one of the cornerstones of the entire ECHR system.s Indeed,
considering the universal dimension of human rights and the "dialogue" that is in place
among judges, eminent authors have defined the Convention system as a pluralist6 and
cosmopolitan legal order. According to those scholars, in this new and complex system,
the relationship between institutions and sources of law is no longer based on the principle
of hierarchy, but rather follows, on the contrary, the principle of heterarchy ("an
interaction of different sub-orders that is not subject to common legal rules but takes a
more open, political form""), in which the judges play a central role.
However, the existing legal order is far from being perfect; it is based on a general principle
the implementation of which is reserved mainly to informal and voluntary mechanisms.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that domestic judges are the masters of the correct
interpretation and implementation of fundamental rights, through mechanisms such as
judicial interpretation and, in more problematic cases, review of domestic legislation,
taking the ECHR as a standard. When performing these functions, domestic judges are
often engaged in a dialogue with the European Court, whose case law is taken as a
benchmark for the correct interpretation of fundamental rights. However, this dialogue is
mainly indirect, is often hidden,9 and is completely based on the will of national judges,
who can deliberately decide to avoid any confrontation with the European judge.
According to Artcile 35(1) ECHR, "The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have
been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken." This principle is even reinforced by the recently
adopted Protocol no. 15 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
6 On pluralism in the Convention system, see Nico Krish, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law,
11 LSE LAw, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS (2007).
7On the ECHR as a cosmopolitan legal order, with the European Court as a "Constitutional Court," see Alec Stone
Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 53-90 (2012).
8 Nico Krish, The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law, 12 LSE LAw, SOCIETYAND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 2 (2009).
On the cases of hidden or "implied" dialogue, see Rafael Bustos Gisbert, XV Proposiciones generales para una
teoria de los di6logos judiciales, 95 REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 30-31 (2012). Although "hidden,"
this still amount to a form of engagement according to VICKY JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A
TRANSNATIONAL ERA Chapter 3 (2013).
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In this light, this section aims to explore Protocol No. 16, not only as the first formal
instrument of direct interaction between domestic judges and the ECtHR, but also as a new
mechanism that can produce indirect effects on the existing functions of judges, and on
the dialogue among them, for the reinforcement of fundamental rights in Europe. In
analyzing the possible effects of the protocol on the system already in place, it can be
observed that, despite the fact that the introduction of the protocol must be considered an
undeniably crucial step in the process of the expansion of a culture of "European rights,"
important problems nevertheless remain unresolved. In particular, the mechanism of
judicial referral to the European Court in order to obtain advisory opinions risks adding
further complexity to an already complex landscape. In this context, the realization of the
risk of confusion between the functions of ordinary and constitutional courts, to the
detriment of the role of Constitutional courts, could be one of the major shortcomings.
IL The "Dialogue Protocol"
As was hoped for by scholars quite a long time ago, 10 at the 2012 Brighton Conference it
was stated that:
The Conference... notes that the interaction between
the Court and national authorities could be
strengthened by the introduction into the Convention
of a further power of the Court, which States Parties
could optionally accept, to deliver advisory opinions
upon request on the interpretation of the Convention
in the context of a specific case at domestic level.
The idea that the correct implementation and interpretation of fundamental rights at the
domestic level is strictly connected with a well-balanced cooperation between domestic
judges and the ECtHR emerges clearly. Indeed, on the basis of these general principles, the
Preamble to Protocol No. 16 states that the power to give advisory opinions upon judicial
referral aims to "further enhance the interaction between the Court and national
authorities and thereby reinforce implementation of the Convention, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity." 1 2
10 Frangoise Benoit-Rohmer, Les perspectives de reformes a long terme de la Cour Europeenne des droits de
I'homme: "certiorari versus renvoiprejudiciel" REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE ['HOMME 7-8 (2002).
11 Brighton Declaration, 12.d.
12 Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR, Preamble.
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Therefore, with the aim of strengthening the dialogue between domestic judges and the
ECtHR, Article 1.1 of the Protocol confers to the "highest courts and tribunals of a High
Contracting Party" the power to "request the Court to give advisory opinions." The courts
authorized to refer shall be indicated by each Contracting Party, by means of a declaration
that shall be submitted at the time of the signature or ratification of the protocol. The
declaration is not binding, since Parties retain the power to modify it at any time.13
The jurisdictions authorized to seek an advisory opinion should be involved in a pending
process.14 This means that among the authorities indicated by the Contracting Parties, only
those effectively exercising judicial power in the context of a pending process can seek an
opinion from the ECtHR. Therefore, the referral has a concrete nature, with abstract
review of legislation not being allowed.s
The decision of the ECtHR regarding judicial referral is not considered to be the last stage
of domestic controversies. Its aim, rather, is to give an opinion only on "questions of
principle relating to the interpretation or application" of the ECHR rights and freedoms.
Here, the analogy with the power of referral of tribunals to Constitutional Courts in the
majority of the European systems of constitutional review of legislation is evident.
Moreover, even the task of interpreting the legal issues concerning fundamental rights
protected under the ECHR is not left entirely to the ECtHR, for the decision of the Court is
to be based on the legal and factual background of the pending case provided by the
17domestic jurisdiction. This means that even the question of interpretation is not to be
simply transferred to the ECtHR, but is to be solved on the basis of the interaction between
the "preliminary" interpretation of the domestic judge and the "final" interpretation of the
ECtHR. To this end, the domestic judge is to present, in particular: (i) the subject matter of
the domestic case and the relevant findings of fact; (ii) the relevant domestic legal
provisions and the Convention issues raised; (iii) the arguments of the parties; and (iv), the
views of the domestic judge on the question.
13 Art. 10 of the Protocol.
14 Art. 1.2 of the Protocol.
15 See the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, point 10,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_explanatoryreportENG.pdf [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
16 Art. 1.1 of the Protocol, second part.
17 Art. 1.3 of the Protocol.
18 Explanatory Report at point 12.
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When reading the text of Protocol No. 16, therefore, the aim of its drafters to reinforce the
dialogue among judges in the ECHR system emerges clearly. 9 Nevertheless, when
analyzing the possible concrete effects of its implementation, a number of doubts can be
raised as to its ability to fulfill this overarching aim, as will be demonstrated in the
following paragraphs.
///. The Impact of Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights on the
Existing Functions of Judges and Their Interaction with Supranational Judges
In the ECHR system, domestic judges have always had a crucial role in implementing
fundamental rights,20 and, when necessary, in solving the conflictS21 deriving from the
interaction between supranational and national sources of law. In this regard, reviewing
the studies devoted to this phenomenon, it is possible to classify the functions of judges
into two categories: a) interpretation of domestic legislation in conformity with the ECHR
and, in the event that the conflict cannot be solved by interpretative means, b) review of
domestic legislation deemed to conflict with the ECHR. The second mechanism can take
two forms: (i) the control of conventionality, which is usually performed by ordinary
judges, though sometimes also by Constitutional Courts, and (ii) the control of
constitutionality, performed by Constitutional Courts. Protocol No. 16, which adds the
power of domestic courts and tribunals to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR,
introduces a new mechanism of dialogue between national judges and the ECtHR. This,
however, does not appear able to correct the imperfections of the existing system of
judicial interaction.
1. The Impact of Protocol No. 16 on Judicial Interpretation of Domestic Legislation in
Conformity with the Convention
Following the integration of the ECHR into European legal systems, the interpretative
power of domestic judges started to become more relevant.22 Judicial interpretation,
19 It is not by chance that the President of the European Court of Human Rights, Dean Spielmann, in his speeches
defined the protocol as "the dialogue protocol", as pointed out, among the Italian scholars, by E. Nalin, I protocolli
n. 15 e 16 ala Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in I GIUDICI DI COMMON LAW E LA (CROSS)FERTILIZATION: I CASI DI
STATI UNITI D'AMERICA, CANADA, UNIONE INDIANA E REGNO UNITO 119-50 (Pamela Martino ed., 2014).
20 Among the Italian scholars, a number of studies by Antonio Ruggeri are devoted to the role of judges in the
multilevel system of fundamental rights. With particular reference to the effects of the adoption of Protocol No.
16 on the expansion of judicial functions, see Antonio Ruggeri, Ragionando sui possibilisviluppi dei rapporti tra le
Corti europee e i giudici nazionali (con specifico riguardo all'adesione dell'Unione al/a Cedu e all'entrata in vigore
del prot. 16), 1 RIVISTA DELL'ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI (2014).
21 On the crucial role of conflicts in the EU legal system, see Giuseppe Martinico, The "Polemical" Spirit of
European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of Conflicts in EU Law, in this Special Issue.
22 According to Jan Polakiewicz, "the main responsibility for ensuring the observance of the Convention in
domestic law lies with the legislature and the judiciary." Jan Polakiewicz, The Status of the Convention in National
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indeed, has the power to "create links between legal orders even in the absence of
expressed norms of connection. 23 Among the mechanisms of coordination between
domestic legal systems and the ECHR, consistent judicial interpretation has, therefore,
emerged as one of the most relevant, reflecting a trend similar to that of the coordination
24between national and supranational systems within the European Union.
In some cases, interpretation that is consistent with the ECHR and its jurisprudence is a
duty imposed on national judges by the statutes incorporating the ECHR, 25 as in the case of
26 27the United Kingdom26 and Ireland. In those cases where statutes do not impose such a
judicial duty, Constitutional Courts often introduce this same rule.28 Consequently, both
types of jurisdiction usually take ECHR jurisprudence into consideration, and, as a result,
ECtHR judgments are often quoted by national jurisdictions, even if they concern other
states. In these cases, an obligation to take into account European and international law in
judicial interpretation is usually considered by Constitutional courts to be indirectly based
Law, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950-
2000, 31-53 (Robert Blackburn& Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001). Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller add also
administrative officials. Alec Stone Sweet, Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, in A
EUROPE OF RIGHTS. THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS, 3-712 (Robert Blackburn& Jorg Polakiewicz
eds., 2008).
23 GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE's LEGAL SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND THE
CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS 6 (2012).
24 In this sense, see Giuseppe Martinico, Is the European Convention Going To Be "Supreme"? A Comparative-
Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 401-24 (2012).
25 As Martinico points out, Art. 10 of the Spanish Constitution, Art. 20(1) of the Romanian Constitution, and Art. 5
of the Bulgarian Constitution are examples of the constitutional duty to follow the European Convention in
judicial interpretation of national legislation. The case of the UK is an example of legal duty of consistent
interpretation. Martinico, supra note 24,
26 Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, indeed, provides that "so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation
and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention
rights."
27 Section 2.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, in fact, states, "[i]n interpreting and applying any
statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as is possible, subject to the rules of law relating to such
interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention
provisions." In so far as the incorporation of the European Convention into domestic systems is concerned, the
cases of UK and Ireland are considered "relatively 'like cases."' See Samantha Besson, The Reception Process in
Ireland and the United Kingdom, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 34-106, supra at note 22.
28 This happens in particular in the Baltic countries. See in particular the cases of Latvia (Constitutional Court,
judgments n. 2000-03-01 of 30 Aug. 2000 and n. 2006-03-0106 of 23 Nov. 2006). All cases are cited by
Martinico, supra note 24.
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on the Constitution, and examples of this include the so-called "hinge provisions" in the
German Basic Law and Article 117 of the Italian Constitution.29
The capacity of the mechanism of consistent judicial interpretation to reinforce the culture
of rights in Europe is more than evident. However, the risk of conflicting interpretations of
the same rights, in some cases even in the same country, is clear. Moreover, this system,
being based only on the will of each court to refer to European standards and case law in
the interpretation of rights, could produce asymmetries. The introduction of the ECtHR's
advisory competence, conferring on the Court a general power to give the "final
interpretation", could offer a solution to these problems. Nevertheless, requesting an
advisory opinion from the ECtHR is not a duty, but a mere right of domestic courts, which
may deliberately decide to forego the "European Court test."
From this perspective, the adoption of Protocol No. 16 does not, therefore, produce any
new positive effects on the existing system of interaction between the jurisprudence of the
European and the domestic courts. This interaction instead remains based on a voluntary
system, the effects of which can vary, depending on the will and the sensitivity of the
actors involved.
However, the picture concerning the effects of the interpretation provided by the ECtHR
on the case law of the domestic courts in case of ratification of the protocol might be more
complicated. Indeed, Article 5 of the Protocol, according to which an advisory opinion,
once adopted, is not binding, must be coordinated with point 27 of the Explanatory
Report, which states that:
They [the advisory opinions] would, however, form
part of the case law of the Court, alongside its
judgments and decisions. The interpretation of the
Convention and the Protocols thereto contained in
such advisory opinions would be analogous in its effect
to the interpretative elements set out by the Court in
judgments and decisions.
Therefore although it is up to the requesting Court to decide on the effects of the opinion
in the pending case,30 it is quite predictable that ECtHR judgments will have a stronger
effect than would be derived from Article 5 of the Protocol-or at least in those cases
29 References to the role of Constitutional Courts in the dialogue with the ECtHR can be found in the reports of the
XVI Conference of the European Constitutional Courts, Vienna, Constitutional Court of Austria, 12-14 May 2014,
devoted to "The cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe. Current situation and perspectives" (available at
http://www.confeuconstco.org).
30 Explanatory report at point 25.
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where the ECtHR will adopt a decision on the basis of a "well-established" interpretation of
ECHR rights31 -in a way which is not completely different from the system of judicial
referral to the CJEU (as it will be argued in Section C.IV).
2. The Impact of Protocol No. 16 on the Power of Judges to Review Domestic Legislation
Deemed to Contrast with the Convention
In cases where a sharp conflict arises between the national and the Convention systems,
consistent interpretation would not offer a final solution. In such cases, and where a
stronger approach is needed, the only solution may be to review national legislation
deemed to contrast with the supranational norms.
With the control of conventionality, cases of conflict between national legislation and the
ECHR are solved by "ordinary" domestic judges, who disregard national legislation and
directly apply the ECHR provisions. This mechanism, which is based on the principle of the
direct effect of supranational legislation, is particularly common in monistic countries
where a system of control of constitutionality of legislation is not provided. As a result, in
the hands of ordinary judges, the decentralized system of conventional review of
legislation compensates for the lack of constitutional review of legislation.
32
This is the case, for example, of France until 2008 and the Netherlands. Indeed, in France,
where a posteriori constitutional review of legislation was not provided until the 2008
constitutional reform, the power of domestic judges to exercise the control of
conventionality of domestic legislation, on the basis of Article 55 of the Constitution, has
been recognized by the Conseil constitutionnel itself. However, the Conseil constitutionnel
refused to exercise this power, stating that constitutional judges are provided with the
power of control of constitutionality, while the control of conventionality is reserved to
31 As can be derived by decision no. 49/2015 of the Italian Constitutional Court, according to which Strasbourg
case-law is binding for domestic judges, only when based on an established jurisprudence. While, according to
some authors, the decision is an expression of "constitutional patriotism," intended to put strong limits on judicial
interaction (Antonio Ruggeri, Fissati nuovi paletti dalla consulta a riguardo del rilievo della CEDU in ambito
interno. A prima lettura di Corte cost. n. 49 del 2015, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO (2015),
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1427919457RUGGIERI_2015a.pdf; Diletta Tega, La sentenza della
Corte costituzionale n. 49 del 2015 sulla confisca: il predominio assiologico della Costituzione sulla Cedu, FORUM DI
QUADERNI CONSTITUTIONALI (2015), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/nota_49_2015_tega.pdf), according to others, it is an expression of "functional
disobedience," that is a natural and positive effect of judicial dialogue (Giuseppe Martinico, Corti costituzionali (o
supreme) e "disobbedienza funzionale", DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO (2015),
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1430150015MARTINICO_2015.pdf).
32 In France, at least until the 2008 constitutional reform.
Stating that "Treaties or agreements properly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an
authority superior to legislation, provided always that the relevant agreement or treaty is applied by the other
party."
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ordinary judges. As a result, an extensive use of this power followed, firstly by the Court of
Cassation and later also by the Conseil d'Etat, 34 and for a long time the control of
conventionality was the only possible a posteriori review of legislation in France.
The case of the Netherlands is similar. The Constitution itself, while prohibiting any form of
constitutional review of legislation,s provides for the control of conventionality of
domestic legislation. Article 93 thus states that international treaties are binding, and
Article 94 explicitly provides that: "Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall
not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of
resolutions by international institutions that are binding on all persons." Judicial review of
conventionality of legislation has, therefore, a constitutional basis in the Netherlands, even
though the courts tend to use this instrument with caution, avoiding excessive interference
with the powers of Parliament.
In Belgium, the evolution of the role of judges with regard to the ECHR reflects the
evolution of the attitude of the State towards international law and the progressive
transformation of constitutional review of legislation in Belgium. Indeed, as far as the
relationship between national and international law is concerned, until 1971 the Belgian
legal system was based on the dualistic theory. However, this trend was reversed following
the adoption, in 1971, by the Supreme Court of Appeal, of the judgment in Franco Suisse Le
Ski, where, for the first time, the direct effect of international treaties was recognized.
From the end of the 1970s onwards, this principle was progressively applied also with
reference to the ECHR. A decentralized system of review of statutes deemed to conflict
with fundamental rights (whose recognition was based on the ECHR) therefore emerged.
This trend reinforced the system of constitutional review of legislation, a power that was
only gradually recognized as pertaining to the Belgian Constitutional Court.
However, the control of conventionality is also exercised by ordinary judges in countries
where there is a system of constitutional review of legislation already in place. In these
cases, control of constitutionality and control of conventionality, with reference to
34 Catherine Dupre, France, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE, 313-33, supra note 22.
5 Article 120 Const. states, "The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the
courts."
3 See Erika De Wet, The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 22,
at 229-309.
After the adoption of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Marckx v. Belgium.
The competence to review the compatibility of statutes with reference to all fundamental rights was assigned
to the Belgian Cour d'Arbitrage only in 2003. In 2007 its name was changed to Cour Constitutionnelle.
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fundamental rights, coexist. This is the case, for example, of Spain39 and Austria, 40 as well
as of most Central and Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria,41 Romania, and
Moldova.
Judicial review of legislation in conflict with ECHR rights is very rarely applied in dualistic
countries, as the case of the United Kingdom shows clearly. The Human Rights Act, in fact,
confers upon judges only the power to make a "declaration of incompatibility" between
the statute and the ECHR, while no power of review of legislation with regard to the ECHR
is admitted, according to the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.42 Even in Italy, judicial
"disapplication" 43 of statutes in contrast with the ECHR-on the model of the mechanism
in force with reference to the EU treaties-has been stopped by the Constitutional Court,
with Decisions no. 348 and 349 of 200744
In all the aforementioned cases, the transformative effect of the ECHR on the role of
judges in domestic legal systems cannot be ignored, even though it must not be
overestimated. 45 Apparently, these judges play the role of "watchdogs" over the correct
implementation and interpretation of fundamental rights, as defined at both national and
supranational levels, and, in performing this function, they sometimes tend to exercise a
quasi-constitutional role. Thus, an evident effect of the ECHR is the great expansion of the
powers of ordinary domestic courts, in many instances to the detriment of Constitutional
Courts.
Article 96.1 Const. states, "Validly concluded international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall be
part of the internal legal system. Their provisions may only be repealed, amended or suspended in the manner
provided for in the treaties themselves or in accordance with the general rules of international law."
40 Where the European Convention on Human Rights has been incorporated into the Constitution.
41 Article 5(4) Const. provides that "International treaties which have been ratified in accordance with the
constitutional procedure, promulgated and having come into force with respect to the Republic of Bulgaria, shall
be part of the legislation of the State. They shall have primacy over any conflicting provision of the domestic
legislation." However, domestic judges have shown certain self-restraint in the exercise of this power.
42 Robert Blackburn, The UnitedKingdom, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE, 935-1008, supra note 22.
43 Namely when a domestic statute is not applied to the case but nevertheless remains in force in the legal
system.
44 On the effects of the ICC 2007 judgments, see, critically, Oreste Pollicino, The European Court of Human Rights
and the Italian Constitutional Court: No "Groovy King of Love," in THE UK AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS. A STRAINED
RELATIONSHIP?, 361-77 (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks & Loveday Hodson eds., 2015)
45 As Giuseppe Martinico pointed out, on one side, the judges usually make use of the power of "disapplication"
of domestic legislation with caution, and, on the other, in a growing number of countries, Constitutional Courts
are setting constitutional limits on the prevalence of conventional legislation over domestic statues, on the model
of the theory of counter-limits within the EU system. MARTINICO, supra note 24.
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The power to review domestic legislation deemed to conflict with the ECHR has so far been
exercised very rarely by Constitutional Courts. Austria is the most famous example of this.
Austria is a monistic country, whose Constitution does not provide for a bill of rights, and,
since 1964, it has been admitted that in the Austrian legal system the ECHR has
constitutional status. Consequently, conflicts between domestic legislation and the ECHR
can result in a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Federal Constitutional Court, while
possible problems of conflict between the ECHR and the Constitution are solved according
46to the principle lex posteriori derogate legi priori. Constitutional Courts, therefore, seem
to be the main "losers" in the process of the "Europeanization" of rights under the ECHR
system, and the introduction of Protocol No. 16 does not seem to have the power to
reinforce their role, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraph.
IV. Ordinary and Constitutional Courts in the European Convention System: Overlapping
Functions
As an effect of the multiplication of mechanisms of interaction among judges, a process of
gradual overlapping of functions between ordinary and constitutional courts has been
emerging in the ECHR system.47 Indeed, in the absence of any specific rule at the
supranational as well as the national level, both ordinary and Constitutional Courts
spontaneously started to provide consistent interpretation, as well as reviewing domestic
legislation deemed to contrast with the European standards.
In particular, the duty to interpret national legislation in a manner that is consistent with
the ECHR and its jurisprudence is implemented indifferently by ordinary as well as
Constitutional Courts.48The control of conventionality of legislation in contrast with the
ECHR is a power exercised quasi-exclusively by the ordinary courts, while the power of
control of constitutionality in cases of infringement of ECHR rights is very rarely exercised
46 On the effects of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Austrian legal system, see Daniela
Thurnherr, The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, 311-86, supra note 22. On the
consequences of the constitutional status of the European Convention in the Austrian legal system with reference
to the relationship between national legislation and EU legislation, see Andreas Orator, The decision of the
Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: an instrument of leverage or rearguard
action?, in this Special Issue.
47 With reference to the EU, as well as the ECHR, Antonio Ruggeri points out the risk of imbalances between
ordinary courts, Constitutional courts and European courts in the system for the protection of fundamental rights
in Europe. See Antonio Ruggeri, Tutela dei diritti fondamentali, squilibri nei rapporti tra giudici comuni, Corte
costituzionale e Corti europee, ricerca dei modi con cui porvi almeno in parte rimedio (2012), available at
www.giurcost.org.
48 References can be found in the reports of the XVI Conference of the European Constitutional Courts, Vienna,
Constitutional Court of Austria, 12-14 May 2014, devoted to "The cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe.
Current situation and perspectives" (available at http://www.confeuconstco.org).
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by Constitutional Courts. 49 However, as already stated, considering the similarities with the
decentralized system of control of constitutionality, the effects of control of
conventionality can easily be assimilated to constitutional review of legislation of internal
laws in conflict with the ECHR. As a result, the powers of ordinary and constitutional
courts, in this regard, are clearly overlapping. At the same time, both ordinary and
Constitutional Courts are losing most of their autonomy in deciding cases concerning
fundamental rights. As a result, the role of both ordinary and constitutional judges in the
European system is clearly facing a dramatic transformation.50
In this landscape, it is more than evident that there is a risk of duplication of functions
between the ordinary and Constitutional Courts, with a consequent marginalization of the
role of Constitutional Courts, gradually assimilated to all other apex courts, as well as
asymmetries among CoE countries, due to a number of national variables, including in
particular the approach to supranational law, as well as the rules on the organization of the
judiciary in each legal system.
Protocol No. 16 does not seem to offer a viable solution to these shortcomings. Indeed, as
already mentioned, Article 1.1 of the Protocol refers generically to the "highest courts and
tribunals of a High Contracting Party." 5 This choice is at the same time both exclusive and
inclusive. It is exclusive since not all courts, but only those sitting at the apex of the judicial
system, are authorized to request an advisory opinion. It is inclusive because, as is pointed
out in the explanatory report, the term "highest" (instead of "the highest") refers not only
to constitutional and supreme courts, but also to all those tribunals that "although
inferior... are nevertheless of especial relevance on account of being the "highest" for a
particular category of case." On this basis, it is to be expected that a wide range of
tribunals, including also, but not only, Constitutional courts, would be authorized by the
Contracting Parties to submit a request for an advisory opinion.52
With all this in mind, the request of advisory opinions may, on the one hand, generate
problems of interaction between consultative and adjudicatory functions of the ECtHR (see
49 The Constitutional Court of Austria seems to be the only clear example in this sense.
5o On the transformation of Constitutional Courts in the European legal order, see-among the Italian scholars-
Marina Calamo Specchia, La giustizia costituzionale, un sistema atipico in un ordinamento democratico? Spunti di
riflessione sul ruolo delle Corti nei sistemi costituzionali aperti, in ALLE FRONTIERE DEL DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE. SCRITTI IN
ONORE DI VALERIO ONIDA (Marilisa D'Amico & Barbara Randazzo eds., 2011).
51 Art. 10 of the Protocol.
52 As can be derived from the choice of Romania that has already indicated the jurisdictions authorized to request
advisory opinions from the European Court: the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the Constitutional Court, as
well as the Courts of Appeal. On the possibility that Constitutional Courts will be likely included, see Oreste
Pollicino, La Corte costituzionale & una "alta giurisdizione nazionale" ai fini della richiesta di parere della Corte
EDU ex Protocollo 16?, 2 DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 293-315 (2014).
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on this point Sections C and D) and, on the other hand, it may suddenly become a new
"battleground" for competition between different types of courts, fulfilling competing
aims, including, in particular, apex ordinary and Constitutional Courts (see Section C.1l). The
effect, if judges do not show a cooperative attitude, would be one of complicating an
already complex architecture. Within this puzzle, moreover, another piece must also be
taken into account. This is that, in CoE countries which are also members of the EU, all the
aforementioned courts have also to "compete" with the CJEU, as Section C will show.
C. The Mechanism of the Advisory Opinions of the ECtHR from the Viewpoint of
Constitutional Courts: What Can the Experience of the Preliminary Reference Before the
CJEU Tell Us?
At first glance, the procedure devised in Protocol No. 16 appears to generally resemble the
preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU (Article 267 TFEU), whilst departing from
it in some regards.-3 However, to what extent are these two mechanisms comparable from
the viewpoint of Constitutional Courts in EU Member States? In this Section, it is argued
that the effects and impact of these proceedings on Constitutional Courts are largely
dependent on the actual use made by these courts and the ECtHR of Protocol no. 16, and
may well result in Constitutional Courts being further sidelined in the European legal order.
Moreover, should Protocol No. 16 enter into force, the triangular relationships between
Constitutional Courts, the CJEU, and the ECtHR may become even more unpredictable in
their development and more complex for applicants seeking restoration of their rights.
I. The Overall Aim of the Two Mechanisms and the Impact on Constitutional Courts
The aims of the advisory opinion procedure within the ECHR and the preliminary reference
procedure in the EU are apparently very different because of the different telos of each
international/supranational organization. While the former is primarily designed to create
a dialogue between national highest jurisdictions and the ECtHR while the national
proceeding is still underway, so as to guide national judges in interpreting and applying the
ECHR, 54 the EU preliminary reference procedure was conceived and used by the CJEU in
order to foster the unity and uniformity of EU law across the Member States.55 These
See Janneke Gerards, Advisory opinions, preliminary rulings and the new Protocol No. 16 to the European
Convention on Human Rights, 4 MAASTRICHTJOURNALOF EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAw 630-651(2014).
54The relationship between national courts and the ECtHR is not a new topic (see Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning
the European Court of Human Rights. Embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European human rights
regime, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 125-29 (2008); A EUROPE OF RIGHTS (Helen Keller & Alec Stone
Sweet eds., 2008) 687-688, supra at note 22, although it will be reshaped and will become more formalized as a
result of Protocol No. 16.
Compare ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 97 (2006). On the different scope and
reach of the EU and the ECHR and on the different role played by the two supranational courts, see MARTINICO &
POLLICINO, supra note 23.
2015 1401
German Law Journal
different objectives reflect the differing natures of the two organizations: whilst the CoE is
a human rights organization, which is in principle unwilling to set out a harmonized human
rights policy for its forty-seven Contracting Parties, the EU is primarily a regional
integration process, with the CJEU acting as the first engine of the harmonization of
national legal systems. Indeed, the CJEU was considered to be first and foremost a
guarantor of EU competences, starting with the internal market, and a guarantor also of
the separation of powers within the EU, rather than a human rights protector.57
In practice, however, given the principle of primacy (which has superseded even national
constitutional norms) and the increasing case law on fundamental rights, both pre- and
post-Charter, the two supranational courts are potentially able to encroach upon one of
the most important functions that European Constitutional Courts have, that is, the
protection of fundamental rights entrenched in national Constitutions.
Moreover, both the advisory opinion mechanism and the preliminary reference
mechanism are unidirectional. Only national courts and, in the case of Protocol no. 16, only
the highest courts identified by each Contracting Party, can refer questions to the two
supranational courts, and not the other way around. This is notwithstanding that the
potential for intrusion into national constitutional systems by the supranational courts
could have made the introduction of a two-way communication flow between the
ECtHR/CJEU and Constitutional Courts desirable as a step before the supranational court
takes a decision which is sensitive for the domestic Constitution. In this light, the question
arises of whether, based on the actual functioning of the preliminary reference procedure
before the CJEU, it is possible to predict that Constitutional Courts might appear reluctant
in exploiting the new device introduced by Protocol No. 16.sa
The different conceptions which underlie the two organizations and, hence, the two
judicial procedures, are reflected in the fact that while all Member States' courts are
involved in the enforcement of Article 267 TFEU (with the well-known differences between
courts of first instance and appeal and courts of last resort), the mechanism of the advisory
opinions can be subject to a selective application, since adherence to Protocol no. 16 is
voluntary on the part of the CoE's members (Section B). Thus, the standardization of the
56 This is confirmed by the long-standing margin of appreciation doctrine, now entrenched in Protocol no. 15. See
Federico Fabbrini, The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A Comparison, 15 ICOURTs WORKING
PAPER SERIEs 2015, forthcoming in A FUTURE FOR THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION? (Mads Andenas, Eirik Bjorge &
Giuseppe Bianco eds., 2015).
Although a recent study has proven that at the very beginning of the process of European integration there was
an (unsuccessful) attempt to make the European Community a truly human rights actor, particularly in order to
preserve fundamental rights in the Member States. See Grainne de B~rca, The Road Not Taken: The European
Union as a Global Human Right Actor, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 653-64 (2011).
See, for more details, Section C.V.
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relationship between every single national highest court and the ECtHR, for the sake of the
uniform application of the ECHR, is not at stake in the case of the advisory opinion
procedure.
In turn, according to the discretion granted to each Contracting Party, the new mechanism
of Protocol No. 16 is likely to involve Constitutional Courts in a very asymmetrical way,
depending on whether national governments have opted in or not. Given the limited
number of signatures to the Protocol collected since the date of opening almost two years
ago, and that only five countries, at present, have completed the ratification process
(Section B), it may well be that only 10 Constitutional Courts-ten being the minimum
requirement for the Protocol to enter into force-will "take advantage" of the advisory
opinion procedure. Thus, for most Constitutional Courts, the legal situation might not
change. Furthermore, even if Protocol no. 16 is ratified by all Contracting Parties of the
ECHR, Constitutional Courts would still enjoy full discretion in deciding whether to request
advisory opinions from the ECtHR. Indeed, the implementation of the mechanism is
completely reliant on the unilateral commitment of Constitutional Courts (and other
indicated highest courts) to engage in a dialogue with the ECtHR. This unilateral
commitment cannot be taken for granted at the moment of the signature in the light of
the foreseen effects of this new device (see also Section E) and, at the same time, of the
willingness of the ECtHR to respond to these request.
By contrast, in the EU, when the conditions of Article 267 TFEU are fulfilled, the
Constitutional Courts of all Member States are obliged to issue a preliminary reference to
the CJEU, although many of them have traditionally avoided doing so.s9 Constitutional
Courts under Protocol no. 16 would not have such an obligation.
//. Judges Entitled to Ask for an Advisory Opinion and to Refer: Are the Constitutional Courts
Like Any Other Courts?
Neither the preliminary reference procedure nor the advisory opinion mechanism set out a
special role for constitutional judges.6o They stand as any other judge entitled to use that
device and do not enjoy a sui generis treatment despite their access and jurisdiction, their
procedure of appointment and composition, and the constitutional nature of the
"material" they constantly manage-material which involves potential conflicts between
" On the reluctance of Constitutional Courts and its gradual overcoming, especially in the last few years, see
Monica Claes, Luxembourg, here we come? Constitutional Courts and the preliminary reference procedure, in this
Special Issue. On the still hesitant attitude of some constitutional judges, in particular in Eastern Europe, see the
articles of this Special Issue highlighting a missing link between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU.
60 See also Section B.IV supra on this point. In the EU, the lack of engagement of the CJEU with Constitutional
Courts as the referring courts has been often criticized by scholars and has been put forward as justification, in
turn, of most Constitutional Courts' timid attitude toward the preliminary reference proceeding. See, e.g.,
Leonard F. M. Besselink, The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni, 39 EUR. L. REV. 531-52 (2014).
2015 1403
German Law Journal
the level of protection of fundamental rights under constitutional law and that ensured
under the two supranational regimes. While Constitutional Courts, in the countries in
which they operate, are usually considered, because of their powers, to be "special
courts", their specialty is devalued or simply overlooked by the EU treaties and the ECHR
(and its protocols).
However, while Article 267 TFEU treats all national judges equally in terms of access to the
preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU, with the only difference lying in the
obligation to refer for the courts of last resort (Constitutional Courts included), Protocol
no. 16 draws a clear line between highest courts and tribunals and other courts. Only the
former are entitled to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR, provided that a case is
pending before them and that the relevant legal and factual background of the case is set
forth; the remaining courts are not. Nonetheless, as stated supra (Section B.IV), what a
highest court or tribunal actually is rests wholly upon the discretion of each Contracting
Party.
What is important to highlight here is the lack of any particular acknowledgment in
Protocol no. 16 of the role of Constitutional Courts and judicial bodies that carry out the
constitutional review of legislation as being one of the ultimate guarantors of
62
constitutional rights at the domestic level in most Contracting Parties. It is the
importance and the potential clash between performing the constitutional review of
legislation and applying the ECHR that is neglected in Protocol no. 16. By speaking of
highest tribunals, Protocol no. 16 only takes into account the function of judges of last
resort in criminal, civil, and administrative matters, regardless of whether they can also
review the constitutionality of the norm applicable to the case. The prospect of conflict
between the effects of the review of constitutionality and conventionality is denied by the
Protocol. For it to have been otherwise, the Protocol would have needed to have referred
specifically to these kinds of review instead of identifying the relevant courts through their
ranking in the judicial order.
The problem does not arise where there is a diffuse system of constitutional review of
legislation in place, because the ultimate judicial authority, for instance a Supreme Court,
is the court of last resort for both the review of constitutionality and conventionality at the
same time. Neither does it arise where a Constitutional Court, like in Germany, or, albeit
with some caveats, in Italy, reviews the compliance of legislation with both the Basic Law
and the ECHR. However, more complex and peculiar are the situations in which the control
61 Art. 10, Protocol No. 16. On this point, see Paul Gragl, (Judicial) love is not a one-way street: the EU preliminary
reference procedure as a model for ECtHR advisory opinions under draft Protocol no. 16, 2 EUR. L. REv. 229-47
(2013).
62 Possibly with the only exceptions of countries like the UK and the Netherlands where no constitutional review
of legislation is in place.
1404 Vol. 16 No. 06
The Prospective Role of Constitutional Courts
of conventionality is disjointed from that of constitutionality, as in France. In these
circumstances, which courts should stand as the "highest courts" under Protocol no. 16:
those having ultimate jurisdiction only for the conventionality review, thus excluding the
Constitutional Court, or also those performing the constitutionality review (although they
are not involved in checking the compliance of national law with the ECHR)? In other
words, by reference to which function are the "highest courts" to be identified?
Even in the case of centralization of the review of constitutionality and conventionality in
the hands of the same Constitutional Court, some problems could arise if other courts are
considered by the Contracting Parties to be "highest tribunals" for the purpose of Protocol
no. 16. Indeed, it is clear that the most sensitive context is the one in which the outcome
of the control of conventionality and constitutionality may diverge. In this regard, Protocol
no. 16 can create problems for intra-judicial relationships at a state level, especially
between Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts if both are considered "highest
tribunals". A Supreme Court might strategically use the advisory opinion procedure in
order to seek guidance in the interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR and to narrow
through this 'external' interpretation the discretion of the Constitutional Court in
protecting a fundamental right.
A comparable case has already arisen in the context of the EU with the French Court of
Cassation deciding to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU before involving the
Conseil constitutionnel through the control prioritaire de constitutionnalit6." Under those
circumstances, the CJEU confirmed that the preliminary reference takes precedence over
the domestic reference, with a view to ensuring the uniform implementation of EU law as
64the supreme value. This could be explained by the mandate of the CJEU as the
supranational court that fosters the ultimate objective of "an ever closer union" (Article 1
TEU). By contrast, in the case of the advisory opinion procedure in the framework of
Protocol No. 16, and given the rationale of the procedure, which does not aim at ensuring
the uniform implementation of the ECHR as long as fundamental rights are protected, it
should be for any Contracting Party to determine whether precedence should be given to
constitutional review of legislation and thus to a preliminary reference of constitutionality
by the Constitutional Court or, rather, to requesting an advisory opinion on the
interpretation of the ECHR.
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-188 & C-189/10, Melki and Adbeli, 2010 E.C.R. 1-05667 and the comment by Arthur
Dyevre, The Melki Way: The Melki Case and Everything you Always Wanted to Know about French Judicial Politics
(But Were Afraid to Ask), in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE: ACTORS, TOPICS AND PROCEDURES 309-22 (M.
Claes et al. eds., 2012).
64See Frangois-Xavier Mil let & Nicoletta Perlo, The first preliminary reference of the French Constitutional Court to
the CIEU: revolution de palais or revolution in French constitutional law?, in this Special Issue.
2015 1405
German Law Journal
As a result, the position of constitutional judges in general can be challenged by the use of
the advisory opinion procedure, like the preliminary reference procedure. Furthermore,
the actual measures of implementation of Protocol No. 16 at the domestic level,
depending on what are the "highest tribunals" identified, can transform a cooperative tool
between the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts into a prospective limitation for the role of
the latter courts.
///. The Prospective Impact of the ECtHR's Docket Control on Advisory Opinions
Protocol No. 16 can be better understood within the framework of a wider process of
reform of the ECHR system, which finds its justification in the need to counterbalance the
increasing workload of the ECtHR and the delay of its judgments.eS By allowing the highest
courts and tribunals to seek guidance on the correct interpretation or application of the
ECHR in advance, it is thought that Protocol no. 16 could reduce the number of
66
applications brought before the ECtHR. However, this objective could not be reached if
the number of requests for advisory opinions overwhelmed the activity of the Court, which
67has to deal with almost 65,000 pending cases as of 31 March 2015.
Hence the idea of, firstly, limiting the requests for advisory opinions to the highest
jurisdictions and, secondly, granting the ECtHR the possibility of not, with due reasons,
delivering the requested opinion. The very high number of preliminary reference
proceedings before the CJEU, indeed, derives mainly from the activism of the courts of first
instance and appeal that allow the CJEU to have a say on many crucial issues for the
deepening of the European integration process (direct effect, primacy, state liability, and
so on).6 By contrast, as stated, supreme and, even more so, Constitutional, Courts, have
See VIadimiro Zagrebelsky, Parere consultivo della Corte europea dei diritti umani: vera efalso sussidiarieta, in
LA RICHIESTA DI PARERI CONSULTIVI ALLA CORTE DI STRASBURGO DA PARTE DELLE PI. ALTE GIURISDIZIONI NAZIONALL PRIME
RIFLESSIONI IN VISTA DELLA RATIFICA DEL PROTOCOLLO 16 ALLA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL'UOMO 91 (Elisabetta
Lamarque ed., 2015).
The issue of whether such an objective can actually be achieved cannot be discussed here, but it suffices to say
that most applications reaching the courts are due to systematic violations of the Convention and come from 4
contracting parties: Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and Italy. The advisory opinions under Protocol no. 16 do not appear
to redress such systematic violations, which are patent and well known by the competent domestic authorities,
and, thus, to eliminate the cause of the high number of applications from those States. Moreover, nothing
prevents an individual from lodging an application before the ECtHR (Art. 34 ECHR), even if the matter has been
already addressed by the Court under the advisory opinion procedure. See Explanatory Report to Protocol no. 16,
Art. 5; Gerards, supra note 53, at 636.
67 See the statistics available on the website of the Court at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Statspendingmonth_2015_BIL.pdf.
See Harm Schepel & Erhard Blankenburg, Mobilizing the European Court of Justice, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE 37 (Grainne de Brca & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 2001); Thomas de la Mare & Catherine Donnelly,
Preliminary rulings and EU legal integration: evolution and stasis, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 363 (Paul Craig &
Grainne de Brca eds., 2011).
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traditionally been more reluctant. By excluding lower courts, Protocol no. 16 avoids the
"explosion" of requests for advisory opinions sent to the ECtHR, but, at the same time,
limits the timing of the ECtHR's intervention to the very end of the domestic judicial
proceeding. Earlier ECtHR involvement would possibly have been more effective in terms
of restoring violated rights.
Moreover, unlike in the EU preliminary reference procedure, under Protocol No. 16 the
ECtHR retains the power to decide which requests it wants to address; it is not a matter of
admissibility of the reference on procedural and factual grounds. 70 Rather, the ECtHR
enjoys a discretion as to which opinions to issue.
The request lodged by a highest court is analyzed by a panel of five ECtHR judges, including
ex officio the judge of the High Contracting Party from where the mechanism was activated
and, if the request is accepted, then it is the Grand Chamber that delivers the opinion. If
the request is denied, reasons must be given for the refusal by the panel and must,
moreover, be made public.
Given the vague phrasing of Article 2 of Protocol No. 16, it is likely that the ECtHR will
develop its own criteria to select cases. It has also been convincingly argued that because
of the composition of the panels selecting the advisory opinions and deciding on referrals
to the Grand Chamber, the same conditions will apply to both cases. This would mean that
the request of a highest court would be accepted "if the case raises a serious question
affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or a
serious issue of general importance" (Article 43(2) ECHR). Thus, selection would be
oriented by the quality and significance of the issues to be addressed.
There are elements which lead one to foresee a mild scrutiny on those conditions, whereas
others lead to the consideration that the ECtHR will set strict standards. On the one hand,
if the primary objective of the advisory opinion mechanism is to strengthen the
relationships between national courts and the ECtHR and to favor the correct
interpretation and application of the ECHR, it would be reasonable to assume that the
ECtHR would try to be as responsive as possible to the concerns of the highest courts,
selecting the greatest number of opinions compatible with the sustainability of its
workload. The new mechanism of Protocol No. 16, indeed, is designed to centralize
69 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Interaction between the European Court of Human Rights and member states:
European consensus, advisory opinions and the question of legitimacy, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ITS DISCONTENTS. TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH 116-46 (Spyridon Flogaitis etal. eds., 2013).
70 See the acte clair doctrine of the CJEU and the CILFITcase, Case C-283/81, Sr CILFIT e Lanificio di Gavardo SpA
v. Ministero della sanita, 1982 E.C.R. 03415.
71 See Gerards, supra note 53, at 644-45.
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interpretation of the ECHR, with a central authority, the ECtHR, giving guidance to the
"fellow courts". 72
This trend towards the centralization of interpretation is testified by the preliminary
reference procedure and the CJEU, although devoid of a docket control. The CJEU has
traditionally been very generous in declaring preliminary references admissible, starting
from the definition of "any court or tribunal of a Member State" allowed to issue a
preliminary reference (Article 267 TFEU). The limits posed to preliminary references
through the CJEU case law, like the CILFIT case and the acte clair doctrine, are aimed only
at balancing the need for a constant dialogue between national and supranational courts
with a workload that could hinder the CJEU.
On the other hand, however, the ECtHR fulfills a different role to the CJEU, and indeed,
when the discussion on Protocol no. 16 was still underway, the ECtHR judges expressed
serious concerns about the idea of delivering advisory opinions also.73 The ECtHR usually
judges in concreto, on specific cases, and when deciding on a case it does not see
interpretation as separate from application of the ECHR. 74 This makes the mechanism of
Protocol No. 16 rather different from the EU preliminary ruling procedure. 75 It is thus
unlikely that the ECtHR will decide to issue an opinion on a law in abstracto; at the same
time, it will not deliver an advisory opinion on issues which are already at stake in a
pending case (Article 47(2) ECHR), unless the case is completely new and the Court has
never been asked to decide on the point in question before.
IV. The Effects of the ECtHR Opinions and the CJEU Preliminary Judgments: A Similar
"Threat" to the Autonomy of Constitutional Interpretation?
In theory, the most apparent difference between the preliminary reference procedure and
the advisory opinion mechanism consists in the effects of the intervention of the
76
supranational court. By case law and conventional interpretation of the EU treaties,
72 Whether this centralization will succeed is difficult to predict, but some hypotheses are advanced in Section I.E.
See Zagrebelsky, supra note 65, at 93.
74 As noted by Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Protocol No. 16, Art. 1, unexpectedly talks about "interpretation or
application" rather than interpretation and application.
See Christos Giannopoulos, Considerations on Protocol N'16: Can the New Advisory Competence of the
European Court of Human Rights Breathe New Life into the European Convention on Human Rights?, 2 GERMAN L. J.
337, 345 (2015).
7 See Roberto Conti, La richiesta di parere consultivo al/a Corte europea do parte delle Alte Corti introdotto dal
Prot. 16 CEDU e il rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione europea. Prove d'orchestra per una
nomofilachia europea, in LA RICHIESTA DI PARERI CONSULTIVI ALLA CORTE DI STRASBURGO DA PARTE DELLE PI. ALTE GIURISDIZIONI
NAZIONALI, supra note 63, at 100-02; Giannopoulos, supra note 73, at 341-43.
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which are silent on this point, these effects are binding and ergo omnes for the CJEU case
law,n whilst, according to Article 5 of Protocol No. 16, the advisory opinions are explicitly
non-binding. It would follow that the national judicial authority issuing the request for an
advisory opinion then has discretionary powers regarding the implementation of the ECtHR
opinion, meaning that it could perhaps even be disregarded (Section B.Ill.1).
This notwithstanding, the Explanatory Report to the new Protocol states:
They [the advisory opinions] would, however, form part
of the case law of the Court, alongside its judgments
and decisions. The interpretation of the Convention
and the Protocols thereto contained in such advisory
opinions would be analogous in its effect to the
interpretative elements set out by the Court in
78judgments and decisions.
Although the binding and inter-partes effects of final ECtHR judgments cannot be
recognized in the new advisory opinions (Article 46(1) ECHR), the Explanatory Report
emphasizes the importance of these opinions as part of the case law of the Court and,
therefore, as being of comparable interpretative value to its judgments and decisions.
Having force of res interpretata, the advisory opinions complement the ECHR and are thus
expected to be complied with by national courts, parliaments, and administrations (and
not only by the issuing authority).7 The practical implications of these opinions, based on
the Explanatory Report, could therefore be much more significant than the plain words of
Article 5 let predict.
Whilst the reference in an advisory opinion to the interpretation of an ECHR right would,
therefore, be binding, the concrete application and adaptation of that interpretation to the
pending case would be for the national court to do. Thus, an advisory opinion would
contain both a binding part and a part specifically addressed to the case at stake, and this
latter would be merely a guide for the national judge. However, because of the link,
highlighted in Article 1 of Protocol No. 16, between the advisory opinion and the pending
"See Jan Komarek, Federal elements in the Community judicial system: building coherence in the Community legal
order, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 10 (2005).
78 See Explanatory Report at point 27.
See Adam Bodnar, Res interpretata: legal effect of the European Court of Human Rights judgments for other
states than those which were party to the proceedings, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 21S CENTURY, 223-
62 (Yves Haeck & Eva Brems eds., 2014); Janneke Gerards, The European Courtof Human Rights and the national
courts-giving shape to the notion of "shared responsibility", in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECHR AND OF THE JUDGMENTS
OF THE ECTHR IN NATIONAL CASE LAW. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 21-27 (Janneke Gerards & Joseph W.A. Fleuren eds.,
2014).
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case, a clear-cut distinction between the general interpretation of an ECHR provision and
its application to the case in the light of the criteria and standards set out by the ECtHR is
very difficult to trace in practice. This, coupled with the authority of the opinion and the
seriousness of the questions raised (see supra Section II.C), would make it almost
impossible for the highest court requesting the advisory opinion not to follow it in
resolving the case. Furthermore, given the general interpretative standards and principles
established through them, advisory opinions could be deemed to have an impact
comparable to an ECtHR pilot judgment, with ergo omnes effects, rather than to an
"ordinary" ECtHR judgment, with just inter-partes implications.
In practice, then, the difference between the preliminary reference procedure and the
advisory opinion mechanism in terms of actual effects on domestic courts and national
legal systems may dissolve.ao Depending on the level of detail of the advisory opinions and
on the potential use of the mechanism as a vehicle to anticipate subsequent case law
development, advisory opinions, even if addressed to other highest courts, may be
perceived by national Constitutional Courts as being a possible threat to their autonomy in
constitutional interpretation. The same applied for many years-and still applies, today-
with regards to preliminary rulings by the CJEU. Some commentators have considered,
however, that advisory opinions might be rather vague in their content, because the ECtHR
usually refrains from setting general principles, so as to reserve for itself a certain margin
of manoeuvre for addressing subsequent cases. By the same token, the Court might not
be willing to use the possibility, expressly provided for by Protocol No. 16, to deliver
separate opinions where no unanimous consent is reached, as has happened in the two
cases of advisory opinions delivered to the Committee of Ministers. Should this be
confirmed, the preference for delivering a single opinion would be likely to lead to a
compromise solution among ECtHR judges, open to different interpretations.82
V. Would Constitutional Courts be Willing to Engage in the Advisory Opinion Procedure?
Drawing on the Experience of the Preliminary Reference Procedure in the EU
What will make the advisory opinion procedure work is first of all a cooperative attitude by
the parties involved: the ECtHR and national highest courts, and in particular the
Constitutional Courts as the traditional watchdogs of fundamental rights in domestic
constitutional systems in Europe. The centralizing trend in the interpretation of the ECHR
80 It has also been argued, on the EU side, that the level of follow-up on the CJEU preliminary rulings by national
courts has been rather modest: see, for example, Michal Bobek, Of feasibility and silent elephants: the legitimacy
of the Court of Justice through the eyes of national courts, in JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE EXAMINED 917-33 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013).
81 Zagrebelsky, supra note 65, at 96.
82 Id. at 95.
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and its protocols that may be detected as a consequence of the entry into force of Protocol
no. 16 can only become a reality if and insofar as national courts activate the mechanism.
However, as has been widely acknowledged, the experience of the preliminary references
before the CJEU testifies that Constitutional Courts in particular have not usually been
willing to engage in such a "conversation." This is despite the fact that, acting as courts of
last resort, Constitutional Courts are obliged to refer questions of validity and
interpretation of EU law that arise before them in order to solve a pending case. If these
Courts have been reluctant in the presence of a precise obligation stemming from Article
267 TFEU, the hesitancy may be even stronger where, as in the case of the advisory
opinion mechanism, such a duty does not exist.
Yet a direct "confrontation" between the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts is unavoidable
as long as the object and the standard of review of conventionality and constitutionality at
least partially overlap, or as long as they have to cope with the same challenges. This is
reflected also in the shifting attitude of many Constitutional Courts towards the
preliminary reference procedure in the EU in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty and the
Euro-crisis. The codification of rights at EU level and eventually the entry into force of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights has triggered a reaction by some reluctant Constitutional
Courts (in Italy, France, and Spain, for example) that could no longer escape direct
interaction with the CJEU, once that Court had officially become a competing authority for
the determination of the level of protection of rights ensured at the domestic level
(through the application of EU law). By the same token, a similar reaction by Constitutional
Courts (in Germany and Slovenia, for instance) was triggered within national constitutional
systems facing the stress of the financial crisis and the Euro-crisis law.
Likewise, in the implementation of the new advisory opinion procedure, Constitutional
Courts can potentially be interested in establishing a long-standing "partnership" with the
ECtHR, with the aim of ensuring the stability and predictability of the system of
fundamental rights protection in Europe. The process of building up a relationship
between Constitutional Courts and the ECtHR is the opposite of the one developed
between Constitutional Courts and CJEU, although the final outcome, following Protocol
No. 16, could be similar.
Within the framework of the ECHR, the national and supranational courts have always
focused on the same issues in terms of the protection of rights, but they did not encroach
upon each other's competence until individual applications to the ECtHR were made
possible in 1998. After Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR eventually entered into force, only a
hidden dialogue between Constitutional Courts and the ECtHR was possible, as no device
for their direct interaction was in force. Protocol No. 16 and the advisory opinions would
fill this gap. By contrast, in the EU, the mechanism by which Constitutional Courts and the
CJEU can interact directly-the preliminary reference procedure-has been in force since
the very beginning of the process of European integration. However, until the 1970s, when
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the CJEU became increasingly involved in the protection of fundamental rights, the
supranational court and Constitutional Courts spoke different languages. This remains
partly the case even today: the CJEU has usually spoken the language of the internal
market, whereas Constitutional Courts have always been concerned with constitutional
rights beyond economic freedoms.
Even without using the preliminary reference procedure, the CJEU and Constitutional
Courts have been indirectly engaged in an intense conversation through their case law,
which has shaped the whole process of European integration. What held most
Constitutional Courts back from exploiting the preliminary reference tool until recently,
despite the legal obligation arising from the treaties and the ergo omnes effects, was the
constraint provoked upon them by a direct and targeted preliminary ruling of the CJEU
adopted upon their request.
For the same reason, Constitutional Courts could also feel uncomfortable with the advisory
opinion mechanism, which, as has been argued, if activated would be more binding in
terms of ECHR interpretation than one could expect, based on Article 5 of Protocol No. 16.
Since, by contrast with the prescription of Article 267 TFEU, the request of advisory
opinions is optional, in order to preserve its autonomy a Constitutional Court might be
reluctant about submitting its case law on fundamental rights to the standards set by the
ECtHR for the pending case. Constitutional Courts might strategically avoid requesting
advisory opinions if they perceive those opinions as being not merely guidance, but as
limiting their discretion to find the most suitable solution for the domestic jurisdiction.
VI. National Constitutional Courts and the EU Accession to the ECHR: "Lost in the
Application" of Protocol No. 16 and the EU Preliminary Reference Procedure
To the complex picture of the relationship between the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts
already laid out must be added a further element. How can the European system of
fundamental rights litigation and the place of Constitutional Courts accommodate the new
mechanism of the advisory opinions within the preliminary reference procedure?
This question is not merely hypothetical; it has been expressly invoked by the CJEU as a
prospective issue of incompatibility between the draft accession agreement of the EU to
the ECHR and EU law. When Protocol No. 16 was signed, on 2 October 2013, the draft
agreement had already been finalized. Yet the CJEU detected a potential threat arising
from the advisory opinion procedure for the autonomy of EU law, in particular for what
8 See Opinion 2/13, paras. 197-199 (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/.
84 See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, It's the Autonomy, Stupid!"A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to
the ECHR, and the Way Forward, 16 GERMAN L. J. 10546 (2015); Johan Callewaert, Protocol 16 and the Autonomy
of EU Law: Who Is Threatening Whom?, EUROPEAN LAW BLOG, 3 October 2014, available at
http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2551.
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has been described as "the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties" (§
176 Opinion): the preliminary reference procedure.as It is especially the lack of
coordination between these two mechanisms when Constitutions, the Charter, and the
ECHR overlap on the protection of a certain right that creates concerns in the Opinion of
the CJEU. The CJEU focused its reasoning here only on the CJEU and the ECtHR, as if
Constitutional Courts or national judges carrying out constitutional review of legislation
were not at stake in this "dangerous twist" for the protection of fundamental rights in
Europe.
The CJEU argued that the main mechanism which has protected the autonomy of EU law-
the preliminary reference procedure-would be jeopardized if the same judges (i.e., the
national highest courts and tribunals, which under EU law are obliged to issue a
preliminary reference whenever a question of interpretation or validity is raised) firstly
involved the ECtHR through a request for an advisory opinion. This would occur, in
particular, when a highest domestic court had doubts about the compliance of EU norms
or national measures implementing EU law with the ECHR. The risk, in the Opinion of the
CJEU, is the circumvention of the Article 267 TFEU procedure.
According to the CJEU, when the protection of a right equally concerns the EU Charter and
the ECHR, national courts of last instance might find it more convenient to resort to the
advisory opinion procedure in combination with the activation by the ECtHR of a
mechanism that is devised by the draft accession agreement-the "prior involvement" of
the CJEU itself by the ECtHR. This could happen when an indirect action against EU law for
the violation of an ECHR right is brought before a national court of last resort, which might
then decide not to issue a preliminary reference to the CJEU, but rather a request for an
advisory opinion from the ECtHR. EU law would then be interpreted without the CJEU. The
prior involvement mechanism allows the ECtHR only to consult the CJEU before a decision
affecting EU law (and its autonomy) is taken.
In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU considered the combination of a request for an advisory opinion
and the prior involvement mechanism to have the potential to structurally undermine the
use of the (direct) preliminary reference procedure. In this case, the usual "blindness" of
the supranational courts towards the peculiar and essential role of Constitutional Courts in
816Europe was also confirmed. Indeed, on the one hand, the problem about the order of
precedence among different types of referrals replicates the complex dynamic already in
place between preliminary references of constitutionality to Constitutional Courts and
preliminary references under EU law. On the other hand, in Opinion 2/13 the CJEU
Adam Lazowski & Ramses A. Wessel, When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European
Union to the ECHR, 16 GERMAN L. J. 179, 188 (2015).
With reference to Constitutional Courts in the EU, see Jan Komarek, National constitutional courts in the
European constitutional democracy, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 525-44 (2014).
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oversimplified the reality by raising the issue of the bilateral relationship between the
ECtHR and itself when a right is protected to a different extent by the Charter and the
ECHR. However, Constitutions are also competing sources of authority for the protection of
fundamental rights and so are their Courts, which are inserted into a network of
relationships starting from those with the respective domestic supreme courts. In a system
of fundamental rights protection resulting from the process of EU accession to the ECHR
and from Protocol No. 16, and designed through these intertwined-although not fully
coordinated-national and supranational courts, the main aim for which this complex
architecture is in place is often overlooked. In other words, in an attempt to codify the
procedures and to claim the precedence of a preliminary referral (constitutional,
European, or conventional) over the others, according to "top down" mechanisms, it is
possible to lose sight of the protection of fundamental rights, with too many
"Constitutional Courts,"87 domestic, European, and conventional, pretending to be judge in
their own cause and to have the last word.""
The standpoint of national Constitutional Courts in the application of these mechanisms
cannot be neglected, as they represent the main point of mediation between the
enforcement of EU law and the ECtHR with domestic Constitutions, especially when a
direct conflict arises between the level of protection accorded to a fundamental right
under national constitutional law vis-a-vis the ECHR and/or the EU Charter. Given their
proximity to citizens, national Constitutional Courts are best placed to accommodate
supranational norms and case law within their domestic jurisdictions, while preserving, at
the same time, a suitable degree of national constitutional ownership.
D. How to Fix the Problems Deriving From the Advisory Opinions in the ECHR System?
Lessons from the Advisory Opinions Within the ICHR System
1. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights as a Model
After two years, Protocol No. 16 has not yet entered into force. There has been much
commentary and discussion in the legal scholarship on the functioning of the advisory
opinion system within the ECHR, underlining the strengths but also the weaknesses, as
clearly shown in the analysis provided in Sections B and C. In particular, one of the most
criticized aspects is that apparently Protocol No. 16 would not be able to reach the goals
for which it was designed, due to, on one side, the uncertainty surrounding the
87 On the ECtHR and the CJEU as "Constitutional Courts" in their respective domains, see Steven Greer & Luzius
Wildhaber, Revisiting the Debate about "Constitutionalising" the European Court of Human Rights, 12 HUMAN
RIGHTs L. REV. 655, 668-70 (2012), BARBARA RANDAZZo, GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE SOVRANAZIONALE. LA CORTE EUROPEA DEI
DIRITTI DELL'UOMO 4-10 (2012); Bo Vesterdorf, A constitutional court for the EU?, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 607-17 (2006).
Aida Torres Perez, Too many voices? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 4 EUR.
J. HUMAN RIGHTs 565, 583 (2013).
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harmonization of the advisory function with the contentious function (as demonstrated by
the experience of the ICHR), and, on the other side, the real utility of the Protocol as an
instrument capable of strengthening the judicial dialogue in Europe (see Section B).
These critical aspects have also all appeared in the Inter-American system. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (hereafter, the ICHR) has dealt with these issues in a very
developed and advanced body of jurisprudence, and it is useful to look at this in order to
speculate on the possible evolutions of the advisory mechanism in the European context.
With this question of anticipating how the advisory mechanism might function being the
main purpose, we will firstly analyze the main structural characteristics of the advisory
opinion within the ICHR (the relevant norms and the case law developed by the Court in
the light of the elements of the ICHR system) (1), before focusing, secondly, on the
relationship between its consultative function and its adjudicatory function (1l), and, finally,
on the dialogue between the ICHR and States (ll).
IL The Structural Features of the Advisory Opinions in the ICHR
In 1985, the Vice-President of the ICHR, Thomas Buergenthal, wrote, "[t]he role of the
Court as a judicial institution of the OAS is grounded in its advisory jurisdiction."90 Being an
"autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the
American Convention on Human Rights" (as established in Article 1 of its Statute), the ICHR
exercises its jurisdictional function through two modalities: the adjudicatory function and
the advisory function.
The ICHR advisory function, defined as "multilateral rather than litigious",91 has been
enriched by the Court itself, taking as a starting point Article 64 of the American
.92Convention.
See Pasquale De Sena, Caratteri e prospettive del Protocollo 16 nel prisma dell'esperienza del sistema
interamericano di protezione dei diritti dell'uomo, 8 DIRITTI UMANI E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 593-606 (2014).
9o See Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1985).
9 See I/A Court H.R., Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Art. 51 American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-15/97 of 14 November 1997. Series A, No.15, para. 26, according to which it
is evident that the State or organ requesting an advisory opinion is not the only one with a legitimate interest in
the outcome of the procedure, whose very purpose is the protection of human rights.
92 The advisory function, besides complementing the ICHR adjudicatory competence, also complements the
competences of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, as indicated in the Charter of the Organization
of American States (Art. 106) and in the American Convention of Human Rights (from Arts. 34 to 51).
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1. Subjects
According to this provision, all Member States of the Organization of American States
(hereafter, the OAS), whether or not they have ratified the Convention, may consult the
Court. All the organs of the Organization (organs listed in Chapter X of the OAS Charter)
may also consult the Court, but their competence is limited because they can only consult
the Court within their sphere of competence.93 Even if the Inter-American Commission is
one of the organs listed in Chapter X of the OAS Charter, the Court has recognized its
absolute right to consult the Court, given the Commission's broad powers relating to the
promotion and observance of human rights as established in Article 112 of the OAS
Charter. 94 However, this absolute right does not extend the Commission competence to
address a request to the Court according to Article 64(2) (see below).9 s
Organs indicated in Article 64 may also participate in the proceeding, despite the fact that
neither the Statute of the ICH R nor the 1980 Rule of the Court provide for amicus curice.
This is because since its very first advisory opinion the Court allowed national and
The expression "within their sphere of competence" has been interpreted by the Court with a "legitimate
institutional interest" by the requesting organ in the questions posed in the request. See I/A Court H.R., The
Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75),
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A, No. 2, para. 14, according to which, even if initially
each organ decides whether the request falls within its sphere of competence, the Court has the ultimate word in
determining compliance with this requisite by reference to the OAS Charter and the constitutive instrument and
legal practice of the particular organ. See also BERTHA SANTOsCOY-NORO, LE SYSTEME INTERAMERICAIN DE PROTECTION DES
DROITS DE ['HOMME, EN INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE ['HOMME (1996).
94 See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force, supra note 91, at para 16. See also I/A Court H.R.,
Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A, No. 3 OC 3/1983, para. 42.
9 See I/A Court H.R., International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the
Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of
December 9, 1994. Series A, no.14, paras. 24-26, in which the Court excluded the possibility for the Commission
to request an advisory opinion on a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Peru, which would have
expanded the number of cases for which the death penalty could have applied, because the Commission was not
requesting a statement as to the compatibility of that provision of Peru's domestic law with the abovementioned
provision of the Convention. On the contrary, the questions posed by the Commission made no reference to that
provision, being general in nature and concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the states or individuals
that promulgate or enforce a law manifestly in violation of the Convention.
Adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS at its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz Bolivia, October 1979
(Resolution No. 448).
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international organizations to take part in the procedure,97 later extending this possibility
also to individuals and non-organized groups.
2. Object
According to the text of Article 64, two different types of advisory opinions are recognized,
establishing in general a very wide competence (far wider than the advisory function
provided by Protocol No. 16).
a) The Interpretation of the Convention and of Other International Treaties Concerning the
Protection of Human Rights
As a matter of fact, according to Article 64(1), the Court may be consulted regarding the
interpretation not only of the American Convention, but also of other treaties concerning
the protection of human rights in the American states. Whilst identification of the
Convention is absolutely clear, the definition of the "other treaties concerning human
rights" has been the subject of interpretation by the Court since its first advisory opinion.99
According to the ICHR, Article 64 confers "the power to interpret any treaty as long as it is
directly related to the protection of human rights in a Member State of the Inter-American
system".100 Thus, it is not necessary that the "treaty" has been adopted within the Inter-
American system or that it is a "treaty" to which only American states are parties. The
Convention does not distinguish between multilateral and bilateral treaties or between
treaties whose main purpose is the protection of human rights and those treaties, which,
though they may have some other principal object, contain provisions regarding human
rights.101
Thus, in its advisory function the Court may interpret any treaty on the protection of
human rights valid in any of the States of the OAS, even when they have not ratified the
American Convention. It is not even important whether this treaty has been conceived
See I/A Court H.R., "Other treaties" subject to the consultative jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A No. 1, para. 5.
In the 2009 reform of the Rules of the Court, amicus curiae was expressly included for adjudicatory
proceedings, while for advisory proceedings the Court may authorize any person to give its opinion on the
consultation.
9 The Court was asked by the Government of Peru to interpret the phrase "or of other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the 'American States."' Cf. "Other Treaties," supra note 95.
100 Id. at para. 21.
101 Id. at para. 21. See PEDRO NIKKEN, LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOs HUMANOS,
MEMORIA DEL SEMINARIO: EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI
(2003); Buergenthal, supra note 90.
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within the framework of the Inter-American system or whether it involves one or more
non-American States.102 Consequently, the Court has interpreted international treaties like
the Convention on the Rights of the Childo0 and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. 104
Moreover, in interpreting the word "treaty", as indicated in Article 64, the Court has stated
that it must include other documents too, even if these are non-binding and even if they
have not been concluded following the formalities required for treaties. In this context, it
has recognized the possibility of pronouncing an advisory opinion on the text of the 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, based mainly on the idea that
Member States of the OAS have agreed that the Declaration contains and defines the
fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter of the Organization itself, which
cannot be interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned without relating
its norms, consistent with the practice of the organs of the OAS, to the corresponding
provisions of the Declaration.105
Finally, the ICHR extended its advisory competence in interpreting the Convention or other
treaties concerning the protection of human rights to reservations attached to those
instruments, based on the idea that reservations are a part of the treaty itself.10s
102 One of the objections posed to the extension of the limits of the Court's advisory jurisdiction is the possibility
of conflicting interpretations between the Court and other organs outside the Inter-American system that might
be called upon also to apply and interpret treaties concluded outside that system. Considering that this is a
phenomenon common to all those legal systems that have certain courts which are not hierarchically integrated,
the Court considered that even a restrictive interpretation of Art. 64 would not avoid the possibility that this type
of conflict might arise. See Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 50.
103 See I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28,
2002. Series A, No.17; I/A Court H.R., Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need
ofinternational protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of 19 August 2014.
104 Even if at first glance the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is not a treaty on human rights, it does
contain important provisions on the right to information on consular notification (under Art. 36(1)(b)). The
concurrent opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade is fundamental in recognizing that this Convention can no longer
be dissociated from the international norms on human rights concerning the guarantees of the due process of
law. See I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of
the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October 1999. Series A no.16.
105 See I/A Court H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of 14 July
1989. Series A, no.100C 10/1989, paras. 43 and 48.
106 According to the Court, the effect of a reservation, as provided in the Vienna Convention, is to modify with
regard to the State making it the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation refers. See Restrictions to the
Death Penalty, supra note 94, at para. 45.
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b) The Interpretation of National Laws
According to Article 64(2), Member States of the Organization can activate the advisory
function of the Court by requesting opinions regarding the compatibility of any of their
domestic laws with the international instruments mentioned in Article 64(1). All OAS
Member States-and not only those party to the Convention-can consult the Court to
determine whether provisions of their domestic laws conform to the obligations they
assumed in the Convention or in other human rights treaties.
The Court has clarified that the expression "domestic law" includes legislative or
constitutional drafts.107 This is because the purpose of the ICHR advisory function is to
assist OAS Member States and organs in complying with their international human rights
obligations, and also to avoid the contentious legal process and all related sanctions. This
purpose would be frustrated if the Court could emit a decision on State legislation only
once the law entered into force. However, the Court can decide whether to admit or to
reject advisory opinion requests regarding legislative proposals, and, in doing so, it has to
bear in mind that its main purpose is to assist the requesting state in better complying with
its international human rights obligations. As a matter of fact, the Court will reject a
request in all those cases in which it would become embroiled in domestic political
squabbles, which could affect the role assigned to it by the Convention.
3. The Effects of the Decisions
The extensive interpretation developed by the ICHR and the progressive extension of its
material competence, as well as of the subjects legitimated to activate the procedure, are
the consequences of the principal and unique purpose of the advisory function itself: the
interpretation of the American Convention and of other treaties concerning the protection
of human rights in the American States. The extensive advisory jurisdiction conferred on
the Court by Article 64 of the Convention and by its judicial interpretation is unique in
contemporary international law. The advisory opinion system has created a parallel system
to the adjudicatory power of the Court by offering an alternative judicial method with
consultative nature. Its aim is to assist states and organs in applying and complying with
human rights treaties, without subjecting them to the formalism and the sanctions
associated with the contentious judicial process.'0a These considerations are fundamental
in order to clarify the framework as to the effects of advisory opinions. This is also
important because, from the effects of decisions, some considerations can be drawn
107 See I/A Court H.R., Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984. Series A, no. 4, on the request presented by the Government of
Costa Rica of an advisory opinion on the compatibility of a constitutional reform of Articles 14 and 15 of its
Constitution. See id. at para. 26.
10s See Restrictions to the Death Penalty, supra note 93, at para. 43.
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regarding the relationship between adjudicatory and advisory functions and regarding the
judicial dialogue in the Inter-American context.
The foregoing considerations imply that, for the Court, advisory opinions do not have the
same binding effect as adversarial decisions. However, they do have undeniable juridical
effects, and consequently the requesting State or organ is not the only party interested in
the result of the proceeding. For if a State carries out activities that the ICHR, through an
advisory opinion, has determined as incompatible with the American Convention, that
State can no longer claim to be unaware that its behavior is violating its obligations under
the Convention.109
Considering the main philosophy behind the advisory function-"assisting the American
States in fulfilling their international human rights obligations and to assist the different
organs of the inter-American system to carry out the functions assigned to them in this
field"no-the Court has a discretionary, but not arbitrary, power to comply with a request.
It can refuse every time a request for an advisory opinion has another purpose that would
weaken the system established by the Convention and that would distort the advisory
jurisdiction of the Court in a manner that would impair the rights of potential victims of
human rights violations.
The legal scholarship dealing with the effects of advisory opinions is not unanimous. Part of
it considers that the Court exercises the function, both at the adversarial and advisory
levels, of applying and/or interpreting the American Convention, thereby functioning as a
jurisdictional body and, as such, making jurisdictional decisions. According to this
scholarship, these decisions should be considered as case law, and an auxiliary source of
law in international law according to the provisions of Articles 38-59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Indeed, this approach is supported by the fact that many
advisory opinions have been invoked in contentious cases.112
Nonetheless, it is also true that Article 2 of the Court's Statute distinguishes between its
jurisdictional function and its advisory function. However, part of the legal scholarship
considers that in this case the term "jurisdiction" has been used as a synonym for
"contentious."113
.o.See JORGE ERNESTO ROA, LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOs HUMANOS 96 (2015).
110 See Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 25.
I /d. at para. 31.
112 See NIKKEN , supra note 101.
113 Id. at 171.
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Meanwhile, another strand of legal scholarship,114 which is based on the Court's
expressions according to which in the exercise of its advisory function the Court fulfills a
consultative function through opinions, considers that they "lack the same binding force
that attaches to decisions in contentious cases.", 15
///. The Relationship Between the Advisory and the Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
One of the most delicate aspects that demands the attention of scholars studying the
possible problems of Protocol 16 is the relationship between the advisory and the
adjudicatory function. It is necessary to seek a harmonization between the two functions.
The following parts of the article set out some considerations as to how the ICHR has dealt
with the issue.
1. The Use of Advisory Opinions to Inform Decisions on Contentious Cases, as Interpretative
Criteria
In at least twenty adjudicatory cases, the Court has applied arguments taken from advisory
opinions as part of the interpretative process in contentious cases. It remains unclear
whether the Court does so because it feels bound/obliged to refer to its case law or
whether it only does so on a discretionary basis. Under the first approach, the Court would
define the effects of the advisory opinion throughout its interpretation. On one side,
advisory opinions would be considered as binding on all states, thereby representing a
horizontal precedent that could be used in contentious cases. On the other side, the Court
would not consider its advisory opinions to be binding, except when "transposed" in a
decision in an adjudicatory case. Under the latter approach, advisory opinions would only
represent subsidiary interpretative criteria, with an opinion only being converted to
international jurisprudence when the Court uses it as a basis for its decision in an
adjudicatory case. This approach would be problematic, because from the point of view of
States' international responsibility it would mean recognizing that in all those cases in
which the Court based a decision in favor or against a State on an advisory opinion, it
would be applying interpretative criteria that really are not binding on any State. Any
declaration of State responsibility would stand outside the international obligations of the
State itself, with the subsequent violation of the rights of victims.
If advisory opinions are considered to simply be part of the argumentative process
developed by the Court, then they cannot be considered binding. The latter hypothesis
appears to be the most consistent, but it is probably less tied to reality, because in fact the
114 See HrCTOR FAUNDEZ LEDEZMA, EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOs DERECHOs HUMANOS: ASPECTOS
INSTITUCIONALES Y PROCESALEs 450-54 (1996).
11' See Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 51.
2015 1421
German Law Journal
Court usually directly quotes advisory opinions when adopting certain decisions in a
proceeding.
2. The Use of Adjudicatory Jurisprudence in Advisory Opinions
If the Court uses the precedents pronounced in contentious cases in advisory opinions as
part of the decision, it would have the same consequences as we have already mentioned
with reference to the effects of an advisory opinion. The most complicated situation is
when the Court develops, in an advisory opinion, jurisprudence that has been established
in a contentious case, which happened in the advisory opinion on "Juridical Condition and
Human Rights of the Child." In this opinion, the Court not only defined the juridical
status and children's human rights in accordance with international standards, but referred
to the case Nihos de la Colle (Villagrdn Morales y otros) v. Guatemala to support the
development of rights to equality, education, and judicial guarantees for children. The
Court increased the standard of protection of their rights and imposed new obligations on
States. It might be thought that in these cases in which the interpretative principle
affirmed in an advisory opinion derives from the development of a binding precedent, that
standard is not made mandatory.
In particular, the Court's extension of its advisory jurisdiction does not imply that it is
possible to a State that is not part of the Convention a standard that is nothing else but the
development of an interpretation of an international treaty that is binding for the
requesting State. It would be possible to apply this standard given the pro persona
principle in human rights interpretation, but not for a direct application of the advisory
opinion in which it was provided.
3. The Case of States That Have Not Accepted the Court's Jurisdiction
In this context, we can consider two different options.
(1) The case in which the Court is asked to render an advisory opinion on a dispute that
could not be referred to the Court under the adjudicatory function because one of the
States had not accepted its contentious jurisdiction;
116 I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of 28 August
2002.Series A, no.17.
117 I/A Court H.R., Case of the "Street Children" (Villagr6n Morales and others) v. Guatemala, Decision of 19
November 1999, Series C No. 63.
11s See RoA, supra note 109.
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(2) The case in which the Commission, in the absence of a State's consent to the Court's
jurisdiction, seeks an advisory opinion under Article 64(1), being unable to refer the case to
the Court under the contentious jurisdiction.
As was mentioned above, the ICHR has recognized the absolute right of the Inter-American
Commission to consult the Court. According to the powers and obligations conferred upon
the Commission by the Convention, it is necessary and appropriate that it consult the
Court regarding the meaning of certain provisions, whether or not there exists an
interpretative difference between a State position and that of the Commission. The Court
has considered that only cases in which the advisory opinion request might interfere with
the proper functioning of the system of protection spelled out in the Convention, or if it
might adversely affect the interests of the victim of human rights violations, would not be
admitted."'
IV. The Dialogue
In the Inter-American context, the "dialogue" follows two main directions: judicial and
intergovernmental.120 As seen in the previous paragraphs, advisory opinions are generally
not legally binding. However, legal scholarship, Member States, and the Court itself tend to
recognize them at least at the interpretative level, and many judges have used advisory
opinions as interpretative arguments.121
However, as will be indicated below, even if State behavior has not been unanimous, the
"dialogue" with the States has been quite complicated, for several reasons. First, standards
of protection elaborated in advisory opinions are not binding on Member States. This is
u1 See Other Treaties, supra note 95. Another limit is represented by all those cases in which the advisory opinion
of the Court could produce a determination of contentious matters not yet referred to the Court, without
providing the victims with the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Such a result would distort the
Convention system. Cf. I/A Court H.R., Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-12/91 of 6 December 1991. Series A, no.12, para. 28.
120 It is necessary to underline that "judicial dialogue" within the Inter-American system has been better realized
through conventionality control and consistent interpretation. See Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Interpretaci6n
conforme y control difuso de convencionalidad. El nuevo paradigma para el juez mexicano, 2 ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALEs 531-622 (2011).
121 In this sense, for example, the Supreme Court of Argentina in the case Simon, Julio Hector y otros s/privaci6n
ilegitima de la libertad, etc. case no. 17.768, decision of 14 June 2005, declared the unconstitutionality of two
amnesty laws (Law no. 23.492 and Law no. 23.521). For several reasons, but with an explicit reference to the
advisory opinion on International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the
Convention, considered as part of the Convention case law. More specifically, this opinion underlined, with direct
reference to the Convention, the general principle according to which all state organs have to comply with State
international obligations. The supreme judge of Argentina invoked this principle in order to inhibit human rights
violations committed during the military dictatorship. See De Sena, supra note 89; ROA, supra note 109, at 130 on
the application of the ICHR advisory opinion in the Constitutional Court of Colombia case law.
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due to legal conditions, but also to the extension and indeterminacy of the ICHR's
competence. Member States cannot find in advisory opinions a general source of legal
obligation, as in the case of contentious decisions, partly because the Court cannot
pronounce on State responsibility.
Whilst it is true that American States, which are also part of the Convention system, have,
in in the great majority of cases, respected advisory opinions, human rights protection
implies a higher and greater level of commitment.
It is important to underline that, in the latest advisory opinion, "Rights and guarantees of
children in the context of migration and/or in need of international protection, 122 the ICHR
stated that the interpretation given to a provision of the Convention through an advisory
opinion provides all the organs of the Member States of the OAS, including those that are
not parties to the Convention but that have undertaken to respect human rights under the
Charter of the OAS (Article 3(l)) and the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Articles 3, 7, 8
and 9), with a source that, by its very nature, also contributes, especially in a preventive
manner, to achieving the effective respect and guarantee of human rights. In particular, it
can provide guidance when deciding matters relating to children in the context of
migration and to avoid possible human rights violations. Similarly, the Court found it
necessary to recall that, pursuant to international law, when a State is party to an
international treaty, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, such a treaty is
binding on all its organs, including the Judiciary and the Legislature, so that a violation by
any of these organs gives rise to the international responsibility of the State. Accordingly,
the Court considers that the different organs of the State must carry out the corresponding
control of conformity with the Convention, based also on the considerations of the Court
in exercising its non-contentious or advisory jurisdiction, which undeniably shares with its
contentious jurisdiction the goal of the Inter- American human rights system, which is "the
protection of the fundamental rights of the human being.;;
123
Thus, advisory opinions are considered as a binding parameter for national authorities.
From now on, ignoring an advisory interpretation and implementing or maintaining the
validity of a law contrary to the interpretation set out in the advisory opinion, could
generate the international responsibility of the State before the Inter-American Court.
Although progress in determining the effects of advisory opinions has been attained, there
remains a contradiction between, on one side, the increasingly clear binding force of
advisory opinions and, on the other side, the Court's attitude of continuing to differentiate,
in this aspect, the effects of advisory opinions and the judgments in contentious cases.
122 See Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need of international protection,
supra note 103.
123 Id. at para. 31.
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However, it is still difficult to explain the differences between the effects of an advisory
opinion and those of a contentious decision, beyond the intrinsic characteristics of each of
the procedures. Moreover, the Court has advanced a strange understanding of its advisory
function, because the ICHR is not a higher court with the power to revoke lower court
sentences, ignoring its own precedents, and it is not even possible to talk about the value
of a precedent on a horizontal level.124
Finally, in exercising the advisory function, the Court can perform a compatibility control
between norms in force (constitutional and legal) or legislative drafts (constitutional or
legal) of States. The control of compatibility of existing rules of States with the American
Convention is analogous to the abstract and posterior control of constitutionality and the
control of compatibility of constitutional or legislative drafts is analogous to prior judicial
review. However, caution is needed here because, as has been underlined, the analogy
between the Inter-American Court and Constitutional Courts is limited since the Inter-
American Court cannot invalidate provisions contrary to the Inter-American corpus iuris.125
E. Final Remarks
If Protocol No. 16 becomes effective, the ECHR system will be aligned with most of the
supranational human rights organizations, providing for not only contentious, but also
advisory, jurisdiction.
However, because of the interaction with the existing mechanisms for the protection of
fundamental rights at the domestic as well as European levels, the effects of the protocol
might become much wider than its drafters imagined. This could result not only in the
expansion of the culture of "European rights," but also in some shortcomings. In particular,
the ECHR system could suffer asymmetries, considering not only the state of ratifications,
but also the discretion left to national authorities in selecting the courts authorized to
refer. Moreover, the new mechanism could have an effect on the existing balance between
ordinary and Constitutional Courts in fundamental rights adjudication in Europe, with the
risk of creating conflicts that, in the end, result in a decline in the level of protection of the
rights of individuals.
Protocol No. 16 could trigger an ECtHR-based centralization of interpretation and,
indirectly, of application of ECHR rights, while leaving a narrow margin of manoeuvre to
national, and in particular constitutional, judges, in the interpretation of those rights based
124AUGUSTo GUEVARA PALACIOs, Los DICTAMENES CONSULTIVOS DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOs HUMANOS.
INTERPRETACION CONSTITUCIONAL Y CONVENCIONAL 321-22 (2012).
125 See Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos como Tribunal Constitucional,
in IUS CONSTITUTIONALE COMMUNE EN AMERICA LATINA. RASGOS, POTENCIALIDADES Y DESAFIOs 412-57 (Hector Fix Fierro,
Mariela Morales Antoniazzi & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 2014).
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on national constitutional provisions. Hence, a reluctance in using the advisory opinion
mechanism on the part of Constitutional Courts could be foreseeable-a reluctance,
perhaps, comparable to that witnessed for many years of Constitutional Courts failing to
fulfill their duty to use the preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU. By contrast, if
the ECtHR interprets its power of docket control strictly, then the impact of the overall
mechanism on its relationship with highest courts will be almost non-existent. Indeed, the
text of the Protocol is left deliberately vague.
All in all, however, the advisory opinion mechanism in principle has the merit of allowing
Constitutional Courts to engage in the protection of fundamental rights actively in
coordination with the ECtHR, whereas heretofore such a direct link was lacking. In other
words, it is for the Constitutional Courts to decide whether, in the framework of the ECHR
system, they want to be mere recipients of the interpretation of fundamental rights
provided by the ECtHR or also agents of fundamental rights in Europe.126 The latest
developments in terms of preliminary references to the CJEU by Constitutional Courts,
which involve an increase in both the number of references and in the number of courts
involved, show that, even where the cooperation with the CJEU is mandatory according to
the EU treaties (and contrary to Protocol No. 16), in practice and despite the obligation,
Constitutional Courts have eventually decided when to use Article 267 TFEU.
As the experience of the ICHR demonstrates, a cooperative attitude of courts could help in
avoiding the possible shortcomings identified in the mechanism of Protocol No. 16.
Favorable legislation and a supportive environment have been the ingredients that have
allowed the Inter-American system to enjoy quite a wide consultative function,127 insofar
as the locus standi before the Court is concerned, as well as the number and type of
subjects on which advisory opinions from the Court may be requested, the object (i.e., the
texts on which the opinion may be requested), and the effects of the decision.
Furthermore, through the advisory opinion function, the ICHR has developed a pro-
persona interpretation, elaborating solid and advanced juridical conceptions directed at
reinforcing its advisory competence.128 However, some weaknesses have also emerged
126 See Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary
Ruling, in this Special Issue.
127 In the practice of the Inter-American Court, the adoption of advisory opinions has developed considerably
especially in the first phase of the life of the Court, primarily due to the reluctance of States to submit to the
ICHR's adversarial jurisdiction. In fact, in the period of 1982-1989, the Court has issued its first ten advisory
opinions or nearly half of those issued to date (total of twenty-one): two in 1982, one in 1983, one in 1984, one in
1985, two in 1986, two in 1987, and one in 1989. The same trend has been repeated in the early nineties (1990-
1994), when the exercise of the adversarial jurisdiction was still very sporadic.
128 In this sense, see Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 17, according to which with reference to Art. 64 "This
text, which was broader than any similar contemporary international provision." See also Fabian Salvioli, La
competencia consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: marco legal y desarrollo
jurisprudencial, in HOMENAJE Y RECONOCIMIENTO A ANTONIO CAN ADO TRINDADE, T. Ill, 417-72 (S. Fabris eds., 2004).
1426 Vol. 16 No. 06
The Prospective Role of Constitutional Courts
within the Inter-American system, which mainly stem from the uncertainty of the effects of
the decisions. At the same time, the activism of the ICHR with regard to the expansion of
its advisory competence has generated the following consequences: it questions the
international legality of obligations the Court may impose on States in those contentious
judgments constructed on arguments expressed in the advisory opinion and it makes the
practice of the Court to use arguments of contentious sources in advisory opinions
somewhat confusing. Generally speaking, the highest courts of several Latin American
countries-which, due to the characteristics of the prevalent model of constitutional
justice in that area, have also to deal with constitutional review of legislation, thereby
reflecting the U.S. model-have assumed a positive conduct.129 The result is a dynamic
interaction and a gradual reinterpretation of domestic law, without introducing a formal
change.
Finally, the success of the mechanism introduced by Protocol No. 16 will depend on the
elements analyzed in this article and concerning both the prospective attitude of
Constitutional Courts and of the ECtHR as well as the prospective contents of its advisory
opinions.
Likewise, the development of the triangular relationship between the CJEU, ECtHR, and
Constitutional Courts needs to be explored in the light of Protocol No. 16 and EU accession
to the ECHR, if and when it is achieved. From the point of view of Constitutional Courts, EU
accession to the ECHR may further complicate the functioning of Protocol No. 16, as it
would open up competing channels of communication, first of all with the EU preliminary
reference, between national and supranational courts.
As has been pointed out, the complex intertwining of the new advisory opinion mechanism
of the ECtHR and the preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU shows that there is
a missing piece in this jigsaw. These mechanisms devise inter-judicial relationships that rely
only upon the inputs of domestic courts, as if the CJEU and the ECtHR, in their respective
domains, d o not need to engage in the first place in a "conversation" with national judges,
129 This positive approach is resumed in the approach of the Constitutional Court of Peru, according to which it
has referred to the ICHR as the "ultimate guardian of rights in the region," underlining the necessity to take into
consideration its interpretation. See Constitutional Court of Peru, 17 April 2002, Cartagena Vargas, no. 218-02-
HC/TC, para. 2. The Constitutional Court of Peru considers that ICHR judgments-including advisory opinions-are
binding for all public authorities, binding nature that "is not exhausted by its operative paragraphs, but extends to
the ratio decidendi, even in those cases in which the Peruvian State has not been a party to the proceedings." Id.
at para. 36. On the same line is the Constitutional Court of Colombia. See Diego Garcia-Sayan, The Inter-American
Court and Constitutionalism in Latin America, 7 Tx. L. REV. 1835-62 (2011). For a "negative approach" in the
experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, see Alexandra Huneeus, Rejecting the Inter-American Court:
Judicialization, National Courts, and Regional Human Rights, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL
ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 112-39 (Javier A. Couso, Alexandra Huneeus, & Rachel Sieder eds., 2013).
2015 1427
German Law Journal
and particularly with Constitutional Courts. 130 Without the CJEU and the ECtHR being able
to take steps forward towards constitutional judges, some of their decisions risk being
detached from the constitutional systems from where the case arose, or risk exclusively
focusing on the protection of a right without taking other competing public interests
seriously (for example, in cases having an impact on welfare systems, still financed almost
entirely by States, and on national budgets). 13  Hence, the establishment of a system of
reverse referrals from the CJEU and the ECtHR, respectively, to Constitutional Courts,
would perhaps appear appropriate. This could be used when doubts arise about the
constitutional implications of a prospective EU or conventional judgment at the domestic
level, especially when constitutional judges have had the opportunity to have a say on the
pending case.132 This way, the declared objective of Protocol no. 16, which is to strengthen
the cooperation between highest domestic courts and the ECtHR, would be truly fulfilled,
through the putting in place of a bi-directional relationship.
130 See Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary
Ruling, in this Special Issue.
1 See, e.g., in matter of pensions, the case Da Conceig5o Mateus v. Portugal, App. Nos. 62235/12 and 57725/12,
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/, which took a different view to the Portuguese Constitutional Court in
Decision no. 353/2012. By contrast, in Decision no. 264/2012, the Italian Constitutional Court, again on pensions,
decided not to follow the judgment rendered on the same issue by the ECtHR in Maggio and others v. Italy, App.
Nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08, and 56001/08, (May 31, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. See
Cristina Fasone, Constitutional Courts Facing the Euro Crisis. Italy, Portugal and Spain in a Comparative
Perspective, MAX WEBER PROGRAMME WORKING PAPERS (2014).
132 In this context, the "Case-Law Exchange Network with Highest Courts," recently established by the European
Court of Human Rights, represents a crucial intermediate step.
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The Decision of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights: An Instrument of Leverage or
Rearguard Action?
By Andreas Orator
A. An "Instant Classic" Decision
In a landmark decision of 2012 on the relevance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
(CFR) in domestic constitutional adjudication, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof
(Constitutional Court) substantially extended the applicable yardstick, according to which
the constitutionality of ordinary laws and administrative action may be assessed, to certain
Charter rights.' At the same time, the Verfassungsgerichtshof claimed its active
commitment to judicial dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
through the preliminary reference procedure pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to effectively
protect Charter-based fundamental rights of individuals. Arguably, both the domestic and
Union-wide ramifications of this "instant classic" case of a domestic constitutionalization of
the Charter are substantial, delivering insight not least as to the transformative role of the
Charter for domestic fundamental rights protection and the adaptations of domestic
constitutional courts in such a changed environment.
In this article, the reasoning of the Verfassungsgerichtshof shall be traced back to its status
as a domestic constitutional court, its rapport with the CJEU, as well as the overall
relationship of Austrian constitutional law and EU law. In order to better understand the
Court's astonishing approach in its Charter decision, the profound impact of the entry into
force of the binding and directly applicable CFR on fundamental rights protection in Austria
needs to be taken into account. Following an assessment of the Charter judgment itself,
the article seeks to investigate possible ramifications for the Austrian system of
constitutional adjudication in general and the role of the Verfassungsgerichtshof as a
fundamental rights court vis-h-vis other domestic supreme courts in particular. In all
Dr. iur. (Vienna), LL.M. (NYU), diplIme (Sciences-Po), Assistant Professor, WU Vienna University of Economics
and Business, Institute for European and International Law, andreas.orator@wu.ac.at. I wish to thank the
participants of the seminar in memoriam of Gabriella Angiulli, "The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice
of the European Union by Constitutional Courts," at LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy, in March 2014, for their
comments on an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 VfSlg 19.632/2012. All quotes are taken from the judgment's English translation made available by the
Verfassungsgerichtshof, http://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site/attachments/9/6/0/CH0006/CMS1353421369433/
grundrechtechartaenglish u466-11.pdf.
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likelihood, the Verfassungsgerichtshof will employ the preliminary reference procedure
more often and will become a more "active" player, especially with regard to the system of
Charter rights protection.
B. A "Model Pupil" Constitutional Court
Despite Austria's accession to the EU only in 1995, its Verfassungsgerichtshof was still
among the very first constitutional courts of an EU Member State to take recourse to the
2procedure of preliminary reference. In Austria, it is commonly claimed that the
Verfassungsgerichtshof was the first constitutional court of an EU Member State to refer
questions to the CJEU. While being incorrect, this assertion might also indicate the
character of a "model pupil" constitutional court which, from the outset, actively engages
in a judicial dialogue with the CJEU. To this can be added the fact that, in general, Austrian
courts and tribunals have eagerly made use of the reference procedure, making Austria
today the Member State with the second-most frequent usage of the preliminary
reference procedure per capita.4
In 1999, four years into Austria's EU membership, the Verfassungsgerichtshof considered a
question of interpretation of European law to be relevant to deciding a domestic
constitutional issue and accepted, without reservations, its obligation under EU law to
refer it to the CJEU.s These and two other early referrals are notable not least because
disputes relating to European law generally could not be argued before the
Verfassungsgerichtshof, since the Court's measuring yardstick was limited to formal
6Austrian constitutional law. Theoretically, questions relating to EU law could raise
unconstitutionality proceedings if EU law were to take precedence over a domestic norm,
2 See THEo OHLINGER & MICHAEL POTACs, EU-RECHT UND STAATLICHES RECHT. DIE ANWENDUNG DEs EUROPARECHTS IM
INNERSTAATLICHEN BEREICH 175 n. 706 (2014); Heinz Schaffer, Osterreich und die Europdische Union-Erfahrungen
und Leistungen des 6sterreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs, 60 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 345, 378
(2005).
For the first referral by the Belgian (then) Cour d'arbitrage see Case C-93/97, Federation belge des chambres
syndicales de medecins ASBL v. Flemish Government, Government of the French Community, Council of Minister,
1998 E.C.R. 1-04837, see Jan Komarek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 420, 432
(2013). The Cour d'arbitrage has been a member of the "Conference of European Constitutional Courts" since
1990 and was renamed Cour constitutionnelle in 2007. The Belgian Court's referral dates from 1997, the Austrian
Verfassungsgerichtshof referred its first case two years later, see VfSlg 15.450/1999.
4 See BEDANNA BAPULY & GERHARD KOHLEGGER, DIE IMPLEMENTIERUNG DEs GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS IN OSTERREICH 583-737
(2003); Hannes Rosler, Die Vorlagepraxis der EU-Mitgliedstaaten-Eine statistische Analyse zur Nutzung des
Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens, 47 EUROPARECHT 392, 398 (2012).
VfSlg 15.450/1999. The Constitutional Court had accepted the CJEU's supremacy case-law from the outset, see,
in particular, VfSlg 14.886/1997.
See in detail, infra at C.
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be it either a constitutional norm or a domestic measure challenged before the
Verfassungsgerichtshof. In the former case, Austrian constitutional law would no longer
constitute the applicable yardstick given the blocking effect of directly applicable EU law.
In the latter case, the supremacy of EU law would result in what the Court understands as
lack of "applicability," which, however, is a decisive procedural requirement in cases of
"concrete" judicial review.
Thus, in the 1999 case, the Verfassungsgerichtshof pondered the consequences of its
recognition of the supremacy of EU law over Austrian law for a domestic provision on
partial energy tax refunds, which possibly violated provisions on state aid pursuant to
(today's) Article 103 TFEU. The challenged domestic measure would either be rendered
inapplicable or have to be interpreted in conformity with EU law. In two subsequent cases,
the Court referred further questions to the CJEU on the interpretation of EU law provisions
possibly conflicting with a domestic measure.9 Whilst following these three early referrals
the Verfassungsgerichtshof did not initiate further preliminary reference proceedings until
2011, it should have been sufficiently clear that the Court was ready to accept and willing
to activate this instrument of cooperation under EU law. 10 At the same time, however, EU
law would still not constitute "a standard for its own judicial review.""
C. The Charter as a Domestic "Game Changer"
I. Three Apex Courts with Respective Functions
Traditionally, the three supreme judicial bodies-the Verfassungsgerichtshof, the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court), and the Oberster Gerichtshof
(Supreme Court of Justice)-have been characterized as equally ranking peer courts, which
have been attributed respective functions. 12 As for general judicial review, the jurisdiction
On this issue of "Prajudizialitat," cf. Michael Potacs, Die Bedeutung des Gemeinschaftsrechts for dos
verfassungsgerichtliche Normprijfungsverfahren, in DAS VERFASSUNGSGERICHTLICHE VERFAHREN IN STEUERSACHEN 245,
251 (Michael Holoubek & Michael Lang eds., 2010); Gerhard Baumgartner, Verfassungsgerichtliche
Normenkontrolle und EU-Recht, 65 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 295, 305 (2010).
See also for cases of individual complaints and differences from abstract review OHLINGER & PoTAcs, supra note 2,
at 163-68.
9 VfSlg 16.050/2000, VfSlg 16.100/2001.
10 Michael Holoubek, Dos Verhdltnis zwischen europdischer Gerichtsbarkeit und Verfassungsgerichtshof, in
KOOPERATION DER GERICHTE IM EUROPAISCHEN VERFASSUNGSVERBUND. GRUNDFRAGEN UND NEUESTE ENTWICKLUNGEN 12.
OSTERREICHISCHER EUROPARECHTSTAG 2012, 157, 163 (Christoph Grabenwarter & Erich Vranes eds., 2013).
11VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 24, with further references
12 Matthias Jestaedt, Die (Mbglichkeit einer) Gesetzesbeschwerde an den Verfassungsgerichtshof, in DIE
vERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT ERSTER INSTANZ 395, 400 (Michael Holoubek & Michael Lang eds., 2013).
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of the Verfassungsgerichtshof would only cover the "illegality" of domestic (administrative)
regulations pursuant to Article 139 Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG) as well as the
"unconstitutionality" of domestic laws pursuant to Article 140 B-VG, which does not entail
primary or secondary EU law.13 The Constitutional Court would be exclusively competent
to strike down domestic regulations and laws;14 in this sense, judicial review is
concentrated before the Verfassungsgerichtshof,s which may and must remove from the
domestic legal order provisions which are deemed incompatible with constitutional law.
The Verfassungsgerichtshof would also be the main fundamental rights court of the land: it
is competent to repeal administrative decisions which violate constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Furthermore, the review of legality of administrative decisions would be shared
between the Supreme Administrative Court and the Verfassungsgerichtshof. It is
noteworthy that EU law as a measuring yardstick would generally fall within the Supreme
Administrative Court's realm. While EU law generally would not qualify as a standard of
review before the Constitutional Court, it consistently acknowledged in its case law that
administrative breaches of EU law had to be equated with breaches of Austrian statutory
provisions, whose compliance would be controlled by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof: "[A]
violation of [EU] law would be tantamount to a violation of a simple (i.e. not of
constitutional status) domestic law, which would be for the Supreme Administrative Court
to address."16
Finally, the jurisdiction of the Oberster Gerichtshof would mainly stretch to the legality
review of civil and criminal cases. Originally, with the exception of "abstract" judicial
review, parliamentary statutes on civil and criminal matters would not be reviewable by
the Verfassungsgerichtshof unless the Oberster Gerichtshof referred a case to the
Constitutional Court; under that "division of labor" of the constitution the Oberster
Gerichtshof would independently consider whether a judicial decision complied with
constitutionally guaranteed rights in particular and the Austrian constitution in general.
Recently, this balance of judicial powers has been modified, since there is now a right to
file a complaint to the Verfassungsgerichtshof to constitutionally challenge regulations and
statutes applicable in civil and criminal proceedings.
13 See OHLINGER & POTACs, supra note 2, at 168.
14 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 33.
15 Id. at para. 41.
1See VfSlg 14.886/1997 (as quoted in the English translation of VfSlg 19.632/2012).
17 Art. 92 Federal Constitutional Act (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, "B-VG"), cf. Eckhart Ratz, Der Oberste Gerichtshof
in Osterreich als Grundrechtsgericht, 73 OSTERREICHISCHEs ANWALTSBLATT 274 (2013). See, however, the
interlocutory proceedings for constitutionality review before the Verfassungsgerichtshof, Art. 89 para. 2 B-VG.
18 The "Subsidiarantrag auf Normenkontrolle" came into effect on 1 January 2015, Federal Law Gazette BGBl. I
114/2013.
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11. The Impact of the Charter
The general "division of labor" among the three apex courts with regard to domestic
constitutional and EU fundamental rights should be borne in mind when assessing the
impact of the binding - and directly applicable-Charter of Fundamental Rights upon the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 9 Given the very broad scope of application of the
Charter, whose rights have to be observed in domestic legal disputes whenever Member
States are "implementing" EU law pursuant to Article 51(1) CFR, many civil and
administrative cases involving issues of Charter rights would have to be decided by the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof or the Oberster Gerichtsh of.20
As long as the Verfassungsgerichtshof would adhere to its formally restrictive approach for
issues involving EU law in general, it would need to accept the compelling consequences
flowing from the principle of supremacy of EU law (including Charter rights), the wide
scope of application of EU law, and, subsequently, the CFR.21 The Constitutional Court
would often have to share its role as a "fundamental rights court" with the two other
domestic apex courts, and, arguably, the CJEU as the final arbiter on the interpretation of
CFR provisions.
D. Charter Rights as a Constitutional Yardstick
I. The Domestic Constitution alization of the Charter
It is against this backdrop that the Verfassungsgerichtshof rendered its landmark judgment
of 14 March 2012.22 Two non-EU citizens seeking asylum had been refused international
protection pursuant to the Austrian Asylum Act, which, inter alia, was considered to
transpose Directives 2004/83/EC and 2005/85/EC on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals as well as minimum standards on asylum
23procedures. Pursuant to Article 51(1) of the Charter, the competent authorities, the
19 On the impact of the "visibility" of Charter rights, cf. Daniel Thym, Die Reichweite der EU-Grundrechte-Charta-
Zu viel Grundrechtsschutz?, 32 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 889 (2013).
20 See Andreas Orator, Herousforderungen der 6sterreichischen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zur effektiven und
legitimen Letztentscheidung unter Integrationsbedingungen, in TAGUNGSBAND 53. ASSISTENTENTAGUNG OFFENTLICHES
RECHT "DAS LETZTE WORT-RECHTSETZUNG UND RECHTSKONTROLLE IN DER DEMOKRATIE" 237, 244 (Dominik Elser et al. eds.,
2014).
21 On the scope of application of the Charter, see, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 375 (2012).
22 VfSlg 19.632/2012.
23 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and
the content of the protection granted, Official Journal L 304/12, 30 September 2004, Council Directive
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Federal Asylum Office and the Austrian Asylum Tribunal, were therefore under a duty to
apply respective provisions of the Charter. In particular, the Federal Asylum Tribunal had
dismissed the complainants' motion for oral hearing. Before the Constitutional Court, the
complainants, therefore, exclusively argued that this dismissal violated their
constitutionally guaranteed rights to an effective remedy and a fair trial according to
24Article 47(2) of the Charter. They did not, however, invoke any fundamental right
formally guaranteed under the Austrian Constitution as required under the proceedings of
the (then) Article 144a B-VG.25 When applying the above-mentioned restrictive case law of
the VfGH on EU law not being a constitutional yardstick, the complaints could only have
been dismissed from the outset.
Interestingly enough, however, the Verfassungsgerichtshof took a different course of
action. It engaged in a surprisingly long discussion on the value of invoking Charter rights in
26
constitutional proceedings in situations involving the implementation of EU law. While it
dismissed the complaints as unfounded, it held, obiter,27 that in cases brought before it in
which the Charter was generally applicable, those Charter rights which were "similar in its
wording and purpose" 28 to fundamental rights guaranteed under Austrian constitutional
law would henceforth be regarded as a formal constitutional yardstick against which the
validity of administrative decisions and even general norms could be tested.
IL The Role of the Principle of Equivalence
This surprising domestic constitutional appreciation of Charter rights "normatively
follows,"29 inter alia, from the Court's understanding of the EU principle of equivalence,
which, under the case law of the CJEU, requires that as long as EU procedural rules are
lacking, domestic "rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive
from [EU] law" apply
2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status, Official Journal L 326/13, 13 December 2005.
24 VfSlg 19.632/2012, paras. 1-14.
25 Id. at para. 16.
26 On the traditional style of reasoning of the Verfassungsgerichtshof, which has been characterized as relatively
"cautious" or "reserved," see Kurt Heller, Die Anwendung der Grundrechte der Europdiischen Union durch den
Verfassungsgerichtshof, 134 JURISTISCHE BLATTER 675 (2012).
27 See Magdalena Poschl, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit nach Lissabon. Anmerkungen zum Charta-Erkenntnis, 67
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 587, 602 (2012).
28 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 35.
29 Holoubek, supra note 10, at 166 n. 38 (relativising the Court's use of the principle of equivalence served as a
mere "starting point and occasion"); cf. Verfassungsgerichtshof, B 166/2013-17, 12 March 2014, at n. 22.
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provided, however, that such rules are not less
favourable than those governing similar domestic
actions [...] and do not render virtually impossible or
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by
Community law.3 o
From this and the Member States' obligation of sincere cooperation pursuant to Article
4(3) TEU, the Verfassungsgerichtshof concludes that, as a competent domestic court, it
must ensure that "rights which are guaranteed by directly applicable Union law must be
enforceable in proceedings that exist for comparable rights deriving from the legal order of
the Member States."31
The Court then assesses the Pontin judgment of the CJEU, which calls upon the respective
domestic court to "consider whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their
purpose, cause of action, and essential characteristics", 3 2 and finds that the Charter entails
"rights as they are guaranteed by the Austrian constitution in a similar manner as
constitutionally safeguarded rights."33
At this point, it must be highlighted that many rights, which are guaranteed under the
Austrian constitution, that is, Austrian fundamental rights, stem directly from the
catalogue of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which enjoys
constitutional rank in the Austrian legal order. In other words, Convention rights are part
of the formal constitutional yardstick and can be directly invoked as constitutionally
guaranteed rights. 34 Unsurprisingly, this peculiar situation alleviates the Court's search for
"comparable" fundamental rights, since many fundamental rights protected under the
ECHR served as models, "both in wording and intention"35 for respective Charter rights. For
instance, according to the Charter's Explanations, Article 47 CFR is directly based on the
wording of Article 13 ECHR (in its first paragraph) and Article 6(1) ECHR (in its second
paragraph); in its scope, however, Article 47(2) CFR is not limited to "disputes relating to
civil law rights and obligations", but applies to "all rights guaranteed by Union law." 36
'0 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v. T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. 1-07835, para. 18, with references to
earlier case-law (italics not in original).
31 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 29.
32 Case C-63/08, Virginie Pontin v. T-Comalux SA, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10467, para. 45.
3 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 30.
34 Federal Law Gazette BGBl. 59/1964.
5 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 31.
See the explanations to Article 47 CFR, Official Journal 2007 C 303/29.
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Whilst the Court's reasoning is tied to its understanding of the EU principle of
equivalence, it is coupled with two main functions of the Verfassungsgerichtshof, namely
its tasks as a quasi-centralized fundamental rights court and as a "negative legislator"39
(i.e., a centralized court to judicially review parliamentary acts and administrative
regulations). From these EU and domestic principles, the Verfassungsgerichtshof concludes
its domestic competence "to adjudicate on largely congruent rights" 40 in the Charter, both
41in fundamental rights proceedings as well as general judicial review proceedings.
1/. Partial Constitutionalization, Pronounced En Passant
This approach evidently deviates from the previous case law of the Verfassungsgerichtshof
42
on the value of (parts of) EU law in constitutional proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court
seems to be keen to contain its overruling of the former general non-invocability of EU law
in constitutional proceedings by limiting the effect to certain Charter rights only. In order
to do so it aims at, first, presenting the Charter as "an area that is markedly distinct from
the 'Treaties. "43 Second, it confines its new approach to Charter rights "similar in its
wording and purpose to rights that are guaranteed by the Austrian Federal Constitution," 44
that is, in particular congruent rights under the ECHR. Third, it reserves its right "to decide
on a case-by-case basis" which Charter provisions contain (comparable) "rights" and which
would rather constitute (non-comparable) "principles" according to Article 51 CFR. 4 5
Finally, the Verfassungsgerichtshof draws on the argument of codification of EU
fundamental rights, deriving from general principles of law which had been developed by
CJEU case law, as sufficient a leap to accept (only) certain "codified" Charter rights as a
national standard of review in constitutional proceedings: "[T]he applicability of a detailed
However, see the qualification, supra note 29.
VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 33 ("The system of legal protection set out in the Federal Constitutional Act provides
in general for a concentration of claims for violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights with one instance, i.e.
the Constitutional Court [...]").
9 Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 5 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DEUTSCHER
STAATSRECHTSLEHRER (1929) 26 ("negativer Gesetzgeber").
40 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 34.
41 Art. 144 B-VG as well as Arts. 139-140 B-VG.
42 See Franz Merli, Umleitung der Rechtsgeschichte, 20 J. FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 355, 355-356 (2012).
43 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 25.
44 Id. at para. 35.
45 Id. at paras. 34, 36.
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catalogue of rights and duties as set out in the [CFR] is not comparable to the derivation of
legal positions from general legal principles." 46
For the sake of that argument, the Verfassungsgerichtshof had to ignore the fact that the
CJEU not only regularly drew on the similarly detailed and, in particular, written,
fundamental rights catalogue of the ECHR when sketching out the contents of such
principle-based fundamental rights. What is more, already the pre-Lisbon version of Article
6(3) TEU had explicitly referred to the standard of those general principles "as guaranteed
by the" written catalogue of the ECHR.
The Verfassungsgerichtshof seeks to further legitimate its discriminate treatment of
(certain) EU fundamental rights based in the Charter on the one hand and other EU
fundamental rights (or, for that matter, other directly invocable provisions guaranteed by
the Treaties) by the new wording of Article 6 TEU. One cannot help but describe its
respective citation as distorting. The Court cites the passage of "the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the Treaties," to underline the distinctiveness of the Charter as
opposed to the Treaties, yet omits the subsequent wording of Article 6(1) TEU that states
that both instruments "shall have the same legal value."47 This omission is all the more
surprising since the Verfassungsgerichtshof, only several paragraphs earlier, had correctly
presented the Charter as EU primary law which had been explicitly attributed the same
legal value as the Treaties pursuant to Article 6(1) TEU.48 From these and other arguments
it becomes obvious that the Verfassungsgerichtshof was eager to confine the effect of the
equivalence principle to rights arising from the Charter as opposed to directly applicable
rights arising from other sources of EU primary law and not completely overrule its
previous case law. The astounding result of this partial constitutionalization of EU primary
law thus comes at the price of considerable argumentative inconsistencies.
What is more, the Court's eventual dismissal of the case - it did not find a violation of
Article 47(2) CFR for lack of an oral hearing before the Austrian Asylum Tribunal - turned
the bold argumentative move of the Verfassungsgerichtshof into a drop of bitterness for
the complainants, who relied exclusively on constitutional arguments, which would have
been futile from the outset before this constitutionalization of the Charter. The Court
apparently took the first case which had come along to modify its case law after having
made the necessary preparations.49 It did not wait for a case involving an actual violation
46 Id. at para. 38.
47See Poschl, supra note 27, at 591-92.
48 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 18.
49 On those, see the earlier literary statement of Justice Rudolf Muller, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und
Europiische Grundrechtecharta, 67 OSTERREICHISCHEJURISTEN-ZEITUNG 159 (2012).
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of constitutionalized Charter rights, turning its reasoning in an exceptionally extensive
obiter dictum.so
As a result, Charter rights such as Article 47(2) CFR would henceforth be regarded as a
formal constitutional yardstick against which the constitutional validity of administrative
decisions and even general norms could be tested. In that vein, the Verfassungsgerichtshof
has, since then, declared further Charter rights to be constitutionally guaranteed rights.s"
More recently, on the grounds of a violation of Article 47(2) CFR the
Verfassungsgerichtshof invalidated several administrative decisions, and, in its exercise of
general judicial review, declared a statutory provision unconstitutional.52 Thus, it has
become the first constitutional court of an EU Member State to apply parts of the Charter
as a constitutional standard of review.53
E. Judicial Cooperation Coming with Strings Attached?
Apart from this spectacular move to partially constitutionalize the Charter for the Austrian
legal order, the Verfassungsgerichtshof is keen to reiterate its readiness to cooperate with
the CJEU by referring relevant issues of interpretation of EU law to the Luxembourg court
for a preliminary ruling.54 However, the Charter decision leaves room for questions as to
whether the Constitutional Court's commitment to judicial cooperation under the
procedure pursuant to Article 267 TFEU is fully in line with CJEU case law.
First of all, the Verfassungsgerichtshof seems to interpret the CILFIT doctrine of the CJEU,
providing for exceptions to Article 267 TFEU situations,55 in a way that the criterion of
"irrelevance" of the issue should also apply "if a constitutionally guaranteed right,
50 Heller, supra note 26, at 675. It took the Court another year to actually invalidate a decision based on a
violation of Charter rights, see infra, note 52.
5 See Arts. 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, and 21 para. 1 CFR; cf. VfSlg 19.673/2012, VfSlg 19.702/2012, VfSlg 19.749/2013, Case
B 166/2013.
52 See, e.g., Case U 1257/2012, 26 June 2013. Since the Charter decision, the Verfassungsgerichtshof has reversed
about a dozen administrative decisions, so far almost exclusively on the grounds of violations of the right to an
oral hearing under Article 47, paragraph 2 CFR. For the same reasons, on one occasion the Verfassungsgerichtshof
declared unconstitutional an already expired provision of the Federal Asylum Tribunal Act, exercising general
judicial review based on the Charter as a constitutional yardstick for the first time, Case G 86/2013, 27 February
2014.
On other European Constitutional Courts, see Maartje De Visser, National Constitutional Courts, the Court of
Justice and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in a post-Charter Landscape, 14 HUM. RTS. REV. 1 (2013).
54 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 40.
Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, Case C-495/03,
Intermodal Transports BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, 2005 E.CR. 1-8151.
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especially a right of the ECHR, has the same scope of application as a right of the [CFR]."s6
The Verfassungsgerichtshof concludes that in these instances it would rest its decision on a
congruent fundamental right under formal domestic constitutional law, to which ECHR
rights belong rather than on an equivalent Charter right, refraining from referring a
respective question at hand to the CJEU. To say the least, it is far from clear that the CJEU
holds an identical understanding of the relevance criterion of the CILFIT doctrine,57 which is
why this issue should be eventually decided by the CJEU itself.
What is more, it has already become evident that the Constitutional Court's interpretation
of the principle of equivalence is anything but clearly based in CJEU case law.sa According
to the Verfassungsgerichtshof, the principle of equivalence requires that directly applicable
Union rights "must be enforceable in proceedings that exist for comparable rights deriving
from the legal order of the Member States. 59 The Constitutional Court seems to imply that
rather than equivalent legal protection, identical procedures in cases of comparable rights
are warranted.6o As supporting evidence, the Verfassungsgerichtshof cites a passage from
the CJEU's Pontin judgment:
The principle of equivalence requires that the national
rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether
the infringement alleged is of [EU] law or national law,
61
where the purpose and cause of action are similar.
When continuing its quotation from the Pontin judgment, the Court omits the following
sentence: "However, that principle is not to be interpreted as requiring Member States to
extend their most favourable rules to all actions [...]y62 It is striking that the
Verfassungsgerichtshof did not refer to a CJEU statement which clearly excluded an
understanding of the principle of equivalence demanding the "most favourable" or even
identical procedure. Domestically, there are good reasons to take the view that the
6 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 44.
See Poschl, supra note 27, at 598.
Merli, supra note 42, at 356-57.
VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 29.
6o See Merli, supra note 42, at 356.
61 Case C-63/08, Virginie Pontin v. T-Comalux SA, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10467, para. 45, as cited in VfSlg 19.632/2012,
para. 29.
62 Id. at para. 45.
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procedures at hand before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof as an "EU fundamental rights
,,63 64
court' are generally not unfavorable.
Thus, the Charter decision of the Verfassungsgerichtshof entails a number of important
issues of interpretation of EU law, some of which are even essential to delivering the
Court's conclusion for partial constitutionalization of the Charter. Arguably, some of these
issues do not fall under the category of an acte clair and, therefore, should have been
65
referred to the CJEU. One is tempted to speculate about the reasons for which the
Verfassungsgerichtshof, traditionally and ostensibly committed to judicial cooperation
under Article 267 TFEU, chose not to present these issues as triggering a duty under EU law
to seek a preliminary judgment. Here, the idea suggests itself that the Constitutional
Court precisely sought an EU law-based "leverage" to constitutionalize Charter rights,
which it found in a possible, but in all likelihood not compelling interpretation of the
principle of equivalence. Under that assumption, the Pontin or Levez case law of the CJEU
strongly indicates that a referral would not have "delivered" the interpretive results that
the Verfassungsgerichtshof might have wished for from the CJEU. In that respect, the
Charter decision, despite its clear language of commitment to cooperation with the CJEU,
remains ambiguous.
To this can be added a number of complications resulting from the traditional
understanding of a non-hierarchical relationship of the three Austrian apex courts. It hardly
came as a surprise that the Charter decision met with judicial reactions by the other two
67
supreme courts. Less than a year after the Charter decision, the Oberster Gerichtshof
challenged the Constitutional Court's questionable understanding of the principle of
equivalence and referred, inter alia, a question to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU which
also aimed at an interpretation of the principle of equivalence.6 In its preliminary ruling,
63 Michael Potacs, Rechte der EU-Grundrechte-Charta als verfassungsgesetzlich gewlihrleistete Rechte, 134
JURISTISCHE BLATTER 503, 511 (134); see also the reaction of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof in Case 2013/15/0196, 23
January 2013.
64See Poschl, supra note 27, at 594-95.
65 See id. at 597.
66 In particular, see the Court's fragmented citation of the Pontin case; cf. Merli, supra note 42, at 356 n. 2;
further, see the relativization in the Constitutional Court's follow-up case-law, e.g. Case B 166/2013-17, 12 March
2014, para. 22; see Poschl, supra note 27, at 603; Christoph Brenn, VfGH versus Unionsrecht, 67 OSTERREICHISCHE
JURISTEN-ZEITUNG, 1062, 1065 (2012).
For a literary reaction, see, e.g., Ratz, supra note 17, at 278.
Order of the Oberster Gerichtshof for a preliminary ruling, 17 December 2012, 9 Ob 15/12i; see CJEU, Case C-
112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. 1-00000, para. 27 ("In the case of rules of procedural law under which the
ordinary courts called upon to decide on the substance of cases are also required to examine whether legislation
is unconstitutional but are not empowered to repeal legislation generally, this being reserved for a specially
organised constitutional court, does the 'principle of equivalence' in the implementation of European Union law
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the CJEU reiterated its previous case law as prescribing the application of "detailed
procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual's rights under EU law [...]
no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions."69 However, yet rather
unsurprisingly, the CJEU avoided directly commenting on the Constitutional Court's
interpretation of the principle of equivalence, which the Oberster Gerichtshof had
obviously wished for.70 Rather, the CJEU identified, "from the reasoning of the order for
,,71
reference, the relevant question in the issues of domestic, possibly constitutional,
interlocutory proceedings with a view to Article 267 TFEU obligations of ordinary courts as
well as in the principle of primacy of EU law.
There, the CJEU rather positively perceived the Constitutional Court's reference to its
earlier case law on that matter.72 In its Charter decision, the Verfassungsgerichtshof had
raised that issue:73 In the Melki and Abdeli judgment the CJEU argued that such
interlocutory proceedings could be compatible with Article 267 TFEU as long as, inter alia,
"national courts or tribunals remain free to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling, at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate, even at the end of
the interlocutory procedure for the review of constitutionality, any question which they
consider necessary. 74
Thus, the constitutionalization of Charter rights, taken together with a national procedural
provision requiring ordinary courts to request the invalidation of domestic legislation
deemed unconstitutional, must not in any way limit the unconditional right of the national
court to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU. In a sense, this reflects the traditional
Simmenthal principle that "it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior
setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means,,,75 for otherwise
the effectiveness of the procedure under Article 267 TFEU could be impaired. In its order
for a preliminary ruling, the Oberster Gerichtshof seemed to take up precisely that possible
mean that, where legislation infringes [Art 47 CFR], the ordinary courts are also required, in the course of the
proceedings, to request the constitutional court to set aside the legislation generally, and cannot simply refrain
from applying that legislation in the particular case concerned?").
Case C-112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. 1-00000, para. 45, quoting from previous case-law (italics added).
70 In its order for a preliminary ruling, the Oberster Gerichtshof cites from the Charter decision, see order of the
Oberster Gerichtshoffor a preliminary ruling, 17 December 2012, 9 Ob 15/12i, section 3.7.
71 Case C-112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. 1-00000, para. 29.
72 Id. at para. 32.
73 VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 42.
74 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Aziz Melki and Selim Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R. 1-5665, para. 57.
Case C-106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629, para. 24.
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blocking effect of the Melki case law with regard to Article 89 paragraph 2 B-VG, which
obliges ordinary courts, if they consider an applicable general norm to be unconstitutional,
to refer the issue to the Verfassungsgerichtshof as the centralized authority for judicial
review. To the disappointment of the Oberster Gerichtshof, the CJEU did not (have to) take
76
sides, but only generally pointed to the importance of compliance with the Melki criteria.
At closer inspection, therefore, the Constitutional Court's offer to cooperate seems to be
incomplete and possibly inconsistent, whereas the constitutionalization of parts of EU
fundamental rights openly challenges the previous "division of labour" between three
domestic apex courts.n
F. Preserving Endangered Functions?
The outcome of the Charter decision, that is, the partial domestic constitutionalization of
an EU catalogue of fundamental rights, undoubtedly represents a landmark case both
under Austrian constitutional law and under EU law. From the outside, the motives for this
rather spectacular decision, remain, however, less clear. Nonetheless, one might trace the
Court's general motives from the judgment's language, from the literary comments of a
number of (former) constitutional justices, and from the academic debate on the
judgment.
Here, the affirmation of the role of the Verfassungsgerichtshof as a quasi-exclusive
fundamental rights court of last resort and as the "monopolist" of general judicial review
runs like a central theme throughout the Charter decision. With a view to the entry into
force of a directly applicable Charter, blocking the application of conflicting national rules
including national fundamental rights, the Verfassungsgerichthof proved to have a good
sense of the profound impact of the Charter on the exercise of these central constitutional
functions. In that sense, the Charter decision might be viewed as a "rearguard action" to
protect those functions of the Constitutional Court which it considered to be at risk due to
a directly applicable Charter.ao
Insofar as its role as a quasi-exclusive fundamental rights court is concerned, the
Constitutional Court fears the multiplication of actors competent to decide on
fundamental rights issues. Under the Charter, each national court and tribunal would
76 Case C-112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. 1-00000, para. 46.
7For a reaction of the other supreme court, see Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Case 2013/15/0196 of 23 January 2013.
On the "guiding function" of the Constitutional Court, cf. Holoubek, supra note 10, at 166.
Already on similar "fears" after Austria's accession to the EU, see Schaffer, supra note 2, at 371.
80 See Poschl, supra note 27, at 590.
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become an "EU fundamental rights court"; as apex courts of all civil and criminal or
administrative courts, the Oberster Gerichtshof and the Verwaltungsgerichtshof would be
strengthened, let alone the CJEU via the Article 267 TFEU procedure. In that vein, the
Charter decision might be viewed as a countervailing action by providing several
instruments to compensate for such a partial functionary loss. In a remarkable literary
statement heralding the Charter decision, Justice Muller unmasked the tone of the Court's
alternative of inaction: the Verfassungsgerichtshof would "abdicate" in favor of ordinary
and administrative courts and would utterly "surrender" the constitutional function of
being a guardian of fundamental rights.82
Concerning the Court's function as to centralized judicial review, that is, the right to
remove general norms from the legal order due to their unconstitutionality, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof seems to fully understand the threat that the primacy of directly
applicable EU norms in general and Charter provisions in particular might pose to its
function. To the extent that national authorities abide by the principle of the primacy of
the (broadly applicable) Charter provisions and simply disapply conflicting national
provisions, the Constitutional Court as a "negative legislator," charged with eliminating
83unconstitutional norms from the legal order, could even become superfluous; the
additional task of formally removing inapplicable and also unconstitutional norms from the
legal order could be performed by the parliamentary legislator.84
In its Charter decision, the Verfassungsgerichtshof infers from the principle of equivalence
that administrative decisions or general norms contravening Charter rights are to be
annulled or struck down in proceedings before the Verfassungsgerichtshof. This leads one
to ask whether such an alternative system of legal protection would not eventually amount
to an aggravation compared to the status quo ante: Under the proposed system, a citizen
would often need to use an additional procedure before the Verfassungsgerichtshof to
strike down the conflicting provision, whereas other authorities could simply disregard the
domestic provision which violated Charter rights.as One of the most convincing critiques of
81 See MOller, supra note 49, at 167; Brenn, supra note 66, at 1065; Merli, supra note 42, at 359. Citing from that
literature, one justice admits to these "explanations" for the Charter decision, see Holoubek, supra note 10, at
169.
82 MOller, surpa note 49, at 167. To the extent that these instruments developed through the Charter decision
relate to an intensified relationship with the CJEU, see infra at G.
83 However on this function of "Rechtsbereinigung," i.e. "removal" of conflicting domestic law, see already VfSlg
19.632/2012, para. 33.
84 See Brenn, supra note 66, at 1065.
85 See Poschl, supra note 27, at 596.
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the Charter decision demonstrates that such a longer procedure might result in a situation
in which a citizen could be eventually even worse off.
Clearly, the Constitutional Court anticipated the shift of balance in the separation of
judicial powers with regard to its function as a fundamental rights court. The Charter
decision may therefore be read as an attempt to counter or even "override" the other
supreme courts' potentially enhanced roles as EU fundamental rights courts. Irrespective
of its future role under Article 267 TFEU, the Constitutional Court's fear of losing control
over the judicial development of fundamental rights protection in Austria seems not only
to be justified, but also inevitable in view of the functioning of the EU principles of primacy
and effectiveness. Seen in this light, the Charter decision might be a rather symbolic and
ostensive "act of self-assertion of a constitutional court,". coming closely, therefore, to a
"rearguard action" vis-h-vis the other domestic apex courts.
G. An Instrument of "Leverage"
Far from that, the Verfassungsgerichtshof arguably comprehended the leveraging potential
of the "Charterization" of fundamental rights control. Not only did it grasp the potential
impact of the Charter on domestic fundamental rights protection, but its Charter judgment
may also be seen as a measure of empowerment, seizing an early opportunity to co-shape
the future of European fundamental rights protection together with the CJEU through the
preliminary reference procedure. In this vein, Justice Holoubek called the decision an
"offer for a European fundamental rights community." 9
As a young fundamental rights catalogue, containing many "untested" Charter rights, an
unclear distinction between rights and principles, and a number of unresolved horizontal
issues relating to the relationship between the Charter, the Convention, and domestic
fundamental rights, the Charter will have to be fleshed out through case law of the CJEU.
The Verfassungsgerichtshof seems prepared to make intensified use of the preliminary
reference procedure to actively shape that future EU fundamental rights case law and,
therefore, to leverage its influence on a European scale. In that sense, the Constitutional
Court "dialogue" with the CJEU does not only go well beyond, but is diametrical to, the
Merli, supra note 42, at 357.
However, see the unaltered case law of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Case 2013/15/0196, 23 January 2013.
Stefan Mayr, Verfassungsgerichtlicher Prbfungsgegenstand und Prbfungsmapstab im Spannungsfeld nationaler
konventions- und unionsrechtlicher Grundrechtsgewlihrleistungen, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERWALTUNG 401, 409 (2012).
8 Holoubek, supra note 10, at 166.
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traditional resolution mechanisms (such as the "Solange" doctrines) of conflicting
fundamental rights protection regimes.9o
In order to better understand the Constitutional Court's willingness to internalize an
international fundamental rights catalogue, one needs to point to the peculiar status of the
ECHR within the Austrian legal order. Besides its status as an international treaty that the
Republic of Austria adheres to, the ECHR was incorporated into domestic law, meaning
that it formally enjoys constitutional rank. For more than 50 years, and more intensively
than most other constitutional courts in Europe, the Verfassungsgerichtshof has been
citing judgments of the Strasbourg Court.91 ECHR fundamental rights are now inherent in
the domestic fundamental rights culture.92 Consequently, in practice the Constitutional
Court is not at all adverse to referring to "European" fundamental rights in its domestic
jurisprudence. Taking recourse to another "European" catalogue of fundamental rights
such as the CFR, which, in addition, both in substance and procedure is closely intertwined
with the ECHR, might therefore be more easily acceptable than for other constitutional
courts and might have additionally reassured the Court of the feasibility of their approach
in the Charter decision.
It is here that the Verfassungsgerichtshof offers the CJEU its services to become a
"privileged partner" in a judicial dialogue in what has been described as filtering domestic
cases, clarifying them on their own, preparing them for the CJEU, and adapting the
preliminary rulings for the peculiarities of the domestic legal order.93 The Constitutional
Court could also support the CJEU in coordinating the respective overall concepts of
fundamental rights interpretations.94 In a "division of labour"9 between the CJEU and the
Constitutional Court, the latter would act as a kind of gatekeeper and clearing house for
national cases.
In case of congruence of Charter rights with domestic ECHR rights, and given the existence
of relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), national
constitutional courts could decide autonomously "in the sense of the principle of
9o See Komarek, supra note 3, at 422. On the function of "Solange" doctrines within the judicial dialogue of the
CJEU and national courts, see Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping
Consensus: The ECl and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order, 16 EUR. L. J. 511 (2010).
9 See Christoph Grabenwarter, Europdiische Grundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des Verfassungsgerichtshofes, 20
J. FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 298, 299 (2012).
92 See id. at 304.
9 Merli, supra note 42, at 360; Holoubek, supra note 10, at 167.
94See Holoubek, supra note 10, at 168.
9 Heller, supra note 26, at 677; Grabenwarter, supra note 91, at 304.
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subsidiarity. Here, the Verfassungsgerichtshof must have also had in mind the
overloaded ECtHR, suggesting leaving more room to develop domestic case law on Charter
rights. In this respect, the Charter decision may be read as bringing the Constitutional
Court "back into the equation"98 by fully realizing the Court's potential to shape the future
content of the Charter in particular and of European fundamental rights protection in
general.
In keeping with this strategy of "Charterization" of fundamental rights control, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof referred, only months after its Charter decision, several questions
concerning the Data Retention Directive and Charter provisions for a preliminary ruling.
The main question related to the validity of several provisions of the contested Data
Retention Directive in the light of Articles 7, 8, and 11 of the Charter.99 In that sense, the
Constitutional Court reinforced its statements from the Charter decision with regard to its
obligations under Article 267 TFEU, that is, to refer not only question of interpretation of
Charter provisions, but also questions of the conformity of EU secondary law with the
Charter. 100 To this was added a set of five detailed interpretive questions, regarding the
scope and interpretation of rights and principles (Article 52 CFR, the right to respect for
private and family life (Article 7 CFR), and the right to protection of personal data (Article 8
CFR)).101 Again, the Charter decision may thus also be seen as an act of "self-assertion"; 102
in procedures for a preliminary ruling, national constitutional courts may significantly
96 Grabenwarter, supra note 91, at 304.
See Muller, supra note 49, at 168.
98 Merli, supra note 42, at 360; Muller, supra note 49, at 165; Clemens Jabloner, Dos Verhdltnis zwischen
europdischer Gerichtsbarkeit und Verwaltungsgerichtshof, in KOOPERATION DER GERICHTE IM EUROPAISCHEN
VERFASSUNGSVERBUND. GRUNDFRAGEN UND NEUESTE ENTWICKLUNGEN, 12. OSTERREICHISCHER EUROPARECHTSTAG 2012, 171,
183 (Christoph Grabenwarter & Erich Vranes eds., 2013).
9 See VfSlg 19.702/2012 and CJEU, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Karntner Landesregierung and Others, 2014
E.C.R. 1-00000, para. 21.
100 VfSlg 19.702/2012, para. 27.
101 See, e.g., the first question: "In the light of the explanations relating to Article 8 of the Charter, which,
according to Article 52(7) of the Charter, were drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of
the Charter and to which regard must be given by the Verfassungsgerichtshof, must [Directive 95/46] and
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 18 December 2000] on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies
and on the free movement of such data [OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1] be taken into account, for the purposes of assessing
the permissibility of interference, as being of equal standing to the conditions under Article 8(2) and Article 52(1)
of the Charter?", CJEU, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Karntner Landesregierung and Others, 2014
E.C.R. 1-00000, para. 21.
102 Mayr, supra note 88, at 409.
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contribute to the interpretative work of the CJEU. It is likely that the
Verfassungsgerichtshof will follow suit in other Charter cases.
H. Conclusion
By comparison to its earlier case law, the Charter decision of the Verfassungsgerichtshof
represents a remarkable example of activist judicial constitutionalization. 103 Despite its
argumentative inconsistencies, the decision provides evidence of a court's consciousness
of the profound impact of a directly applicable EU fundamental rights catalogue on its
traditional constitutional functions. On the one hand, the Court's reaction to a shift of
judicial powers towards the other domestic apex courts as well as the CJEU with regard to
its function as a fundamental rights court resulted in a rather symbolic "rearguard action"
vis-a-vis the other two supreme courts. On the other hand, the Verfassungsgerichtshof
pledges to actively engage in a judicial dialogue with the CJEU to effectively protect
Charter-based fundamental rights of individuals. In doing so, the Constitutional Court
recognizes a substantial leveraging potential to shape European fundamental rights under
the auspices of the Charter together with the CJEU.
The Court's domestic adjudicatory functions as a "negative legislator" and as a
fundamental rights court, which have both been limited under the influence of
Europeanization, are then complemented by the dialogical function of the network of
European constitutional courts.104 In this respect, this development fits well with the
emerging concept of a "Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 1 0s a compound of the CJEU and
national constitutional courts. 106
103 This is to be contrasted with the "constitutionalization" of another European fundamental rights catalogue, the
ECHR, through formal constitutional amendment. See Orator, supra note 20, at 248.
104 Another indication of the Constitutional Court's awareness for and willingness to use this dialogical function
are the (prompt) publications of English translations of important judgments of the Verfassungsgerichtshof, see,
e.g., VfSlg 19.632/2012 (Charter decision), VfSlg 19.702/2012 (referral of the Data Retention Directive case).
105 Andreas VoRkuhle, Der europdiischer Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 29 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 1
(2010).
106 In favor of such a "dialogue on the same subject in a common language," see Holoubek, supra note 10, at 167.
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Pouring New Wine into New Bottles? The Preliminary
Reference to the CJEU by the Italian Constitutional Court
By Giorgio Repetto
A. Introduction
In the ongoing debate about preliminary references raised by constitutional courts, the
Italian Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, hereafter, ICC) is apparently a latecomer.
Despite its pivotal role in the founding era in which the relationships between Community
law and national legal orders were assessed, its reluctance towards preliminary references
to the ECJ (since 2009: Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU)1 has repeatedly been
invoked as a standard in legal scholarship. Whereas from the early 1960s onwards it
engaged dialectically with the CJEU, and contributed to some basic tenets of EC law vis-b-
vis national law (direct effect, primacy, limits concerning basic constitutional principles, so-
called counter-limits),2 it appeared for a long time to be almost silent on the crucial aspect
concerning its ability to enter into a direct dialogue with the CJEU via the preliminary
reference procedure. Although this ambivalence may appear contradictory, one should not
forget that behind the scenes, dialogue took place along indirect or "hidden" channels.
Either in response to claims raised by the judiciary in incidenter proceedings, or in
adjudicating disputes between State and Regions in principaliter ones, the ICC often sent
messages and alerts to the CJEU. In so doing, it indirectly contributed to shaping the
relationships between EU law and domestic law. In the long run, the absence of the ICC's
direct involvement in the relationships with the CJEU has, however, estranged its action
from the core of EU law in favor of the partnership between the CJEU and the common
judges (both ordinary and administrative).4
Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Perugia.
For the sake of uniformity, throughout the present article I will use the current denomination of the Court even
when I refer to pre-2009 cases and situations, whereas EU law is used to refer to Union law in general.
2 Like in the seminal Costa (judgment 7. March 1964, no. 14), Frontini (judgment 17. Decembrer 1973, no. 183)
and Granital (judgment 8. June 1984, no. 170) cases. All judgments and orders of the ICC are available at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do. A selection of recent cases (since 2006) translated into
English is available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ActionPagina_1260.do.
For an insightful overview on hidden dialogue, see Giuseppe Martinico, Judging in the Multilevel Legal Order:
Exploring the Techniques of 'Hidden Dialogue,' 21 K.L.J. 257 (2010).
4 Moving from the functions demanded of Constitutional Courts in the process of European legal integration as
elaborated by Monica Claes and Bruno De Witte, one may summarize the overall approach of the ICC in the
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In my article, I will firstly demonstrate that the long-standing refusal of the ICC to raise a
preliminary reference is not to be deemed an illogical consequence of the dialogical
attitude emerging from the Granital case, but rather the direct corollary of the peculiar
pluralism enshrined in that decision. Far beyond the formal reasons referred to by the ICC
in justifying that refusal, its crucial objective was that of shielding constitutional
adjudication from interferences stemming from the CJEU. In this way, the integration
model centered upon "coordination and separation" between EU and national law did not
affect the autonomy of the ICC to establish the boundaries and the conditions of the
relationship (B). In the second section of this article, I will examine the first preliminary
reference raised by the ICC in 2008 in the renowned case concerning "luxury tax." Despite
the importance accorded to this decision, for the most part it must be considered to apply
Granital, since its origin in a principaliter proceeding does not call into question the need
for the ICC to be shielded against the displacement of the "right to the last word" to the
alliance between the CJEU and the judiciary (C). In the third section, I will focus on the
most recent preliminary reference raised by the ICC in 2013, concerning fixed-term
workers in public schools. On first glance, this case could be depicted as the carrying out of
the traditional attitude of the ICC vis-a-vis the CJEU, since the EU norms at stake were not
deemed to have direct effect and were not, therefore, directly enforceable by judges.
Against this background, my argument is that this case paves the way for a new era of
relationships between the two Courts, in which the ICC dismisses the most conservative
and defensive aspects of its case law (D), first of all those connected to the problem of dual
preliminarity and to the rigid alternative between direct and indirect effect (E). In reaching
a new balance, the ICC seeks, however, a new way to avoid dismantling its systemic role of
"last resort guardian." Within this context, I argue that its peculiar role should be that of a
conveyor of constitutionally sensitive issues at supranational level. In the final section, I
will briefly sketch out the systemic consequence of this paradigm shift, both at internal and
at supranational level. On the one hand, if the ICC is likely to inaugurate a phase of direct
dialogue aimed at injecting constitutional blood at EU level, it should provide a clearer
guidance of its action, for example by abandoning the most hostile traits of its case law
concerning dual preliminarity. On the other hand, the CJEU is called to encourage this
attitude, by showing a peculiar responsiveness towards voices and reasons that seek to
enlarge the constitutional foundations of EU law (F).
following terms: extensive facilitation of the legal integration between Community law and domestic law,
procedural resistance against a shift of ultimate judicial authority in internal law, and a minor direct contribution
to the development of a common constitutional heritage for Europe. Monica Claes and Bruno De Witte, The Role
of National Constitutional Courts in the European Legal Space, in THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN MULTILEVEL
GOVERNANCE 77, 81 (Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan & Werner Vandenbruwaene eds., 2013).
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B. Form and Substance in Establishing Reluctance: Granital and Preliminary References
If one tries to briefly outline the main judicial episodes in which the ICC has shown its
reluctance towards the preliminary ruling procedure, it appears to be quite evident that
the formal reasons adopted in the cases as to the ICC's unwillingness to enter into a direct
dialogue are only a part of the story. At a deeper level, its refusal goes hand in hand with
the basic theoretical mindset that has shaped the relationships between EU law and
domestic law over the years.
. On Strategic Dualism
As is well known, the current state-of-the-art of these relationships can be summarized by
the doctrines enshrined in Granital, in which the ICC fully accepted the basic tenets of the
Simmenthal case law of the CJEU, whilst at the same time offering a framework different to
that of the monist one adopted by the CJEU in order to justify its acceptance of the basic
principles enshrined therein. Unlike in its previous case law, on that occasion the ICC
acknowledged a direct and prevailing effect of EU law and consequently accorded to the
judiciary the possibility of directly setting aside conflicting domestic law, without needing
to involve the ICC in order to declare it unconstitutional. The acceptance of the
Simmenthal doctrine is, however, limited to the final outcomes of the relationship
between national and supranational law, since the theoretical background of Granital is
devoted to sharply contrasting the monist tenets of the CJEU in favor of a sort of "strategic
dualism." Even if the ICC declared that, due to Article 11 of the Constitution,s EU law
amounted to a directly enforceable law within the domestic legal order and prevailed over
conflicting internal law, this was made possible by stating that the two legal orders were
"autonomous and separated, even if coordinated according to the separation of
competence established and guaranteed by the Treaty."6 The autonomy of the two legal
orders, in other words, is the key theoretical instrument that allows the ICC to let EU law
"in" whilst ensuring that this is made possible by an autonomous choice of the Italian legal
order. This sort of unease towards a strict compliance with the CJEU's doctrines is,
moreover, demonstrated by the fact that, according to Granital, the internal act that
conflicts with EU law is not properly set aside or disregarded (disapplicato), but rather non-
applied (non applicato), that is, simply ignored by the judges. Though the difference may
appear irrelevant or quite formalistic, the rationale behind this choice is to enforce a
separation between legal orders, in that domestic law is not illegal as a consequence of a
violation of EU law as a higher law, but as an autonomous choice of the Italian legal order
to accord a prevalence to the latter over the former within the framework of a separation
of competence. In the words of the rapporteur in Granital, Antonio La Pergola:
Article 11 reads, "Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that
may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages
international organisations furthering such ends."
6 Judgment No. 170/1984 at para. 4.
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[t]he dualist rationale behind this result is that Italy has
chosen to grant superiority to international law by
withdrawing its national law ... Italy applies Community
law because the Constitutional Court interprets Italian
constitutional principles as indicating that the Italian
legal orders chooses not to impede the application of
Community law, not because Italian law is subordinate
to Community law as maintained by the Court of
Justice.
A similar commitment to strategic dualism is, moreover, evident when Granital traces the
boundaries of its doctrine along the distinction between EU law provided with direct effect
and not. While in the former case, the withdrawal of national law allows supranational law
to be directly enforceable by judges, in the latter case the national rule maintains its
validity and is therefore subject to review by the ICC, which is exclusively entitled to
declare it as conflicting with Article 11 of the Constitution. This reinforces the "separate
but coordinated" principle, since when non-directly enforceable EU law is at stake, the task
of the judiciary is to involve primarily the ICC, that re-expands its role vis-a-vis
supranational law. Within this kind of "separation of sovereignty,"" the distinction between
direct and indirect effect is of utmost relevance, because it provides the main criterion that
judges must rely on in order to convey their claims to the two different regimes (non-
application or declaration of inconstitutionality) and therefore to the two Courts that are
the ultimate guardians of those regimes (the CJEU and the ICC).
Against this background, one may ask whether this strategic dualism exerted an influence
on the possibility of the ICC itself raising a preliminary reference. Before Granital, in the
only case in which the ICC had been called on to raise such a reference, it refused to do so
and delegated this task to the referring judge.9 At first sight, this solution appeared
extravagant, because following the decision of the CJEU, the ICC in the pre-Granital regime
would have been called on to reexamine the case anyway.10 Nevertheless, the solution
7Antonio La Pergola and Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM.
J. INT'L L. 598, 614, 615 (1985) (emphasis added). The doctrinal roots of a similar judicial strategy must be seen in
the pluralist theory of Santi Romano, whose seminal oeuvre L'ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO 146 (1951, 1st ed. 1918) is
devoted, among others objectives, to challenging the idea that relationships between legal orders are entirely
shaped by the principle of exclusivity. In this light, coordination occurs as the outcome of the acceptance by one
legal order of the rules adopted by another, that are acknowledged by the former not as a mere fact but in their
proper legal relevance.
8 La Pergola and Del Duca, supra note 7, at 615.
Order 28. July 1976, No. 206.
10 Marco Dani, Tracking Judicial Dialogue-The Scope for Preliminary Rulings From the Italian Constitutional Court,
16 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 149, 154 (2009).
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provided in that case demonstrates that within that framework, the ICC was undoubtedly
more directly involved with EU law and, paradoxically, even though supranational law was
accorded a minor status, it was easier for the ICC to enter a direct dialogue with the
CJEU. 11 On the contrary, with Granital, the task of dealing with EU law was for the most
part delegated to common judges. This had the effect of indirectly displacing the ICC from
its role of interlocutor with the CJEU. At a deeper level, from that moment on the difficulty
for the ICC to raise a preliminary reference has been dramatized by the effort of the Court
to expand the premises of the "separated but coordinated" principle from the sphere of
the relationship between legal orders to the one involving the relationship between
judicial actors. In other words, just as Granital hallows the self-limitation of national law
when EU law is invoked, in the same vein the ICC decided autonomously to retire from the
dialogue with the CJEU and to delegate this task to the judiciary. In doing so, while the
judiciary was completely entrapped in the doctrines of primacy and direct effect developed
by the CJEU, the role of the ICC remained shielded by the supremacy accorded to the
Italian Constitution and to the reservation of sovereignty enshrined therein.12
11. Separation of Powers and De Facto Monism
The founding rationale of Granital lies therefore in linking the normative status of EU law
in the domestic legal order (which is fully consistent with the Simmenthal doctrine) with a
delegation to the common judges of the task of managing the application of supranational
law and references to the CJEU. This accommodation led to a misplacementl4 of the ICC,
since its action was increasingly detached from the application of EU law and from the
chance of an interaction with the CJEU. 15 From the internal point of view, this solution is
11 Federico Sorrentino, Svolta della Corte sul rinvio pregiudiziale: le decisioni 102 e 103 del 2008, in 52
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 1288, 1289 (2008).
12 Enzo Cannizzaro, Rinvio pregiudiziale e Corti costituzionali nazionali, in SCRITTI IN ONORE DI GIUSEPPE TESAURO, 819,
822 (2d vol. 2014). On a similar dialectic between primacy and supremacy, see Giuseppe Martinico & Federico
Fontanelli, Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and
Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice, 16 EU R. L. J. 345, 349 (2010).
13 In so doing, the ICC took into account the need to integrate in the same theoretical setting what Joel Rideau,
Les garanties juridictionnelles des droits fondamentaux dans l'Union Europeenne, in L'UNION EUROPIENNE ET LES
DROITS FONDAMENTAUx 75, 91 (Stephane Leclerc, Jean-Frangois Akandji-Kombe & Marie-Joelle Redor eds., 1999),
defined as "hierarchies normatives" and "hierarchies institutionnelles".
14 One of the earliest and most insightful accounts of this misplacement has been made by Sergio Panunzio, I
dirittifondamentali e le Corti in Europa, in I DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI E LE CORTI IN EUROPA 3, 23 (Sergio Panunzio ed.,
2005).
15 An insightful critique of a similar misplacement can be found in Marta Cartabia, Europe and Rights: Taking
Dialogue Seriously, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 5, 25 (2009).
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perfectly consistent with a pluralist approach that works "under shifting grundnorms,"16
since the full acceptance of direct effect and primout6 at internal level coexists with the
preservation of the autonomous role of the ICC, which entails the safeguarding of a sphere
of constitutional identity and not the application of EU law. As in the words of the former
President of the ICC, Valerio Onida: "to each one his own job."17
One may argue that a similar outcome, if assumed in general, was not inevitable. As has
been previously highlighted, the ICC remained formally entitled to decide and to give effect
to Community law in those cases where not directly enforceable EU law was at stake. But
on several occasions, the ICC decided simply "not to decide" these cases, either because
domestic law was not deemed to conflict with supranational law or because the task of
raising a preliminary reference was anyway shifted to common judges. If priority had been
given to the referral of constitutionality-so argued the ICC19-the decision of the ICC
risked being unnecessary because the CJEU was entitled to proffer subsequently a different
interpretation that was binding for the referring judge.20
The capacity of the strategic rationale of Granital to expand its premises is even more
evident if one considers that whenever the CJEU was involved by judges in cases
concerning EU law without direct effect, its judgment could in any case be enforced by the
referring judge. According to the case law of the ICC, 21 the CJEU's decisions must be
accorded direct effect, so that at the end of a preliminary ruling procedure the referring
judge is entitled to give it effect without needing to further involve the ICC (which, if
anything, would declare the referral inadmissible, as in every other case concerning
directly applicable EC law). The distinction between direct and indirect effect, though
formally effective, appeared therefore to be quite fictitious in grasping the exceptions to
the Granital doctrine, since even in these cases the common judges were called to apply
EU law and to enter into a dialogue with the CJEU. The combination of these
jurisprudential strains, a mix of judicial isolationism and commitment to legal integration,
16 Daniel Sarmiento, The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves. Constitutional Pluralism, Preliminary References and
the Role of Silent Judgments in EU law, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 285, 289
(Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012).
17 Valerio Onida, <<Armonia tra diversi e problemi aperti. La giurisprudenza costituzionale tra ordinamento interno
e ordinamento comunitario, 22 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 549, 551 (2002).
18 Order 23. June 1999, No. 267.
19 Orders 29. December 1995, No. 536; 26. July 1996, No. 319; 18. April 2008, Nos. 108 and 109.
20 According to the rules regulating the procedure before the ICC, an order of referral raised by a judge is
admissible insofar as the decision of the ICC is necessary in order to define the case pending before it (criterio
della rilevanza).
21 Judgment 23. April 1985, No. 113 and judgment 11 July 1989, No. 389.
1454 Vol. 16 No. 06
The Italian Constitutional Court's Preliminary Reference
increased the misplacement of the ICC and left the core of the judicial dialogue to the
alliance between the CJEU and the common judges.
Besides this, the only real Granital free area is that concerning principaliter rulings, raised
by State and Regions in cases of conflicts concerning the exercise of legislative
competences. In these proceedings, as will be further shown, the ICC operates as the only
judge, so that nobody else can be delegated the responsibility of giving full effect to
supranational law and, consequently, of raising a preliminary reference to the CJEU.
Despite this, until 2008 the ICC decided on several occasions to declare internal legislative
provisions which conflicted with the EU Treaties as void,22 but never referred to the CJEU.
Apart from principaliter rulings, the basic tenets of the "separated but coordinated"
principle, first of all the divergence in the relationships between legal orders and those
among judicial actors, represent the theoretical framework within which the question of
the preliminary reference by the ICC should be grasped. As we will see in the next part, the
reasons given over the years to justify its reluctance are nothing but a plain corollary of the
stance taken in 1984.
///. Preliminary References and "Definitional Struggles"
Given the need to reinforce a separation of powers between the CJEU and the ICC and in
light of the delegation of the task to refer to the judiciary, the explicit refusal of the ICC to
raise a preliminary reference should come as little surprise. Following the precedent set by
Case No. 206/1976,23 the ICC eluded the issue for a second time in 199124 when, in rather
abstract terms, it stated that the establishment of the direct effect of an EC Directive could
be ascertained by the CJEU upon referral of the judge or, alternatively, of the same ICC.
Despite this potential opening, this precedent has remained isolated, since the ICC has
never used this possibility.
In subsequent decisions, the ICC clearly formulated the terms of its refusal to be engaged
in a dialogue with the CJEU, by stating that its role is strictly linked to a function of
constitutional control and of supreme guarantor of the allegiance to the Constitution by
the constitutional organs of the State and of the Regions, so that it cannot be considered
to be a national judicial authority in the terms of the then Article 177 TEC (currently Article
267 TFEU). 25 Although the argument based on the non-judicial nature of the function
22 Judgments 10. November 1994, No. 384; 30. March 1995, No. 94; 13. January 2004, No. 7; 28. March 2006, No.
129.
23 Order 28. July 1976, No. 206.
24 Judgment 18. April 1991, No. 168.
25 See, inter alia, orders 29. December 1995, No. 536; 26. July 1996, No. 319.
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exercised by the ICC has since played a key role in justifying the reluctance of the Court, it
has always appeared as a mere fagade hiding the institutional balance displayed by the
11 16
"strategic dualism" solution. Much more than a similar definitional struggle, what is
worth highlighting is the set of judicial arguments used by the ICC to further enhance the
shield mentioned above, which has aimed to prevent direct contact with the CJEU's
decisions.
On the one hand, the ICC has declared inadmissible those judicial referrals affected by dual
preliminarity, both when the judge decided not to refer to the CJEU before addressing its
claim to the Constitutional Court, and when the judge decided to contemporarily raise two
17
referring orders to the CJEU and to the ICC. In the same vein, the ICC on several occasionS
gave the file back to the referring judge (restituzione degli atti) because a subsequent
judgment of the CJEU made it necessary for him to evaluate whether the claim was still
necessary.
All these arguments have been widely criticized by many legal scholars because of their
inconsistency with some basic assumptions that regulate both the role of the ICC at
internal level and the relationships between supranational and domestic law.28 It suffices
here to recall that the status of "court or tribunal of a Member State" is an autonomous
notion of EU law that cannot be self-standingly defined by national legal orders. Moreover,
one may add that the general prohibition of dual preliminarity does not take into account
the fact that the two questions can arise independently from each other, so that the
decision of the constitutional adjudicator is not necessarily destined to possible conflict
with the one adopted by the CJEU (and vice versa).29
For all these reasons, it should be clear why I decided to define the arguments used by the
ICC in order to pinpoint its refusal as nothing more than "definitional struggles." They each
appear to be largely incapable of providing a sound justification for the isolationist view
26 Not to mention the legal flaw of a similar stance, given that the ICC previously qualified itself as a "judge" in
order to raise a constitutional referral before itself. Tania Groppi, La Corte costituzionale come giudice del rinvio ai
sensi dell'art. 177 del trattato CE, in GIUDICI E GIURISDIZIONI NELLA GIURISPRUDENZA DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE 171, 187
(Pietro Ciarlo, Giovanni Pitruzzella & Rolando Tarchi eds., 1997).
27 Orders 14. March 2003, No. 62; 20. April 2004, No. 125; 24. February 2006, No. 70.
28 An extensive account of these critical stances can be found in Marta Cartabia, La Corte costituzionale italiana e
il rinvio pregiudiziale al/a Corte di giustizia europea, in LE CORTI DELL'INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA E LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
ITALIANA99, 107 (Nicolo Zanon & Valerio Onida eds., 2006).
29 AUGUSTO CERRI, CORSO DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE PLURALE 181 (2012). In a similar vein, see Marta Cartabia,
Considerazioni sulla posizione del giudice comune di fronte a casi di <doppia pregiudizialitan comunitaria e
costituzionale, 120 11 FORO ITALIANo 222, 224 (1997). On dual preliminarity as a more general problem concerning
multiple loyalties of judges in multilevel contexts, see Giuseppe Martinico, Multiple loyalties and dual
preliminarity: The pains of being a judge in a multilevel legal order, 10 I-CON 871 (2012).
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purported by the ICC. Taken as a whole and considered from the theoretical standpoint
elaborated by the ICC, they appear for what they are: corollaries of a more general
precommitment towards a separatist attitude established by the ICC in order to find a
balance between the normative bounds deployed by EU law on the domestic legal order
and the institutional autonomy that the ICC carved out vis-a-vis the CJEU.3 o
Two cases decided by the ICC in 2002 and 2004 provide a useful example of both problems
raised by this approach for the effectiveness of judicial protection and the underlying
implications for the relationships between domestic and EU law.
The first case is the prequel of the well-known Pupino saga, decided by the ICC in 2002.
The referral order raised by the Tribunale di Firenze sought to extend the application of the
"special inquiry procedure" for young children regulated by Article 398 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure with regard to offences other than sexual crimes. In its decision, the
ICC dismissed the claim by stating that the provision at stake was to be considered lex
specialis and therefore could not be extended to similar situations. What matters, in this
decision, is that the ICC in substance ignored the argument put forward by the referring
judge, according to which the extensive interpretation was supported by a Framework
decision,32 though lacking direct effect, that required the introduction of similar inquiry
proceedings when vulnerable subjects were involved in a criminal case. The rest of the
story is well known and does not need to be analyzed in detail. The decision of the
CJEU, 34 while extending the notion and the consequences of the direct effect doctrine to
the Third Pillar and to Framework decisions, in a certain way confirmed the impossibility of
extending the special procedure in the case at stake, since the consistent interpretation of
national law could not be pursued contra legem. The point, as highlighted by Marco Dani,
is that the refusal of the ICC to deal with the effects of the Framework decision by lodging
a preliminary reference to the CJEU leaves the common judge without a clear yardstick for
the decision. While the ICC justified the narrower interpretation of the procedural rules, it
did not state that the interpretation endorsed by the CJEU was unconstitutional, with the
consequence that it was not clear whether the extensive interpretation had to be
considered contra legem: "[a] similar uncertainty could have probably been avoided had
30 The intertwining of these two aspects has been highlighted by Cartabia, supra note 15, at 115 and Dani, supra
note 10, at 157-58.
31 Judgment 18. December 2002, No. 529.
32 EU Framework decision 2001/220 of 15 March 2001, O.J. 2001 L 82/1.
3 See Eleanor Spaventa, Opening Pandora's Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in
Pupino, 3 EUCONST 5 (2007).
34 Case 105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, 2005 E.C.R. 1-5285, para. 47.
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the Constitutional court referred the case to the Court of Justice, a wise solution that the
former apparently did not consider.,35
The second case concerned the criminal norms that mitigated the punishment for the
offence of false accounting (falso in bilancio). Several judges turned alternatively to the ICC
and to the CJEU and claimed that the norms at stake conflicted both with the Constitution
36
and with an EC Directive that required adequate sanctions for similar offences. Before
the ICC, the claim was raised as to whether the challenged legislation conflicted with
Articles 11 and 117(1)37 of the Constitution, due to its inconsistency with the Directive in
question. Whilst the ICC simply updated the question without taking a decision on the
merits, the CJEU stated that the challenged legislation was not consistent with the aims
pursued by the Directive, but that the application of this could not have the effect of
increasing the criminal liability in the specific case, due to the principle of the retroactive
application of the more lenient penalty.39 As in Pupino, and given the persisting refusal of
the ICC to decide the case pending before it, the difficulty of the CJEU in providing a viable
answer to the referring judges could have been balanced (if not eliminated) by a major
involvement of the ICC, that could have conveyed constitutional arguments aimed at
40
resolving the impasse that the judges had to face in both cases.
C. The 2008 "Luxury Tax" Case: Upheaval in Continuity?
The reluctance of the ICC has for the most part relied upon technical considerations aimed
at justifying a separation of powers with the CJEU; it has rarely taken into account
substantive reasons that could have pushed it to set before the CJEU a set of constitutional
arguments capable of conveying a distinct internal constitutional perspective (as it should
have been for both the Pupino and the Berlusconi cases).
In the light of the critiques addressed to this case-law, it could appear inevitable that the
ICC was led over time to rethink the premises of its isolationism-an isolationism that
increasingly revealed itself to be ineffective in the face of the growing de facto monism
that the same ICC had upheld since the end of the 1980s.
Dani, supra note 10, at 157.
EEC Directive 68/151 of 9 March 1968, O.J. L 65.
Art. 117(1) reads, "Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the
Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations."
3 Order 1. June 2004, No. 165.
Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02, and C-403/02, Silvio Berlusconi, 2005 E.C.R. 1-3565, para. 75.
40 The exemplarity of the Berlusconi saga is thoroughly investigated by Cartabia, supra note 28, at 110.
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A similar rethinking occurred in a quite routinely principaliter proceeding activated in 2008,
when the State government challenged a series of fiscal measures adopted by the Sardinia
Region in order to reform its tourism policy. In particular, a regional law of 2007 created
taxes on capital gains accruing from the transfer of holiday homes, fees in the landing of
aircrafts and mooring of sports boats, and a general tourist tax. Among the different
standards of review, the State government complained that the tax on planes and boats
(the only one that raised problems of compatibility with EU law) conflicted with Article
117(1) of the Constitution in relation to Article 12 TEC (the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of nationality), Article 49 TEC (freedom to provide services), and Article 87 TEC
(the prohibition of state aids). The core of the case involved the heavier burden posed by
these measures on providers not resident in Sardinia and, consequently, the indirect
advantage of local suppliers of tourism services. An in-depth analysis of the general legal
41background of the case is not necessary here. What is worth highlighting, however, is
that the ICC adopted a twofold approach in dealing with the claims. On the one hand, it
reiterated the basic assumptions governing the relationships between supranational and
internal law as far as the preliminary reference procedure is concerned, and, on the other
hand, it highlighted the difficulty of dealing with the case at stake as it had done in the
past, when it had stated that the absence of doubts as to the application of the relevant EU
law made a reference to the CJEU unnecessary (pursuant to the acte claire and to the acte
6claird doctrines).
In relation to the first set of arguments, the judgment No. 102/2008 reaffirms the
42differences between incidenter and principaliter proceedings. Only in the former is the
duty to give full effect to EU law demanded of the common judge, who is consequently
entitled to lodge a preliminary reference with the CJEU. In principaliter cases, quite on the
contrary, the absence of a judge shifts to the Constitutional Court the duty to transform
the question of compatibility of internal law with EU law into a question of
constitutionality, through the medium of Article 117(1) of the Constitution. In the words of
the judgment:
In cases in which the Constitutional Court is seized
directly [...], the assessment of the conformity of the
regional law with Community legislation occurs, by way
of Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in constitutional
proceedings, and accordingly where it is found to be
incompatible, the court does not set aside the law,
41See Fontanelli & Martinico, supra note 12, at 350.
42 Judgment 15. April 2008, No. 102, para. 8.2.8.1. (official translation available at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/ download/doc/recentjudgments/S2008102 Bile Gallo en.pdf).
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but-as noted above-declares it unconstitutional ergo
43
omnes.
These arguments are not deemed to be a novelty in the case law of the ICC, given that the
reference to Article 117 is not meant to make any valuable difference in respect of what is
enshrined in Article 11. In fact, the apparently major involvement in EU law issues does not
exclude that the judgment is in line with the main corollaries mentioned before, such as
the general prohibition on dual preliminarity.4 4
With the second set of arguments, the ICC reveals its unease with a solution that simply
replicates its previous case law in terms of reliance on the acte claire doctrine. The need to
provide an answer, which the ICC on this occasion does not hold to be self-evident, leads it
to lodge a preliminary reference with the CJEU in relation to the conflicts with Articles 49
and 87 TEC. 4 5 On these premises, the ICC states that in principaliter proceedings, its
position can be fully equated with that of every referring judge, since its nature, despite its
peculiar role, is judicial and, moreover, because in these proceedings it is the only judge
able to solve the case.
Against this background, it seems necessary to assess whether this precedent can be
considered as a breakthrough with respect to the doctrines of "strategic dualism" or
whether it is rather to be understood as a peculiar enhancement of that theoretical
baseline. Some points of the decisions at stake represent an undoubted novelty, like when
46the ICC gets rid of every definitional taboo about its judicial nature. Even more
importantly, it is crucial to highlight the attention shown in this case towards the need for
the CJEU (and not the ICC) to assess the discriminatory nature of the contested taxes. This
second element in particular demonstrates that the decision to refer breaks with the most
blatant premises of strategic dualism. On the other hand, it is plain to see that the ICC
emphasizes the continuity with its precedents, because, as I highlighted before,
principaliter proceedings have traditionally been the only Granital-free area in relation to
the procedural relationship with the CJEU.
In the end, one might say that the meaning of the luxury tax case by itself is not
particularly innovative, because the ICC does its best to link the novelties with the
43 Judgment No. 102/2008 (note 43), para. 8.2.8.1.
44 "[...]where the ordinary courts question the compatibility of national law with EC law, the failure to make a
preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice means that any question of constitutionality raised by it is
not relevant and therefore inadmissible." See id.
45 Order 15. April 2008, No. 103 (official translation http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/
download/doc/recent judgments/02008103_Bile_Galloen.pdf).
46 Sergio Bartole, Pregiudiziale comunitaria e <integrazionen di ordinamenti, 36 LE REGIONI 898, 900 (2008).
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coherent development of what was included in the Granital doctrine.47 On further analysis,
however, the impression is that of a tentative message, a sort of ballond'essai directed at
both national and (mainly) supranational interlocutors (the CJEU in particular), that
announces the dawn of a new era of mutual relationship and, alongside this, an in-depth
rethinking by the ICC of the most strict isolationist premises of its action vis-a-vis
supranational law.48 To become reality, however, this message needed to be further
developed and its basic premises clarified.
D. The "Fixed-Term Workers" Case and the Quest for Constitutional Sensitivity
After 2008, the absence of further preliminary references by the ICC has led many scholars
to believe that that episode had to remain isolated and its rationale confined to the less
relevant area of principaliter judgments. If so, it would have been forceful to consider that
the long-run effects of the 2008 precedent had to be grasped within a strain of continuity
with the traditional mindset of the ICC's case law.
However, what seemed hardly possible became reality in 2013, when the ICC 49 lodged for
the second time ever a preliminary interpretive reference with the CJEU, and this time in
the framework of an incidenter proceeding. The case concerned the terms of employment
of fixed-term workers in public schools. The circumstances of the case are worth
highlighting, since they shed light on the overall approach of the ICC and on the doubts as
to whether this case is another application of well-established principles or, on the
contrary (as I argue), it represents the beginning of an unprecedented way of dealing with
EU law and with the CJEU in particular.
The referral orders concerned the constitutionality of Article 4(1) and (11) of Law no. 124
of 3 May 1999 (Urgent provisions on school staff) and were raised by the Tribunale di Roma
and by the Tribunale di Lamezia Terme with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution,
as related to Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP
on fixed-term work, annexed to Council Directive no. 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999.50
The applicants in the main proceedings were teachers and administrative staff who worked
in different schools under the terms of numerous successive fixed-term contracts. They
claimed that the internal legislation was unconstitutional on the grounds that a similar
47 
"The overruling should not be overemphasized." Cartabia,supra note 15, at 24.
48 Bartole, supra note 46, at 902.
49 Order 18. July 2013, No. 207 (official translation http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download
/doc/recent judgments/207-2013.pdf).
5o Council Directive concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP,
O.J. L 175/43.
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system of limitless substitute teaching (supplenze) conflicted with Directive 1999/70 in that
this sought to prevent and punish the abuse of such contracts and called on States to set
time limits and a right to damages in case of violation. Since 2001, in Italian law this time
limit amounts to a maximum of thirty-six months and, after this period, in the public sector
the work contract cannot be converted into a permanent one, but the worker is entitled to
payment of damages. Within the public sector, the school is the only exception to this rule,
and according to the challenged norms fixed-term workers that are employed for more
than thirty-six months cannot benefit from any compensatory damages either. The
constitutional justification for these limitations lies in the fact that, while according to
Article 97 of the Constitution public workers can be employed exclusively after an
administrative competition (and not as a consequence of a conversion of a contract), in
public schools in particular the more restrictive regime reflects the need to adapt the
education service over time to the constantly changing student population. Only this
adaptive and flexible recruiting system, so the ICC argued, can guarantee a qualitatively
and quantitatively adequate level of education, enabling full enjoyment of the right to
education (Article 34 of the Constitution).
On first glance, the key element of the case is the fact that Directive 1999/70 lacks any
direct effect.s" As I earlier recalled, whenever the ICC is called upon to decide on cases
concerning EU norms without direct effect, its ability to rule on the case and, eventually, to
refer to the CJEU is not theoretically in question. Despite this, on several occasions the ICC
dismissed similar claims by stating that the interpretive doubts as to EU law should be
conveyed to the CJEU by the ordinary judges; it did this even in recent cases in which the
direct nature of the EU provisions at stake needed to be further ascertained.52 In all these
cases, the rather abstract competence of the ICC to deal with supranational law remained
entangled by a sort of "dual preliminarity trap" that pushed the ICC to overemphasize the
procedural rules regulating its action53 rather than its duty to give effect to EU law when
judges are not entitled to directly enforce it. What the ICC constantly reaffirmed in the past
is, however, evidently absent on this occasion, since the ICC refuses to delegate to the
referring judge the task of making a preliminary reference and accepts being engaged in a
conversation with the CJEU in which it justifies, in light of internal constitutional law, the
legislative choices concerning the organization of public schoolS. 54
51 Barbara Guastaferro, La Corte costituzionale ed il primo rinvio pregiudiziale in un giudizio di legittimita
costituzionale in via incidentale: riflessioni sull'ordinanza n. 207 del 2013, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 1, 7
(Oct. 21, 2013), available at www.forumcostituzionale.it).
52 Order 17. December 2008, Nos. 415 and 2. April 2009, No. 100.
See supra note 20.
54 The outcome is even more striking if one highlights that, with a judgment issued in 2012 (No. 10127 of 20 June
2012) the Italian Court of Cassation stated that the norms at stake did not have to be challenged before the CJEU
because of its univocal case law on this matter. See 0. Pollicino, From Partial to Full Dialogue with Luxembourg:
the Last Cooperative Step of the Italian Constitutional Court, 10 EUCONST 151 (2014).
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The ambivalent terms of the "luxury tax" precedent become clearer in this case, since the
uncertainties surrounding that reasoning and the doubts as to its generalization were
swept away when the ICC placidly overruled case law that had stood for thirty years and
stated that "it must be concluded that this Court also has the status of a 'court or tribunal'
within the meaning of Article 267(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union within proceedings in which it has been seized on an interlocutory basis.,ss
Alongside the question of the formal reasons handed down in the referring order, the
question arises of why there was such a judicial breakthrough. The triggering factor seems
to be strictly linked to substantive reasons that entail both the constitutionally sensitive
area in which the ICC had to decide and the quest for a "qualified" interaction with the
CJEU. As to the former, the ICC aims at demonstrating that a plain application of the
Directive 1999/70 conflicts with the basic constitutional principles regulating the right to
education and the need for administrative competition for public workers. In this light, the
core of the case can be summarized in the second question raised by the ICC, when the
CJEU is asked to assess whether the
organi[z]ational requirements of the Italian school
system as set out above constitute objective reasons
within the meaning of clause 5(1) of Directive no.
1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 thereby rendering
compatible with EU law legislation such as Italian law
which does not provide for a right for damages in
relation to the hiring of fixed-term school staff. 7
In the constitutionally sensitive nature of the case is thus to be seen the reason that led
the ICC not to declare inadmissible the order raised by the referring judges, but rather to
share those doubts and to further qualify them in constitutional language.s"
This explains why, for the ICC, it is necessary that a particularly "qualified" view supporting
internal law is conveyed before the CJEU. While in ordinary cases the common judges are
best suited to guarantee the full and uniform application of EU law, when constitutional
" Order No. 207/2013.
Cannizzaro, supra note 12, at 827 (arguing that this need for a justification can be qualified in terms of "active
cooperation").
Order no. 207/2013.
A similar opinion is shared by Stefano Civitarese Matteucci, The Italian Constitutional Court Strengthens the
Dialogue with the European Court of Justice Lodging for the First Time a Preliminary Ruling in an Indirect
('Incidenter') Proceeding, 20 EUR. PUB. L. (2014), 641.
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issues are at stake it is up to its guardian to make the case, since in doing this its role is
irreplaceable. Although this stance is not directly purported in the case, it can be assumed
to emerge in one of the most debated points of the order, where the "last resort" nature
of the jurisdiction of the ICC is called into question with reference to Article 267(3) TFEU. In
the "luxury tax" case, the assimilation of the ICC to a last resort judicial authority was
justified by the fact that in principaliter proceedings, the ICC is not only the higher judge to
deal with the case, but more simply the only one, since common judges do not enter the
scene there. Moreover, a similar conclusion relied upon the fact that, according to Article
137 of the Constitution, "[n]o appeals are allowed against the decision of the
Constitutional Court." If the latter argument remains true even for incidenter rulings, it is
much more questionable to assume that in these cases the ICC is either the higher or the
only judge to deal with the case. Despite this, in 2013, the ICC, as in 2008, plainly assumed
that its jurisdiction is that of a last resort judge in terms of Article 267(3) TFEU, and that it
is therefore subject, like every other last resort judge, to a duty to refer to the CJEU. The
imposition upon the ICC of a similar duty to refer must, however, not be overstated. Unlike
last instance common judges, the ICC has an intrinsically wider leeway when evaluating
whether a claim must be referred to the CJEU, and this derives from the sui generis nature
of its jurisdiction, that is still aimed at safeguarding the basic systemic conditions of the
"separated but coordinated" principle. In other words, it must be assumed that the ICC is
in a preferred position to assess whether it has a duty or not to refer. On the one hand, this
is because, defacto, it still freely sets the terms of its engagement with the CJEU, as, for
example, when it recalls the doctrines of acte claire and acte eclaird,s9 or when it recently
argued that a preliminary reference can only be raised when it is called to decide on the
basis of the constitutional parameters of Article 11 and 117(1) of the Constitution,so or,
61lastly, when it offers an autonomous interpretation of EU law. On the other hand, it is
important to consider that the overcoming of the most blatantly isolationist premises of its
previous case law has not led the ICC to an unhindered acceptance of the judicial monism
that basically equalizes every judicial authority under the CJEU. In so doing, the ICC could
maintain the last word on its commitment towards EU law while at the same time
61
safeguarding a pluralistic setting for judicial relationships.
5 Judgments 23. December 2008, No. 439; 21. January 2010, No. 16; 16. October 2014, No. 235.
6o Judgment 31. March 2015, No. 56.
61 Judgment 7. July 2015, No. 130.
62 For a partially different stance, according to which in this case the ICC has accepted to be engaged in a "full
dialogue" with the CJEU. See Pollicino, supra note 54, at 153.
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E. Dual Preliminarity and Direct Effect Revisited
If the ICC has been able to pour new meanings into the old framework regulating its
relationships with the CJEU, this did not occur as a breakthrough but rather thanks to a
learned and cautious rethinking of two governing doctrinal tools that it largely used until
now: dual preliminarity and the doctrine of direct effect. I will examine the transformations
affecting these doctrines in the following parts of the article, reserving the analysis of their
long-term effects to the final considerations.
. Dual Preliminarity in Constitutionally Sensitive Claims
Although the ICC has regularly inhibited common judges from raising preliminary
references to the CJEU after or at the same time as a constitutional referral in indirect
(incidenter) proceedings, signals of a possible revirement arrived shortly before the order
63 64
no. 207/2013. An example is the mentioned order no. 165/2004, when the ICC simply
updated the question without declaring it inadmissible, or the judgment No. 94/2013,s
where, according to Augusto Cerri, the ICC signaled a certain unease with its established
66
case law. These episodes reveal the growing need for the ICC to rethink the absoluteness
of its ban on dual preliminarity, at least in terms of separating the claims where
supranational and internal (constitutional) claims are strongly intertwined (so-called
'strong alternative') from those where, on the contrary, the two profiles are basically
67independent from each other (weak alternative). While in the latter case the ICC could
righteously uphold its previous approach, in the former it should allow the common judge
to refer its doubts with more procedural ease to the two Courts.
In the "fixed-term workers" case, the ICC dealt with a different situation. Although the
internal and the supranational profiles regarding the legislation on school personnel are
strongly enmeshed, the need for the ICC to turn to the CJEU derived from the urgent need
to provide a constitutional justification for the challenged measures. In this light, it must be
emphasized that the same internal norms have been challenged before the CJEU, though
in a different perspective, by the Tribunale di Napoli." At a deeper sight, the fact that
some judges decided to turn to the ICC and others to the CJEU must not be linked to a
mere divergence regarding the circumstances of the case or the nature (direct/indirect) of
6 See supra note 50.
64 See supra note 38.
65 Judgment 22. May 2013, No. 94.
Augusto Cerri, La doppia pregiudiziale in una innovativa decisione della Corte, 57 GC 2897, 2898 (2013).
67 Id. at 2900; Onida, supra note 17, at 557.
Decisions of 2, 15, and 29 January 2013.
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the EU law in question. This fact reflects, on the contrary, a systemic necessity which is
strongly linked to the different roles of the ICC and the common judges whenever they are
called to give effect to EU law lacking direct effect. On the one hand, the latter seek a
continuity between internal and EU law since their action is more directly embedded in the
circumstances of the case, so that they claim first and foremost the uniform application of
supranational law (first-order justification). On the other hand, the former deals with the
need to provide a justification for the choices adopted by internal law, moving from a
perspective that is systemic because: a) in substance, it places (constitutional) national and
EU law on an equal footing, and b) it basically ignores the concrete circumstances of
individual applicants (second-order of justification).
If this is the case, it is inevitably necessary to analyze finally whether a similar outcome
could occur even with regard to EU law with direct effect. If no one can doubt that here
the basic premises of the Granital doctrine remain unchallenged and thus the preliminary
reference can be raised only by common judges (with the exception of counter-limits
cases), what if a similar need of qualified interaction emerges even in these cases? Are the
substantive reasons underpinning a constitutional choice sufficiently and adequately
conveyed to the CJEU by common judges, even if they do not endanger a severe
constitutional momentum (as in the case of counter limits)? Even if one may have doubts
as to whether this setting will remain unchallenged in the future, it is hard to provide an
answer. Whereas the ICC is unlikely to abruptly reverse its overall approach on this point in
the next future, major changes could come from a rethinking of apparently technical or
minor issues: the divide between direct and indirect effect could be one of those.70
IL Direct Effect: Beyond Van Gend En Loos?
As has been highlighted, direct effect has been the pivotal doctrinal tool that the ICC has
relied upon in order to set a clear-cut distinction between its functions vis-&-vis EU law and
the powers delegated to the common judges. The fixed-term workers case called this
distinction into question, because it was left in the background while the quest for a
substantive interaction was privileged. From a more general perspective, this rethinking
coincides with an overall reshaping of the doctrine of direct effect at supranational level,
so that a sort of variable reliance on it at internal level can find further justifications in the
near future.
69 The difference between first order and second order of justification is drawn by NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 99 (1994).
70 In a similar vein, Cartabia, supra note 15, at 29, argued that "[d]octrines like direct and indirect effect could
easily be interpreted so as to involve also the supreme and constitutional courts, instead of banning them."
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The classical stance of Granital went hand in hand with the basic premises of the doctrine
71'
emerging from Van Gend en Loos, according to which direct effect was nothing more
than the intrinsic nature of an EU norm, whose ascertainment was to be deemed as the
inquiry on a matter of fact. The expansion of EU competences, the growing
interconnections between national and supranational judicial actors, the montde en
puissance of consistent interpretation, the process of constitutionalization of the EU and
the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights have progressively altered such a
paradigm, that was for the main part grounded on the objective nature of Community law
norms72 and on a simplified interaction between judicial actors (the post-Simmenthal
paradigm). More recent analysis show that the rationale of the doctrine of direct effect is
shifting from a (supposed or real) clear-cut legal ontology to the convergence of multiple
and variable factors, such as: a) the concurrence of variable norms stemming from
different sources (OMC, soft law, general principles, and so on), whose direct effect
appears as the outcome of a process of interpretive combination rather than selection; b)
the expansion of its role beyond the State-individual (vertical) relationship and the
connected capacity to impose burdens and duties on individuals (horizontal direct effect);
c) the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which imposes on the CJEU
the duty to assess whether national courts can enforce the same Charter rights as are
enshrined in national constitutions.
Against a similar background, it is possible to argue that the decreasing reliance on the
distinction between direct and indirect effect in the case law of the ICC is not only an
episode, but more probably the assessment of a changing paradigm in the relationships
between domestic and EU law, whose main focus, as far as the role of Constitutional
Courts is concerned, regards the contribution and the place of fundamental rights in the
European legal landscape.74 If it is unquestionable that they represent the most important
domain "in which EU law effectiveness is challenged, these days, in relation with the issue
of applicability of EU and national law,,,7S a growing activism of Constitutional Courts
seems inevitable in the light of the competing interaction between judicial actors.
71 One might see in this the acceptance by the ICC of the systemic combination of direct effect and preliminary
reference as it has been emphasized by Joseph H.H. Weiler, Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and
object and the dilemma of European legitimacy, 12 I-CON 94, 95 (2014).
72 Sacha Prechal, Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the European Union, in
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EU LAW REVISITED: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 35, 36 (Catherine Barnard
ed., 2007).
73 These transformations involving the doctrine of direct effect are deeply analyzed by Sophie Olivier-Robin, The
evolution of direct effect in the EU: Stocktaking, problems, projections, 12 I-CON 165 (2014).
74 In this (slightly different) perspective, I share the assumption of Dani, supra note 9, at 169, according to which
"[a]s long as the EU judicial architecture will maintain its current post-Simmenthalstructure, the task of conveying
constitutional traditions to Luxembourg cannot but rest with ordinary courts."
Olivier-Robin, supra note 73, at 185.
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As far as the ICC is concerned, the relativization of that distinction calls into question a
further problem that involves the persistent sustainability of the rationale of Granital. In
other words, behind the solution given to the "fixed-term workers" case, a potential
contradiction is to be grasped: while the clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect
effect of EU law is increasingly being blurred, the most defensive premises of the
"separated but coordinated" principle become mutually contradictory, since the spheres of
normative and institutional relationships no longer instantiate two autonomous and self-
sufficient domains. In a complex system like the EU, the enforcement of supranational law
at national level requires an elaborate judicial construction in which the nature of norms is
assessed thanks to a multi-faceted judicial interpretation, where the role played by the
rigid alternative direct/indirect effect is increasingly replaced by the more flexible
76instrument of consistent interpretation. If that separation is not the only viable
theoretical instrument for the ICC to establish a relationship with EU law (and with the
CJEU in particular), an adequate commitment should be given to the elaboration of a
doctrine of "constitutional sensitivity", which could be the rising paradigm called to govern
in the near future the concurring ambits of European and national judges whenever
fundamental rights are at stake.n
F. Conclusions
The changing attitude of the ICC toward the CJEU and the use of the preliminary reference
procedure is quite evident, although its deep theoretical underpinnings ought to be further
assessed in future referrals. On the one hand, the "fixed-term workers" case reveals that
the most blatantly isolationist premises of the Granital doctrine are no longer tenable in
the current European legal scenario. In this light, the overcoming of the definitional
struggle on the judicial nature of the ICC and the partial acceptance of dual preliminarity
pave the way for a growing involvement of the ICC whenever its engagement is necessary
in order to convey constitutionally qualified arguments to the CJEU. On the other hand, it
should not be forgotten that this major involvement is not tantamount to encapsulating its
future action within the monist setting pleaded for by the CJEU. As the question
concerning the qualification of the ICC as a last instance court demonstrates, once the
most untenable aspects of its previous case law are swept away, it must be entitled to
carve out the "how" and "why" of its participation in the preliminary reference procedure,
6 Prechal, supra note 72, at 37.
A similar view is shared by Stefano Civitarese Matteucci, Breaking the Isolation? Italian Perspectives on the
Dialogue between the CIEU and Constitutional Courts, PAPER PRESENTED AT THE EDINBURGH LAw SCHOOL CONSTITUTIONAL
DISCUSSION GROUP SEMINAR, 26 May, 2015, unpublished (courtesy of the Author) and, albeit in a not coincident
perspective, by Cannizzaro, supra note 12, at 831, that emphasizes the "functional decoupling" (duplicita
funzionale) between the CJEU and Constitutional Courts.
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since it has at least the final say over the double allegiance (to the Constitution and to EU
78
law) under which it operates.
In this light, reinforcing the pluralist virtuality of the "separated but coordinated" principle
in terms of a contrapunctual interaction between judicial actors could lead to an emphasis
on the cooperative nature of the ICC's engagement, as happened in both the 2008 and in
the 2013 cases, instead of the antagonist attitude inherent in the various forms of ultra
vires control triggered by other Constitutional Courts. While the ICC has not hesitated in
recent times to invoke a reservation of sovereignty in the face of decisions of the
International Court of Justiceso or the European Court of Human Rights, it is widely
acknowledged that in respect of EU law the activation of the counter-limits is likely to be a
quite abstract possibility that could become merely hypothetical in case of a growing
willingness on the part of the ICC to purport on a regular basis the "internal point of view"
before the CJEU.
In sum, the strategic tenets of the solution provided for by the ICC seem to offer a viable
response to the dilemmas of integration, since they tackle the challenges emerging from
European constitutional pluralism in a spirit that is dialogical but not hostile and is
centered upon dialogical attitudes82 and instruments rather than on an uncritical
83
openness.
78 Cannizzaro, supra note 12, at 830.
Needless to refer, among others, to the Landtov6 case decided by the Czech Constitutional Court (Judgment of
31 January 2012, PI. OS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVll) or to the OMT case of the German Federal Constitutional
Tribunal (Decision of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13).
80 ICC, Judgment 22. October 2014, No. 238 with respect to Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.
Italy), ICJ Reports 2012, 96.
81 ICC, Judgment 28. November 2012, No. 264.
82 GIUSEPPE MARTINICO, THE TANGLED COMPLEXITY OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. THE FRUSTRATING KNOT OF EUROPE 116
(2013).
83 As far as the role of Constitutional Courts in the European legal landscape is concerned, the pluralist setting
enshrined in the "constitutional sensitivity" approach could lead to an understating of the clash between the
"jurisprudence of constitutional conflict" setting. See Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict:
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11 EU 262 (2005). For the strain
toward the establishment of a "European constitutional democracy" recently proposed by Jan Komarek, see Jan
Komarek, National Constitutional Courts in the European Constitutional Democracy, 12 I-CON 525 (2014). Their
mutual commitment to constitutional pluralism can be emphasized in that the need to provide a balance between
European and national constitutional supremacy cannot find a solution only in the reasons and arguments
advanced by (national and supranational) courts, because a more deep commitment to the value choices
enshrined in the continuum EU-national law is required: either in terms of the relevant principles governing the
"constitutionalism beyond the State" paradigm ("the formal principle of legality, jurisdictional principle of
subsidiarity, the procedural principle of democracy, and substantive principle of the protection of basic rights or
reasonableness," Kumm, supra in this note, at 299) or by recalling the capacity of Constitutional Courts to
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It must, however, be noted that the effort to overcome the ICC's previous misplacement
risks being nullified if the CJEU does not take into account the preferred position of the ICC
(as of every other Constitutional Court) in order to convey before it constitutionally
sensitive claims. As the decision taken by the CJEU in the fixed-term workers case
84demonstrates, the European adjudicator is persistently reluctant to bring to light the
constitutional tone of its responses to the referring judges, whereas it traditionally showed
a masterly ability to deal with constitutional claims in implicit and silent forms.as However,
when the reference involves basic constitutional values and stems from a Constitutional
86Court, the octroyde construction of constitutional traditions cannot be the solution. On
the contrary, Voice (by national Constitutional Courts) and Loyalty (by the CJEU) are more
and more necessary in order to take those constitutionally shaped arguments into account,
since the constitutional pluralism embodied in the European space "finds its roots in the
nature of cases before courts, and develops a methodology for the resolution of the
conflict, particularly when it entails a normative clash and judicial review must be put into
action."
In the light of the growing acceptance by the Constitutional Courts of the preliminary
reference procedure, and even more so in the face of the cooperative attitude displayed
by many of them (like the ICC), the time should indeed be right for the CJEU to place the
nature and the scope of the references raised by them on a different footing than the rest
of cases and to show a major concern for their arguments whenever a constitutionally
responsive judgment is required.
revitalize the communicative arrangement for those who are defacto excluded by the enjoyment of EU individual
freedoms (Komarek, supra in this note, at 539).
84Joined Cases C-22/13, C-61/13 to C-63/13, and C-418/13, 2014, Raffaella Mascolo v. Ministero dell'Istruzione,
dell'Universita e della Ricerca, (Nov. 26, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/.
Daniel Sarmiento, National Voice and European Loyalty. Member State Autonomy, European Remedies and
Constitutional Pluralism in EU Law, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE AUTONOMY OF MEMBER STATES 325, 336
(Hans-W. Micklitz & Bruno De Witte eds., 2012). It must however be observed that Mascolo was mainly
addressed to the legislator because of the persistent and massive noncompliance of the school recruitment
system with the basic criteria of EU law with regard to fixed-term employment.
8Dani,supra note 10, at 168. In a similar vein see Fabian Amtenbrink, The European Court of lustice's Approach to
Primacy and European Constitutionalism-Preserving the European Constitutional Order?, IN THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICEANDTHE AUTONOMY OF MEMBER STATES, 35, 60 (Hans-W. Micklitz & Bruno De Witte eds., 2012).
8 Sarmiento, supra note 85, at 344, with reference to A.O. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
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Court to the CJEU: Rvolution de Palais or Revolution in French
Constitutional Law?
By Frangois-Xavier Millet & Nicoletta Perlo*
A. Introduction
A preliminary reference on the part of the Constitutional Council was, in several respects,
not to be expected. It was debatable whether it would consider itself as a "court or
tribunal" within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) and, therefore, whether it would refer a case to the European
Court of Justice (CJEU) at all. The French constitutional court could also have resorted to
the acte clair doctrine so as to escape from their obligation to ask for the interpretive
guidance of the CJEU. However, the main reason why a reference was not awaited by legal
actors lies in the limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council. Until the introduction in
2008 of the so-called QPC, that is, question prioritaire de constitutionnailit6' (the Priority
Preliminary Reference mechanism on issues of constitutionality), the Conseil
constitutionnel had a very limited jurisdiction compared to its European counterparts. Its
main mission was to assess the conformity of parliamentary bills and treaties with the
Constitution and only with the Constitution. Its review could only take place ex ante,
between the adoption and the promulgation of a text. By opening the way to an ex post
review of statutes with regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution,
the QPC brought about a major change in the French adjudication system: statutes are no
longer immune from constitutional challenge once they are in force. However, treaties and
other international or European commitments are no parameters of constitutional review.
The Conseil constitutionnel made this clear in 1975 and never seriously changed track,
despite minor qualifications to the rule. In their seminal IVG ruling on the Voluntary
Interruption of Pregnancy Act, 2 they held that it was not up to them to review the
* Frangois-Xavier Millet is Professor of Public law (on leave from the University of the French West Indies).
Currently Referendaire at the Court of Justice of the European Union. Nicoletta Perlo is Maitre de conferences,
Universite Toulouse I Capitole.
1 See Otto Pfersmann, Concrete Review as Indirect Constitutional Complaint in French Constitutional Law: A
Comparative Perspective, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 223-48 (2010); DOMINIQUE ROUSSEAU, LA QUESTION PRIORITAIRE DE
CONSTITUTIONALITE (2010); XAVIER MAGNON, QPC, LA QUESTION PRIORITAIRE DE CONSTITUTIONNALITE: PRINCIPES GENERAUX,
PRATIQUE ET DROIT DU CONTENTIEUX (2013).
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compatibility of bills with treaties, in spite of Article 55 of the Constitution. Consequently,
the task of the constitutional judges does not go beyond the assessment of laws with
regard to the Constitution. This is the main reason that explains why, on the face of it, the
Conseil constitutionnel was unlikely to refer a case to the CJEU. Why would it seek the
interpretation or ask for the review of a European text if this text is immaterial for it and if
the yardstick of its examination is the Constitution and only the Constitution? Yet, it
happened. For the first time, the Conseil referred a case to the CJEU on 4 April 2013.
Although this is undoubtedly a major legal breakthrough, we will see in due course that
this is probably more a rdvolution de palais than a true revolution in French constitutional
law.
B. The Case
At the beginning of this affair, a British court issued a European Arrest Warrant [EAW] for
kidnapping against a male British national, Jeremy F, a secondary school mathematics
teacher who had left the country with one of his female students, who was then fifteen
and a half years old. He was arrested in France and he agreed to be handed over to the UK
judicial authorities, in compliance with Framework Decision 2002/584,4 but without
agreeing to waives the benefits deriving from the rule of specialty, according to which "a
person surrendered may not be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise deprived of his or her
liberty for an offence committed prior to his or her surrender other than that for which he
or she was surrendered."
Thus, once delivered to the British authorities, solely on the basis of charges of "kidnapping
a minor," Jeremy F could not be brought to trial for any other crimes within the United
Kingdom. However, due to the young student's voluntary participation in the escapade,
the UK authorities did not have a solid case for the charge in question, and wished to
broaden the scope of the investigation and potential charges. Once Jeremy F was
repatriated, they called on the investigating judge of the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux to
2 Conseil constitutionnel, decision 74-54 DC of 15 January 1975, Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act.
Article 55 reads, "Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of
Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party."
4 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures
between member states, amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of February 26 2009.
Pursuant to Art. 13(1) of the Framework Decision.
Art. 27(2) of the Framework Decision. The CJEU specified that "it is important to check whether the elements of
the offence, according to the legal definition of the offence of each Member State, are those for which the person
was delivered and if there is sufficient correspondence between the data contained in the arrest warrant and that
contained in the subsequent procedural acts." Case C-388/08 PPU, Criminal proceedings against Artur Leymann
and Aleksei Pustovarov, 2008 E.C.R. 1-08993.
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extend the effects of the surrender decision in order to include the offence of "sexual
intercourse with a minor under the age of 16," based on Articles 27(3)(g) and 27(4) of
Framework Decision 2002/584.
The French investigating judge accepted the request on 15 January 2013. Jeremy F, having
thus been made aware that he was liable to receive a sentence twice as long as that for the
previous charge, quickly moved to challenge the legal basis of this extension before the
French Cour de cassation (the top court in civil and criminal matters), arguing that the UK
authorities had gone beyond the limits of the principle of speciality, which imposed strict
limits upon their actions.
However, such an appeal is precluded by the wording of Article 695-46, paragraph 4 of the
French Code of Criminal Procedure. This article states, "the investigating judge's ruling may
not be appealed against." This was why the claimant also asserted his right to a priority
preliminary reference on issues of constitutionality (QPC), challenging the compliance of
this legal provision with the constitutional principle of equality before the law and with the
right to due process.
In addressing this case, the French Court of Cassation was confronted with a complex and
intricate legal issue involving the determination of the true author of the contested norm.
The fourth paragraph of Article 695-46 is grounded in EU law and was added to the code
via the Act of March 9th 2004,9 which transposed the rules concerning EAWs, 10 namely the
framework decision of 13 June 2002 on the EAW. The question is whether the impossibility
of an appeal in the case of an extended EAW derives from the framework decision drafted
by the EU legislator or was decided by the national legislators who transposed the
framework decision, and who, in so doing, used their margin of appreciation in violation of
constitutional principles. Depending upon the answer to this question, the norm could be
subject to different kinds of control, each triggering its own set of consequences.
In order to give full effect to the EAW, the French authorities effectively granted a sort of
"constitutional immunity" to all legal provisions transposing European rules in this area.
Under British law the offence of "sexual intercourse" refers to a minor for persons aged under sixteen, whereas
under French law the offence of sexual assault on a minor is only applicable when the victim is under fifteen.
8 Henri Labayle & Rostane Mehdi, Le Conseil constitutionnel, le mandat d'arrdt europeen et le renvoi prejudiciel a
la Cour de justice, REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROITADMINISTRATIF 461 (2013).
Act No. 2004-204 of March 9th 2004, OfficialJournal No. 59 of 10 March 2004, at 4567.
10 Art. 695-11 to 695-51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
11 Bruce Rabillon, Question sur la question! Nouvelles declinaisons du contr6le de la constitutionnalite des lois de
transposition, 23 POLITEIA 99 (2013).
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Since the enactment of the Constitutional Act of 25 March 2003,12 Article 88-2 of the
Constitution reads, "The law sets down the rules concerning European arrest warrants in
compliance with legal decisions adopted by the institutions of the European Union". It
follows from this constitutional amendment that legal provisions ensuring the application
of European law regarding the EAW shall not be considered unconstitutional, even in cases
of breach of other constitutional principles, including those amounting to the
"constitutional identity of France." However, the provisions that do not necessarily derive
from EU norms can be challenged through a QPC. In the case of litigation raising the
question of the compliance of certain legal provisions relating to EAWs with the
Constitution, it is therefore of paramount importance to determine whether any non-
conformity with the Constitution is imputable to European law-in which case it is
"covered" by Article 88-2 C-or whether it falls within the margin of appreciation granted
to national legislators, in which case it may be challenged.
Establishing the genealogy of such norms is not an easy task. Articles 27 and 28 of the
framework decision, upon which paragraph 4 of Article 695-46 is based, are silent vis-h-vis
the possibilities of appeal that should be offered by national legislation. Both articles
specify that "the decision [concerning a request for an extension or for extradition based
upon a European Arrest Warrant] will be issued within thirty days of the request." 14 As for
Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, paragraph 4, this provision prescribes
that the investigating judge in charge of processing such requests issues a "ruling without
the possibility of appeal (...) within thirty days." The issue requiring clarification is whether
the absence of any possibility of recourse against the ruling of the investigating judge
"necessarily flows from the obligations" prescribed by Articles 27 and 28 of the framework
decision, requiring the judge to rule within thirty days of the request, or whether it stems
from the French legislator's freedom of choice. The framework decision seemed to provide
a few hints regarding questions of interpretation, requiring the establishment of a series of
(undefined and rather ambiguously-worded) "sufficient safeguards"1 s vis-h-vis the
enforcement of EAWs, stating that "the current framework decision is not meant to
12 The Constitutional Act No. 2003-267 of March 25 2003 (OfficialJournal No. 72 of March 26, 2003 at 5344) was
adopted prior to the transposition into French law of the Framework Decision, in order to address the
incompatibility identified by the Council of State (Advisory Opinion no. 368282 on 26 September 2002, EDCE 54,
no. 2003 at 192), of this secondary piece of legislation with a fundamental principle recognized by the laws of the
Republic, "that the state should be allowed to refuse extradition for offences which it considers as political
offences or related to political offences."
13 On this concept and its comparative use, both in EU law and in domestic law, see FRAN OIS XAVIER MILLET, L'UNION
EUROPEENNE ET ['IDENTITI CONSTITUTIONNELLE DEs ETATS MEMBRES (2013).
14 Art. 27(4); Art. 28(3)(c).
15 "Rulings on the execution of the European arrest warrant must be subject to sufficient controls which means
that a judicial authority of the Member State where the person has been arrested will have to take the decision to
surrender the person in question." Recital 8 of the Framework Decision.
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prevent a Member State from applying its own constitutional standards regarding the right
to a fair trial . . . . However, in the absence of explicit provisions, the European
lawmaker's presumed intention of leaving the regulation of EAWs to the discretion of its
Member States would seem insufficient to clarify Articles 27 and 28 in this regard.
The Court of Cassation, obliged as it was to make a ruling, deemed that the choice to bar
"all possibilities of appeal" was made by the French lawmaker. By a decision delivered on
19 February 2013,17 it referred the question of constitutionality to the French
Constitutional Court and did not make a reference to the CJEU, as would have been
required had the origin of the legal standard been attributed to European lawmakers.
The French Cour de cassation ascertained that the QPC met the three criteria foreseen by
the organic law of 10 December 2009. The challenged legal provision was "applicable ...
to the procedure," namely the appeal before the Supreme Court; it "[had] not yet been
deemed in compliance with the Constitution through a ruling of the Constitutional Court";
and finally, the constitutionality issue "[was] paramount since the provision challenged
[was] likely to constitute a breach of the right to an effective appeal and of equality before
the law."
C. The Preliminary Reference
The Constitutional Court clearly asserted the constitutional immunity of legislation deriving
from the framework decision and decided to refer the case to the CJEU. 19
First, the Constitutional Court gave an interpretation of Article 88-2 of the Constitution,
stating, "[b]y these special provisions, the constituent legislator intended to remove
constitutional barriers precluding the enactment of the legislative provisions that
necessarily follow from the acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union relating
to the European arrest warrant."20
The assessment of conformity with the constitution is thus obviated in relation to the legal
provisions dealing with the substantive rules relating to EAWs, in conformity with the
constitutional immunity of secondary legislation provided for by the French constituent
16 Recital 12 of the Framework Decision.
17 Ruling no. 13-80491.
18 Organic Law no. 2009-1523 on the application of Art. 61-1 of the Constitution.
19 Conseil constitutionnel, decision no. 2013-314P QPC, April 4, 2013, Jeremy F. [Absence of appeal in case of
extension of the effects of the European arrest warrant - preliminary issue to the Court of Justice of the European
Union], Official Journal of April 7, 2013, at 5799.
20 Recital 5.
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power in 2003. However, such constitutional immunity is only applicable to legal norms
that "necessarily flow" from the requirements of this provision. The Constitutional Court
thus concluded that:
In consequence, it is for the Constitutional Council
when seized in relation to legislative provisions on the
European arrest warrant to review the constitutionality
of such legislative provisions that result from the
exercise by the legislator of the margin of appreciation
provided for under Article 34 of the Treaty on European
Union, in the version currently in force.2
The Conseil constitutionnel thus made it clear that the barrier constructed between the
legal provisions and the Constitution (that is, the so-called "constitutional immunity") is
not absolute, but flexible and dependent upon the lawmaker's discretionary power. It was
therefore up to the constitutional court to rule whether, in the case at hand, and
considering the particular provisions of the framework decision, the French lawmaker
22
merely exercised his discretion or was constrained by EU law to adopt a specific norm.
The Court therefore examined the terms of Articles 27 and 28 of the framework decision in
detail together with the solemn affirmation regarding the respect of fundamental rights
23
referred to in Article 6 TEU. The Court then turned to sketch out the application of its
review power vis-h-vis the legislative provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
It shall be for the Constitutional Court to determine
whether the provision of this law text which calls for
the investigating judge to "rule without the possibility
of appeal and within thirty days" necessarily results
from the requirement imposed upon the judicial
authorities of the member state, by paragraph 4 of
Article 27, and by point c) of paragraph 3 of Article 28
of the framework decision, which calls for a ruling
within thirty days from the date on which the request
has been received.24
21 Id.
22 Eva Bruce Rabillon suggests a new "compulsory review" that the Constitutional Court would be required to
make in cases involving the laws of the Union. Bruce Rabillon, supra note 11, at 99.
23 Recital 6.
24 Recital 7.
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The Court then outlined the results of its constitutional review in this case:
Under the aforementioned terms of the framework
decision, an assessment of the possibility of an appeal
against the original decision of the court, beyond the
period of thirty days, and suspending the execution of
the original decision requires that a ruling be provided
on the interpretation of the act in question, and that,
pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the
European Union alone shall have jurisdiction to issue
preliminary rulings on such a question, and that,
consequently, it is necessary to refer to it and to defer
to it the decision concerning the priority issue of
25
constitutionality raised by Mr. F.
The Court found it impossible, under the terms of the framework decision, to exercise its
discretion concerning the possibility of an appeal. It considered that the text was not clear
enough for it to determine the precise intention of the European lawmakers on this point.
Therefore, this issue should be referred to the CJEU for interpretation on the basis of
Article 267 TFEU. The ruling of the EU judiciary would determine the possibility for the
Constitutional Court to precisely define the scope of its review (or lack thereof) over the
contested provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Only if the CJEU were to deem
that the exclusion of any appeal within thirty days fell within the discretion of the French
legislature would the Constitutional Court be able to address the QPC raised by Jeremy F.,
under Articles 16 and 6 of the Diclaration des droits of 1789. The constitutional review was
thus to be suspended until the decision of the CJEU. Like the Italian Corte costituzionale,
the French Constitutional Court seems to consider the law of the Union as an "interposed
norm,";26 suitable as a "building block of constitutional criteria." 27
It should be noted that the preliminary reference to the CJEU in this case introduces two
significant exceptions to the ordinary procedure before the Constitutional Court,
constituting effective pro futuro precedents. First, the Constitutional Court defers a
decision, pending the judgment of the CJEU. No law governing its competences
acknowledges such a deferral. The Constitutional Court does not mention the legal basis
for this right to defer a decision, thus suggesting that this represents a solution required by
25 Id.
26See Corte costituzionale, Rulings no. 7/2004, 166/2004, 406/2005, 129/2006 and 348/2007.
27 Case C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10821.
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the very spirit of fair judicial cooperation inherent in the preliminary ruling procedure, the
legal basis for which can be found in Article 88-1 of the Constitution.28
The second exception concerns the procedural deadlines set for exercising constitutional
29 30
review: one month for the a priori review and three months for a posteriori review.
Given the brevity of these deadlines, until 4 April 2013, the Court always maintained that it
was impossible to call upon the CJEU in cases of a priori constitutional review. 31 As regards
a posteriori review, the Secretary General of the Court had previously specified that the
three month deadline "is not sanctioned by the relinquishment of jurisdiction on the part
of the Constitutional Court in cases of non-compliance. 32
In the Jeremy F. case, the Constitutional Court therefore considered that it was possible to
refer the case to the CJEU within the context of successive judicial review by multiple
courts (at national and European level), but, being conscious of the fact that that the
average length of a conventional preliminary ruling procedure was incompatible with the
procedure of the French Constitutional Court, requested that the CJEU assess the case via
the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.34 The request was justified on the basis of the
obligations relating to procedural delays, on the one hand, and the deprivation of liberty of
the applicant in the context of the main proceedings, on the other.3S However, despite
28 Jerome Roux, Premier renvoi prdjudiciel du Conseil constitutionnel a la Cour de justice et conjonction de
dialogues des juges autour du mandat d'arrdt europden, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEENNE 531 (2013).
According to Xavier Magnon, the jurisprudence of the CJEU also serves as implicit basis for this procedural
exception, including Factortame (Case C-213/89, Factortame Ltd, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, para. 23) and Melki and
Abdeli (Cases C-189/10 & C-188/10, Aziz Melki and Selim Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R. 1-5667, para. 56). X. Magnon, La
rdvolution continue : le Conseil constitutionnel est une juridiction... au sens de P'article 267 du Trait6 sur le
fonctionnement de l'Union europdenne, 96 REVUE FRAN AISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 930 (2013/4).
29 Const. Art. 61, para. 3.
30 Art. 23-10 of amended ordinance 58-1067 of 7 November 1958 on the organic law on the Constitutional
Council.
31 Conseil constitutionnel, decision no. 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006, para. 20, Rec. 88. Also, decision no. 2006-
543 DC of 30 November 2006; decision no. 2010-605 of 12 May 2010, para. 18.
32 Marc Guillaume, QPC: textes applicables etpremibres ddcisions, 29 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 21 (2010).
The latest annual report on the activity of the courts of the Union establishes the average duration for a
preliminary ruling, excluding procedural incidents, as being 15.7 months for 2012. Report available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201304/192685_2012_6020_cdj_ra_2012 fr proof_04
.pdf.
34 Art. 23bis of Protocol No. 3 to the TFEU on the status of the CJEU; Art. 104ter of the Rules of Procedure of the
Court. The last annual report of the Court indicates that the average decision time was 1.9 months in 2012. The
risk of procedural distortions is thus lower.
5 Para. 8.
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being granted access to the emergency procedure by the CJEU, the three month deadline
36for the ruling was not respected. This did not invalidate the substantive decision of the
Constitutional Court. It would seem that the new procedure "P QPC" (Preliminary prior
question regarding constitutionality) implies a certain tolerance with regard to deadlines to
issue a judgment.
D. The CJEU Preliminary Ruling
The Jeremy F. ruling exemplifies the latent tension existing between human rights
protection and effectiveness of criminal proceedings across Europe. In its answer, the CJEU
proved rather lenient towards both the Constitutional Council and domestic protection of
human rights.
As usual, the Court started its analysis by recalling the purpose of the EAW. Founded on
the salient principle of mutual recognition, it seeks "to facilitate and accelerate judicial
cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the European Union to
become an area of freedom, security and justice."" Turning to the assessment of the
possibility of bringing an appeal with suspensive effect against the decision of the judicial
authority, the Court noted that the Framework Decision did not expressly provide for such
an appeal. According to the CJEU, this absence was unproblematic under EU law given that
the possibility of filing an appeal was not required by the Charter, especially Article 47
guaranteeing the right to an effective remedy. It was sufficient that "the entire surrender
procedure between Member States is . . . carried out under judicial supervision."39
Although this reasoning is not necessarily flawless, as we could have actually conceived of
an enhanced right to an effective remedy under the Charter, it is understandable. In
reasoning in this way, the CJEU renounced a maximal level of human rights protection,
showing that it cannot be a Court that is exclusively concerned with human rights but that
rather, it must endeavor to strike a fair balance with other considerations.
This did not, however, prevent the Constitutional Council from ensuring a higher
protection of human rights at the national level. The CJEU judged that the Framework
Decision did not preclude Member States from providing for an appeal suspending the
execution of the decision of the judicial authority consenting to the extension of the EAW.
The Conseil received the case on February 27, 2013 and the decision was granted on the merits of the case on
14 June 2013.
Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F., (May 30, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
8 Id. at para. 35.
9 Id. at para. 46.
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In the absence of further detail in the actual provisions
of the Framework Decision, and having regard to
Article 34 EU, which leaves the national authorities the
choice of form and methods needed to achieve the
desired results of Framework Decisions, it must be
concluded that the Framework Decision leaves the
national authorities a discretion as to the specific
manner of implementation of the objectives it
40pursues.
According to the Court, the national Parliament has a discretionary power and can freely
decide whether it shall lay down the possibility of filing an appeal. Using the words of the
Constitutional Council, we can rephrase it as saying that neither the prohibition, nor the
imposition, of an appeal is the necessary consequence of the Framework Decision. The
latter is neutral in this respect. What matters for the Court overall is the correct application
of the EU secondary act: "Provided that the application of the Framework Decision is not
41frustrated, as the second paragraph of recital 12 in the preamble states, it does not
prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules relating inter alia to respect
for the right to a fair trial."42
However, in order to limit the adverse effects of such an appeal on effectiveness, the Court
introduced a caveat. It came to the conclusion that Articles 27(4) and 28(3) of the
Framework Decision did not preclude Member States from providing for an appeal
suspending execution of the decision of the judicial authority which gives its consent to the
extension of a EAW to include prior offences, "provided that the final decision is adopted
within the time-limits laid down in Article 17 of the Framework-Decision." 43 To reach such
an outcome, the Court was satisfied that "the possibility of having a right of appeal follows
implicitly but necessarily from the expression 'final decision' used in Article 17 (2), (3) and
(5) of the Framework Decision."44 Nonetheless, those provisions did not leave an
unfettered discretion to the Member States, as they set tight time limits for the executing
judicial authority to come up with a "final decision." For the Court, "it follows from the
40 Id. at para. 52.
41 Recital 12 in fine reads, "This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its
constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of
expression in other media."
42 Jeremy F., Case C-168/13 PPU, at para. 53.
43 Id. at para. 75.
44 Id. at para. 54. Article 17 especially deals with the time limits to execute the EAW. It sets tight time limits for the
executing judicial authority to come up with a "final decision." However, the Framework Decision fails to define
what "final decision" actually means.
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decision that certain limits must be set as regards the margin of discretion enjoyed by
Member States in this respect." 45 This comes from the "underlying logic of the Framework
Decision and to its objectives of accelerating surrender procedures." 46 In view of the
tightness of the time-limits and the need to swiftly reach "final decisions," the CJEU put a
limit on the discretion of national authorities in implementing the EAW into domestic law.
This is not surprising, as Member State procedural autonomy is traditionally limited by the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness of EU law. As Articles 27(4) and 28(3) did not
set time-limits for the "final decision" properly so called, the Court still held that the
national authorities had to comply with the time-limits laid down in Article 17 of the
Framework Decision for making a final decision.
On reading it, the judgment of the Court strikingly favors not only the protection of human
rights generally speaking (at the expense of "the underlying logic" of the EAW, which may
be understood to mean effectiveness and swiftness) but, more precisely, it emphasizes
domestic human rights. However, it is doubtful that the CJEU has started off a new trend. It
seems rather that the approach here has more to do with the specifics of the case, namely
the very first preliminary reference of the Constitutional Council. The CJEU might have
been willing to give further incentives to the Conseil, as it did already in Melki and Abdeli.
As a response to the cooperative stance of the Conseil constitutionnel, the lenient
approach of the CJEU is to be praised. It is a way to lure the Constitutional Council and
those other constitutional courts that remain reluctant to engage in a dialogue with the
CJEU through Article 267 TFEU. Moreover, it is valuable for the image of the CJEU, as it
gives the impression that human rights rank highly on the CJEU's agenda when it comes to
European Criminal Law and, more broadly, the area of freedom, security and justice.47 The
Constitutional Council could then draw all consequences from the CJEU ruling for the sake
of human rights.
E. Back to the Constitutional Court
Two weeks after the decision of the CJEU, the French Constitutional Court ruled on the
merits of the case, in conformity with the interpretation decided upon by the European
Court. The Conseil quashed Article 695-46, paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
after noting that, according to the judgment of the CJEU, this provision "does not
necessarily flow from the legal acts of the European Union institutions concerning the
45 Id. at para. 56.
46 Id. at para. 73(emphasis added).
47 For further analysis of the CJEU ruling, see Frangois Xavier Millet, How much lenience for how much
cooperation? On the first preliminary reference of the French Constitutional Council to the Court of Justice, 51
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 195, 213-15 (2014).
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European Arrest Warrant"48 and should therefore be examined for compliance with the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Article 695-46, paragraph 4 is not
covered by Article 88-2 of the Constitution, which could have constituted an obstacle to
constitutional review, had the authorship of the standard been attributed to the European
lawmakers by the CJEU.
For the Constitutional Court, the lawmaker's margin of appreciation in the transposition of
an act of secondary legislation of the Union prevents it from taking the requirements of
effective judicial protection lightly. The Conseil's case law is clear on this point: according
to Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789,49 "no
substantial encroachments may be made upon the right of the individuals concerned to
seek effective relief before a court."5,o This does not entail that the right to be brought
before a judge is absolute in its scope. The Constitutional Court guarantees the
effectiveness of the available appeal procedures and possible equivalents thereto, without
going as far as giving constitutional status to the right to be brought before two separate
courts. In the case at hand, the refusal of the lawmaker to grant the right to appeal with
regard to the extension of proceedings relating to an EAW constituted an "unjustified
restriction 51 in view of the fact that this restriction was not the necessary result of an
obligation imposed by EU law.
The Constitutional Court then turned to the scope of its decision,52 using a now-standard
formula to imbue it with ex tunc effect,53 accompanied by the provision that the
48 Conseil constitutionnel, decision no. 2013-314 QPC, 14 June 2013, M. Jeremy F. [Absence of appeal in case of
extension of the effects of the European arrest warrant], Official Journal, 16 June 2013 at 10024, para 8.
49 "A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no
Constitution at all."
5o Conseil constitutionnel, decision no. 2012-283 QPC on 23 November 2012, para. 11.
5 Conseil constitutionnel, decision No. 2013-314 QPC.
52 According to Article 62, paragraph 2 of the French Constitution, "A provision declared unconstitutional on the
basis of Article 61-1 is revoked as from the publication of the decision of the Constitutional Council or at a later
date stipulated in the decision. The Constitutional Council determines the conditions and the limits under which
the effects produced by the provision may be questioned." This formula is quite confusing in its wording and
actually awards mixed effects to the Council's rulings- ex nunc and ex tunc, according to a modulation performed
by the constitutional court itself. See on this subject, Magnon, La modulation des effets dans le temps des
decisions des juges constitutionnels, ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNEL 558-91 (2011); Cartier,
L'effet utile des declarations d'inconstitutionnalite, 23 POLITEIA 15-55 (2013).
5 "As a matter of principle, the declaration of unconstitutionality must benefit the party submitting the priority
question on constitutionality and the provision ruled unconstitutional cannot be applied to proceedings in
progress at the time the decision of the Constitutional Council is published, the provisions of Article 62 of the
Constitution grant the Council the power both to set the date of repeal and to defer its effects as well as to
provide for the review of the effects that the provision generates before this declaration takes effect." This
formula has been standard since the decision of the Constitutional Council QPC No. 2011-110 of 25 March 2011.
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declaration of non-conformity with the Constitution would take effect upon publication of
the Constitutional Court's decision, and would be applicable to all appeals that were
currently in process.54
So, what are the practical consequences of the partial abrogation of Article 695-46,
paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? Decisions that are pending and not yet
final may be appealed against before the Court of Cassation. However, these appeals and
any reviews thereof are subject to strict deadlines, so that the very final decision is not
delivered on a date that exceeds the sixty-day deadline prescribed by the framework
decision.ss Considering the fact that the investigating chamber must rule within thirty days
of receipt of the request, the deadline for the review of a potential appeal against the
initial decision should theoretically be less than thirty days. However, the rules governing
appeals in criminal matters are inadequate for this purposes; and should be discarded. If
the legislators fail to engage in swift reforms concerning this matter, it will be the role of
the Court of Cassation, within certain parameters, to mention the deadlines for the
submission and review of appeals. The Court of Cassation will thus play the role of a "juris-
lator," justifying such a move through the necessity of imposing an interpretation of Article
695-46, paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that is in compliance with the
framework decision,s" with the words "without the possibility of appeal" having been
expunged from the former. As has been correctly noted elsewhere, "the judges still
therefore have the last word as they are the fundamental makers of a fair Europe."5, 9
F. The Scope of the First Preliminary Reference
I. The French Constitutional Court as a Judicial Body in European Law
The first and most basic observation raised by the first preliminary question treated by the
French Constitutional Court concerns the status of the Conseil itself: beyond mere
doctrinal debates, at the European level, the Constitutional Court now qualifies as a Court,
having jurisdiction for matters of European law. Under Article 267 TFEU, in fact, only
national courts under the Treaty are entitled to make use of the preliminary reference
54 Decision No. 2013-314 QPC at para. 11.
Art. 17 of the Framework Decision; Jeremy F., Case C-168/13 PPU, judgment of 30 May 2013, pt. 64.
Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 695-46, para. 4.
Five clear days for filing an appeal; forty days to review.
Consistent interpretation required by the principle of primacy. See Case C-105/03, Criminal Procedure
against Maria Pupino, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5309.
Jerome Roux, Premier renvoi prejudiciel du Conseil constitutionnel a la Cour de justice et conjonction de
dialogues des juges autour du mandat d'arrit europeen, supra note 28.
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procedure. Thus, on the one hand, by making a reference to the CJEU, the Constitutional
Court signals that it considers itself to be a national court, and on the other hand, the
CJEU's acceptance of its request acknowledges that the Constitutional Court meets the
criteria of a judicial authority.
Indeed, the Council fulfills the various criteria for judicial authorities, as established by the
60
case law of the CJEU. It represents a "permanent body" established by law, the members
of which are appointed by a public authority,6 and the jurisdiction of which is compulsory,
a body, moreover, that rules by means of "adversarial proceedings" applying "the rule of
law." As to the criterion of judicial independence, given the constitutional and organic
regulations that guarantee it, the Constitutional Court evidently takes on "the role of an
objective outsider in relation" to the "authority," 62 the acts of which are challenged before
it. Finally, the guarantee of the impartiality of the members of the Court is undoubtedly
somewhat imperfect, since in the course of previous positions they may have held, they
may have taken part in the development of the legislative provisions that are being
challenged or of European standards that may result in the dismissal of a claim.6 However,
it is clear that the CJEU applies the criteria with a certain degree of flexibility,64 always
assuming that the constitutional courts that submit preliminary references fulfill the
6 5criteria it has prescribed for defining judicial authorities. The desire to encourage a
certain degree of preliminary dialogue with the constitutional courts of the Member States
takes clear precedence over the mere will to judge national practices (and particularly
judicial traditions), which would be seen as inappropriate and intrusive by national
authorities.
60 Case C-61/65, Vaassen Gobbels, 1966, E.C.R. 1-395; Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, 1997 E.C.R. 1-4961.
61 Except for "rightful" members, who are former Presidents of the Republic. This is probably a malfunction of the
French system of constitutional justice. See Patrick Wachsmann, Sur la composition du Conseil constitutionnel, 5
JUS POLITICUM 14-16 (2010).
62 Case C-24/92, Corbiau, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1277.
Art. 4, Decision on the procedure before the Constitutional Council for priority issues of constitutionality of 4
February 2010 (Official Journal of 18 February 2010 at 2986).
64 Despite the non-decisive character of the intervention of Consiglio di Stato, the Court acknowledged it as a
court (Cases C-69/96 to C-79/96, Garofalo, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5603). Similarly, the Dutch Council of State had been
recognized as having jurisdiction at a time when it only exercised on a restricted basis (Case C-36/73,
Nederlandse Spoorwegen, 1973 E.C.R. 1-1299).
Henri Labayle, Rostane Mehdi, Le Conseil constitutionnel, le mandat d'arrdt europeen et le renvoi prejudiciel a la
Cour de justice, supra note 8.
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IL The Constitutional Court-Not the Ordinary Union Law Judge
The preliminary ruling does not render the Constitutional Court an ordinary adjudicator of
European Union law. This function is, in fact, an inseparable component of the process of
judicial review of domestic law for compliance with the EU treaties, which, when exercised
by national judges, guarantees the "full effect" of EU law through the non-application of
66 67
national provisions that are contrary to European norms. In France, in 1975 the
Constitutional Court decided to decline jurisdiction in monitoring compliance of legislation
with international treaties under Article 61 of the Constitution. This lack of jurisdiction was
stressed in relation to the a posteriori review power on the basis of Article 61-1 of the
Constitution.6 The French ordinary EU law judge is, therefore, the civil or the
administrative judge. The Constitutional Court, for the time being, remains keen on a strict
construction of its unique nature and competences, namely reviewing the conformity of
statutes with the sole Constitution.
Referral to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling has not triggered a change in the function of
the Constitutional Court with respect to EU law; on the contrary, the route undertaken by
the French judges confirmed the existing case law on this issue. On 4 April 2013, the
Constitutional Court confirmed that it could rule solely on the constitutionality of laws and
that the review required by Article 88-2 does not in fact constitute a species of judicial
review for compliance with international treaties, but rather a simple "verification stage"69
that must precede constitutional review,70 and that is an indispensable component
thereof.
Thus, the Jeremy F. case does not constitute a volte-face, but rather a step along the road
of the Constitutional Court's European case law. Within the context of this journey, the P
QPC 2013 follows the Melki case of 2010, giving continuity and depth to the judicial
dialogue, and furnishing an important contribution to the debate on the order of referrals.
In the ruling Aziz Melki and Selim Abdeli of 22 June 2010, the CJEU began an initial
72dialogue with the Constitutional Court, attempting to address the thorny question of the
Case C-106/77, Finance Administration of the State against Societe anonyme Simmental, 1978 E.C.R. 1-629, pt.
24.
6 Conseil constitutionnel, decision no. 74-54 DC, 15 January 1975, IVG.
Conseil constitutionnel, decision no. 2011-217 QPC, 3 February 2012, M. MohammedAkli B. Rec. p. 104.
Bruce Rabillon, supra note 11, at 104.
70 Along a similar line Henri Labayle, Rostane Mehdi, Le Conseil constitutionnel, le mandat d'arrt europeen et le
renvoi prejudiciel a la Cour de justice, supra note 8.
71 Cases C-189/10 & C-188/10, Aziz Melki and Selim Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R. 2010 1-05667.
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compatibility between the organic legal provisions relating to QPC and the provisions of
Article 267 TFEU relating to the preliminary ruling procedure. In an obiter dictum, the CJEU
implicitly invited the Constitutional Court to disregard the requirements deriving from
Article 61, stating that "the requirement for a strict deadline imposed upon national courts
cannot result in the impossibility of procuring a preliminary ruling on the validity of the
provision under scrutiny."73 While in this quotation, the obligation of allowing the
possibility of a preliminary ruling as a prerequisite for any form of judicial review refers to
the difficulties in challenging the validity of a directive, it can also be readily applied to the
interpretation of directives. The Jeremy F. ruling, three years later, undoubtedly
constitutes a positive response to the request made by the CJEU: 7 4 The Constitutional
Court agreed to go over the deadline for reviews in order to refer the preliminary issue to
the CJEU, prior to exercising its own constitutional review.
Secondly, by means of its 2013-314 P QPC ruling, the Constitutional Court also seems to
have settled the debate on the order of referrals, which was initiated by the Cour de
cassation in 2010.7s In its judgment concerning online games, 76 the Constitutional Court
had already stated:
Neither Article 61-1 of the Constitution nor Articles
23-1 and following of the Ordinance of November 7th
1958 referred to hereinabove preclude a judge, asked
to rule in litigation in which the argument of
incompatibility with European Union law is raised, from
doing, at any time, all and everything necessary to
prevent the application in the case in hand of statutory
provisions impeding the full effectiveness of the norms
and standards of the European Union.
72 The CJEU referred in particular to the Council's Ruling no. 2010-605 DC of 12 May 2010, Law on the liberalising
competition and sector regulation of gambling and online gambling, rec. at 78.
73 MelkiandAbdeli, Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 at para. 56.
74 Henri Labayle, Rostane Mehdi, Le Conseil constitutionnel, le mandat d'arrdt europeen et le renvoi prejudiciel a la
Cour dejustice, supra at note 8; Bruce Rabillon, supra at note 11, 119.
On 16 April 2010 the Cour de cassation called upon the CJEU for an appeal of validity of an action concerning
the compatibility of the priority of the QPC with the requirements of the CJEU for national judges as common law
judges of the Union. Cass., Aziz Melki, No. 10-40002.
76 Conseil constitutionnel, decision n 2010-605 DC.
Para. 14.
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The Court added:
Sections 23-1 and following of the Ordinance of
November 7th 1958 referred to hereinabove do not
deprive Courts of law or Administrative Courts,
including when they are requested to transmit an
application for a priority preliminary hearing on the
issue of constitutionality, of the freedom, or, when
their decisions cannot be appealed against in domestic
law, of their duty to refer to the European Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the
78Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The Constitutional Court has thus attributed to the QPC the status of an alternative
preliminary reference, an additional tool for the protection of human rights in a legal
sphere that has become European in nature. In other words, the QPC and the preliminary
reference procedure are distinct in their scope and are to be used independently. In April
2013, the Constitutional Court itself resorted to the preliminary reference procedure. The
French Constitutional Court thus masterfully demonstrated the complementarity of these
two instruments, which should be used in a spirit of cooperation between national and
European judicial institutions.
///. The Constrained Future of Preliminary Rulingsfrom the Constitutional Court
Rdvolution de palais or revolution in French constitutional law? Without minimizing the
importance of this very first preliminary reference, it must nevertheless be noted that the
perspectives opened up by this case are quite limited. Indeed, the possibility of raising a
preliminary issue before the CJEU only happened because two conditions were fulfilled:
the ability to make use of the urgent ruling procedure and the fact that the legal issue at
stake concerned the European Arrest Warrant under Article 88-2 of the Constitution.
However, since both the first and second conditions are rarely fulfilled, their coincidence
will, most likely, very rarely resurface.
Regarding the first condition, the Constitutional Court, in the context of such a question,
has shown itself able to bend certain tenets of its own rules of procedure, even issuing a
valid ruling two weeks after the deadline imposed by the organic law. This exception
observes the principle of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU). However, it does not stretch to a priori constitutional review, which
7 Para. 15.
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requires a shorter time limit,79 and it only seems possible in the context of an urgent
preliminary ruling procedure, given that the average ordinary procedure in the CJEU lasts
approximately sixteen months.
Circumvention of the deadline came about due to reciprocal concessions that the
Constitutional Court and the CJEU agreed on in this case: the Constitutional Court accepted
the exceeding of the time limit since the CJEU delivered a ruling swiftly. It is, however, a
contingent balance, which cannot be repeated regularly. Furthermore, the CJEU upheld
two arguments presented by the Constitutional Court: The deprivation of liberty to which
the applicant was subjected during the main trial, and the time limits which the
Constitutional Court must observe when issuing a ruling. However, it is not certain that the
mere presence of a deadline can be used in order to justify an emergency ruling in the
future.ao In addition, the use of the emergency procedure is limited to questions involving
freedom, security, and justice, which constitute a further obstacle to a broader use of the
preliminary reference procedure by the Constitutional Court. As for the accelerated
procedure,82 which may involve any area of EU law, the conditions for its implementation
seem too restrictive for this option to be used by a constitutional court. Indeed, an
11 83
"extraordinary emergency" is required to justify the use of this procedure.
Regarding the second condition, it is debatable whether referrals will be confined to the
limited field of EAWs. One can have doubts as to the likelihood of further preliminary
references when it comes to statutes transposing EU norms other than measures
concerning EAWs. Only the latter enjoy full and absolute constitutional immunity under
Article 88-2 of the Constitution. Through this provision, the constituent power consented
without reservation to the EAW in all of its features, whereas it never explicitly endorsed
the other numerous secondary norms that are adopted by the EU institutions and can have
far-reaching legal effects domestically. For those norms, Article 88-1 of the Constitution is
applicable.
Bruce Rabillon, supra note 11, at 124. Concerning the possibility for the Council to refer to the CJEU for a
preliminary ruling in the context of preliminary oversight, see Jerome Roux, supra note 28.
80 To our knowledge, this type of justification has not yet been received by the Court, which emphasized the
deprivation of liberty suffered by a person pending the decision (see, e.g., Case C-278/12 PPU, Adil v. Minister
voor Immigratie (July 18, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/) or the situation of children separated from their parents
pending the settlement of custody cases (see, for example, Case C-497/10 P.P.U., Mercredi v. Chaffe, 2010 E.C.R.
1-14309). Along a similar line: Marie Gautier, L'entree timide du Conseil constitutionnel dans le systhme
juridictionnel europeen, 19 ANNUAIRE JURIDIQUE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 1086 (2013); Xavier Magnon, supra note 28,
at 932.
81 Art. 23bis of the Statute of the CJEU.
82 Art. 105 of the Rules of procedure before the CJEU.
83 The CJEU acknowledged the urgency in the ruling MelkiandAbdeli.
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Article 88-1 is arguably the first and foremost provision relating to the European Union
that can be found in the French Constitution. It reads:
the Republic shall participate in the European Union
constituted by states which have freely chosen to
exercise some of their powers in common by virtue of
the Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, as they result
from the treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007.
Initially, Article 88-1 was perceived as being mainly symbolic and therefore deprived of
any legal effect. Yet, it is being increasingly relied on by French judges as a constitutional
mandate allowing, requiring, or prohibiting certain actions. Inter alia, in relation to EU
directives, both the Conseil constitutionnel and the Conseil d'Etat have read into Article 88-
1 a constitutional obligation to transpose directives.84 Such an obligation already derives
from EU law through the duty of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. However,
the domestic judges are still reluctant to ground their rulings on EU provisions. That
explains why they discovered a constitutional requirement to transpose directives. In doing
so, they not only gave a national constitutional imprint (in a dualistic fashion) to their
judgments, but they were enabled to discretionarily set limits on this obligation, which
were to be found in the Constitution itself and not in EU law. Above all, this obligation shall
not trump the requirement for a directive to respect the "constitutional identity of
France.,,s The obligation to transpose directives is therefore relative and not stringent, as
it shall yield before the constitutional core of the Member States. This a major difference
with EAWs, as the latter are fully immune from constitutional challenge. The Conseil did
not mention French constitutional identity as a valid claim against national measures
implementing EAWs. For domestic measures implementing other EU secondary acts,
though, the infringement of constitutional identity may lead to a declaration of
unconstitutionality.86 To sum up, under Article 88-2, no claim connected with
constitutional identity can hold and a preliminary reference can be made. Under Article 88-
1, constitutional identity can serve as a limit to EU integration and the prospect of an
institutional dialogue with the CJEU remains uncertain.
84 Conseil constitutionnel, decision no 2004-496 DC of 10th June 2004, Act on Trust in the Digital Economy; Conseil
d'Etat, judgment of 8 February 2007, ArcelorAtlantique et Lorraine. On the Conseirs ruling, see the annotation by
JACQUELINE DUTHEIL DE LA ROCHERE, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 859-69 (2005).
Conseil constitutionnel, decision no 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006, Act pertaining to Copyright and Related Rights
in the Information Society.
However, the Conseil made it clear that the constitution-making power could actually give up French
constitutional identity: "[T]he transposition of a directive cannot run counter to a rule or principle inherent to the
constitutional identity of France, except when the constituting power consents thereto." Conseil constitutionnel,
decision no. 2006-540 at para. 19 (our emphasis). On this controversial option, see FRAN OIS XAVIER MILLET, L'UNION
EUROPEENNE ET L'IDENTITE CONSTITUTIONNELLE DES ETATS MEMBREs 42-45 (2013).
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G. Conclusion
The first preliminary reference of the French Constitutional Council to the CJEU is
undoubtedly a milestone event, which may even herald the start of a new era. However, it
might also remain isolated. Because of its curtailed jurisdiction, the Conseil constitutionnel
will never have many opportunities to refer a case to the CJEU. Unless it overrules its
current approach, any further preliminary reference is bound to happen in the course of
the review of a domestic statute implementing EU law. If we now know that the Conseil
will not shy away from sending in a case relating to the EAW, it remains to be seen
whether it will repeat the experience in a situation involving another EU secondary norm
that is not being specifically addressed in an ad hoc provision of the Constitution such as
Article 88-2 but falls within Article 88-1. Although it is understandable that the Conseil
constitutionnel is reluctant to engage in a dialogue with the CJEU when no less than
national constitutional identity is infringed by EU law, it would, however, be well-advised
to do so in order not to undermine the fragile European project.
The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References-
Still a Match not Made in Heaven?
By Eva Julia Lohse*
A. Introduction
So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth: BVerfG)
has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU)
Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and
cooperation' which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This
situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January
2014,2 proving predictions on the perceived "most powerful constitutional court" and its
relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the
interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European
Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate
General Cruz Villal6n was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the
doubts expressed by the BVerfG about the conformity of the OMT programme with EU
law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the
reluctance of the BVerfG remain the same after this single referral and offer explanations
as to why the BVerfG had for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former
European Court of Justice (ECJ).
On a political level, there might be a simple answer, often claimed by the media: a fear of
loss of influence. One might assume that the BVerfG considers itself as the keeper of
Friedrich Alexander-Universitat Erlangen-Nurnberg/Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg/Brsg.
See also Jorg Ukrow, Von Luxemburg lernen heijit Integrationsgrenzen bestimmen, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN 119, 122-23 (2014).
2 134 BVERFGE 366 [hereinafter OMT].
See also-while denying this to be the case-Ulrich Everling, Vorlagerecht und Vorlagepflichtnationaler Gerichte
nach Art 177 EGV, in VORABENTSCHEIDUNGSVERFAHREN VOR DEM GERICHTSHOF DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 11, 14
(Reichelt ed., 1998); Jan Bergmann, Dos Bundesverfassungsgericht in Europa, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT
620, 627 (2004).
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German fundamental rights and as a court too powerful to follow the interpretation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on constitutional matters. One might state
that this denial impedes a true cooperation and communication between "constitutional"
courts, and reduces cooperation to mere visits and academic discussions.4 On a closer look,
though, the situation is multifaceted:s a normative analysis of the case law allows three
presumptions on the relationship between constitutional control by the BVerfG and its
readiness for preliminary references. The pivot is a requirement of EU Law: in order to
refer a question to the CJEU, the national court must consider the answer necessary to
enable the national court to give judgment (Article 267(1) TFEU). This leaves a subjective
margin of discretion for the national courts,6 which they can use in order not to refer a
question out of "political" reasons. It is also an objective criterion (C. I.), which is hardly
reached before the BVerfG due to the specific structure and requirements of constitutional
procedural law (B). However, the OMT decision shows that the requirements can be met
and that the peculiarities of constitutional law may only be used as an "excuse" not to
refer a question to the CJEU.
One can deduce the following three aspects that need to be considered by the BVerfG in
the course of its deliberation: the use of preliminary rulings by non-constitutional courts on
specific questions of Union Law (C. II.), the means for safeguarding the idea of cooperation
between courts in the course of ultra-vires-control, and the so-called constitutional
"identity" control (C. Ill.), and the (maybe futile) attempt to shield fundamental rights in
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law, henceforth: GG) from EU influence, especially the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (EChFR) (C.IV.).
B. A Restricted Standard of Review: Requirements of German Constitutional Procedure
Under the Influence of European Law
One of the reasons that is claimed to underlie the reluctance of the BVerfG to refer are the
particularities of the German system of constitutional review. The comparative
constitutional lawyer may, however, doubt that the requirements and setting are so
7peculiar compared to other continental systems of constitutional review.
4 See Jacques Ziller, Le dialogue judiciare et la Cour de Karlsruhe, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROITEUROPIEN 93, 95
(2010); Maya Walter, Integrationsgrenze Verfassungsidentitat-Konzept und Kontrolle aus europdischer,
deutscher und franzbsischer Perspektive, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES RECHT UNDVOLKERRECHT 177, 197 (2012);
Ukrow, supra note 1, at 123.
See also Franz C. Mayer, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 399,
407 (Armin v. Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast eds., 2010).
Burkhard HeR, Die Einwirkungen des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens nach Art. 177 EGV auf dos deutsche
Zivilproze/?recht 108 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 59, 75 (1995).
For an overview, see BERND WIESER, VERGLEICHENDES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 120, 125 (2005).
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The German system is that of a separate constitutional court entrusted with the review of
all aspects of state action against the Grundgesetz. In this sense, it is a comprehensive
review. Yet, it naturally means restricting the jurisdiction of the BVerfG to the
interpretation of the German constitution. Questions of the interpretation and application
of German statutory law are left to non-constitutional courts, and the interpretation of
primary and secondary EU law is exclusively assigned to the CJEU according to Article 19 of
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This attribution of competences seems clear and
common for most constitutional courts following the Kelsenian model of constitutional
review. However, in concreto, the spheres cannot be separated so easily. Hence it is
important to understand in which situations the need for a preliminary reference arises. It
is argued that a situation in which a referral was admissible and even necessary under the
conditions of German procedural law had arisen prior to the preliminary reference in OMT,
adding a particular political connotation to this first preliminary reference.
The main procedures leading to a review of German state action against the standard of
the Grundgesetz and raising questions of EU law at the same time are the
Verfassungsbeschwerde (individual constitutional complaint), the
abstrakteNormenkontrolle (abstract review of legislation), konkreteNormenkontrolle
(judicial review of legislation in form of a referral by a German court), and
Organstreitverfahren (court proceedings between state organs).
(1) Verfassungsbeschwerde: an individual may claim the violation of his or her fundamental
rights under the Grundgesetz (but not under the EChFR or the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) 8 ) by state action, that is, by a statute, a court decision, or an
administrative act. Contrary to those Member States which have incorporated the ECHR as
directly applicable constitutional law (e.g., Austria) the German fundamental rights remain
separate from their European counterparts. A Verfassungsbeschwerde is only admissible
after all other remedies have been exhausted, therefore the non-constitutional courts are
the prevailing interpreters of the GG and can also make references to the CJEU in matters
of EU law. Yet, in rare circumstances, EU law may become relevant for the BVerfG.9
This may involve, first, a violation of a German fundamental right by a German statute
transposing EU secondary law. In such circumstances, the BVerfG has to determine
whether the Member States had a margin of implementation, as only national law not
determined by EU law is bound by German fundamental rights.10
8 110 BVERFGE 141, 154-55 [hereinafter Kampfhunde]; 115 BVERFGE 276, 299 [hereinafter Winner Wetten].
See also Konrad Feige, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vorabentscheidungskompetenz des Gerichtshofs der
Europdiischen Gemeinschaften, 100 ARCHIV FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 530, 539-50 (1975).
10 Thorsten Kingreen, GRCh Art. 51 in EUV/AEUV KOMMENTAR margin no. 12(Christian Calliess& Matthias Ruffert
eds., 4th ed. 2011).
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A second circumstance in which EU law may become relevant is where the EU act is ultra
vires or harms the immutable core of the Grundgesetz (Article 79(3) GG) and must
therefore not be applied by German state actors. The BVerfG has accepted, in the context
of EU integration, that a violation of the right to vote (Article 38(1) GG) can be claimed
when the German parliament limits its sovereignty by transferring excessive competences
to the EU. Every citizen can therefore assert that the limits of European integration as
stated in Articles 23(1) and 79(3) GG are to be respected in any legislative act yielding
sovereignty to the EU.
Third, EU law may become relevant where the German legislature could not transfer
powers to the EU due to the immutable core of the German constitution.
In the latter two situations, the BVerfG needs to ask the CJEU either whether EU law is
valid or how the provision of EU law is to be interpreted.
As a Verfassungsbeschwerde can be raised not only against Acts of Parliament but against
any state action, as long as a violation of fundamental rights is at stake, it offers the widest
possibility to initiate a referral to the CJEU. Therefore, especially in connection with Article
38(1) GG, which informally allows a review of the principle of democracy and of the
safeguarding of other fundamental principles of the Grundgesetz, it has been the basis of
some of the most famous decisions of the BVerfG on the relationship between the CJEU
and the BVerfG as well as the Grundgesetz and EU law (Solonge 11,1 Moostricht,
Lissabon,14 Honeywell,s Vorratsdatenspeicherung, 1 Antiterrordatei,17 ESM,18 and lately
OMT).
(2) AbstrakteNormenkontrolle: an abstract judicial review can only ask the question of
whether a German statute conforms to the Grundgesetz. Contrary to the practice in some
other Member States, international treaties are neither subject of an
11 Christian Hillgruber, Die verfassungsprozessuale Dimension des Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)-
Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLATTER 635, 636 (2014).
12 73 BVERFGE 339.
13 89 BVERFGE 155.
14 123 BVERFGE 267 [hereinafter Lissabon].
15 126 BVERFGE 286 [hereinafter Honeywell].
16 125 BVERFGE 260 [hereinafter Vorratsdatenspeicherung].
17 133 BVERFGE 277 [hereinafter Antiterrordatei].
18 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) [BVERFG], Mar. 18, 2014, 2 BvR 1390/12,
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20140318_2bvrl39012.html.
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abstrakteNormenkontrolle nor can they be used as a standard of review. 9 A connection to
EU law is, however, possible when the statute transposes EU secondary law and either its
validity or the margin of discretion for the transposing state is disputed and needs to be
clarified in an Article 267 AEUV procedure. Another possibility is the control of an act
approving an EU treaty. In this case, the CJEU may be asked to interpret provisions of the
TEU or the TFEU under Article 267 AEUV, in order to decide whether the Bundestag has
transferred too much sovereignty to the EU, rendering the German approval act void.
(3) KonkreteNormenkontrolle: a concrete judicial review may be raised by a German court
if it considers a German statute unconstitutional and therefore void, and if this
unconstitutionality is relevant for the outcome of the case. EU law is at stake if the margin
of discretion needs to be determined or if the EU secondary legislation is considered ultra
vires and therefore not applicable within the EU. It might also influence the standard of
review, if the Grundgesetz would have to be interpreted in accordance with EU law.
(4) Finally, court proceedings can be filed between governmental bodies (Organstreit),
either against Acts of Parliament approving an EU treaty or against acts of governmental
bodies like the German Central Bank, which participate in actions on an EU level that might
be ultra vires. In most cases concerning possible referrals, like Maastricht, ESM, and OMT,
an Organstreit had been initiated by a part of the Bundestag, demanding increased
participation by the parliament in order to hinder its "disempowerment," filing for
injunctive relief20 or for political action of the government in EU matters.21
As can be seen, in most cases German statutes are reviewed for their compatibility with
German fundamental rights and other fundamental state principles like the principle of
democracy. The BVerfG itself is not competent to decide on matters other than the
Grundgesetz and acts issued by German state organs. In order to have a situation where a
preliminary ruling might become relevant, these actions by German state organs must in
some way be determined by EU law. This is the case either when they implement EU law or
when they approve the transfer of power to the EU. In the first case, the BVerfG needs to
know whether the German state actors act within the margin of discretion left by the EU
instrument and are therefore still bound by German constitutional law, or whether the EU
act is ultra vires and must not be applied. In the second case, it needs to know what the EU
provisions mean in order to be able to decide whether the Grundgesetz allows this transfer
of power. In the last resort, however, it only decides on constitutional matters; it does not
decide on EU law, nor on questions of statutory law or facts.
19 This is the case in Austria and Poland, and Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia respectively. See WIESER, supra note7,
136-37.
20 OMTat para. 1, para. 45; Lissabon at para. 336.
21 OMTat para. 1, para. 46.
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C. Discretion of National Courts: The Impact of the Question on the Outcome of the Case
/. "Relevance to the case" (Article 267(1) TFEU)
From the point of view of EU law, the BVerfG, like any other court, can refer questions to
the CJEU "if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment" (Article 267(1) TFEU). It is argued that for three reasons this criterion is the key
to why and how the BVerfG could, for so long, not refer a question to the CJEU.
(1) First, it lies in the discretion of the national courts whether they deem the decision of
the CJEU necessary for their own decision. This means, however, that either they can
cooperate by using their discretion in an "EU-friendly" way, or that they may consider the
question not relevant for the outcome in order to protect their own competence over
interpretation. The BVerfG has explicitly used this argument in its decision on the Data
Retention Directive (Vorratsdatenspeicherung).22 In OMT it takes quite a lot of space in
order to justify the reference to the CJEU, although the relevance of the question is less
than obvious.2 3
(2) Second, the criterion of "relevance" is hardly defined under law or in an objective
14
way. Only when a valid definition has been found will it be possible to state whether the
BVerfG has in the past misused its discretion. In the OMT case it can be argued that the
questions were irrelevant because German state organs could not act no matter what the
answer by the CJEU was. Even if the CJEU had found a violation of the Treaties there was
nothing German state organs could have done to prevent this.25 Yet, the CJEU, following
22 Vorratsdatenspeicherung at para. 308. See also Kampfhunde at para. 156. If the statute did not conform to EU
law, it would be inapplicable within Germany. Hence, a constitutional complaint would be inadmissible, as the
statue was non-existent. However, as the statute might violate constitutional law and could therefore be void, a
decision by the CJEU on the conformity with EU law would not be necessary (Art. 267(1) TFEU) for the outcome of
the case. On the other hand, if the statute conforms to constitutional law, the BVerfG-due to its restricted
standard of review-cannot rule on the merits of the case as far as the conformity with EU law is concerned, as it
does not apply EU law and does therefore not have to answer a question concerning the interpretation of EU law.
So, notwithstanding whether the statute conforms to EU law or not, the BVerfG cannot make a preliminary
reference.
23 OMTat para. 33. See also dissenting opinion by judge Lubbe-Wolff, at paras. 11-14.
24 For a further analysis, see Eva Julia Lohse, Die "Entscheidungserheblichkeit" gemif] Art. 267 Abs. 1 AEUV als
Instrument des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Steuerung von Vorabentscheidungsersuchen, 4 DER STAAT 633,647-
52 (2014).
25 See dissenting opinion by judge Lubbe-Wolff, OMTat para.12. Similarly, see Franz C. Mayer, Zurackzur
Rechtsgemeinschaft: Dos OMT-Urteil des EuGH, NJW 1999, 2002 (2015).
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the Opinion of the Advocate General, has not chosen the way of inadmissibility, stating
that the question was not purely fictitious or hypothetical.26
As the CJEU claims that preliminary rulings are not tools to raise hypothetical or theoretical
questions,27 and as it does not rule on the requirements of national law, the determination
of "relevance" lies solely in the hands of the national courts.
"Relevance" must therefore be defined from the point of view of the pertinent national
provisions. Under German constitutional law, the question about the validity of a provision
is relevant to the outcome when the case would have been decided differently depending
on whether the provision was valid or not. As in the Article 267 TFEU proceedings, the
CJEU also adjudicates on the interpretation of primary and secondary EU law, "relevance"
needs to be defined more widely: it has to take into account whether the outcome of the
case depends on the interpretation of the EU provision in question.
(3) Third, the use or misuse of discretion can hardly be controlled, either from the
domestic level or from the Union level. For example, within Germany, the BVerfG is the
highest court. Unlike rulings by non-constitutional courts, its rulings cannot be reviewed.
Control by the CJEU is reduced to "misuse" and to the situation of "wrong referral" (that is,
the CJEU can reject a preliminary reference when its decision is not necessary).2 By
contrast, in the situation of a non-referral by a national court, the European Commission
would need to initiate an infringement procedure, a measure admissible under EU law, but
not used so far given the assumption that enforcement of Article 267(3) TFEU would stunt
29
cooperative behavior by domestic courts.
For the BVerfG, the decision of the CJEU is thus relevant either when it directly or indirectly
influences the interpretation of a provision in the Grundgesetz in accordance with EU
law,o or when the BVerfG needs the CJEU to decide whether the statute brought before
the BVerfG is determined by EU law in a way that the Grundgesetz may not serve as a
standard of review. The first situation concerns ultra vires acts and such provisions harming
26 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutcher Bundestag, paras. 18-31 (June 16, 2015), http://cura.europa.eu
[hereinafter OMT Decision].
27 See LUIGI MALFERRARI, ZURUCKWEISUNG VON VORABENTSCHEIDUNGSERSUCHEN DURCH DEN EuGH 163 (2002).
28 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw 488 (2011); Bernhard Wegener, Art. 267, in EUV/AEUV KOMMENTAR mar.
no. 23 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Rufferteds., 4th ed. 2011; BERNHARD SCHIMA, DAS
VORABENTSCHEIDUNGSVERFAHREN VOR DEM EuGH 75 (2004).
29See also Wegener, supra note 28, at mar. no. 34.
0 See also Rainer Stormer, Vorabentscheidungsersuchen nach Art. 177 EGV durch Landesverfassungsgerichte, 52
NEUE JUSTIz 337, 339 (1998) (on the identical question about the restricted standard of review of the constitutional
courts of the Lander).
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the constitutional identity of the Grundgesetz; the second situation concerns constitutional
complaints about the violation of German fundamental rights by statutes determined by
EU law. All other questions of interpretation, concerning specific questions of EU law, must
have been raised by the non-constitutional courts and referred to the CJEU by them. This
means that these questions either cannot come before the BVerfG or cannot be reviewed
by the BVerfG, due to its limited standard of review.
IL Preliminary Rulings as a Primary Task of Non-Constitutional Courts
1. Exhaustion of all Remedies Before a Constitutional Complaint
The most commonly used action before the BVerfG is the individual constitutional
complaint: in 2013 alone, 6477 of 6686 proceedings were Verfassungsbeschwerden.31 This
explains why there are so few opportunities for a preliminary reference by the BVerfG.
Aside from the nature of cases concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law and the
restricted jurisdiction of the BVerfG in general, under German law all remedies before the
non-constitutional courts must be exhausted before an individual constitutional complaint
can be filed (§ 90(2) Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (Statute on the organization of the
Constitutional Court, henceforth: BVerfGG)). Other than the ultra vires and "identity"
review, the BVerfG only reviews German statutory law transposing EU secondary law as a
court in the meaning of Article 276(3) TFEU.32 And even in the case of ultra vires review,
33
where the BVerfG maintains that a preliminary reference is necessary, usually a non-
constitutional court will already have referred the question concerning the validity of the
EU law as the basis for its decision to the CJEU. 3 4 This conforms to the attribution of
competences between the BVerfG and non-constitutional courts.3s
Preliminary references are thus left to the courts deciding on non-constitutional matters
(Fachgerichtsbarkeit). This seems wise, as they will be confronted by specific questions on
the interpretation and application of EU law, whereas the BVerfG can only rule on the
interpretation of the Grundgesetz. However, it does not explain why the BVerfG did not
refer questions about the validity of the Data Retention Directive to the (then) ECJ, as in
31 See http://www.bverfg.de/organisation/gb2013/A-1-4.html.
32 See Lohse, supra note 24, at 6.
3 Lissabon at para. 353; Honeywell at 304; Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 308; OMTat paras. 27-29.
34 This was the case in Honeywell at para. 308, where the BVerfG cites Case C-144/04, Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. I-
9981, paras. 77-78.
Gabriele Britz, Verfassungsrechtliche Effektuierung des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1313, 1317 (2012).
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this rare case a direct constitutional complaint concerning statutory law had been
admissible under Section 90(2) 1 BVerfGG.
2. Control of the Non-Constitutional Courts by the BVerfG
Still, the BVerfG obviously considers preliminary rulings to be a useful instrument of
European integration and a safeguard of EU fundamental rights,37 as it protects the
efficient use of Article 267 TFEU by non-constitutional courts as part of its "cooperation"
with the CJEU by a very effective mechanism. First, the CJEU is considered "lawful judge"
under Article 101(1) GG (guarantee of the "lawful judge" for every citizen): if a court in the
meaning of Article 267(3) TFEU does not refer to the CJEU, the claimant can exact a
preliminary ruling by the means of a constitutional complaint.39 Second, the BVerfG only
hears references in concrete judicial review (Article 100 GG) about the validity of a German
statute implementing EU law if the referring non-constitutional court had referred the
questions about the margin of implementation and the goals of the directive, the
interpretation of conflicting EU primary law, or the validity of the EU directive to the
CJEU. 40
This keeps the dialogue between courts alive, apart from specifically constitutional
questions. At the same time, this may lead to tension whenever the implementation of the
preliminary ruling by the non-constitutional court does not conform to German
fundamental rights.41 The unsuccessful party might file a constitutional complaint, claiming
that the German court had disregarded his or her fundamental rights. The BVerfG would
then, save a case of ultra vires, have to decide on the EU-consistent interpretation of the
Grundgesetz and be in a situation where it might refer the question on the interpretation
of the pertinent provision in EU law to the CJEU. It can be claimed that constitutional
courts should not indirectly review statutory law against the standard of EU law by means
36 The same can be said about other proceedings: the prohibition of an "unconstitutional" political party (NPD),
while it does also run for elections for the European Parliament (104 BVERFGE 214 (218)). See Franz C. Mayer, Dos
Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Verpflichtung zur Vorlage an den Europdiischen Gerichtshof, EUROPARECHT 239,
254 (2002); a constitutional complaint concerning a German statute on the prohibition of the trade with
dangerous dog breeds (Kampfhunde at para. 154), see Bergmann, supra note 3, at 626; a statute establishing a
state monopoly on gambling premises, see Winner Wetten.
Britz, supra note 35, at 1316.
See also Bergmann, supra note3, at 626.
For example, 82 BVerfGE 159 (195-96); BVerfG, EuGRZ 520 (2004).
40 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) [BVERFG], Oct. 4, 2011, Case No. 1 BvL 3/08; see also
85 BVerfGE 191, (203-04) (the non-constitutional court has to decide whether a German statute is inapplicable
due to its non-conformity with EU law. If it is not sure, it has to refer the question to the CJEU).
41 Similarly, GUISEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE's LEGAL SYSTEMS 80-81 (2012).
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42
of EU-law-consistent interpretation, as it is not their standard of review. Yet, on the other
hand, the constitutional court must not apply its domestic standard of review in a way that
violates EU law.
In Winner Wetten,43 in any case, the BVerfG would have been able to raise the question of
whether a transitional period for the nullity of a statute under Section 78 BVerfGG was in
conformity with Article 4(3) TEU. However, it maintained-formally correct, but not
pertinent in this case-that it does not rule on the conformity of statutory law with EU law,
and did not even discuss a preliminary reference. It thus required a referral by an
administrative court in order to clarify that a transitional period violates EU law.44
1/. Preliminary References and Ultra Vires Acts
1. A Relationship of Cooperation with the CJEU
Preliminary references are connected to the ultra vires control of EU law. Dating back to
the decisions Solange // and Bananenmarktordnung, and confirmed in Maastricht, the
BVerfG does not hear constitutional complaints on violations of German fundamental
rights by secondary EU law as long as the standard of protection within EU law is
comparable to that under German law and as long as those acts are not ultra vires,
meaning that the EU has respected their attribution of competences in the Treaties. More
recent case law confirms that an ultra vires act does not need to be applied by German
public bodies, as do such acts violating the "identity" of the Grundgesetz, that is, the
"immutable" and hence "integration-safe" core of the German constitution as guaranteed
by Article 23(1) in connection with Article 79(3) GG. 45
The assumed competence of a domestic court to review EU law against the standard of
Article 5(1) TEU ("limited attribution of powers") or the immutable core of the domestic
constitution (Article 79(3) GG) poses legal problems: the supremacy of EU law, its uniform
application, and the exclusive competence of the CJEU to set aside secondary law, a
competence stemming from Articles 263 and 267 TFEU. Stressing its "friendliness" towards
EU law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit), the BVerfG uses the tool of preliminary references to
protect the cooperation with the CJEU, which is vested with a capacity to interpret EU law
in the last resort (Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU). An EU act can only be declared ultra
42 See Stormer, supra note 30, at 340.
43 Winner Wetten at 298.
44 Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten, 2010 E.C.R. 1-8015, paras. 59-61.
45 Lissabon at 353; Honeywell at 301-03; Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 307; OMT at para. 22.
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vires, or a violation of the "identity" of the Grundgesetz be stated by the BVerfG, if a
preliminary ruling on the question has been sought. 47 The latter can, obviously, be
effectuated by the BVerfG or-according to the attribution of powers-by a non-
constitutional court.
2. Non-Determination of Implementing Domestic Law by Ultra Vires Acts
As the claim of ultra vires can be used by individual complainants to obtain a decision on
the conformity of implementation acts with the Grundgesetz, it offers judicial protection
48
against German statutes determined by EU law. Commonly, the BVerfG does not review
statutory law implementing EU secondary law, as it would otherwise indirectly render EU
law subject to the Grundgesetz. If the secondary act is ultra vires, though, supreme EU law
no longer determines German statutory law, which can therefore be measured against the
standard of the Grundgesetz. This requires a preliminary reference, which, surprisingly, the
BVerfG rejected in the decision on the Data Retention Directive. It considered the question
of the validity of the Directive to be irrelevant to the issue, because the Directive allowed
for a margin of implementation, which could have been used in conformity with the
Grundgesetz.49
Apparently, the BVerfG did not want to initiate a preliminary reference, as one could very
well argue that it had no capacity to decide on the limits of the margin, and on whether an
implementation in accordance with fundamental rights would also conform to the goals of
the Directive. Unlike the decision in Honeywell,s0 which concerned litigation between
private parties before the labor courts, in the case of the Data Retention Directive and its
implementation by the Telekommunikationsgesetz (Act on Telecommunication), a diffuse
review of EU law by a non-constitutional courts1 had not been effectuated, as there are no
remedies against acts of Parliament before the non-constitutional courts. Consequently,
whereas the denial of another reference in Honeywell was correct, in the case of the Data
46 Walter, supra note 4, at 184. Jurisdiction in these matters lies solely with the BVerfG. See Gunter Hirsch,
Europdiischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?, NJW 2457, 2461
(1996).
47 Honeywell at 303; Lissabon at 354 (about the "EU-friendliness" and-simultaneously-the power of the BVerfG
to decide in the last resort on ultra-vires-acts and on safeguarding the "identity" of the Grundgesetz in the course
of European integration). "Identity-control" also requires a preliminary reference. See OMT at para. 27; see also
Franz C. Mayer & Maya Walter, Die Europarechtsfreundlichkeit des BVerfG nach dem Honeywell-Beschluss, JURA
532, 540-41 (2011).
48 Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 306-07; Honeywell at 299.
49 Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 308-09.
5o Honeywell at 304.
51 For the term of "diffuse control of norms" (diffuse Normenkontrolle), see WIESER, supra note 7, at 121-24.
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Retention Directive it appears that extra-legal and political reasons have presumably
played a role in the reluctance of the BVerfG to refer.
IV. Shielding Fundamental Rights from European Influences?
According to Solange 11, Bananenmarktordnung, and Maastricht, the BVerfG accepts the EU
standard of protection of fundamental rights and sees no need to review EU secondary law
or German statutes determined by EU law as long as the standard of protection in general
is equivalent to that of the Grundgesetz. Yet, in concreto it does not seem to trust this
standard of protection. In cases concerning fundamental rights, the BVerfG seemingly tries
to shield the fundamental rights of the Grundgesetz and their (assumed) higher level of
protection from the influences of the EChFR.
s2Formally, German fundamental rights apply as a standard of review when either the
statute is not determined by EU law or when the determining EU act is void. As only the
CJEU can define the scope and validity of EU law,ss in both cases the BVerfG would have to
make a preliminary reference and would not be able to decide on these questions
autonomously.
Likewise, the BVerfG cannot review statutory law against the standard of the EChFR.
However, when Article 51(1) EChFR applies, it means that all state bodies are bound by
supreme EU law and that even fundamental rights in the domestic constitutions have to be
interpreted in accordance with the EChFR. Although Article 53 EChFR safeguards a higher
standard of protection in the Member States, thus far it remains unclear how the CJEU
would interpret this provision when the correct implementation of a directive is at stake.54
The BVerfG seems not to want to take the risk of a prevailing duty to implement drawn
from Article 288 TFEU or other treaty provisions. Unlike constitutional courts like the
52 Similarly, Bergmann, supra note 3, at 626; Mayer, supra note 36, at 245.
5 The standards in CILFIT (Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415), ZuckerfabrikSbderdithmarschen (Case C-143/88, 1991
E.C.R. 1-415), and Foto Frost (Case 314/85, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, para. 11) do also apply to the BVerfG. It has,
however, never made clear whether it considers itself as a court of last instance in the meaning of Art. 267(3)
TFEU or as a court simply permitted, but not obliged to refer, as it does not perceive itself as a court of instance,
but a specialized constitutional court (see Mayer, supra note 36, at 250-51). As, on the other hand, it has
recurred to the principles laid down in CILFIT (id. at para. 16) and to the doctrine of acte clair in BVerfG, 2 BvR
2/13 et al., Decision of 26 February 2014 (3%-Threshold), www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen, paras. 40-44, and
Antiterrordatei at para. 90, it seems to justify a deviation from the obligation to refer under TFEU Article 267(3).
See also Feige, supra note 9, at 534.
54 But see Case C-399/11,Melloni, EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (EuZW) 305, 308 (2013), paras. 55
ff., which gives rise to doubts, whether higher national standards can persist against supreme EU law despite the
wording of Art. 53 EChFR.
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Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court)ss the BVerfG thus does not try to
mold the European legal order by preliminary rulings on Article 52(4) EChFR or specific
European fundamental rights, but rather declares the question to be outside the scope of
EU law. In order to do so, it uses two different causes: the "non-relevance" of EU law for
the outcome of the case, implicitly stating that German constitutional law suffices to
resolve the case, and the use of "acte clair," saying that the interpretation of EU law is so
obvious that a referral is not needed.
1. The Verdict of "Non-Relevance" of EU Law
The most prominent example of this approach is the decision on the Data Retention
Directive, where a reference concerning the validity of the Directive seemed to be called
for considering the unsatisfying ruling in Ireland v. European Parliamentss and given that it
was one of the rare cases where there was no non-constitutional court able to refer. The
claimants had explicitly asked for a preliminary reference in order to quash the directive
and obtain a full review of the statute under the Grundgesetz.s7 The BVerfG simply
declared the validity of the Directive as not "relevant" to the case, as the directive allowed
for an implementation in conformity with the Grundgesetz and it was only the German
Parliament that had chosen the "wrong" implementation.sa It could therefore easily apply
its perceived higher standard of Articles 2(1), 1(1) GG on "informational self-
determination" and "data protection". Now that the decision in the Seitlinger case has
been rendered, one may doubt whether the perception of higher domestic standards was
correct: whereas the BVerfG only found the concrete implementation by the Bundestag to
be in breach of Articles 2(1), 1(1) GG, the CJEU declared data retention in general to be
illegal.59 A reference would have clarified this at an earlier stage, and would have
contributed to the protection of fundamental rights at the EU level.
" Case C-594/12, Seitlinger, 2013 7-80J C 79, preliminary question 2.4. The AG has determined these questions
as being unimportant, as long as a breach of EU fundamental rights can be stated (Opinion of Advocate General
Cruz Villal6n at para.29, Joint Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd./Minister for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Seitlinger, (Apr. 8, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/). In its
ruling on 8 April 2014, the CJEU likewise did not answer these questions as it found the directive to be in non-
conformity with the EChFR (Digital Rights Ireland, Joint Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, at para. 72).
Case C-301/06, Ireland/Parliament and Council, 2009 E.C.R. 1-593, para. 57.
Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 307.
5 Id. at 309.
See also Alexander Rognagel, Neue Majpstabe for den Datenschutz in Europa - Folgerungen aus dem EuGH-
Urteil zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 372, 375 (2014); Jurgen Kuhling, Der Fall der
Vorratsdatenspeicherungsrichtlinie und der Aufstieg des EuGH zum Grundrechtsgericht, NVwZ 681, 685 (2014);
Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, Anmerkung zum Urteil des Europaischen Gerichtshofs vom 8.4.2014 zur
Vorratsdatenspeicherung, DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 608, 609 (2014).
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Nonetheless, this reluctance in matters of fundamental rights also becomes evident in
60
other cases. For example, in the decision on trade with dangerous dog breeds, the
BVerfG shielded its favored interpretation of the freedom to own property (Article 14 GG)
and of profession (Article 12 GG) and the principle of equality (Article 3 GG) from an
interpretation in the light of the EU freedom of movement of goods under Article 34 TFEU
by implicitly declaring the question to be irrelevant to the outcome of the case. And in
Winner Wetten, it ruled that even if state monopolies for lotteries breached EU
fundamental freedoms, and would therefore be inapplicable due to the supremacy of EU
law, the BVerfG may exclusively rule on the conformity of state monopolies with the
Grundgesetz.6 An inapplicable statute is still a lawful restriction of domestic fundamental
rights, and an answer of the CJEU was, once again, not necessary.
2. Interpretation of EU Law as Acte Clair
In the most recent case on the thresholds required for the entry of political parties into the
European Parliament, the BVerfG refers to the doctrine of acte clair in order to refrain
from making a preliminary reference in the context of a restriction on the freedom to vote
and the equality of political parties (Articles 38(1) and 3 GG) in favor of the functioning of
the European Parliament.62
Finally, in Antiterrordatei, the BVerfG had to determine whether a German statute on the
collection of data of terror suspects would fall under the scope of Article 51(1) EChFR. The
BVerfG considered it acte clair that the German statute did not "implement" EU law,
because it neither transposed a directive, nor was there any other obligation under EU law
63demanding or prohibiting such a database. Considering the excessive interpretation of
"implementation" in Akerberg Fransson,64 the BVerfG clearly protects the exclusive
applicability of German fundamental rights. Furthermore, it refrains from making a
preliminary reference, because - according to its own case-law - it would only have to
refer if it was an ultra vires act or a violation of the identity of the Grundgesetz. By not
referring, it insinuates that the CJEU did not mean what it decided in Akerberg Fransson. At
the same time, cooperation between courts is identified as separation of the realms of
domestic and EU fundamental rights. Implicitly, again, it claims the question of EU
fundamental rights not to be relevant to the decision, as they are not applicable anyway.
6o Kampfhunde at 156.
61 Winner Wetten at 299.
62 3%-Threshold at paras. 40-44.
63 Antiterrordatei para. 90.
64 Case C-617/10, Akerberg Fransson, NVwZ 561, 562-63 (2013), para. 20.
65 Tobias Kubicki, Akerberg Fransson, DELUXE 4-5 (2013).
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2.1 OMT-A Special Situation?
After the referral in OMT, the situation seemed to have changed. The reasons for non-
referrals seemed to have vanished into thin air, and the BVerfG was apparently willing to
refer and to seek advice from the CJEU. Nonetheless, some aspects shed doubt on the
initial euphoria about this "historical decision."
a) The Facts of the Case
The OMT case was a constitutional complaint as well as an Organstreit between the
Bundestag (Parliament) and the parliamentary group Die LINKE, concerning the question of
whether the approving act of the Bundestag for government bonds bought by the ECB in
secondary sovereign bond markets would be void, as well as whether the government
and/or the Bundestag had breached their duties under the constitution by not preventing
the decision of the Council of Ministers of the EU on OMT. The legal problem was that:
(1) The EU has no competence to regulate questions of financial and economic policy of
the Member States, and the ECB is therefore restricted to actions on monetary policy by
Articles 119, 123, and 127 ff. TFEU. As the purchase of government bonds on the
secondary market in order to stabilize the domestic economies of those Euro Countries in
crisis could be interpreted as a means of economic policy, the claimants argued that there
had been an unlawful transfer of sovereign power to the EU by the German government
and an act ultra vires.
(2) As the risk of Germany's liability could not be excluded if the bonds failed, the OMTs
were also ultra vires as they amounted to a "union of liabilities" not provided for by the
monetary union of Euro Countries. The BVerfG should therefore establish a violation of
Article 38(1) GG as well as of Article 23(1) in connection with Article 79(3) GG, thus a
breach of the identity of the Grundgesetz and an unlawful transfer of competences to the
EU, leading to a duty on German state organs to refrain from such actions and,
furthermore, to an obligation to act in favor of an abolition of the Council Decisions on
OMT at EU level, for example by filing an action of nullity (Article 263 TFEU).
b) The Reasoning Behind the Referral
The BVerfG referred the question primarily not because the interpretation of Union law
was relevant for its own interpretation of the Grundgesetz. Rather, it was true to its own
standards as set out in Honeywell and other decisions. It asked the question on the
competences of the ECB for Outright Monetary Transactions and on the interpretation of
Christoph Herrmann, Luxemburg, wir haben ein Problem!, EuZW 161 (2014); Ukrow, supra note 1, at 121-22;
rather skeptical Udo Di Fabio, Karlsruhe Makes a Referral, 15 GERMAN L.J. 107 (2014).
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Articles 119, 123, and 127 ff. TFEU by the CJEU, with this being the first time when a
transgression of competences by an EU body other than the CJEU appeared clearly
palpable and had not been subject to a ruling by a non-constitutional court. For the first
time, the seemingly high barrier to assume an ultra vires act (the transgression of
competences being "blatant" and "structurally important", in the words of the BVerfG) had
67been overstepped in the (reasoned) opinion of the BVerfG. Whether or not there will be
a second time remains to be seen.
Thus, unlike in the above-mentioned situations, the BVerfG considered a decision by the
CJEU to be relevant to its own decision; for if the ECB had acted ultra vires, the Bundestag
and the Bundesbank were to be inhibited from participating in such actions and were to
take political measures to prevent such acts in the future." The BVerfG maintained that it
had the power to adjudicate both on the legal consequences of an action ultra vires for
German governmental bodies, and on whether the identity of the Grundgesetz had been
breached by the transfer of powers that enabled such an act by the ECB, even though it
had not acted ultra vires.6 Still, the question remains of whether there had not been
better occasions in the past for making a referral, which would have strengthened the
aspects of "cooperation" and "unity of EU law" .70 This considered, there may be no "wind
of change" in the halls of Karlsruhe.
Nonetheless one must remark that on the one hand, the BVerfG has no capacity to rule on
the political consequences for governmental bodies, and, on the other hand, a
constitutional complaint is only an instrument to claim positive state action, where the
Grundgesetz positively and concretely mandates such action. The BVerfG would have had
good reason to declare the complaints inadmissible,72 and the fact that it did not do so can
only be interpreted as a political action taken to exact a decision from the CJEU to show
that fundamental principles, not only of national constitutional law but also of EU law,
matter, even in times of financial crisis.73
67Di Fabio, supra note 66, at 108.
68 OMT at para. 44. Thereby the situation sketched in MAYER & WALTER, supra note 47, at 541 has apparently
materialized.
69OMTat paras. 102-03, 39.
70 Similar Di Fabio, supra note 66, at 107; Rene Brosius-Linke, Die Vorlageentscheidung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, DOV 612, 613 (2014); Matthias Wendel, Kompetenzrechtliche Grenzglinge: Karlsruhes
Ultra-vires-Vorlage an den EuGH, ZaoRV 615, 618 (2014); Herrmann, supra note 66, at 161.
7
1 See dissenting opinion by Judge Lubbe-Wolff, OMTat paras. 17-24.
72 See also Matthias Ruffert, Europarecht: Vorlagebeschluss des BVerfG zum OMT-Programm, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG
373, 374 (2014); Hillgruber, supra note 11, at 638.
71 Sebastian Muller-Franken, Anmerkung zu Vereinbarkeit des Ankaufs von Staatsanleihen durch EZB mit EU-
Recht-Vorlage an den EuGH, NVwZ 514, 515 (2014); from the point of view of domestic law, see Hillgruber,
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It is interesting to see that the CJEU does not reject the preliminary reference by using a
"strict" standard 74 and claiming a hypothetical question, because the BVerfG cannot decide
on the merits of the case. 7s A hypothetical question is posed when the answer does not
contribute to the decision. This was claimed by several other Member States in the oral
proceedings, but the CJEU maintains that there is a presumption of relevance of the case
which had not been rebutted.
The consequences for German constitutional law and procedure of the CJEU's decision on
the merits of the case remain unclear. Still, the BVerfG is not entitled under German
procedural law to directly oblige German state organs to act or to refrain from acting. It
may only, in the course of a Verfassungsbeschwerde, declare a violation of a fundamental
right. Therefore, it needs an "exit strategy" for the case at hand that the CJEU does not
follow its interpretation of Union Law. 77 So far, the BVerfG has not enunciated the
inevitable in case of an ultra vires act or a violation of the identity of the Grundgesetz: it
would be either a modification of the EU Treaties in order to allow for such action by the
ECB thereby eliminating the perceived lack of competence by the EU, or a modification of
the Grundgesetz in the limits of Article 79(3) GG in order to accommodate the "new"
competences of the ECB, or-as a last resort if neither of the above can be done and thus
78the ultra vires act persists-exit from the EU or at least the Eurogroup. Maybe the BVerfG
will also modify its standard of review for ultra vires acts, using the claim simply as a
possibility for individual claimants to exact a preliminary ruling before the CJEU.
Irrespective of the reaction of the CJEU in this particular case, both the difficulties of
constitutional procedural law and the apparent willingness of the BVerfG to overcome
them for the sake of safeguarding fundamental principles of German constitutional law,
supra note 11, at 638. Whether this will be successful can be doubted looking at the Opinion of Advocate General
Pedro Cruz Villal6n, Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/. He does not state a breach of the TFEU as long as the ECB manages to perform OMTs
under conditions where the ECB respects the requirement of transparent reasoning and of proportionality and
finds mechanisms to safeguard the conditions of free markets even when purchasing bonds on a secondary
market.
74 See MALFERRARI, supra note 27, at 182; SCHIMA, supra note 28, at 76 (general or hypothetical question or no
connection to the issue at stake).
Differently Ruffert,supra note 72, at 374.
6 OMT Decision at paras. 18-31.
7Wendel, supra note 70, at 668; Ruffert,supra note 72, at 375; Herrmann, supra note 66, at 162.
See on a similar decision by the Polish constitutional court Ziller, supra note 4, at 97. Very clearly, Ukrow, supra
note 1, at 135-39.
79 This is suggested by Mayer, supra note 25, at 2002.
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like the principle of democracy, show that there may only be a second time when the high
threshold of ultra vires is again reached by a special measure in special times of crisis. It is
valuable that a constitutional court shoulders the control of legality of acts by EU organs
where governments and parliaments were apparently unable to do so out of various
reasons and does not remain silent. But it must also be stated that the referral is not
necessarily meant to contribute to the "unity of Union law" as envisaged by Article 267
TFEU.
C. Conclusions
To conclude, it seems safe to state that the BVerfG remains reluctant to refer. Although
Germany is often said to have no doctrines of "judicial activism" and "judicial self-
restraint" in political matters, this is not true when it comes to the decisions of the BVerfG
in matters pertaining to the EU. Whereas there are clearly many situations where a
reference by a non-constitutional court has been necessary due to procedural law, there
remain specific instances in which only the BVerfG could have referred the question, but
instead interpreted "relevance to the case" in a way that enabled non-referral for extra-
legal reasons. This could also be named "judicial passivity". The only referral so far shows
that the BVerfG can also interpret the criterion of "relevance" very widely, in order to ask
questions on EU competences where this is politically intended. Neither situation
represents a contribution to the development of European law and integration.
Nonetheless, one can legitimately ask whether references by constitutional courts are
crucial in reaching the goals of preliminary rulings: Neither the unity of European law nor
effective legal protection of the individual against violations of his or her fundamental
rights seem to be in danger, as most of the relevant cases come before non-constitutional
courts in any case. Yet, as the saga of the Data Protection Directive illustrates, it is just
those few other cases that could make history-if there was a true cooperation between
the courts.
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Adjudication After the First Preliminary Reference
By Miryam Rodriguez-lzquierdo Serrano
A. Introduction: The Preliminary Reference Procedure and Fundamental Rights
Adjudication
The purpose of the preliminary reference procedure is to ensure a uniform application and
interpretation of Community law across all the Member States, including European
fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. The entry into force of the Charter has reinforced the authority of the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the field of fundamental rights adjudication. But
the Charter may also be a new source of conflicts between the jurisdiction of the CJEU and
the jurisdiction of national constitutional courts. Indeed, compliance with the indirect
rulings over national law contained in the CJEU decisions became something logical for the
national ordinary courts from the beginning of the integration process,' but it was not the
same for national constitutional courts. Most of them have always disliked the idea of
asking for the CJEU's opinion on a conflict of law involving national constitutional
2provisions. The CJEU succeeded in establishing a legal doctrine through principles of
Community law-supremacy and direct effect being the pioneers-that meant a material
Miryam Rodrfguez-lzquierdo Serrano is Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Seville, Spain. This paper is
the result of the research projects 'Changes in the constitutional action for individual appeals against violations of
fundamental rights: redefining constitutional rights and their protection by the Constitutional Court' (DER2010-
18141), with the financial support of the Spanish Science and Innovation State Department and the European
Regional Development Fund, and 'Building a European standard for the protection of Fundamental Rights: from
the Charter to the National Constitutions and the ECHR' (DER2013-41303-P), with the financial support of the
Spanish Economy and Competitiveness State Department. The arguments about protection of personal data and
freedom of speech rights on the Internet were approached during a research visit to Fordham Law School, New
York City (2012) with the financial support of the Spanish Education State Department through the Jose Castillejo
program. All the Spanish quotes included in this article have been translated by the author.
1 Joseph H. H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26(4) COMP. POL.
STUD. 510, 515 (1994).
2 Even though, as Cruz Villal6n explains, "National Constitutional Courts have made a valuable effort at
understanding and assuming the European integration dynamics without forgetting their particular commitment:
domestic constitutional review." See PEDRO CRUZ VILLALON, LA CONSTITUCION INIDITA 67 (2004). Italics come from the
original Spanish text.
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constitutionalization of the European Union (EU) law system. And for the national
constitutional courts, such an understanding of EU law made a rival of the CJEU.
Fundamental rights adjudication has, therefore, been a controversial issue between
national constitutional courts and the CJEU, especially since the Solange I ruling of the
German Constitutional Court and the Granital ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court.4
Both rulings are crucial to explain that mystic concept of judicial dialogue: a sort of
unofficial way of communication between national high courts and the CJEU. This judicial
dialogue unofficially took the place that the preliminary reference should have had in the
relation between the CJEU and the national constitutional courts, as long as those high
courts were, in general, so unwilling to accept that they should ask for a prior ruling from
another court before taking a decision.s
Of course, not all Constitutional Courts have been equally reluctant to submit preliminary
references to the CJEU, 6 but the Spanish Constitutional Court (SCC) was historically in that
reluctant group since Spain's accession to the European Communities in 1986. The SCC was
not especially argumentative in its refusal to acknowledge CJEU authority, but simply
ignored it for as long as it could. The SCC certainly admitted that EU law principles were
compatible with the Spanish Constitution (SC), 7 but it also made clear that EU law was
none of its business, arguing that it was not a constitutional issue. Judicial dialogue seemed
See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Joseph.
H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991).
4 There is a wide variety of works relating to the reactions of the German and Italian Constitutional Courts to the
doctrine of integration through law developed by the CJEU. See Juliane Kokott, Report on Germany, in THE
EUROPEAN COURTAND NATIONAL COURTs-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 77 (Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, & Joseph H. H. Weiler eds. 1998); Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional Court
and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND
NATIONAL COURTs-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 133 (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec
Stone Sweet, & Joseph H. H. Weiler eds. 1998).
See GIUSEPPE DE VERGOTTINI, OLTRE IL DIALOGOTRA LE CORTI: GIUDICI, DIRITTO STRANIERO, COMPARAZIONE 62 (2010).
Even the harder opponents of the CJEU jurisdiction have gradually changed their attitude. In the early days of
the judicial dialogue, with the Solonge and Granital rulings, it would have been unthinkable that either the
German or the Italian Constitutional Court submitted a preliminary reference to the CJEU, but they have both
finally yielded, acknowledging the CJEU's authority over EU law issues. While we were working on this paper for
the conference in memory of Gabriella Angiulli, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional
Court) made a preliminary reference to the CJEU, in February 2014. The Italian Constitutional Court had
historically been very reluctant to make a reference due to primacy issues, but it finally submitted preliminary
references in 2008. Even the French Conseil Constitutionnel did so in 2013. The Belgian Constitutional Court,
former Cour d'Arbitrage, began to submit preliminary references in 1997, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof in
1999. The Lithuanian Constitutional Court did it in 2007, only three years after the incorporation of Lithuania to
the EU.
SCC Declarations 1/1992 of 1 July and 1/2004 of 13 December. The first one made a previous constitutional
review to the Maastricht Treaty. The second one did the same with the Constitutional Treaty.
1510 Vol. 16 No. 06
The Spanish Constitutional Court
to be unnecessary for the SCC. Only in 2011 did its attitude seemingly change, when it
raised a preliminary reference to the CJEU. This was the famous Melloni case, involving an
Italian citizen who had been convicted in absentia by an Italian court and was about to be
sent back to that country through the execution of a European Arrest Warrant. The
possibility of a collision between the constitutional right to a fair trial and the obligation of
the Spanish ordinary courts under EU law to execute a European Arrest Warrant led the
SCC to send its first preliminary ruling to the CJEU. For the first time, EU law became
something of constitutional concern and it was not a coincidence that fundamental rights
were involved.
Fundamental rights adjudication is at the heart of the unsettled issue of the attitude of the
SCC towards the preliminary reference procedure. In order to explain this, a study of the
Melloni case, including the final ruling of the SCC in February 20149 and its precedents, will
lead the first part of this analysis (B). After that, in the second part of this article we will
discuss the following paradox: that the initial reluctance of the SCC to recognize the
constitutional nature of some conflicts of EU law, as well as its refusal to raise preliminary
references to the CJEU, could be eroding the authority of the SCC as the supreme
interpreter of constitutional rights (C). 10 In other words, disregarding controversies in
which EU rules and fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter are involved is not the
best choice for the SCC to keep its leading role in fundamental rights adjudication."
B. The Spanish Constitutional Court and the Preliminary Reference Procedure: From Zero
to Melloni
As earlier remarked, the SCC never liked the idea of making preliminary references to the
CJEU. For the SCC, EU law was out of its jurisdiction. That was all. To understand this
attitude of the SCC, and how it evolved from zero to Melloni, we need to start by analyzing
the links between the SCC jurisdiction and EU law.
8 Case C-399/11, Melloni, 2013 E.C.R. 2013.
S.T.S., Feb. 13, 2014 (No. 26).
10 See Pablo J. Martin Rodriguez, Tribunal Constitucional-Sentencia 26/2014, de 13 de febrero, en el recurso de
amparo 6922-2008 promovido por Don Stefano Melloni, 48 REVISTA DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO EUROPEo 603, 605
(2014).
11 So it is suggested in the interesting proposal of Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Kottmann, Carlino Antpohler,
Johanna Dickschen, Simon Hentrei, & Maja Smrkolj, Reverse Solange-Protecting the essence of fundamental
rights against EU Member States, 49.2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 489 (2012).
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1. The Jurisdiction of the Spanish Constitutional Court and European Union Law
It must be said that the old and silent refusal of the SCC to cooperate with the CJEU
through the preliminary reference procedure was not just a product of the stubbornness of
the SCC, but also a consequence of the position of the Constitutional Court in the Spanish
legal and institutional system. As is well known, the SCC is not part of the Judicial Branch,
so its functions are not directly related to the application of EU law.12 According to the
provisions of the SC, the SCC has no jurisdiction over EU law aside from the constitutional
review of international treaties established in Article 95 SC. Indeed, the SCC can be
committed either by the Government or by the Chambers of Parliament to review the
constitutionality of European Treaties that may contain stipulations contrary to the
Constitution. That has happened twice: before the ratification of the Treaty of the
European Union in 1992 and before the ratification of the European Union Constitutional
Treaty in 2004.13
Article 95 SC could have been a means for connecting the SCC to EU law. But things are not
so simple and in fact there are many situations in which the Constitutional Court can face a
controversy in which EU law is at stake.
In the first place, as in the case of some other European Constitutional Courts, the SCC has
a function of protecting the fundamental rights of individuals. This is established in Articles
53(2) and 161(1)(b) SC. This procedure of individual appeals against violations of
fundamental rights (known as "amparo") is connected with regular judicial processes. In
general,14 the appellant can only raise an amparo to the SCC after having submitted his
claim in all the previous judicial stages without success. It is through this procedure that an
individual appeal for protection against violation of fundamental rights related to EU law
can be made to the SCC: if some rule of EU law is involved in a case previously submitted to
an ordinary court and if one of the parties finds that their fundamental rights have been
disregarded by the ordinary courts, the SCC would face a controversy in which the
interpretation of EU law might be necessary to give judgment. And that is precisely what
Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is made for.
12 See Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias & Alejandro del Valle Galvez, El derecho comunitario y las relaciones entre el
Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas, el Tribunal Europeo de los Derechos Humanos y los Tribunales
Constitucionales nacionales, 2 REVISTA DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO EUROPEo 329, 354 (1997).
13 See, supra note 7.
14 Article 53.2 of the SC establishes that the individual appeal to the SCC should be a subsidiary procedure to
protect fundamental rights. The initial claims should be submitted to the courts of the Judicial Branch. The only
exception is made in Article 42 of the General Act of the Constitutional Court in relation to the resolutions of the
Parliament which have no legal force and that might violate a fundamental right. In that case, the appeal can be
directly submitted to the SCC.
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In the second place, the SCC might face a conflict involving EU law in connection with the
constitutional review of an act of the Spanish Parliament. Why not? In practice, it is not so
easy to draw the limits between constitutional and legal interpretation that are set out in
theory. And sometimes legal interpretation of an act of the Cortes Generales (Parliament)
involves or requires an interpretation of EU law. The constitutional review of an act of the
Parliament that implements a Directive is a good example.s Following Article 163 SC, this
can even happen as a consequence of a previous controversy before the courts, as long as
Article 163 SC allows and compels Spanish judges to raise constitutional references to the
SSC whenever they may have doubts regarding the constitutional conformity of an act of
the Parliament that has to be applied to rule over a case. By this means, the SCC could face
a controversy involving the application of EU law. As we will see, this is what happened in
Judgment 28/1991 of 14 February.
IL The Spanish Constitutional Court and European Union Law: A Permanent Divorce
Melloni was not the first case in which the SCC had to make a decision involving EU law. It
was only the first case in which the SCC acknowledged that the CJEU ruling was necessary
to solve the controversy and that it was up to the SCC to raise it. From 1986, the date of
Spanish accession to the Communities, to 2011, the date of the Melloni preliminary
reference, the arguments made by the SCC to avoid the jurisdiction of the CJEU were based
on the following reasoning: EU law is not a constitutional issue.
The argument of the non-constitutional relevance of EU law was settled in the SCC
Judgment 28/1991 of 14 February. It was the first time that the SCC had faced a case
involving EU law. A constitutional reference of Article 163 SC had been brought to the SCC.
It was a controversy relating to the interpretation of a Decision of the European Council
regarding the election of the members of the European Parliament. It was necessary to
clarify whether an elected member of the European Parliament could also be a member of
the Basque Parliament. The Basque Parliament claimed that a preliminary reference should
be issued, but the SCC declared that it was up to the ordinary judge, and not itself, to
submit such a reference to the CJEU. Following the Judgment 28/1991, the only way for
the SCC to get involved in interpreting EU law would be if fundamental rights as enshrined
in the Spanish Constitution were at stake. The argument that EU law was not a
constitutional issue had made its first appearance; 1 and so also had the hypothetical
exception regarding fundamental rights adjudication.
15 As the Bundesverfassungsgericht did with the Data Retention Directive and the Telecommunications Act in a
Decision (1 BvR 1299/05), Judgment of 24 January 2012. Nevertheless, the SCC had never been willing to analyze
conflicts of this kind. See MIGUEL AZPITARTE SANCHEZ, EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL ANTE EL CONTROL DEL DERECHO
COMUNITARIO DERIVADO 46 (2002).
1 S.T.S. Feb. 14, 1991 (No. 28). See CARLOS VIDAL PRADO, EL IMPACTO DEL NUEVO DERECHO EUROPEO EN LOs TRIBUNALES
CONSTITUCIONALES 183 (2004).
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During the twenty years between 1991 and 2011, the attitude of the Constitutional Court
towards EU law and the preliminary reference procedure was steady.17 This steadiness was
reflective not only of stubbornness, but also of the position of the SCC in the Spanish
constitutional system, being a logical outcome of its commitment to the Constitution and
not to EU law. The SCC always emphasized that it was for the ordinary courts, and not
itself, to lay down the facts of a controversy and to apply the laws, including EU law. This
included the possible submission of preliminary references to the CJEU.
Regarding fundamental rights adjudication within the Spanish constitutional system, the
SCC always tried to confine itself within the limits of constitutional interpretation,
especially when facing appeals against judgments of ordinary courts through the amparo
procedure. The purpose of the SCC was to avoid conflicts with the Judicial Branch, but also
to make clear that it had the last word on fundamental rights interpretation. We could say
that there has always been a sort of subliminal tension between the SCC and the ordinary
courts regarding fundamental rights adjudication, as the SCC has the power to overrule the
decisions of ordinary courts in order to protect individuals against violations of
fundamental rights.
By contrast, the SCC's perception of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was completely different. It
differed both from its perception of EU Law and from its relationship with fundamental
rights interpretation by the Spanish ordinary courts. The reason for this was a concrete
constitutional clause regarding the interpretation of fundamental rights in conformity with
international treaties. Indeed, Article 10(2) SC establishes that "provisions related to the
fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and
agreements thereon ratified by Spain." The ECHR was directly related to the functions of
the SCC, in particular as regards fundamental rights interpretation. From the same point of
view, even though for the SCC EU law and CJEU preliminary rulings would not be related
with constitutional adjudication, the SCC could have to consider them as long as a
controversy could be connected to EU law and fundamental rights interpretation. That is
the reason why, also according to Article 10(2) SC, the SCC began to use some rules of EU
law and some of the CJEU preliminary rulings as interpretive criteria in cases in which
fundamental rights adjudication was at stake and EU law was directly or indirectly
17 See Luis Maria Dfez Picazo, El derecho comunitario en la jurisprudencia constitucional espailola, 54 REVISTA
ESPANOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 255, 260 (1998); Fernando Alvarez-Ossorio Micheo, Cuesti6n de
inconstitucionalidad y derecho de la Union Europea: El Tribunal Constitucional como juez <ad quo). El caso
espailol, in RECURSO DE AMPARO, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y TRASCENDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL 116, 127 (Jose Maria
Morales Arroyo ed., 2014).
18 JAVIER PlREZ RoYo, TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL Y DIVISION DE PODERES 103 (1988).
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involved. Judgment 130/1995 of 11 September was the first case in which the SCC
acknowledged that EU law had an interpretive role regarding fundamental rights, and
Judgment 292/2000 of 30 November connected this role with the constitutional mandate
in Article 10(2). Since then, the SCC has repeated the same argument in several rulings
relating to equality and non-discrimination as understood by the CJEU case law.1 9
Notwithstanding this particularity connected to fundamental rights interpretation, the self-
rule about the non-constitutional dimension of EU law was not overruled, and it rather
allowed the SCC to stay on the sidelines of conflicts involving EU law. Such conflicts were
resolved as was necessary, but without the unwanted assistance of the CJEU, or, in other
words, without making preliminary references. The rule of separation between
constitutional law and EU law was rigidly applied. Even when an ordinary court refused to
make a preliminary reference to the CJEU, and there was a subsequent appeal against the
violation of the fundamental right to a fair trial and to obtain the effective protection of
the courts, the SCC considered that such a refusal to make a preliminary reference did not
mean an infringement of Article 24 SC (the right to a fair trial). For the SCC, the preliminary
reference was not a guarantee of the Spanish Constitution, and so it did not need to be
20
safeguarded by the Constitutional Court in an amparo procedure.
These last arguments changed in 2004, when feeble exceptions to the non-constitutional
dimension of EU law began to be admitted by the SCC. In its Judgment 58/2004 of 19 April,
the SCC unexpectedly declared that an ordinary court's judgment was void because a
preliminary reference had not been made to the CJEU. The court hearing the case had
found that an act of the Spanish parliament regulating taxation issues was contrary to EU
law. Following the primacy rule, the national law had been set aside in order to preserve
the European mandate. The SCC considered, however, that for the ordinary court to make
such a decision, either a preliminary reference to the CJEU or a constitutional reference to
the SCC through Article 163 SC would have been required. 21 The SCC found a violation of
the right to due process of law (Article 24(2) SC), and the judgment of the ordinary court
was overruled accordingly.
1 S.T.S., Dec. 20, 1999 (No. 240); S.T.S., Mar. 14, 2013 (No. 61); S.T.S., Apr. 8, 2013 (No. 71); S.T.S., June 18, 2013
(No. 116). See JAVIER PlREZ ROYOAND MANUEL CARRASCO DURAN, CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 872 (2014).
20 Dfez Picazo suggests that this argument is similar to the one that has been usually given by the SCC to
appellants who considered that a refusal by the judges to raise a constitutional reference to the SCC (Art. 163 SC)
was a violation of the right to effective protection by the courts (Art. 24 SC). Only the reasons are different for EU
law, as the SCC always stated that the preliminary reference procedure was none of its business. See DiEZ PICAZO,
supra note 17, at 262.
21 Note that, in this case, the SCC also meant to protect the fundamental concept of the submission of the judges
to the acts of the Parliament, which does not allow them to set aside the national laws without the review of the
Constitutional Court. See Paloma Biglino Campos, La primacia del Derecho comunitario: la perspectiva espaihola, 3
REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO EUROPEO 10 (2007).
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That 2004 ruling of the SCC meant a new understanding of European law by the SCC case
law and a first exception to its former doctrine. Its arguments were repeated in SCC
Judgment 194/2006 of 19 June and SCC Judgment 78/2010 of 20 October. These rulings
both shed lights and shadows on this new doctrine and specified its effects. In both cases,
the controversy was about the conformity of an act of the parliament of the Canary Islands
regulating a particular tax for that territory with the European directive for tax
harmonization. The peripheral territory of the Canary Islands was excluded from the scope
of application of the tax harmonization Directive, so the SCC declared that a preliminary
reference was not necessary and that Article 24(2) SC was not affected. EU law was not
really at stake, but it was the SCC itself that checked it, disregarding its former doctrine
about its lack of jurisdiction over EU law issues, but also avoiding a preliminary reference
to the CJEU. 22
Finally, in 2011, the SCC made the Melloni reference. After that reference, but prior to the
Melloni SCC ruling in 2014, there were two other important decisions by the SCC relating to
EU law. The first was in 2012, when the SCC ruled that the refusal of an ordinary court to
apply a CJEU decision was contrary to the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 24 SC.
Indeed, the CJEU had previously found that the Spanish law establishing a penalty was
contrary to EU law, but, after that, a Spanish court had ignored the primacy of EU law and
had applied such penalties to lberdrola, a Spanish energy company. This decision, SCC
Judgment 145/2012 of 30 July, was praised for its new understanding of the relationship
23between constitutional adjudication and EU law. It seemed to leave behind the old
doctrine of the non-constitutional relevance of EU law.
The second important decision of the SCC was Judgment 27/2013 of 11 February. There,
the SCC stated that the refusal of the Spanish Supreme Court to make a preliminary
reference according to the Cilfit doctrine24 was not an infringement of Article 24(2) SC, but
not because of the existence of the Cilfit doctrine, but because there was no Spanish law
that had to be set aside according to the primacy rule. If we compare this decision with SCC
Judgments 194/2006 and 78/2010, we can deduce that the SCC might be more interested
22 In particular, SCC Judgment 194/2006 of June 19 was strongly criticized by the experts because of its ambiguity.
See Ricardo Alonso Garcia, Cuesti6n prejudicial europea y tutela judicial efectiva (a prop6sito de las SSTTCC
54/2004, 194/2006 y 78/2010, 38 CUADERNOS DE DERECHO PUBLICO 11, 19 (2009).
23 Daniel Sarmiento, Reinforcing the (Domestic) Constitutional Protection of Primacy of EU Law: Tribunal
Constitucional, 50.3 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 875 (2013).
24 The Cilfit doctrine makes reference to the acte clair doctrine which sets the criteria for when national courts are
not obliged to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU about the matter of interpretation of EU law. Case C-
283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 1982.
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in preserving the application of national laws than in the conformity of the behavior of
ordinary courts towards the preliminary reference procedure.25
To sum up, we can say that from 2004 onwards, the attitude of the SCC towards EU law
changed, but that it did not change radically. Following the SCC Judgment 58/2004, some
constitutional law scholars suggested that the SCC was closer to accepting the submission
of preliminary references to the CJEU. They argued that this might happen when a
violation of a fundamental right occurred as a consequence of the application of a rule of
EU law, and in particular if the infringed fundamental right was of special relevance in the
26EU law system. That was precisely what happened in Melloni: The European Arrest
Warrant, a rule of EU law, had to be applied; the right of defense and to a fair trial, as
established in the Framework Decision, in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, and in Article
24.2 SC, was at stake; doubts about the meaning and validity of the provisions of EU law
acquired an indirect constitutional significance, insofar as they contributed to delimiting
the scope of the right recognized in Article 24(2) SC.27
///. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Melloni Preliminary Reference
Was it a coincidence that the SCC made its first preliminary reference following the entry
into force of the Charter in 2009? We think it was not. The Charter confers a new
dimension on the role of the CJEU as human rights adjudicator, and the constitutional
courts of the Member States, including the Spanish one, have understood it. As was earlier
explained, the SSC is bound to interpret fundamental rights according to the ECHR doctrine
because of the mandate of Article 10(2) SC. Now that the EU has a Charter of Rights, the
SCC is also bound to interpret the fundamental rights of the Charter according to the CJEU
doctrine thereon. But that is not all. When EU law and the Charter are involved, the SCC is
obliged to respect the standards of protection of rights set out in the Charter, as
interpreted by the CJEU. This is a consequence of the mandate of Article 93 SC, which
allowed the transfer of competences derived from the Constitution to the EU through the
European Treaties. EU law can no longer be considered to be a non-constitutional issue by
the SCC; and the SCC's disregard towards EU law may have come to an end with this first
preliminary reference in Melloni.28
25 This is the point of view of Joaquin Huelin Martinez de Velasco, La cuesti6n prejudicial europea.
Facultad/Obligacidn de plantearla", LA CUESTION PREJUDICIAL EUROPEA, IV EUROPEAN INKLINGS 44, 54 (2014).
26 VIDAL PRADO, supra note 16, at 188.
27 And that constitutional relevance, related with the scope of protection of a fundamental right, made the SSC
preliminary reference consistent with its former arguments about the relationship between EU law and its own
jurisdiction. Luis Arroyo Gimenez, Sobre la primera cuesti6n prejudicial planteada por el Tribunal Constitucional.
Base, contenido y consecuencias, 8 WORKING PAPERS ON EUROPEAN LAW AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 15 (2011).
28 See, supra note 8.
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When the SCC delivered its Order 86/2011 of 9 of June, making the preliminary reference,
both the Charter and a 2009 Amendment to the European Arrest Warrant Framework
Decision had just come into force. The Amendment included some specifications about
trials in absentia which were relevant to the Melloni case. As a precedent, the SCC had
delivered a controversial ruling in a similar case in which the execution of a European
Arrest Warrant (EAW) was also at stake. SCC Judgment 199/2009 of 28 of September was
the case of a Romanian citizen who had been convicted by default in his country and sent
back there by an Order of the Spanish National High Court. His lawyers appealed and the
SCC declared that the Order of the Spanish National High Court was contrary to Article
24(2) of the SC and void. As the Romanian citizen was already back in his country, the SCC
ruling did not affect the EAW application, but dissenting opinions with arguments about
the EU law implications of the case were delivered by several SCC justices. With such
precedents, and with all the normative changes that have been explained, the preliminary
reference was not a complete surprise when Stefano Melloni appealed to the SCC.
Although the facts and legal arguments of the Melloni reference are well known, we will
summarize them succinctly. The conflict was related to Framework Decision 202/584/JHA
of 13 of June 2002 on the EAW and connected to the fundamental rights to defense and to
a fair trial set out in Articles 24(2) SC and 47 and 48(2) of the Charter. Stefano Melloni was
an Italian citizen who had received an extradition order to Italy in 1996. That first
extradition order was executed by the Spanish National High Court, but Melloni escaped
and never returned to Italy, hence he was still in Spain in 2008, when a court in Ferrara
issued an arrest warrant to bring him back to Italy, where he had been convicted by
default. The arrest warrant was implemented by the Spanish National High Court in 2008,
at which point Melloni appealed to the SCC through the process of individual appeals
established for the protection of fundamental rights in Article 161(1)(b) SC.
In previous rulings, the SCC had declared that as a conviction by default entailed a violation
of Article 24(2) SC (the right to a process with all due guarantees), such a conviction in a
foreign court could justify a refusal to implement an extradition order in Spain. The
reasoning behind this was that the execution of the extradition order would amount to an
indirect violation of a fundamental right enshrined in the Spanish Constitution. But an
arrest warrant issued by an Italian court in Ferrara meant that Melloni was not a typical
case of extradition, for EU law was involved. The SCC needed to know whether Articles 47
and 48(2) of the Charter could be interpreted as preventing the implementation of an
arrest warrant when the convict had been sentenced by default in the European country
issuing the arrest warrant. If the answer to this question was to be that these provisions of
the Charter did not prevent the implementation of the arrest warrant, then, bearing in
mind Article 53 of the Charter, the SCC would need to establish which standard of
protection to apply to the case: either the higher one set out in the SC (under Article 24),
or the standard of the Charter.
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To the first question, the CJEU answered that Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter did not
prevent the implementation of an arrest warrant when the convict had been sentenced by
default. In the opinion of the CJEU, the standard of protection of the fundamental right of
defense was the result of a common decision of the Member States contained in the
Framework Decision-which certainly allowed the implementation of the arrest warrant in
such circumstances. To the second question, the CJEU answered that such a common
standard of protection would not affect a higher standard of protection in any Member
State out of the scope of application of EU law.
The Melloni precedent has been of great interest in the academic context, because it has
meant a first interpretation of the controversial Articles 51 and 53 of the Charter regarding
the scopes and levels of fundamental rights protection. But above all, Melloni has been of
great importance for the two Courts involved, the CJEU and the SCC. Together with the
29Akerberg Fransson ruling, for the CJEU these cases have turned out to be landmark ones.
Through them, the CJEU has sketched out the scope of application of the Charter when a
Member State applies EU law-something that Article 51(1) of the Charter leaves open to
interpretation. And following Article 53 of the Charter, the CJEU has also settled some
principles for the differentiation between standards of protection of fundamental rights:
the EU standard, the standards of the Member States, and the ECHR standard.30 For the
SCC, this first preliminary reference meant a long-awaited and a very necessary
acknowledgment of the constitutional dimension of some issues of EU law, leading many
scholars to think that the SCC had finally decided to play an active role in the integration-
through-law process.
But these expectations were frustrated when the SCC's final Melloni decision was delivered
on 13 February 2014. The ruling disappointed many scholars, who consider that the SCC
has not been able to accept the ultimate consequences of the ruling of the CJEU. 31 On the
contrary, some opinions blame the CJEU for the reaction of the SCC, arguing that the SCC
considered itself forced to follow the CJEU's interpretation and that the CJEU was so bold
in its ruling because the SCC was an embattled constitutional court, which was "pretty
32
much in competition with ordinary Spanish courts" rather than with the ECJ. These last
29 Case C-617/10, Akerberg Fransson (February 26, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
30 Daniel Sarmiento, Who's Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New Framework of
Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 50(5) COMMON MARKET L. REV., 1267, 1288 (2013); Pedro Tenorio
Sanchez, Di6logo entre tribunales y protecci6n de los derechos en el 6mbito europeo, 31 REVISTA GENERAL DE
DERECHO EUROPEO 16 (2013).
31 The sentence also disappointed three justices of the SCC who delivered concurrent opinions. Critics of the SCC
ruling can be found in Aida Torres Perez, Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue, 10.2 EUR. CONST. L.
REV. 308, 330 (2014). See also Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 605.
32 Leonard F. M. Besselink, The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni, 4 EUR. L. REV. 531, 551-52
(2014).
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ideas remind us of the debate about the Czech Constitutional Court following the CJEU
Landtovd ruling. Perhaps this is not the first time that the CJEU has forgotten to pay
attention to the national circumstances of some judicial controversies.
From our point of view, the legal reasoning of the SCC uses Article 10(2) SC to put the
Charter rights at the same level as the ECHR rights, and to give the rulings of the CJEU the
same efficacy as the rulings of the ECtHR when the constitutional position of EU law is
different from the constitutional position of the ECHR rights. Indeed, the SCC has appealed
to Article 10(2) SC to integrate the CJEU ruling into its own decision, instead of founding its
decision on the transfer of competences made effective through Article 93 SC. And instead
of treating Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter as the relevant rules to decide the
controversy, the SCC has used Article 24(2) SC. Finally, the SCC has reinterpreted the scope
of protection of this constitutional right in accordance with the CJEU ruling but, as a result,
this new interpretation of Article 24(2) SC is somehow in contradiction with Article 53 of
the Charter, which declares that the standards of protection of the constitutional rights of
the Member States should not be adversely affected by the coming into force of the
Charter.34 As explained, the SCC had always said that a conviction by default could justify
the denial of an extradition order, because it would be contrary to Article 24(2) SC. Only if
the conviction by default could be reviewed in the country issuing the extradition order
could the Article 24(2) SC guarantees be deemed to be respected. In its Melloni ruling, the
SCC has changed this doctrine, by ruling that Article 24(2) SC must henceforth be
interpreted according to both the doctrine of the ECHR and the doctrine of the CJEU
regarding Article 10(2) SC. This mandate of interpretation allows a Spanish court to
execute any extradition order, and not only an arrest warrant, if the convicted has at least
the representation of an attorney. Somehow, then, the guarantees of Article 24(2) have
shrunk, meaning that the interpretation of the rights of defendants under the Spanish
Constitution have narrowed.s
Three of the twelve justices of the SCC issued dissenting opinions to this Melloni ruling.
They considered that the Charter rights are of a compelling-and not merely
interpretative-nature when EU law is involved. They argued that the Melloni decision of
Case C-399/09, Marie Landtova v. eska sprava socialnfho zabezpetenf, 2011 E.C.R. 1-05573. See Ricardo
Alonso Garcia, Guardar las formas en Luxemburgo, 28 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO EUROPEO (2012); Georgios
Anagnostaras, Activation of the Ultra Vires Review: The Slovak Pensions Judgment of the Czech Constitutional
Court, 14 GERMAN L.J. 959 (2013).
34 Article 53: "Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law
and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party,
including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the
Member States' constitutions."
5 BESSELINK, supra note 32, at 533.
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the CJEU was directly related to the case, so the SCC, acting as European court, should
have applied the CJEU decision instead of unnecessarily reinterpreting Article 24(2) SC. 36
And we agree with them. From our point of view, there should be a deeper change in the
SCC understanding of a preliminary reference procedure when the scope of application of
EU law and the Charter rights are involved. The interpretation of the Charter by the CJEU
has only just begun to update the sphere of individual fundamental rights. The
Constitutional Courts, in particular the SCC, should be aware and willing to play their role
in this process of innovation.
C. The Spanish Constitutional Court and Fundamental Rights Adjudication within the
Scope of Application of EU Law
Aside from Melloni, and as long as we have only one preliminary reference from the SCC to
talk about, we cannot establish a comparison or a deeper analysis of the judicial dialogue
between the CJEU and the SCC regarding fundamental rights adjudication. What we can do
is a review of some situations that show a distance between the case law of both courts,
and from this we can try to prove the convenience that would be presented by a more
fluent dialogue between them through the preliminary reference procedure.
. Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination: Agreements and Disagreements
As has already been explained, the SCC had already appealed to the CJEU case law to solve
some controversies in which the right to equality and non-discrimination was at stake.
Article 10(2) SC allowed the SCC to follow the CJEU doctrine on equality and non-
discrimination without having to accept the constitutional relevance of EU law. Through its
Judgment 130/1995, mentioned above, the SCC declared that a Moroccan citizen who had
been working in Spain could not be excluded from unemployment benefit because of a
European Regulation that prohibited discrimination between EU citizens and Moroccan
citizens regarding social security benefits. The SCC also appealed to EU law and CJEU case
law in its Judgment 292/2000 to declare that the rules relating to the social security
benefits that discriminated against part-time workers were contrary to the equality
principle enshrined in the SC and in EU law. The same argument was held by the SCC-
36 S.T.S., Feb. 13, 2014 (No. 26). The arguments related to the interpretation of the CJEU ruling through Art. 10.2
SC are in para. 3 of the judgment. Justice Asua Batarrita criticizes such arguments in para. 1 of her dissenting
opinion: "[T]he judgment of the Court avoids the central issues [related to the function and protection of the
rights of the Charter]. Instead, it holds to a previous constitutional doctrine through which the Court had
repeated that European law is not a constitutional issue, that the SCC has not the function of guaranteeing the
application of Union law and that European law would only be relevant regarding article 10.2 SC, this is, in
relation with the interpretation of the scope of application of the constitutional fundamental rights." The
Judgment has not been published in the Official Gazette yet, but it can be consulted on the SCC website.
3 Arguments repeated by the SCC in its Judgments 253/2004, 61/2013, 71/2013 and 116/2013.
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240/1999-for a female public employee who was demanding leave to look after her
children.
But some contradictions between the CJEU and the SCC doctrines on this fundamental
right to equality and non-discrimination were also detected. For example, there were
particular CJEU judgments on equality and non-discrimination which slightly contradicted
the SCC doctrine thereon. As an example, in Cordero Alonso v. Fondo de Garantia Salarial,
the CJEU stated that the supremacy of EU law was at stake even though the SCC had
previously ruled over the constitutional conformity of a national rule that happened to be
applicable to a case before the CJEU. The SCC conception of Article 14 SC (the right to
equality) was in slight contradiction with the right to equality as developed in EU law. And,
in such a situation, EU law interpretation was to prevail even if it contradicted a previous
SCC ruling. This same argument was repeated by the CJEU in 2010 when it delivered its
ruling on Francisco Javier Rosado Santana v. Consejeria de Justicia yAdministraci6n Publica
de la Junta de Andalucia.39
This kind of misunderstanding between the CJEU and the SCC in relation to fundamental
rights adjudication is not convenient. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Charter
could lead to more disagreements between the courts if the SCC does not use the
preliminary reference procedure as a logical mechanism of collaboration with the CJEU.
The interpretation of the Charter rights by the CJEU has a direct impact on the
interpretation of the SC rights, as the Melloni case makes clear. The CJEU has ultimate
authority over the interpretation of Charter rights whenever EU law is at stake, regardless
of the national court involved in the particular controversy. And the SCC has ultimate
authority over the rights set out in the Constitution, including the margin of appreciation,
acknowledged by the ECHR, and the national standards, acknowledged by the Charter. If
the SCC refuses to establish a dialogue with the CJEU on fundamental rights standards, its
ultimate authority will be eroded, because the ordinary courts will assume the leading role
in that task. The case of data protection is an example of this.
IL Data Protection: A Bit of Disregard
Data protection is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 18(4) SC. Since its early
decisions on Article 18(4), the SCC has stated that protection of personal data is not only a
guarantee for privacy and reputation (as set out in the wording of Article 18(4)), but a
See supra note 19.
Case C-81/05, Cordero Alonso v Fondo de Garantfa Salarial (Fogasa), 2006 E.C.R. 1-07569. See Fernando
Alvarez-Ossorio Micheo, El sistema multinivel de protecci6n de Derechos Fundamentales. Un an6lisis desde la
Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Union Europea, in LA UNION EUROPEA EN PERSPECTIVA CONSTITUCIONAL 113, 118
(Ana M. Carmona Contreras ed., 2008). See also Case C-177/10, Francisco Javier Rosado Santana v Consejerfa de
Justicia y Administraci6n P~blica de la Junta de Andalucia, 2011 E.C.R. 1-07907.
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separate fundamental right with its own particular features. 4 0 Notwithstanding these
statements, the SCC doctrine on data protection has always been somewhat confusing,
connecting, as it does, infringements of protection of personal data with infringements of
privacy or of the right to personal image, both of which are established in Article 18(1) SC.
As these rights almost always absorb the Article 18(4) right, the SCC has never identified
the particular European features of data protection and it has never turned to the CJEU
case law on this right.41
On the one hand, following the SCC doctrine, EU law was not a constitutional issue while
data protection was just a constitutional one, even though Directive 95/46/EC regulated
data protection for all Member States. On the other hand, although the SCC was bound to
interpret fundamental rights in accordance with international Treaties ratified by Spain
(under Article 10(2) SC), protection of personal data was not considered to be a
fundamental right in any international Treaty other than the Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Number 108 of the
Council of Europe. For all these reasons, the SCC doctrine never paid attention either to
the European dimension of data protection or to the CJEU case law. Only in some
decisions-and only as one argument among others-did the SCC indirectly mention the
European origins of data protection. Moreover, in some decisions, the SCC mentioned this
fact so as to refuse the constitutional dimension of the Directive on data protection, 42in
keeping with its well-known doctrine about the non-constitutional relevance of EU law.
On several occasions, the SCC has also refused to submit preliminary references on data
protection issues. The first one came in a controversy relating to the implementation by
the Spanish Government of the tax identification number. The appellants argued that such
identification numbers were contrary to the right to privacy and the right to protection of
personal data under the Spanish Constitution. They also asked the SCC to make a
40 See SCC Judgment 254/1993 of 20 July, the very first case about protection of personal data decided by the SCC.
41 See as examples SCC Judgments 11/1998 of 13 January; 202/1999 of 8 November; 144/1999 of 22 July or
159/2009 of 29 June. The exception could be SCC Judgment 29/2013 of 11 February, in which the pictures of an
employee recorded by a security camera were not treated as right to personal image, but as right to protection of
personal data. The relationship between privacy and personal data as fundamental rights in the Spanish
constitutional doctrine is studied in PABLO LUCAS MURILLO DE LA CUEVA, EL DERECHO A LA AUTODETERMINACION
INFORMATIVA: LA PROTECCION DE LOS DATOS PERSONALES FRENTE AL USO DE LA INFORMATICA 26 (1990); Francesc de Carreras
Serra, El derecho fundamental a la protecci6n de datos personales, in LOS NUEVOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALEs 65, 69
(2007); or EMILIO GUICHOT REINA, DATOS PERSONALES Y ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA 164 (2005).
42 The Directive was obviously taken into account in SCC Judgment 292/2000 of 30 November, in which the SCC
had to decide about the constitutionality of General Act 15/1999 of 13 December. In other decisions, the SCC had
just mentioned the Directive indirectly and together with a reference to the Covenant 108 of the Council of
Europe. See as examples SCC Judgments 202/1999 of 8 November and 79/2009 of 23 March. In its Judgment
29/2013 of 11 February, the SCC only mentions the Directive after having made reference to the General Act and
to the regulations which implement it in the Spanish system of law.
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preliminary reference to the CJEU, as they found that some EU law principles were
involved, namely those linked to protection of reputation and privacy and some others
relating to certainty and the rule of the law. Directive 95/46/EC and the Charter had not
yet been issued, and so the SCC replied to these arguments that there were no specific
regulations in EU law at that moment against which to interpret the rights of the
Constitution regarding Article 10(2) SC. The Court also made its well-known argument that
EU law was not the object of its jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition of the appellants to
make a preliminary reference was deemed inadmissible.43
Some years later, the SCC had a new opportunity to consider submitting a preliminary
reference in relation to data protection. An appellant to the SCC argued that the inclusion
of his personal data in a catholic baptism register was contrary to his right to protection of
personal data. He had formerly applied for the erasure of his data from the record, but had
received a negative answer. For the Spanish Supreme Court, as these books of baptisms
were not considered a filing system, the appellant's claim could not be considered an
44infringement of his right to protection of personal data. This argument was in fact an
interpretation of the scope of application of the Directive. A justice of the Spanish Supreme
Court delivered a dissenting opinion arguing that a preliminary reference should be made
to the CJEU in relation to the conflict.4 5 However, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Constitutional Court made the preliminary reference. The SCC affirmed the decision of the
Supreme Court through its Order 20/2011 of 28 of February, disregarding the possibility of
a reference and notwithstanding the important issues related to the scope of application
of the Directive and its connection to the right to protection of personal data. In contrast
with the former case about the tax identification number, the Charter was already in force
when this case was raised to the SCC. And, as a matter of fact, the SCC had even to
interpret the provisions of the General Law of Protection of Personal Data,46 meaning that
it had to interpret the Directive and, consequently, to rule on the application of EU law. On
the one hand, the doctrines of direct and indirect effect of EU law are accurate in such
controversies, meaning that disregarding the Directive could have meant an infringement
of the Treaty. On the other hand, the SCC was in fact interpreting EU law - something that
the SCC itself considered to fall outside its jurisdiction. Too many contradictions were left
unresolved.
43 S.T.S., May 9, 1994 (No. 143). Anyway, Dfez Picazo considers that it would have been absurd to send a
preliminary reference on this issue, as the Directive had not been enacted yet. DiEZ PICAZO, supra note 17, at 262.
44 T.S. Sept. 19, 2008 (Sec. 3).
45 The same opinion is in Pedro Tenorio Sanchez, Tribunal Constitucional y Cuesti6n Prejudicial ante el Tribunal de
Justicia de la Union Europea, 7520 DIARIO LA LEY 1 (2010).
46 Another example is SCC Judgment 96/2012 of 12 June, a very interesting case about disclosure of personal data
to a third party in preliminary proceedings in the course of a private law action.
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In the aftermath of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the situation is different.
Article 8 of the Charter declares that the protection of personal data is an EU fundamental
right; the TFEU includes, in Article 16, a legal basis to regulate this right within the scope of
EU law; the European Commission has proposed a General Data Protection Regulation; 47
and Spanish ordinary courts have submitted several preliminary references to the CJEU
relating to data protection. In 2010, shortly after the entry into force of the Charter, the
Spanish Supreme Court submitted two preliminary references to the CJEU relating to the
interpretation of the Directive and the balancing of the rights to privacy and protection of
481personal data. In 2011, it was the National High Court that made a preliminary reference
of particular interest, Google Spain, not only concerning data protection, but also the
fundamental rights to freedom of expression and information. The ruling of the CJEU,
delivered in May 2014,49 deduced a new right to be forgotten from Articles 7 (privacy) and
8 (data protection) of the Charter. Consequently, search engines such as Google are
required to remove, upon request by a data subject, certain information from the list of
results displayed when introducing that data subject's name. In granting this right to be
forgotten, the CJEU held that the right to privacy will outweigh both the interests of
internet users, their right to obtain information, and Google's economic interest. This is a
fairly bold statement, in acknowledging the primacy of the privacy right over freedom of
information and freedom to conduct a business.50 It is a concrete result of a balancing of
rights which could be extended to similar conflicts and give rise to a general doctrine.
The preliminary reference in this case has set a precedent that would be very difficult to
object to if the SCC happens to face a similar controversy. It contains an extensive
interpretation of the right to protection of personal data and a balancing between that
47 COM (2012) 11 final of 25 January 2012, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data (General Data Protection Regulation). The Commission's draft and the information about the legislative
procedure can be found in Pre-Lex database (http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=es).
48 Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asnef and Fecemd, 2011 E.C.R. 1-12181.
49 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. AEPD, (May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/. The case involved a Spanish
citizen, Mario Costeja, who contacted Google with the following demand: each time his name and surnames were
entered in the search engine, a link to a newspaper of 1998 appeared and he wanted that link to be erased. The
information in question was a note about a real-estate auction connected with attachment proceedings
prompted by social security debts. The data subject, Costeja, was mentioned as the owner of the real-estate. All
the information was true and it came from an official source, so no objection could be made in relation to the
newspaper publication, covered by the exception of Article 9 of the Directive in relation to journalistic purposes.
But the data subject argued that the particular proceedings recounted in the newspaper had been concluded
years before and were not of relevance or public interest in 2010. The fact that his name appeared connected to
that ancient judicial process affected his fundamental rights, in particular his right to reputation in connection
with his right to protection of personal data, so he claimed a right to be forgotten to be included as a
consequence of Art. 8 ECFR. This case was crucial in defining balancing criteria in a really up-to-date conflict of
fundamental rights.
5o Hannah Crowther, Google v. Spain: Is There a Right to be Forgotten?, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 892, 893 (2014).
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right and those rights relating to freedom of expression and electronic communications. In
the light of such a ruling, and following the SCC's own doctrine in Melloni, the SCC has no
choice but to take into account the CJEU criteria. Article 10(2) of the SC compels it to do so.
Moreover, it seems that the ultimate arbiter in conflicts of this kind will be the CJEU, and
that the ordinary courts will be the counterparts in the judicial dialogue.s" If the SCC is left
out of this, its authority as the ultimate guarantor of fundamental rights within the Spanish
system will be in danger.
D. Final Considerations
The SCC would be wise to take an active role in the development of the standards of
protection of the Charter rights. These standards will, of course, be drawn up by the CJEU,
but the preliminary reference procedure will be the instrument for defining such
standards, and the SCC should take part in this task. Issuing a single preliminary reference,
as the SCC has done with Melloni, will not be enough; the interpretation made by the SCC
of the CJEU Melloni rule is not enough. The Melloni reference could have led to the
beginning of a new relationship between the SCC and the CJEU, but such a relationship is
still a long way off. The entry into force of the Charter is a very important landmark and the
SCC should take advantage of the new situation. Given the shared competence between
both Courts on fundamental rights adjudication, the SCC might need the CJEU opinion on
matters regarding some fundamental rights, especially those which are, remarkably, within
the scope of competence of EU law as well as within the scope of protection of the Spanish
Constitution. Cooperation is the best choice for the SCC.
Indeed, the SCC would be best understanding that following the CJEU ruling in a
preliminary reference related to the interpretation of the Charter, when EU law is directly
involved, is never going to weaken its role as ultimate guarantor of fundamental rights. On
the contrary, the SCC should consider the Charter as a new field for the definition of the
European citizen's fundamental rights and it should find its role in such a task.52 If the SCC
does not accept this role, some other national courts will. And then the role of the SCC as
ultimate guarantor of fundamental rights will be weakened, and the preliminary reference
procedure will be the main cause for its weakening.
Since 1980, the SCC case law has been a crucial element in the implementation of a
doctrine of fundamental rights in Spain. After forty years of an authoritarian regime, a
5 We make reference to the article of Mattias Kumm in which he suggests that there should not be a final arbiter,
but rather collaboration between the CJEU and the Constitutional Courts, in particular the German one, in a
pluralist conception of European constitutionalism. See Mattias Kumm, Who Is the Final Arbiter of
Constitutionality in Europe?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 351 (1999).
52 Sarmiento, supra note 30, at 1299. The identification of the rights of the Charter with European citizenship is
analyzed in VON BOGDANDY, supra note 11.
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fundamental rights doctrine was something new and a challenge for the Spanish judiciary.
The SCC has also been very active in the implementation of the ECHR doctrine in Spain.
References to the ECHR case law, which are mandatory through Article 10(2) SC, became
usual in the SCC judgments and the Spanish courts and judges have learned to use those
references to protect fundamental rights. As has been explained in this article, the SCC,
through its case law, has also reinforced the obligation of the ordinary courts to make
preliminary references to the CJEU when a national rule could be set aside as a
consequence of the application of the primacy principle. Finally, in a sentence delivered
after Melloni, SCC Judgment 50/2014 of 14 April, the SCC declared that the case law of the
CJEU has to be taken into account by ordinary courts when ruling over controversies in
which some judgment of that court could be relevant and applicable to a case. The SCC
here acknowledges that the fundamental rights to a fair trial would be damaged if ordinary
courts refused to follow the CJEU applicable rulings. The SCC has succeeded in all these
challenges, but now it has a new one in relation to the definition of EU fundamental rights
in connection with the fundamental rights of the Spanish Constitution.
Further arguments can be made in support of these considerations. When the culture of
fundamental rights was already settled in Spain, the General Act of the Constitutional
Court was amended. This happened in 2007. The amendments were made with the
purpose, inter alia, of reducing the vast volume of individual appeals against violations of
fundamental rights. The idea was that the SCC would only admit individual appeals of
special constitutional relevance: cases that presented new situations regarding the
comprehension of a fundamental right; cases that made it necessary to review the doctrine
about a particular fundamental right; and cases in which the SCC doctrine had been
completely ignored by the courts. From 2007, it would be up to the Judicial Branch to
protect fundamental rights, following the doctrine that the SCC had already settled, with
the SCC only ruling on specific cases of singular constitutional relevance. Any case involving
the interpretation of Charter rights has, undeniably, constitutional relevance, and so also
does any case involving the conformity of the ruling of an ordinary court with the CJEU
case law. Indeed, the SCC confirmed this in its aforementioned judgment 50/2014 of 14
April. The SCC should not dare to interpret EU Charter rights when EU law is involved
without the assistance of the CJEU. Ideally, the doctrine of the SCC, which is mandatory for
the Judiciary following Article 5(1) of the General Act of the Judiciary Branch, would
contribute to the uniform interpretation of those constitutional rights which have a
European nature.
If the SCC does not assume a leading role in the definition of the standards of protection of
fundamental rights together with the CJEU, the judiciary will do it through the preliminary
reference procedure. In fact, it has been remarked that the SCC decided to make the
Melloni preliminary reference prior to the National High Court in order to avoid being left
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behind in the judicial dialogue with the CJEU. 53 A culture of judicial responsibility for
fundamental rights protection is already settled in Spain, as is a culture of the submission
of preliminary references as a tool for the suitable implementation of EU law. What is
lacking now is a culture of collaboration between the SCC and CJEU - something that is
necessary for there to be a good relationship between the rights upheld in the Charter and
those contained in the Constitution.54 Although Melloni was a first step, it was not the turn
of the screw that had been so long-awaited by the experts. The SCC still holds to its original
interpretation of EU law conflicts: it is not the duty of the SCC to implement EU law, not
even EU rights. The Charter rights have the same meaning for the SCC as do those of the
ECHR. The rulings of the CJEU are at the same level as those of the ECtHR, even when EU
law is applied by the Member States. Unfortunately, that is not what Article 51 of the
Charter establishes.
Javier Dfez-Hochleitner Rodriguez, Cuesti6n prejudicial y politica judicial, in LA CUESTION PREJUDICIAL EUROPEA, IV
EUROPEAN INKLINGS 164, 169 (2014).
54 "Furthermore, constitutional courts can put their privileged jurisdictions at the service of the Charter in order to
reinforce the rights it enshrines in the domestic scene." SARMIENTO, supra note 30, at 1300.
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References to the European Court of Justice: An Opencast
Constitutional Lab
By Alessia Fusco*
A. The Preliminary Reference as a "Litmus Test"
At the start of his paper Keeping Their Heads Above Water? European Law in the House of
Lords,' Anthony Arnull reports a judgment delivered by Lord Denning in 1979, in the early
days of the process of the United Kingdom's European integration. It stated as follows:
[The] flowing tide of the Community law is coming in
fast. It has not stopped at high-water mark. It has
broken the dykes and the banks. It has submerged the
surrounding land. So much that we have to learn to
become amphibious if we wish to keep our heads
above water.2
Lord Denning made a similar remark in his judgment in Bulmer v. Bollinger,3 which was a
pivotal case in the dialogue between the United Kingdom (UK) and European systems.
At that time, the UK was taking its first cautious steps in the European Community,
following the entry into force of the European Communities Act in 1972. Since then, much
has changed: the participation of the UK in the life of the European Union (EU) has
developed, and a dialogue between the British and European courts has become a very
powerful feature of the European constitutional landscape and also the British context. It is
no longer a dialogue that suggests a two-way process; instead, from the perspective of the
* PhD Candidate in "Italian, European and Transnational Constitutional Law Studies," Department of Law,
University of Genoa, Italy.
1 Anthony Arnull, Keeping Their Heads Above Water? European Law in the House of Lords, in FROM HOUSE OF LORDS
TO SUPREME COURT. JUDGES, JURISTS AND THE PROCESS OF JUDGING 129 (James Lee ed., 2011).
2 Lord Denning MR in Shields v. E Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER 456, 462.
See HP Bulmer Ltd & Anor v. J. Bollinger SA & Ors [1974] EWCA Civ 14 (22 May 1974), http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1974/14.html&query=Bulmer+and+v+and+Bollinger+and+%281974%2
9&method=boolean.
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integration of the British national system into the EU system, it amounts to a relationship
of cooperation.
In this light, a study of preliminary references under the UK system can be very
informative. As it amounts to a link4 between the domestic and European systems, it can
act as the "litmus test" for dialogue between these two systems. For the UK in particular, it
can tell us something about the frail relationship between the primacy of EU law and the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which is "the very keystone of the law of the
5 6
constitution," as Dicey taught.s Since Costa v. ENEL, the principle of the supremacy of EU
law has been asserted, that is, domestic courts are bound to apply EU law. National law
must give way to EU law. There is thus no doubt that the constitution that Dicey described
no longer operates as it did. The "classic view of parliamentary sovereignty,"7 that is "a
unique feature and a result of the unwritten constitution," belongs to the tradition of the
British system. Nowadays, the constitutional arrangement of the UK is more problematic.
Studying the preliminary reference procedure from the perspective of such a complex
system offers a valid means of considering some crucial national debates.
The main purpose of this article is, accordingly, to verify whether the preliminary
references sent by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (hereafter, UKSC) have
provided a linkage between the European system and the national British system by
securing the protection of rights. Studying this procedure can enable us to understand how
the unwritten British constitution is developing.
The case law will be examined using two different approaches. First, a quantitative
approach will be taken, with the intention of discerning any potential predominance of one
particular issue regarding which the UKSC has considered it necessary to make a reference
to the Court of Justice (CJEU). Second, a qualitative approach will be adopted, based on a
study of the reasoning used by the two Courts in the records of preliminary references. The
intersection between these two approaches will assist in understanding whether and how
the dialogue between the two courts may assist in the integration of the UK into the EU.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this research cannot aim to provide definitive
4 uLe renvoi prejudiciel n'est pas un recours mais un mecanisme, une procedure. 11 n'est pas demande a la Cour de
Justice de I'Union europeenne de se pronunce sur un litige, ni afortiori de le trancher, mais de "dire le droit." Le
renvoi prejudiciel institue un lien entre le juge national et le juge communautaire, un pont assurant un dialogue
qui s'etablit sur les bases d'une cooperation constructive entre deux ordres jurisdictionnel saux fins d'assurer
I'application uniforme du droit de I'Union sur 'ensemble de son territoire." GEORGE VANDERSANDEN, RENVOI
PREJUDICIEL EN DROIT EUROPEEN, REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE DU DROIT BELGE 9 (2013).
5 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 72 (1885).
6 Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
7 See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Constitution, 22/2 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE,
267-90 (2009).
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answers to such difficult questions, particularly in the light of the fact that the data
analyzed forms part of the case law of a very young Court, the role of which is still evolving.
B. A Peculiar Referring Court: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
Before starting our analysis, it is appropriate to consider the referring judge, the case law
of which concerning preliminary references will be the object of this study. It is particularly
important to explain why this focus was chosen.
In October 2009, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was replaced by the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, as provided for under the Constitutional Reform
Act of 2005. The UKSC inherited all of the powers previously vested in the House of Lords
as the ultimate court of appeal. Along with its powers, it also inherited its limits, for
example as to the power to conduct constitutional review of legislation. In its first
judgment on a preliminary reference issued by the UKSC, in Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, the CJEU took note of this transformation and referred
to the national court as "the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, formerly the House of
Lords (United Kingdom).""
As the UKSC is one of the many UK courts that can make references to the CJEU, it is
important to explain the reasons underpinning the choice to focus on the use of the
preliminary reference procedure within this Court only. Of the various reasons which could
be proposed, one must be excluded from the outset. It is necessary to start by engaging in
an actio ad excludendum: The UKSC is not a constitutional court, because it does not have
powers of constitutional review.9 In actual fact, the nature and role of this Court is said to
be "evolving." 10 If we employ the traditional categories used in studies of constitutional
courts in general, the only reason we can advance in support of the UKSC as a
Constitutional Court does not concern the judicial review of legislation - as this power is
not available in the UK - but jurisdiction over devolution issues (Government of Wales Act
1998, Scotland Act 1998, and Northern Ireland Act 1998). The UKSC acquired this
jurisdiction from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. On the contrary, as regards
the power of judicial review, many scholars consider that the UKSC does not have any such
power. Paul Craig, for example, argues that:
in UK law, the principles of judicial review can be used
to invalidate secondary norms and to interpret primary
legislation, but they cannot be used to invalidate the
Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03375.
PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF UNITED KINGDOM: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 202 (2012).
10 See Kate Malleson, The Evolving Role of the UK Supreme Court, PUBLIC LAW 754 (2011).
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latter. This is true even in relation to rights-based
review pursuant to the HRA 1998, since legislation that
is incompatible with Convention rights is not
invalidated, but is subject to a declaration of
incompatibility that does not affect its legal status.
He adds:
The mere fact that we have an unwritten constitution
does not per se preclude principles of judicial review
from being above primary legislation. It would be
perfectly possible to imagine an unwritten constitution
in which this was so. The rationale for the position in
the UK is not because we have an unwritten
constitution, but because its dominant principle is the
sovereignty of Parliament, the corollary being that UK
principles of judicial review may serve as interpretive
guides concerning primary legislation, but cannot lead
to its invalidation.12
Nevertheless, this Court performs a peculiar and controversial institutional role. Indeed, its
name itself is very telling: as Malleson writes, "the cultural connotation of the title,
particular given the long shadow of the US Supreme Court, is likely to impact
physiologically in a way which affects both internal and external expectations of the role of
the court."13 This is true with regard to the relationships with the CJEU.
First of all, the UKSC is a national Court of last resort: it is the final Court of appeal in the
UK for civil cases and for criminal cases from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. As a
final court, it accepts the jurisdiction of the CJEU, under the duty imposed by Article 267 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to ask the CJEU to give
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and
interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union.
Moreover, pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, it is a "[...] court or tribunal of a Member State
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law" and, therefore, it
"shall bring the matter before the Court."
11 Paul Craig, Accountability and Judicial Review in the UK and EU: Central Precepts, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION 192 (Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland eds., 2013).
12 Id. at 193.
13 MALLESON, supra note 10, at 771.
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Secondly, as mentioned above, the UKSC is the designated successor to the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords, before which the dialogue between the UK and EU
started to develop during the 1980s and 1990s through the proposition of certain
preliminary rulings. These included, in particular, the famous decision in R v. Secretary of
State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2).14 This cannot be disregarded in any
accurate account of the meaningful power of the preliminary reference procedure in the
construction of the dialogue between the UK and EU, simply because, according to Drewry,
it "has a special place in the political history of Britain's love-hate relationship with the
Community and the Union.",s
After the European Economic Community arranged for fishing quotas to be established for
each Member State of the Community, the UK Parliament approved the Merchant
Shipping Act in 1988. This Act sought to prevent foreign fishing companies from fishing in
British waters, by prescribing certain rules governing the registration of the fishing boats as
British boats. In fact, it only allowed fishing boats owned by British citizens or UK residents
to trawl in national waters. The Spanish company Factortame had several fishing boats
which could not be enrolled as British boats, even though they had been registered in the
UK before the Act came into force. During the course of a complex legal procedure, three
preliminary references were made to the CJEU, one of which was sent by the House of
Lords. The House of Lords also made some important rulings, stating that the provisions of
the Act had to be set aside as they were at odds with European Community law. This is the
aspect which makes R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) a
pivotal case, and a point of no return for the UK in the European integration process. It
marked a "sea-change in the attitude of the English courts to European law."16 From then
on, the sovereignty of Parliament would not be the same.
The effects which the dialogue among the domestic and European systems have produced
at the judicial level on the core rationale of parliamentary sovereignty cannot be ignored.
On the website of the UK Parliament, we read a definition of parliamentary sovereignty
which recalls Dicey and his Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution. Here it is:
Parliamentary sovereignty is a principle of the UK
constitution. It makes Parliament the supreme legal
14 Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, 1990 E.C.R.
1-02433.
15 Gavin Drewry, The Jurisprudence of British Euroscepticism: A Strange Story of Fish and Vegetables, 3/2 UTRECHT
L. REV. 105 (2007).
16 ARNULL, supra note 1, at 137.
17 See Paul Craig, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. (YEL) 221 (1991).
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authority in the UK, which can create or end any law.
Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and
no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments
cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most
important part of the UK constitution.
In the relationship with the EU legal system, this means that the British Parliament can
repeal the European Communities Act and similar subsequent legislation whenever it
wishes. There is no doubt that this is a feature of parliamentary sovereignty. At the same
time, however, judgments such as Factortame have taken on a constitutional status, which
cannot be underestimated. From this perspective, "UK membership of the EU represents a
significant qualification to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty." 9 The preliminary
reference procedure establishes both collaboration between the legal systems and a
20hierarchy. It does not seem wrong to assert that this produces some important effects on
the "classical view of parliamentary sovereignty. 21
C. Preliminary References Sent by the UKSC: Some Aspects
We may now consider the general landscape of the preliminary references sent by the
UKSC. Acting under Article 42 of the Supreme Court Rules 2009,22 the UKSC has submitted
1sSee www.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty.
See LEYLAND, supra note 9, at 54.
20 R. Romboli, Corte di Giustizia e giudici nazionali: il rinvio pregiudiziale come strumento di dialogo, in NUOVE
STRATEGIE PER LO SVILUPPO DEMOCRATICO E L'INTEGRAZIONE POLITICA IN EUROPA 431 (Ad riana Ciancio ed., 2014).
21 ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 7.
22 Art. 42, Supreme Court Rules 2009: "(1) Where it is contended on an application for permission to appeal that it
raises a question of Community law which should be the subject of a reference under Article 234 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community and permission to appeal is refused, the panel of Justices will give brief
reasons for its decision."
(2) Where on an application for permission to appeal a panel of Justices decides to make a reference under Article
234 before determining the application, it will give consequential directions as to the form of the reference and
the staying of the application (but it may if it thinks fit dispose of other parts of the application at once).
(3) Where at the hearing of an appeal the Court decides to make a reference under Article 234 it will give
consequential directions as to the form of the reference and the staying of the appeal (but it may if it thinks fit
dispose of other parts of the appeal at once).
(4) An order of the Court shall be prepared and sealed by the Registrar to record any decision made under this
rule."
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a total of eleven preliminary references to the CJEU. One of these was struck from the
23
register by the President of the Court. All of the others cases were concluded.
If we attempt to distinguish these on the basis of the main subject-matter dealt with, some
areas of law may be identified. The main subjects of the references are citizenship of the
Union and right of entry and residence (McCarthy case 24), approximation of laws (Public
25sRelations Consultants Association LTD. and David Edwards cases ), social policy (Williams
and others, Alemo Herron and Saint Prix, O'Brien caseS26), freedom of establishment (Test
Claimants 27), and, lastly, the environment (ClientEarth 2). In the cases of Public Relations
29Consultants and David Edwards, along with Office of Communications, the main subject-
matter of the approximation of laws concerned the area of information.
The analysis here must consider the criteria used in making referrals to the CJEU, the
reasons for making the references, the legal reasoning, and any discernible patterns. When
reading each of the judgments, the "reasons of the judgment" become clear. Several
reasons are advanced: in some cases, parts of the Directives do not enable the national
courts to understand clearly whether they are able to provide dynamic interpretations, as
in Alemo-Herron case. Other cases concern some difficult issues of European law, for which
the guidance of the CJEU is required (ClientEarth case). In general, references are made
when various members of the Supreme Court hold different views on a question of
European law (for instance, in the Williams and others, Edwards, O'Brien, Office of
23 Case C-54/11, JP Morgan Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan Securities (July 5, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/. In this
case, the UKSC was sent a copy of the judgment of 12 May 2011 in Case C-144/10 Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe, 2011
E.C.R. 1-03961 by the Registry of the Court. This asked the UKSC whether, considering that judgment, it wished to
maintain its reference for a preliminary ruling. One month later, the UKSC informed the Court that it did not wish
to maintain the reference.
24 Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03375.
25 Case C-360/13, Public Relations Consultants Association LTD. v. The Newspaper Licensing Agency LTD, (June 5,
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos v. Environment Agency, (Apr. 11,
2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
26 Case C-155/10, Williams v. British Airways, 2011 E.C.R. 1-08409; Case C-426/11, Alemo Herron v. Parkwood
Leisure LTD., (July 18, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-507/12, Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, (June 19, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-393/10, O'Brien v. Ministry of Justice, (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/.
27 Case C-362/12, Test Claimants v. Commissioners, (Dec. 12, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
28 Case C-404/13, ClientEarth v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, (Nov. 28, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/.
29 Case C-71/10, Office of Communications v. The Information Commissioner, 2011 E.C.R. 1-07205; Case C-
360/13, Public Relations Consultants Association LTD. v. The Newspaper Licensing Agency LTD., (June 5, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos v. Environment Agency, (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/.
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Communications, Public Relations and Saint Prix cases). In some cases (for example, Test
Claimants) the Court expressly says that "the matter is not acte clair,30 and, for this reason,
considers a reference to the CJEU as necessary. As the UKSC is a national court of last
resort, it is obliged by Article 267 TFEU to refer questions to the CJEU, as noted above.
Hence, on this view, the preliminary references made by the UKSC were necessary.
Rather than dealing with all eleven cases, I will choose some of them, selecting certain
themes and providing some observations. I shall focus on two groups of preliminary
references made by the UKSC. The first group concerns the nodal point of social policy
(Williams, Alemo-Herron, Saint-Prix and O'Brien cases); the second concerns citizenship
(McCarthy and Saint-Prix cases). I have selected one case for each group, namely the
Williams and McCarthy cases.
D. The UKSC References to the CJEU Concerning Social Policy: The Williams Case
British legal culture is characterized by the lack of a catalogue of social rights. For this
reason, social policy is a field which is always developing. Out of the preliminary references
sent by the UKSC, four concern the area of social policy. I refer to the cases of Williams v.
British Airways, Alemo Herron v. Parkwood Leisure LTD, Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions, and O'Brien v. Ministry of Justice. Moving from the assumption that
"the legal culture of each Member State has always a marked effect upon the approach
judges take towards preliminary references,"3 a study of these rulings can suggest how
the dialogue between UKSC and CJEU has secured the implementation of social rights at
the domestic level. Employment is the prominent issue within these cases.
I consider it important to deal with the first case referred to the Court in this area: Williams
and Others v. British Airways plc. In 2009, Williams and 2,750 other petitioners, who were
pilots employed by British Airways, sued the British carrier before the Employment
Tribunal with a claim for holiday pay ("paid annual leave"). The dispute arose because the
pilots asserted that they had been underpaid by the company. According to the main
domestic rules on pilots' employment, their remuneration was composed of three
elements, namely a fixed annual sum and two supplementary payments which were
dependent on the time spent flying and the time spent away from base. According to the
pilots, these last two elements were not computed in their holiday pay. Both the
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal found in favor of the workers.
By contrast, the Court of Appeal held that the "paid annual leave" stands at a level of a
"normal pay." Ms. Williams and other claimants challenged this decision before the UKSC.
so See Case C-77/83, CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1984 E.C.R. 1-01257.
31 Thomas de la Mare and Catherine Donnelly, Preliminary rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and Stasis,
in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 363, 382 (Paul Craig & Grainne De B~rca eds., 2011).
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In order to establish the correct meaning of the concept of "paid annual leave," the Court
needed to make five references to the CJEU. 32
Ruling on the correct interpretation of the concept, the CJEU held that the EU provisions
involved
must be interpreted as meaning that an airline pilot is
entitled, during his annual leave, not only to the
maintenance of his basic salary, but also, first, to all the
components intrinsically linked to the performance of
the tasks which he is required to carry out under his
contract of employment and in respect of which a
monetary amount, included in the calculation of his
total remuneration, is provided and, second, to all the
elements relating to his personal and professional
status as an airline pilot. It is for the national court to
assess whether the various components comprising
that worker's total remuneration meet those criteria.
32 ,(1) Under (a) articles 7 of Council Directives 93/104/EC and 2003/88/EC and (b) clause 3 of the European
Agreement annexed to the Council Directive 2000/79/EC: (i) to what, if any, extent does European law define or
lay down any requirements as to the nature and/or level of the payments required to be made in respect of
periods of paid annual leave; and (ii) to what, if any, extent may member states determine how such payments
are to be calculated?
(2) In particular, is it sufficient that, under national law and/or practice and/or under the collective agreements
and/or contractual arrangements negotiated between employers and workers, the payment made enables and
encourages the worker to take and to enjoy, in the fullest sense of these words, his or her annual leave; and does
not involve any sensible risk that the worker will not do so?
(3) Or is it required that the pay should either (a) correspond precisely with or (b) be broadly comparable to the
worker's "normal" pay?
Further, in the event of an affirmative answer to question (3)(a) or (b):
(4) Is the relevant measure or comparison: (a) pay that the worker would have earned during the particular leave
period if he or she had been working, instead of on leave, or (b) pay which he or she was earning during some
other, and if so what, period when he or she was working?
(5) How should "normal" or "comparable" pay be assessed in circumstances where: (a) a worker's remuneration
while working is supplemented if and to the extent that he or she engages in a particular activity; (b) where there
is an annual or other limit on the extent to which, or time during which, the worker may engage in that activity,
and that limit has been already exceeded or almost exceeded at the time(s) when annual leave is taken, so that
the worker would not in fact have been permitted to engage in that activity had he been working, instead of on
leave?"
Case C-155/10, Williams v. British Airways, 2011 E.C.R. 1-08409, para. 31.
2015 1537
German Law Journal
Following the CJEU's judgment, the UKSC remitted the claims to the Employment Tribunal
in order for the relevant amount to be quantified. The core principle within the European
directive was the correlation between the amount of pay and the period of work.
It should be noted that at the domestic level, this case was a kind of "primum movens,"
specifically in the civil aviation sector in which various claims were raised concerning the
level of holiday pay. Moreover, the CJEU's decision gave rise to a debate on the need to
34
reform national legislation in this area.
E. The Subject of Citizenship in the McCarthy Case
The McCarthy case focused on the interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of
EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States.
It is fitting to start by noting that the citizenship of the Union and the right of entry and
residence are two crucial aspects of EU law. Indeed these themes lie at the heart of many
of the references made by national courts to the CJEU, starting with the Sala case in
1996.ss These rulings gave the CJEU the opportunity to act as a "constitutional
adjudicator , in drawing the "ubi consistam" of European citizenship.
In the McCarthy case, EU law, if it was applied, would guarantee greater protection than
domestic law. Shirley McCarthy was a woman with dual citizenship (British and Irish). The
question was well-summarized in the opinion delivered by Advocate General Kokott:
Can a person who is a national of two Member States
of the European Union but has always lived in only one
of those two States rely upon European Union law ('EU
law') against that State in order to obtain there a right
34 See Sophie Lalor-Harbord, Case-Comment: British Airways plc. v. Williams and Others [2012] UKSC 43, available
at http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-british-airways-plc-v-williams-and-others-2012-uksfc-43/.
Case C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala, 1998 E.C.R. 1-02691. This and the other main citizenship cases (e.g. Case C-
34/09, Zambrano, 2011 E.C.R. 1-01177; Case C-256/11, Dereci, 2011 E.C.R. 1-11315) are commented also by
Michael Dougan, The Bubble that burst: Exploring the legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free Movement of Union
Citizens, in JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 127 (Maurice Adams,
Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen, & Gert Straetmans eds., 2013).
I borrow this expression from Andrea Biondi and Silvia Bartolini, Recent Developments in Luxembourg: The
Activities of the Court's in 2012, 20 EUR. PUB. L. 1-14 (2014).
Citizenship is the main subject of other preliminary references such as the cases referred to, supra note 35.
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of residence for him or herself and in particular for his
or her spouse?
Reliance on EU law would have enabled Mrs. McCarthy's husband, a Jamaican citizen, to
have a derivative right of residence based on his wife's position; on the contrary, domestic
law did not allow this.39 Thus, what was the correct interpretation of Articles 3(1) and 16 of
Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States? Was Mrs. McCarthy able to obtain a residence
permit for her and her husband?
Although she had dual citizenship, the fact that she had always resided in a Member State
of which she was a national and had never exercised the right of free movement led the
Court to hold that Directive 2004/38/EC could not be applied to the case. However, the
Court made an observation with regard to the application of Article 21 TFEU on the
freedom of circulation of EU citizens, stating that whilst it could not be applied in a
situation like this,
the situation of that citizen does not include the
application of measures by a Member State that would
have the effect of depriving him of the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by
virtue of his status as a Union citizen or of impeding the
exercise of his right of free movement and residence
within the territory of the Member States.40
In the light of the UK system, this was a very meaningful assertion. The CJEU was expressly
asserting that, if domestic law guaranteed a lower protection of the rights involved, EU law
would have to be applied.
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 1, Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department (Nov. 25, 2010).
UK Immigration rules provide that nationals of third countries who do not have leave to remain in the United
Kingdom also do not meet the requirements to be granted leave to remain under those Rules as the spouse of a
person settled in the United Kingdom.
40 Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03375, para. 31.
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F. Conclusions: The Preliminary Reference and the Changing British Constitutional
Landscape
As was noted at the beginning of this article, the working question for this contribution
was one of verifying whether the preliminary references issued by the UKSC have
enhanced integration between the European and national British systems by securing the
protection of rights and the development of the unwritten British constitution.
Some considerations may now be proposed. On the one hand, it might appear that the
only path open to the UKSC is that of the preliminary reference to the CJEU. On the other
hand, the number of such preliminary references may be indicative of the fact that judicial
dialogue between the UKSC and the CJEU is increasing. From a quantitative standpoint, it is
telling to observe the considerable increase in the number of preliminary references issued
by the UKSC to the CJEU-an increase especially noticeable when compared to the
experience of the UKSC's predecessor, the House of Lords. It is possible that other factors,
which cannot be considered here, may have played a role in this. Until 2013, the statistics
illustrate the increased incidence of references: eleven preliminary references were issued
by UKSC during four years of activity, as against forty by the House of Lords between 1973
41
and 2008. On this view, this is a revealing statistic.
The thematic aspect is interesting too. Whilst social policy undisputedly dominated in both
the preliminary references sent by the UKSC and the House of Lords, the UKSC has also
made references to the CJEU concerning other important subjects, such as citizenship (as
shown in the McCarthy case). Moving from the assumptions that the preliminary reference
is "the primary indication of judicial support for European integration," 42 both a
quantitative approach and a qualitative one prove that the integration of the UK into the
EU may be improved strictly on the judicial level, although this is threatened by British
euroskepticism. Within this perspective, judicial dialogue, which has grown through
increasing judicial activism, can reveal its power in the process of integration, in order to
create an "interconstitutional" order.43
I have left it to the end to consider an element which may be useful in support of the
argument made here. The UKSC did not make any references to the CJEU in 2014. I do not
think there is any reason to state that the UK is shrinking back from the process of
41 ARNULL, supra note 1 (examining and taking stock of the preliminary references issued by the House of Lords).
42 JONATHAN GOLUB, Modelling Judicial Dialogue in the European Community: The Quantitative Basis of Preliminary
References to the ECI, EUI Working Paper RSC No 96/58, 1.
43 From this perspective, see Antonio Ruggeri, Ragionando sui possibili sviluppi dei rapporti tra le Corti europee ei
giudici nazionali (con specifico riguardo all'adesione dell'Unione alla CEDU e all'entrata in vigore del Prot. 16),
available at http://www.rivistaaic.it/articolorivista/ragionando-sui-possibili-sviluppi-dei-rapporti-tra-le-corti-
europee-e-i-giudici.
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European integration. Perhaps the adoption of a peremptory approach is not the right way
to go about it. This statistic, if anything, allows us to consider how flexible the preliminary
reference procedure is, as it is strongly dependent on the cases the Court has to judge on.
The absence of rulings issued by the UKSC in 2014 is not a sufficient reason to conclude
that "the United Kingdom will [not] continue to engage with Europe and European legal
affairs .
In actual fact, within this scenario, the constitutional role of the UKSC is perhaps a chapter
yet to be written. As has been shown, an unwritten constitution leaves greater scope for
action by this young court. This will enable the rights guaranteed at the domestic level to
be implemented through dialogue with the CJEU. Indeed, it is likely that it is precisely "in
policing the constitutional boundaries of the United Kingdom" 45 that the UKSC could
display and enhance its constitutional role.
44See Lord Mance, The Interface Between National and European Law, 4 EUR. L. REV. 437, 456 (2013). He adds: "In
whatever way the European Union may develop, I believe that the United Kingdom's contributions on both the
legislative and the legal scenes have been and can in future continue to be pre-eminent."
45 MALLESON, supra note 10, at 761.
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Reading the Tea Leaves: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and
the Preliminary Ruling Procedure
By Aleksandra Kustra*
A. Constitutional Courts as Judges Under Article 267 TFEU
The main purpose of the preliminary ruling procedure is to prevent divergences in judicial
decisions applying European Union (EU) law and to ensure the uniform interpretation of
EU legal provisions across Member States. The procedure, introduced in the Founding
Treaties,' has provided a platform for the Court of Justice of the European Union
(hereafter, the ECJ or the CJEU) to deliver seminal judgments that have progressively
defined the relationship between national and EU legal systems, among others. The
procedure has also helped the ECJ to develop fundamental principles of EU law, including
direct effect, indirect effect (i.e., the interpretation of national law in line with directives)
and primacy.2 Being one of the most important aspects of the EU judicial system, the
procedure provided by Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (hereafter, TFEU) has had an immense impact on the harmonious development of
EU law and the way in which national courts and EU courts interact and communicate.
The idea of ensuring the uniform application of EU law certainly influenced the ECJ in its
adoption of a broad meaning of the term "court" under Article 267 TFEU. According to
the settled jurisprudence of the CJEU, when determining whether the authority referring
a preliminary question is a court within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU takes
into account all the circumstances of the case, including in particular the legal basis for
the existence of the judicial body, its permanent or temporary character, the mandatory
nature of its jurisdiction, the adversarial type of proceedings, the application of the rules
of law, and the principle of judicial independence.
* Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law and Administration, Nicolaus Copernicus University,
Toru6, Poland; Law clerk at the Constitutional Court of Poland.
1 Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 23 July 1952, Art. 41, UNTS, vol. 261, 171 (ratified
through 1952). Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1 January 1958, Art. 177, UNTS, vol. 294,
295, 296, 297, 298 (ratified through 1957).
2 ANDREAS NORBERG, PRELIMINARY RULINGS AND THE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN COURTS 16 (2006).
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As regards the status of constitutional courts under Article 267 TFEU, the jurisprudence of
the CJEU still lacks a clear statement that constitutional courts are, in principle, bound by
the obligation to refer. The CJEU rather presumes that the jurisdiction and function of a
body determine whether it can be considered as a court (and court of last resort) under
Article 267 TFEU. At the same time, the issue was twice considered in the ECJ Annual
Reports, and it was also analyzed in several opinions of the Advocates General (hereafter,
AG).
In the 1998 ECJ Annual Report, the view was expressed that there are good reasons to
consider the admissibility of preliminary questions referred by constitutional courts.4 This
position was upheld in the 2002 ECJ Annual Report.s This time, however, the ECJ went
even further and explicitly stated that constitutional courts are covered by the obligation
imposed on national courts under the current Article 267(3) TFEU.
As far as the Opinions of AGs are concerned, it is worth mentioning two of them, both
delivered by AG Kokott. In her Opinion delivered on 2 July 2009 in Presidente del Consiglio
dei Ministri v. Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, AG Kokott held that the reference by
the Italian Corte Costituzionale was a good illustration of the fact that, also in proceedings
before national constitutional courts, questions of EU law may arise that are decisive for
the outcome of the constitutional dispute in question. AG Kokott pointed out that EU law
may be relevant to the decision in constitutional disputes where, among others factors,
the purported effects of an EU law measure are at issue in constitutional law proceedings
or where the scope left by an EU law measure for the national legislature is open to
review by a constitutional court. In another case, AG Kokott also considered the
admissibility of the preliminary reference made by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court,
and stated that constitutional courts also fall within the definition of 'court' for the
purposes of the then Article 234 EC. 9 It is worth highlighting that the AG implicitly denied
See also the guidance provided by the ECJ on the preliminary reference procedure by national courts, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012H1106(01)&from=EN.
4 See the text of the annual report, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_11035/rapports-annuels.
Proceedings of the Court of Justice in 1998 by Mr G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, President 2-3.
See the text of the annual report 8-9, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_11035/rapports-
annuels.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, Ex. Art. 177 and 234, OJEC, vol. 326, 141
and 164 [hereinafter TFEU].
7Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 22, Case C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione
Sardegna, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10821.
8 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 23, Case C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione
Sardegna, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10821.
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 16, Case C-239/07, Sabatauskas and Ohters, 2008 E.C.R. 1-07523.
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the admissibility of a preliminary reference made during a priori review of a statute, by
stating that the reference made by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court fulfilled all
procedural requirements since it was made during the review of a statute which had
already come into force.10
The CJEU criteria for a court (and court of last resort) under the current Article 267(3)
TFEU and the Opinions of AGs in cases filed by constitutional courts prove that the CJEU
supports such preliminary references. Nevertheless, only a few constitutional courts have
referred to the CJEU so far." The Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunal Konstytucyjny;
hereafter, the PCT) belongs to the majority of constitutional courts that have still not
applied the preliminary reference procedure. May the PCT be considered as a court of last
resort under Article 267(3) TFEU? The answer to this question depends on the PCT's
jurisdiction and function. Therefore, before analyzing the present case law of the PCT
concerning the preliminary procedure, the rudiments of the PCT's position in the Polish
constitutional system need to be presented.
B. The PCT's Position in the Context of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure
The PCT's position in the political system is characterized by the principle of
independence. According to Article 10(2) of the Constitution of 2 April 1997 (hereafter,
the Polish Constitution or the Constitution), which states that judicial power shall be
vested in courts and tribunals, the PCT is to be regarded as an organ of judicial authority.
However, the distinction between courts and tribunals must be emphasized. Courts-and
courts only-constitute the system of organs established to adjudicate in individual cases
("to implement the administration of justice," according to the phrasing of Article 175(1)
of the Constitution) and are subordinated-in a certain way-to the Supreme Court and
the Supreme Administrative Court. The PCT (together with the Tribunal of State) remains
outside the system of courts, thus constituting a separate branch of judicial power.12
The Polish Constitution recognizes four areas of the PCT's jurisdiction:
(1) The review of norms (both abstract and specific; a posteriori and a priori); a particular
procedure for reviewing norms is adjudicating on constitutional complaints;
(2) Settling disputes over authority between the central constitutional organs of the
State;
10 Id. at para. 18.
1 See Aleksandra Kustra, Sqdy konstytucyjne a procedura prejudycjalna przed Trybunalem Sprawiedliwoici Unii
Europejskiej, 4 PRZEGLAD SEJMOWY 78 (2012).
12 See ZDZIStAW CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, LESZEK GARLICKI, JANUSZ TRZCINSKI, KOMENTARZ DO USTAWY o TRYBUNALE
KONSTYTUCYJNYM 6 (1999).
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(3) Deciding on the conformity with the Constitution of the purposes or activities of
political parties;
(4) Determining whether or not there exists an impediment to the exercise of office by
the President of the Republic.13
Without any doubt, the primary function of the PCT is the control of hierarchical
conformity of legal norms, and the eliminating of norms which are inconsistent with the
system of law in force. The exclusive point of reference for such adjudication is the
Constitution.14
The Polish constitutional system provides for both a priori review (review of preventive
nature) and a posteriori review (which refers to such normative acts that are already
enacted, are in force, or are still in the vacatio legis period). However, it clearly assigns
priority to a posteriori review. Only exceptionally may the review of norms be
conducted a priori, and the only subject entitled to initiate such a review is the President
of the Republic. By contrast, the right to initiate the proceedings under the abstract
review procedure is vested in a fairly wide range of subjects.
We can also distinguish between a universal and a particular initiative. The universal
(general) initiative permits the questioning of the constitutionality of every normative act,
regardless of whether the content of this act is related to the scope of activity of the
applicant. This right belongs to numerous State organs (the President, the Marshals of the
Sejm and the Senate, the Prime Minister, the First President of the Supreme Court, the
President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Public Prosecutor General, the
President of the Supreme Chamber of Control, and the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights)
and the parliamentary opposition (a group of 50 Deputies or 30 Senators).
The particular initiative permits the questioning of those acts or norms that relate to
matters within the scope of activity of the applicant. The right to a particular initiative
belongs to: the National Council of the Judiciary to the extent to which the questioned
acts relate to the independence of courts and judges; the constitutive organs of units of
local government; the national organs of trade unions, as well as the national authorities
of employers' organizations and occupational organizations; and churches and religious
organizations.
The concrete review may be initiated in two ways. The first is the consequence of the
right of all courts to refer a question of law to the PCT. In order to submit a question, a
1" See KRZYSZrOF WOJTYCZEK, SADOWNICTWO KONSTYTUCYJNE W POLSCE. WYBRANE ZAGADNIENIA (2013).
14 See PIOTRATULEJA, STOSOWANIE KONSTYTUCJI RP W SWIETLE ZASADYJEJ NADRZkDNOSCI (WYBRANE PROBLEMY) (2003).
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court must be doubtful as to the conformity with the Constitution of a legal norm on
which its decision is to be based. The court referring such a question to the Tribunal shall
suspend the proceedings in the case to which the question relates, so that the decision
can be based on the judgment of the PCT.
Constitutional complaint in Poland is another form of initiating a concrete review before
the PCT, since an allegation can only be based on the unconstitutionality of a normative
act upon the basis of which a final decision infringing the constitutional freedoms or
rights of a complainant was passed.
The catalogue of norms under review, at least for the abstract review proceedings, is
listed in Article 188 of the Constitution. This submits three types of acts to the PCT's
review: statutes, international agreements, and legal provisions issued by central State
organs.
As to the effects of PCT judgments, it should be highlighted that they may not be
appealed against and have an ergo omnes effect (i.e., they are binding on all addressees).
Under the Polish system of constitutional review, as a rule, the loss of the binding force of
the reviewed unconstitutional act takes effect on the day of the publication of the PCT's
judgment. However, the PCT may specify another date for the end of the binding force of
a normative act (the pro futuro effect of the judgment). Such a period may not exceed 18
months in relation to a statute, or 12 months in relation to any other normative act
(Article 190(3) of the Constitution).'s
C. The PCT Case Law Concerning the Preliminary Ruling Procedure and the Obligation to
Refer Under Article 267(3) TFEU
I. Accession Treaty Judgment - GeneralAcceptance of the Duty to Refer Under Article
267(3) TFEU
All the rudimentary information regarding the PCT's position in the political system of
Poland suggests that the PCT should consider itself as a court of last resort under Article
267(3) TFEU.
The PCT was aware of this fact, and just a few days after Poland's accession to the EU, it
decided on its status under Article 267 TFEU. In a judgment of 11 May 2005, K 18/04
concerning the constitutionality of the Accession Treaty (hereafter, the Accession Treaty
" See MONIKA FLORCZAK-WATOR, ORZECZENIA TRYBUNAtU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO I ICH SKUTKI PRAWNE (2006); Katarzyna
Gonera, Ewa t.towska, Artykul 190 Konstytucji ijego konsekwencje wpraktyce sqdowej 9 PANSTWO I PRAWO
(2003).
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judgment), the PCT accepted the obligation to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ, at
least when performing a constitutional review of legislation.
As the Accession Treaty judgment still remains the most comprehensive one delivered on
the status of EU law in the Polish legal system, it is worth briefly presenting several salient
statements from the Treaty which have had an impact on the PCT's considerations
concerning the preliminary ruling procedure.
In the Accession Treaty judgment, the PCT decided that Poland's accession to the EU did
not undermine the supremacy of the Constitution over the whole legal order within the
field of sovereignty of the Polish State. The process of European integration, connected
with the delegation of competences to EU organs in relation to certain matters, has its
basis in the Constitution (Article 9017), as the mechanism for Poland's accession to the EU
finds its express grounds in constitutional regulation and the validity and efficacy of the
integration are dependent upon the fulfilment of constitutional elements of the
integration procedure, including the delegation of the competences. The PCT highlighted
that none of the constitutional provisions authorize the delegation to the EU of the
competence to issue legal acts or to take decisions contrary to the Polish constitution,
which is the supreme law of the Republic of Poland (Article 8(1) of the Polish
Constitution). Concomitantly, the Constitution does not authorize the delegation of
powers to such an extent that it would signify the inability of the Republic of Poland to
continue functioning as a sovereign and democratic State.
Regarding the status of the Accession Treaty, the PCT held that the precedence over
statutes of the application of international agreements which were ratified on the basis of
16 See Jan Barcz, Glosa wyroku TK z dnia 11 maja 2005 r., K 18/04, 4 KWARTALNIK PRAWA PUBLICZNEGo 169 (2005);
Stanistaw Biernat, Glosa wyroku TK z dnia 11 maja 2005 r., K 18/04, 4 KWARTALNIK PRAWA PUBLICZNEGO 185 (2005);
Wtadystaw Czapliski, Glosa wyroku TK z dnia 11 maja 2005 r., K 18/04, 4 KWARTALNIK PRAWA PUBLICZNEGo 207
(2005); Anna Wyrozumska, Glosa wyroku TK z dnia 11 maja 2005 r., K 18/04, 4 KWARTALNIK PRAWA PUBLICZNEGO
223 (2005); Krzysztof W6jtowicz, Glosa wyroku TK z dnia 11 maja 2005 r., K 18/04, 6 PRZEGLAD SEJMOWY 190
(2005).
17 "(1) The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international
organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain
matters.
(2) A statute, granting consent for ratification of an international agreement referred to in para.1, shall be passed
by the Sejm by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies,
and by the Senate by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of
Senators.
(3) Granting of consent for ratification of such agreement may also be passed by a nationwide referendum in
accordance with the provisions of Article 125.
(4) Any resolution in respect of the choice of procedure for granting consent to ratification shall be taken by the
Sejm by an absolute majority vote taken in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies."
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statutory authorization or consent granted via the procedure of a nationwide referendum
(procedures provided for in Article 90 and Article 91 of the Constitution ), in no way
signifies an analogous precedence of these agreements over the Constitution.
Furthermore, the PCT claimed that the concept and model of EU law created a new
situation wherein, within each Member State, autonomous legal orders coexist and are
simultaneously operative. Their interaction may not be described by the traditional
concepts of monism and dualism regarding the relationship between domestic law and
international law.
Considering the role of the ECJ in the EU legal order, the PCT pointed out that the ECJ is
the primary, but not sole, depositary of powers as regards the application of the Treaties
within the EU legal system. The PCT highlighted that the interpretation of EU law
performed by the ECJ should fall within the scope of functions and competences
delegated to the EU by its Member States. It should also remain in correlation with the
principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore, this interpretation should be based upon the
assumption of mutual loyalty between the EU institutions and the Member States.
According to the PCT, this assumption generates a duty for the ECJ to be sympathetically
disposed towards the national legal systems and a duty on the Member States to respect
EU norms.
In the context of the main topic of this paper, it is worth mentioning that one of the
constitutional issues discussed in the Accession Treaty judgment was the compliance of
the preliminary ruling procedure itself (in general) with the Polish constitution. The
initiators of the proceedings before the PCT (a group of Deputies from the Sejm) more
than any other group claimed that the obligation to refer to the ECJ limits the judicial
independence in an unconstitutional way (Article 178(1) of the Constitution) and
threatens the supremacy of the Polish Constitution (Article 8(1) of the Constitution).
The PCT decided that the principle of judicial independence (understood in such a way
that judges are subject to the Constitution) also encompasses the duty to apply EU law
(then Community law) binding upon Poland. According to the PCT, such a duty arises as a
result of the ratification, in compliance with the Constitution and on the basis thereof, of
the Founding Treaties of the EU. The PCT pointed out that the ECJ's competence to
18 Article 91: "(1) After promulgation thereof in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustow), a
ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly,
unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute.
(2) An international agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over
statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes.
(3) If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the
laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws."
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declare a binding interpretation of EU law via the preliminary ruling procedure
constitutes an element of the aforementioned Treaties and as such does not conflict with
the constitutional principle of judicial independence nor does it threaten the supremacy
of the Polish Constitution.
The PCT also stated further that the preliminary reference neither constitutes a threat to
the PCT's competences determined in Article 188 (scope of jurisdiction in constitutional
review proceedings) nor narrows them. Considering its status as a court under Article
267(3) TFEU (then Article 234 EC), the PCT claimed that if it decides to request a
preliminary ruling concerning the validity or the content of EU Law, it would undertake
this within the framework of exercising its adjudicative competences and only where, in
accordance with the Constitution, it ought to apply Community law.1 9
Such a statement suggests that the PCT considered itself to be obliged to refer to the ECJ
in all kinds of constitutional review proceedings, whether they were a priori or a
posteriori and either abstract or concrete review. It should also be noted that the PCT did
not narrow the scope of hypothetical preliminary questions, which may concern both the
interpretation as well as the validity of EU law. However, some reservations are to be
raised regarding an ultra vires review of EU law. Similarly to the standpoint of the German
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; hereafter, the FCC) taken in
numerous judicial decisions (from the Maastricht judgment onwards),20 the PCT stated in
the Accession Treaty judgment that because of the limited and conditional character of
the conferral of EU competences, the PCT is authorized to perform an ultra vires review of
EU acts. Nevertheless, unlike its German counterpart, the PCT seems to exclude the ECJ's
judgments from the scope of this review. The PCT pointed out that the interpretation of
EU law performed by the ECJ should fall within the scope of functions and competences
delegated to the EU by its Member States, should be consistent with the principle of
subsidiarity, and should be based upon the assumption of loyal cooperation (Article 4(3)
TEU) between EU institutions and Member States. In the Accession Treaty judgment, the
PCT highlighted that these reservations generate a duty for the ECJ to be sympathetically
disposed towards national legal systems and a duty for the Member States to show the
highest standard of respect for EU norms. Nevertheless, at the same time the PCT claimed
that the direct review of the conformity of particular decisions of the ECJ with the
Constitution does not fall within the PCT's scope of jurisdiction (Article 188 of the
21Constitution).
19 Point 11.1. of the judgment.
20 See Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship
between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Courtof Justice, 48.1 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9-38 (2011).
21 Pursuant to Art. 188 of the Polish Constitution: "The Constitutional Tribunal shall adjudicate regarding the
following matters:
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11. Act on Excise Duty Decision-The PCT's Isolationist Strategy and its Possible
Consequences as Regards Preliminary Reference in Cases Initiated in Concrete Review
Proceedings
Another reservation concerning the PCT's hypothetical reference to the ECJ can be raised
on account of the decision of 19 December 2006, case P 37/05 (hereafter, the Act on
excise duty decision). The proceedings, which were initiated by the question of law
referred by the Regional Administrative Court in Olsztyn, concerned the compliance of a
statutory provision (the Act on excise duty 22 ) with Article 90 EC (and Article 91 of the
Polish Constitution, which in paragraph 2 guarantees international agreements ratified
upon prior consent granted by statute a precedence over statutes if such an agreement
cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes). The PCT declined jurisdiction
to answer this question of law and ruled that the issue at stake concerned the
23interpretation of EU law, and as such fell within the ECJ's jurisdiction. The PCT
highlighted the autonomy of the EU judicial system and the principles of judicial
cooperation with national courts and held that the preliminary ruling procedure
constitutes a fundamental mechanism of such judicial cooperation. The PCT decided that
there was no need to refer questions of law regarding the conformity of domestic law
with EU law to the PCT. The issue of solving conflicts in relation to domestic statutes falls
outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the PCT, since the decisions on whether a statute
remains in conflict with EU law shall be delivered by Polish courts (the Supreme Court,
administrative courts, and common courts), while the interpretation of EU law shall be
24delivered by the ECJ by way of preliminary rulings.
What is significant for the issue of the PCT's hypothetical use of the preliminary ruling
procedure is the fact that the case was initiated by a court in concrete review
proceedings. Therefore, the question may be raised as to whether, in the Act on excise
duty decision, the PCT did not narrow the acceptance of its status as a court under the
1) the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the Constitution;2) the conformity of a statute to
ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute;3) the conformity
of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the Constitution, ratified international agreements and
statutes;4) the conformity to the Constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties; 5) complaints
concerning constitutional infringements, as specified in Article 79, para. 1."
22 The Act of 23 January 2004 on excise duty (Journal of Laws (Dz.U.) No. 29, item 257, as amended).
23 See also Adam Lazowski, Constitutional Tribunal on the Preliminary Ruling Procedure and the Division of
Competences Between National Court and the Court of Justice, 4 EU R. CONST. L. REV. 187-97 (2008).
24 See Bolestaw Banaszkiewicz, Glosa do postanowienia Trybunatu Konstytucyjnego z 19 grudnia 2006 r., P 37/05
(problem kontroli zgodnogci polskiej ustawy z prawem wsp6lnotowym), 2 PRZEGLAD LEGISLACYJNY 108 (2007); Anna
Wyrozumska, Stosowanie prawa wsp6lnotowego a art. 91, 188 i 193 Konstytucji RP, 3 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLAD SADOWY
39 (2007).
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current Article 267(3) TFEU to being a court only able to engage in abstract review
proceedings, similarly to the standpoint made by the Italian Constitutional Court (Corte
Costituzionale; hereafter, the ICC) in the first reference to the ECJ (order No. 103/2008 of
13 February 2008).25 However, in 2013 the ICC significantly changed its position and also
referred to the ECJ in abstract review proceedings (Order No. 207/2013 of 23 July 2013).26
If the Act on excise duty decision was made on the basis of assumptions analogous to
those accepted by the ICC, it would mean that the PCT presumes that in concrete review
proceedings there is always a judge a quo whose obligation is to ensure the effective
application of EU law in the national legal system. If there is a domestic judge who is
obliged or entitled (depending on the existence of a judicial remedy against its decisions)
to refer to the ECJ, the PCT is not a court within the meaning of Article 267(3) TFEU in
such proceedings.27 Yet, this is only one of many possible interpretations of the Act on
excise duty decision. The aforementioned interpretation is pillared by several theses
expressed by the PCT. Firstly, the PCT accentuated the European mandate of national
courts,28 as it held that the domestic (ordinary and administrative) courts are the primary
judicial bodies responsible for the correct application of EU law in Poland. This was
pointed out by the PCT, when it held that the issue of solving conflicts between EU law
and domestic statutes falls outside the scope of jurisdiction of the PCT, since the decisions
on whether the statute remains in conflict with EU law are to be delivered by the
Supreme Court, administrative courts, and common courts, while the interpretation of EU
law norms is to be provided by the ECJ by way of a preliminary ruling.
The second thesis which assists the proposed interpretation of the PCT's decision is the
adoption of the "isolationist strategy" toward the ECJ. As the PCT indicated, this point was
25 See Giuseppe Martinico, Preliminary Reference and Constitutional Courts: Are We in the Mood for Dialogue?,
TILSBURG INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORKING PAPER 11 (2009/10), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract+1483664. Further on the issue of the ICC's previous case-law concerning the
preliminary ruling procedure, see Marco Dani, Tracking Judicial Dialogue-The Scope for preliminary Rulings from
the Italian Constitutional Court, 10 THE JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER 5-12 (2008), available at
www.JeanMonnetProgram.org.
26 See Stefano Civitarese Matteucci, The Italian Constitutional Court Strengthens the Dialogue with the European
Court of Justice Lodging for the First Time a Preliminary Ruling in an Indirect ('Incidenter') Proceeding, 14 EUR.
PUB. L., 633-46 (2014); Ugo Adamo, Nel dialogo con la Corte di giustizia la Corte costituzionale & un organo
giurisdizionale nazionale anche nel giudizio in via incidentale. Note a coldo sull'ord. N. 207/2013, 1 RIVIsTA
DELL'ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI (2014); Adelina Adinolfi, Una <rivoluzione silenziosan: il primo rinvio
pregiudiziale della Corte costituzionale italiana in un procedimento incidentale di legittimita costituzionale, 4
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (2013).
27 On the disadvantages of such a concept in the Italian legal system, see MARTA CARTABIA, JOSEPH H.H. WEILER,
L'ITALIA IN EUROPA, PROFILI ISTITUZIONALI E COSTITUZIONALI 196-97 (2000).
28 See Michal Bobek, The Impact of the European Mandate of Ordinary Courts on the Position of Constitutional
Courts in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE 287-308 (Maartje de Visser & Catherine Van De Heyning eds.,
2012).
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made to eliminate any potential overlap between the PCT and the ECJ's jurisdiction
followed by concurrent rulings on the same legal issues, as well as to prevent any
dysfunction appearing in relations between the EU and Polish legal orders. The PCT
highlighted that the ECJ and the PCT may not be juxtaposed as courts competing with
each other and stated that "it is essential to indicate the different roles of both courts"
29(although it did not discuss this further). In the Act on excise duty decision, the PCT also
remarked that even the adoption of the 'isolationist doctrine' does not guarantee that no
clash will occur between the ECJ and the PCT judgments. Moreover, the PCT held that it
shall retain its status of the "last word" court on fundamental issues relating to the
constitutional system of the State. This thesis suggests that the PCT will be rather
cautious in referring to the ECJ. Taking into account the recent FCC decision of 14 January
2014, which issued a first preliminary reference concerned the validity and not the
interpretation of EU law, it may be claimed that the PCT might also make use of the
preliminary reference tool not only to serve as evidence of friendliness towards the ECJ
but also as a warning.30 However, as A. Lazowski rightly points out, the PCT fails to define
in the decision matters of constitutional importance in which it reserves for itself the final
31 32
word. This makes the reservation vague and flexible.
1/. Supronowicz Judgment-The PCT Considers for the First Time the Duty to Refer With
Regard to an Adjudicated Case
The status of the PCT as "a court" under Article 267(3) TFEU was considered in abstracto
in both the Accession Treaty judgment and the Act on excise duty decision.
The judgment of 16 November 2011 in the case SK 45/09 (hereafter, the Supronowicz
judgment) has the opposite character. The case dealt with a constitutional complaint
submitted by Ms. Anna Supronowicz. The facts of the constitutional complaint were as
follows.
Ms. Supronowicz was convicted of an offence against the life and health of Mr. De Leeuv.
As part of criminal proceedings pending against Ms. Supronowicz, the Court of Appeal in
Brussels, in a decision of 23 December 2004, ordered Ms. Supronowicz to pay Mr. Jacques
29 This standpoint strongly resembles the position taken by the ICC in the Granital and Mesagerazio Servizi
judgments, where the ICC strongly isolated itself from the application of the EU law and gave the floor to
ordinary and administrative courts.
30 The other constitutional courts which have raised preliminary questions concerning the validity of EU law are:
the Belgian Constitutional Court, the Austrian Constitutional Tribunal, and the German Federal Constitutional
Court.
31 Similarly to, among others, the German Federal Constitutional Court (ultra vires doctrine and the constitutional
identity review) and the ICC (controlimiti concept).
32 See LAZOWSKI, supra note 21, at 194.
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Andre De Leeuv the amount of EUR 12,500 as compensation for the material and moral
damage which Mr. De Leeuv suffered. Both Ms. Supronowicz and the Belgian Public
Prosecutor's Office lodged appeals against the judgment of the Criminal Court in Brussels
and appellate proceedings were carried out. On 11 May 2006, Mr. De Leeuv requested
the enforceability of the decision of the Belgian Court on the territory of Poland. Ms.
Supronowicz lodged an appeal against the Polish court's declaration that the decision was
enforceable. After an unsuccessful appeal against this ruling, Ms. Supronowicz submitted
a constitutional complaint, in which she requested the determination of the
unconstitutionality of several provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of
22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (principle of equality: Article 32, and right to a fair trial:
Article 45 of the Polish Constitution).
The PCT followed the doctrine of "separate pools of cognition" adopted in the Act on
excise duty decision and held that it is necessary to draw a distinction between examining
the conformity of the acts of EU secondary legislation with the Treaties (i.e., the EU
primary law), on the one hand, and examining their conformity with the Constitution, on
the other. However, the Supronowicz judgment was the first case in which the PCT
considered the necessity of making a preliminary reference regarding an adjudicated
issue.
The judgment echoed all over Europe, as it was the first time since the Solonge /
judgment of the FCC in 1974 that a domestic constitutional court had dared to carry out a
constitutional review of a Community regulation.34 Nevertheless, it should also be
highlighted that the controversial standpoint of the PCT was softened by the thesis
expressed in the last part of the statement of reasons.
There, the PCT emphasized that it had reviewed the conformity of the EU's secondary
legislation with the Constitution for the first time. Therefore, the issue of admissibility of
a constitutional complaint was firstly determined, and then the PCT considered the issue
of the substantial validity of the EU secondary legislation. Moreover, due to that new
situation, the PCT decided to thoroughly examine the allegations, comparing the
challenged EU provisions with the higher-level norms for the constitutional review, as
indicated by the complainant. The PCT also noted that there was a need to determine, for
the future, the manner of reviewing the constitutionality of the norm of EU law (the
Treaties and secondary legislation) in the course of reviewing proceedings commenced by
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. 1, as amended.
34 See Piotr Bogdanowicz, Pawel Marcisz, Szukajqc granic kontroli- glosa do wyroku TKz 16.11.2011 r. (SK45/09),
9 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLAD SADOWY 47 (2012); Jan Galster, Agnieszka Knade-Plaskacz, Glosa do wyroku Trybunatu
Konstytucyinego z dnia 16 listopoda 2011 r. (sygn. akt SK 45/09), 6 PRZEGLAD SEJMOWY 131 (2012).
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way of a constitutional complaint.3s Repeating the formula known from the FCC
decision in Solange I and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in Bosphorus, the PCT decided that in the case of a constitutional complaint
which challenges the conformity of a legal act of EU secondary legislation with the
Constitution, the complainant is requested to prove that the challenged act causes a
considerable decline in the standard of protection of rights and freedoms, by
comparison with the standard of protection guaranteed by the Polish Constitution.
Since then, this has become an essential element of the requirement to indicate the
manner in which rights or freedoms have been infringed by the challenged EU
legislative provisions. According to the PCT, the need for this, more specific
rendering, is justified by the character of the acts of EU law, which enjoy a special
status in the Polish legal order and which come from legislative centers other than
the organs of the Polish state. The PCT also emphasized that such a requirement
follows the allocation of the burden of proof in review proceedings commenced by
way of a constitutional complaint. However, this is not tantamount to possible
indication (proof) that there has been an infringement of the Constitution, which is
the task of the PCT.
As regards the preliminary reference procedure, the PCT indicated in the Supronowicz
judgment that Poland accepted the division of powers between the CJEU and the PCT
with regard to the review of EU legal acts. The result of this division is the jurisdiction of
the CJEU to provide the final interpretation of EU law and to determine the conformity of
the acts of EU secondary legislation with the Treaties and the general principles of EU law.
Consequently, the PCT emphasized the subsidiary character of its jurisdiction to examine
the conformity of EU law (both primary and secondary) with the Constitution. The
acknowledgement of the subsidiary character of such jurisdiction was followed by the
statement that before adjudicating on the non-conformity of an act of EU secondary
legislation with the Constitution, the PCT is obliged to consider the necessity of making a
reference to the CJEU. 40 Although the case concerned the issue of the conformity of the
Council Regulation with constitutional provisions, the PCT referred to hypothetical doubts
regarding its compliance with EU primary law and held that in the adjudicated case there
was no doubt as to the conformity of the challenged Council Regulation with EU primary
Point 8.2. of the judgment.
6 Statement of the German FCC from 22 October 1986, sign. 2 BvR 197/83.
Bosphorus Airlines v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, (Jan. 30, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
Point 8.5 of the judgment.
Point 8.5 of the judgment.
40 What is worth mentioning is that the PCT referred to the view presented by the German FCC in its judgment of
6 June 2010 in the case Honeywell.
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law, and hence-within the meaning of the Foto Frost doctrine-there was no need to
refer to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
The Supronowicz judgment clearly shows that the PCT acknowledged its status as "a
court" under Article 267(3) TFEU in the constitutional complaint procedure (which is a
form of concrete constitutional review in the Polish legal system). As well as this, the PCT
suggested in this judgment that it may use the preliminary ruling procedure-similarly to
the FCC-as a warning before declaring that the challenged EU law is unconstitutional.
Moreover, in the context of the standard of review in the Supronowicz case (the right to a
fair trial guaranteed in Article 45 of the Polish Constitution), it is worth pointing out that
the PCT is not entitled to decide on constitutional complaints submitted against a final
judgment-by a court of last resort-that contain the allegation that this court's omission
in raising a preliminary question to the CJEU infringed the complainant's constitutional
right to fair trial.41 This results from the fact that in Poland, a constitutional complaint
may be submitted only against a legal act, not a court's judgment or an administrative
decision.
D. Missed Opportunities?
I support the view that in the Supronowicz case the preliminary reference was needless.
There were neither doubts concerning the validity of the EU Regulation nor its
interpretation. Yet, when the missed opportunities are considered, it is worth analyzing
the broader context of two PCT rulings: the judgment of 7 November 2007, K 18/06,
which serves as an example of a lack of coherence between determining PCT and CJEU
criteria of nondiscrimination, and the judgment of 10 December 2014 K 52/13, where the
EU law perspective became inevitable within the PCT's considerations regarding the
effects of its ruling.
I. Act on Income Tax Judgment in Light of the CJEU's Judgment in the Filipiak Case
As the evaluation of the judgment of 7 November 2007, K 18/06 (hereafter, the Act on
income tax judgment) depends on the broader factual and legal context, it is worth briefly
presenting the main facts of the Filipiak case.
Mr. Filipiak, a Polish citizen, was pursuing economic activity in the Netherlands as a
partner in a partnership under Dutch law; the organizational structure of this partnership
corresponded to that of a general partnership under Polish law. Pursuant to Article 3 of
the Act of 26 July 1991 on income tax payable by natural persons (Journal of Laws of
41 See Marketa Navratilova, The Preliminary Ruling before Constitutional Courts; Clelia Lacchi, The Obligation of
National Courts of Last Instance to Make a Reference For a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice of the EU as
a Constitutional Guarantee, in this Special Issue.
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2000, No 14, item 176; hereafter, the Act on income tax) Mr. Filipiak was subject to
unlimited tax liability in Poland. However, in the Netherlands, he paid the social security
and health insurance contributions required of him by Dutch legislation. In a letter of 28
June 2006, Mr. Filipiak requested from the director of the tax office of Nowy Tomyil
advice in writing on the scope and manner of application of tax law. In his request for that
advice, Mr. Filipiak observed that the provisions of the Act on income tax did not allow
him to deduct the social security contributions paid in the Netherlands from his basis of
assessment, nor to reduce the tax by the amount of the health insurance contributions
also paid in the Netherlands. He claimed that such provisions were discriminatory and,
that being the case, that those provisions should be disregarded and EU law should be
applied directly. With the decision of 2 August 2007, the director of the Nowy Tomyil tax
office replied to the request for advice and expressed the view that Mr. Filipiak's position
was unfounded. The director stated that, pursuant to Article 26(1)(2) of the Act on
income tax, the only contributions which could be deducted from the basis of assessment
were those specified in the Act on social security and that, pursuant to Article 27b(1) of
the Act on income tax, the only health insurance contributions which could be deducted
from tax were those specified in the Law on publicly funded healthcare benefits. As the
contributions paid under Dutch law did not satisfy the criteria laid down in those
provisions, they could not be deducted in Poland from the basis of assessment and from
income tax respectively. When this administrative decision was upheld, Mr. Filipiak
brought an action against it before the Regional Administrative Court in Pozna6 on the
grounds that they infringed, inter alia, Articles 26(1)(2) and 27b(1) of the Act on income
tax, Article 39(2) EC, Article 3(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June
1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed
persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, as amended and
updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 199642 as amended by
Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April
200543 ('Regulation No 1408/71'), and various provisions of the Polish Constitution.
The Regional Administrative Court in Pozna6 took the view that the prerequisites for an
infringement of the freedom of movement for workers provided for in Article 39 EC were
not satisfied in the present case. The court stated in this regard that, since the applicant
in the main proceedings was a businessman who was a member of a general partnership
based in the Netherlands, he was self-employed and did not work on the orders or under
the control of another person. He could not, therefore, be regarded as a "worker" within
the meaning of Article 39 EC. The Regional Administrative Court in Pozna6 considered
that it was essential to examine whether the provisions at issue were compatible with a
provision which was not relied on by Mr. Filipiak, namely Article 43 EC, where the effect
of those provisions is that a taxpayer who is subject to unlimited tax liability in Poland on
42 1997 O.J. 1997 (L 28) 1.
43 2005 O.J. (L 117) 1.
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the entirety of his income and who pursues economic activity in another Member State is
not allowed to deduct from his basis of assessment the amount of the compulsory social
security contributions paid in the Netherlands and is not allowed to reduce his income tax
by the amount of the compulsory health insurance contributions also paid in the
Netherlands, even though those contributions were not deducted from in that Member
State.
What is crucial for further consideration is the fact that the PCT reviewed the provisions
of the Act on income tax in the aforementioned Act on income tax judgment. The PCT
ruled partial unconstitutionality of the challenged statutory provisions and held that they
did not conform with the Constitution to the extent to which they do not allow a taxpayer
who pursued economic activity in another Member State, and who paid in this Member
State compulsory social security and health insurance contributions, to deduct them from
income deriving from an activity pursued outside Poland and from the tax payable
thereon, where those contributions were not deducted in the Member State in which
that activity was pursued. Those provisions are not compatible with the principle of
equality before the law laid down in Article 32 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the
44principle of social justice, set out in Article 2 of the Constitution. Yet, in the same
judgment, pursuant to Article 190(3) of the Constitution, the PCT decided to defer the
date on which the provisions held to be unconstitutional would lose all binding force to a
date other than that of the publication of the judgment, namely to 30 November 2008.45
The deferral of the Act on income tax judgment's effects had a direct impact on the
Regional Administrative Court in Pozna's referral to the CJEU. The Regional
Administrative Court in Pozna6 decided to refer two preliminary questions.
In the first one, it asked whether the first and second paragraphs of Article 43 EC must be
construed as precluding the provisions of Article 26(1)(2) of the Act on income tax, under
which the right to a reduction of the basis of assessment for income tax by the amount of
compulsory social security contributions is restricted to contributions paid on the basis of
provisions of national law. The Regional Administrative Court in Pozna6 asked also
whether the provisions of Article 27b(1) of that Act, under which the right to a reduction
44 See also Adam Lazowski, Half Full and Half Empty Glass: the Application of EU Law in Poland (2004-2010), 48
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 548 (2011); Adam Zalasiski, Odliczenie dla cel6w podatkowych skiadek no ubezpieczenie
spoleczne i zdrowotne, zaplaconych za granicq. Glosa do wyroku TK z 7 listopada 2007 r. (K 18/06), 4 PRZEGLAD
PODATKOWY 41 (2008).
45 Pursuant to Art. 190(3) of the Polish Constitution: "A judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal shall take effect
from the day of its publication, however, the Constitutional Tribunal may specify another date for the end of the
binding force of a normative act. Such time period may not exceed 18 months in relation to a statute or 12
months in relation to any other normative act. Where a judgment has financial consequences not provided for in
the Budget, the Constitutional Tribunal shall specify date for the end of the binding force of the normative act
concerned, after seeking the opinion of the Council of Ministers."
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of income tax by the amount of compulsory health insurance contributions is restricted to
contributions paid on the basis of the provisions of national law, in the case where a
Polish national, who is subject to unlimited liability to tax in Poland on income taxed
there, has paid in another Member State compulsory social security and health insurance
contributions in respect of the economic activity pursued in that other State, and those
contributions have not been deducted either from income or from tax in that other
Member State.
The second question, which is of greater interest in the context of the relationship
between constitutional courts and the CJEU, concerned the doubt as to whether the
principle of the primacy of EU law must be construed as taking precedence over the
provisions of the Polish Constitution in so far as the entry into force of a judgment of the
PCT has been deferred on the basis of those provisions.
At this point, the issue of an alleged missed opportunity arises. The main question in this
regard is: Could the PCT have prevented the appearance of the Filipick case?
For a comprehensive answer, it is necessary to point out that the Act on income tax case
before the PCT was initiated in abstract review proceedings, so there was no need to stick
strictly to the separate fields of cognition doctrine adopted in the Excise duty act decision.
The Ombudsman (Commissioner for Citizens' Rights), as the applicant, argued that the
challenged provision not only infringed the Constitution (Article 32) but also infringed EU
law, and was especially inconsistent with the provision on free movement for workers
(Article 45 TFEU; ex 39 and 48). Therefore, the PCT had the hypothetical possibility of
making a reference to the CJEU asking for the interpretation of Article 45 TFEU.
As the main legal issue in this case concerned the conformity of the statutory provisions
with the constitutional principle of equal treatment, the PCT was not obliged to refer to
the CJEU. However, the PCT did not totally skirt around the EU law context of the
constitutional issue. It held "single-handedly" that the freedom of movement of workers
imposes an obligation of equal treatment and non-discrimination of workers who are
nationals of one Member State and work in this State and those who are nationals of
other EU Member States but work in the same Member State as the former group. Such
an interpretation of Article 45 of the EC Treaty led the PCT to the conclusion that Article
45 of the EC Treaty did not regard the challenged provisions as regulating the relations
between Poland and its citizens (taxpayers) working abroad. (On the other hand, it should
be highlighted that the PCT added that by respecting the principle of EU-friendly
interpretation of domestic law, it had to be stated that the challenged statutory
provisions did not serve for the full effectiveness of EU law, especially of the freedom of
movement of workers, since they might discourage Polish citizens from working in other
EU Member States.)
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In the Filipiak judgment, the ECJ adopted a different interpretation of Article 45 of the EC
Treaty as it held that every taxpayer who is also resident in Poland (and not only Polish
nationals) but pursues his economic activity within another EU Member State and pays
into compulsory social security and health insurance schemes there, but is not able to
either deduct them from the basis of assessment in Poland or to reduce the tax payable in
Poland by the amount of these compulsory health insurance contributions, is treated in a
discriminatory way when compared to every worker not resident in Poland but pursuing
46their economic activity in Poland.
The Filipiak case proves that the "isolationist strategy" towards the ECJ, adopted by the
PCT in the Excise tax act decision, does not always effectively eliminate all potential
overlap between the PCT and ECJ jurisdictions. The juxtaposition of the PCT's Act on
income tax judgment and the ECJ's Filipiak judgment shows concurrent interpretations of
the principle of equality and of the freedom of movement of workers. Therefore, the
PCT's avoidance of "competitiveness of jurisdictions" paradoxically led to such
competitiveness and probably had a significant impact on the Regional Administrative
47Court's decision to refer to the ECJ in the Filipiak case.
As regards the missed opportunities, the Act on income tax judgment serves as an
example of a case where the PCT could have (at least) considered referral to the ECJ
concerning the interpretation of Article 45 EC Treaty. Such a preliminary ruling could have
allowed the avoidance of different perceptions of the similarity criterion by the PCT and
the ECJ. Moreover, in such a scenario, the Filipiak case would not have appeared at all,
since it was, among others factors, the lack of sufficient Europeanization of the
constitutional principle of equality that arguably influenced the decision of the Regional
Administrative Court in Pozna6 to refer to the ECJ. 48
46 The ECJ concurred with the PCT's view on the lack of differentiation of legal situation among Polish nationals
working abroad. Concomitantly, it pointed out that what had to be compared was the situation of Polish
nationals who resided in Poland and pursued their economic activity in Poland with the situation of Polish
nationals who resided in Poland but pursued their economic activity in another Member State. According to the
ECJ, the taxation of both groups should be conducted by applying the same rules of tax deduction. As a result,
the Court, by answering to the first preliminary question, stated that provisions of Polish tax law violated the
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services under Arts. 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty. See
Przemystaw Miktaszewicz, Pytanie prejudycjalne do TS oporte no wadliwej wykfadni prawa krajowego dokonanej
przez sqd pytajqcy (w kontekicie wplywu odroczenia przez TK terminu utraty mocy obowiqzujqcej
niekonstytucyjnych przepis6w krajowych no skuteczno96 prawa UE) - glosa do wyroku WSA w Poznaniu z
14.01.2010 r. (1 SA/Po 1006/09), 10 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLAD SADOWY 41 (2011); Aleksandra Kustra, Odroczenie przez
TK mocy obowiqzujqcej przepisu niezgodnego z prawem UE - glosa do wyroku TS z 19.11.2009 w sprawie C-
314/08 Krzysztof Filipiak v. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu, 6 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLAD SADOWY 34-40 (2012).
47 KUSTRA, supra note 42, at 39-40.
48 The decision of Wojew6dzki SqdAdministracyjny w Poznaniu of 30 May 2008, signature I SA 1756/07.
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On the other hand, the PCT's Act on income tax judgment can be also considered a
thoughtful choice. Such an interpretation of this ruling is based on the assumption that
the PCT decided to flag the autonomy of constitutional and EU standards of review even if
they might have appeared to be legal equivalents. In the Act on income tax case, these
standards had a different character, as the constitutional principle of equality and non-
discriminatory treatment is considered as a constitutional right, whereas the Treaty
provisions indicated by the applicant related to the four Community freedoms. Yet, taking
into account the broader context of the ECJ's recent judgments regarding the application
of the Charter in the domestic legal systems of the EU Member States (Melloni,4 9
Akerberg,so Aliyevs1 ), the emphasis on the autonomy of the constitutional and EU law
standards of review enhances the position of many constitutional courts, leaving them as
the "last word courts" in the sphere of the protection of constitutional rightS.52
11. Ritual Slaughter Judgment in Light of its Effects
Another case that may be considered to be a missed opportunity to refer to the CJEU is
the PCT's judgment of 10 December 2014, K 52/13, concerning an application filed by the
Association of Jewish Religious Communities in the Republic of Poland with regard to the
ban on ritual slaughter (hereafter, the Ritual slaughter judgment). In this judgment, the
PCT decided that the lack of permission to subject animals to slaughter in a
slaughterhouse in accordance with special methods prescribed by religious rites is
inconsistent with the Constitution.
The initiator of the proceedings before the PCT claimed that an absolute ban, backed up
by criminal sanctions, on the slaughter of animals in accordance with special methods
prescribed by religious rites (usually referred to as "ritual slaughter"), did not conform
with freedom of religion, guaranteed by Article 53 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The PCT determined that what had been challenged by the applicant was the absolute
ban on ritual slaughter-in other words, a ban on carrying out ritual slaughter in a
slaughterhouse, to which there were no exceptions. The said ban had been reinforced by
49 C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal (February 26, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
5o C-617/10, Judgment of 26 February 2013, Aklagaren v. Hans Akerberg Fransson (Feburary 26, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/.
5 Case C-112/13, A v. B and Others, (September 11, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/
52 Further on this issue, see Daniel Thym, Separation versus Fusion - or: How to Accommodate National
Autonomy and the Charter? Diverging Visions of the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of
Justice, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 391-419 (2013); Filippo Fontanelli, Hic Sunt Nationes: The Elusive Limits of the EU
Charter and the German Constitutional Watchdog: Court of Justice of the European Union: Judgment of 26
February 2013, Case C-617/1oAklagaren v. HansAkerberg Fransson, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 315 (2013).
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criminal sanctions. In that legal context, Article 9(2) of the Act of 20 February 1997 on
relations between the State and Jewish Religious Communities in the Republic of Poland,
which stipulated that those religious communities had the broadly defined task of
"adhering to the practice of ritual slaughter," might not alone be construed as a basis for
carrying out the ritual slaughter required by Judaism. The PCT indicated that ritual
slaughter carried out in a slaughterhouse was permissible pursuant to Council Regulation
(EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of
killing, which had been applied directly since 1 January 2013. However, the Council
Regulation permitted EU Member States to maintain in place any national rules that were
binding at the time of entry into force of the Regulation and that were aimed at ensuring
more extensive protection of animal welfare during slaughter. These rules were the
challenged regulations of the Animal Protection Act, which prohibited ritual slaughter.
The PCT considered whether ritual slaughter was subject to protection in the light of
freedom of religion, which constituted a fundamental freedom of the individual. The
obligation to respect freedom of religion was strictly related to the protection of the
inherent and inalienable dignity of the person. The PCT stated that the guarantee of
freedom of religion, provided in Article 53(1) and (2) of the Constitution, comprised the
carrying out of any activities (practices, rites, or rituals) which were religious in character.
That also included unusual religious activities, or even those that might be unpopular with
a majority of the public. The constitutional protection also included ritual slaughter,
which has been practiced for centuries by the followers of Judaism and Islam. Ritual
slaughter was also subject to protection under Article 9 of the ECHR, which had been
emphasized by the ECtHR.
The PCT decided that in light of the constitutional and ECHR standards of protection, an
absolute ban on ritual slaughter, backed up by criminal sanctions, constituted a restriction
of the freedom to manifest religion. However, as the freedom to manifest religion is not
absolute in character and may be subject to statutory restrictions, the main constitutional
issue to decide was whether this restriction met constitutional (and conventional)
requirements (i.e., was proportionate). One of the main elements of the constitutional
belief in proportionality in Poland is the necessity of the limitation. This means that the
limitation is necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public
order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms
and rights of other persons.
The PCT decided that there was no link between the absolute ban on ritual slaughter and
the necessity to protect any of the aforementioned constitutional values. The PCT
highlighted that the lack of any risk to the safety and hygiene of food, as well as to the
health of consumers, was confirmed by the fact that the carrying out of ritual slaughter in
a slaughterhouse had been permitted by the rigorous provisions of Council Regulation
(EC) No 1099/2009, as well as the hitherto practice of carrying out ritual slaughter, with
regard to which such risks had not been pointed out. Moreover, the admissibility of ritual
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slaughter remained inextricably linked to the obligation of competent state authorities to
control adherence to numerous requirements for carrying out the said slaughter.
The PCT highlighted that although the introduction of the absolute ban on the slaughter
of animals in a slaughterhouse was not necessary for the protection of health or morals, it
reflected deep concern for the welfare of farmed animals at the time of slaughter. The
introduction of the absolute ban on ritual slaughter had been proposed by numerous
Polish and international organizations who were concerned with enhancing the
protection of animals. The protection of animals, including farmed animals at the time of
slaughter, was also embedded in constitutional axiology. However, the statement that a
restriction on the freedom to manifest religion in the form of the absolute ban on ritual
slaughter was not necessary for the protection of any categories of the public interest, as
specified in Article 53(5) and Article 9(2) of the ECHR, entailed that the restriction did not
meet the requirements set by the Constitution and the ECHR.
Due to the significance of the problem under discussion, the PCT also addressed the
question of the effects of the judgment. It pointed out that as of the date of the
publication of the judgment in the Journal of Laws, it would be permissible to subject
animals to ritual slaughter in an appropriate slaughterhouse on the basis of Article 4(4) of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals
at the time of killing (hereafter, Council Regulation No 1099/2009). And here the doubts
begin. Should (or at least could) the PCT have referred a preliminary question regarding
the interpretation of this EU law provision?
Article 4 of Council Regulation No 1099/2009 regulates methods of stunning animals.
Pursuant to Article 4(1),
Animals shall only be killed after stunning in accordance with the
methods and specific requirements related to the application of those
methods set out in Annex I. The loss of consciousness and sensibility
shall be maintained until the death of the animal. The methods referred
to in Annex I which do not result in instantaneous death (hereafter,
simple stunning) shall be followed as quickly as possible by a procedure
ensuring death such as bleeding, pithing, electrocution or prolonged
exposure to anoxia.
Article 4(4) provides an exception from the rule introduced in Article 4(1). Pursuant to
Article 4(4), "In the case of animals subject to particular methods of slaughter prescribed
by religious rites, the requirements of paragraph 1 shall not apply provided that the
slaughter takes place in a slaughterhouse."
The general tone of the judgment suggests that the PCT decided that the challenged
statutory provisions were not in conformity with the constitutional standards because
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they did not provide for any exceptions regarding the manifestation of religion (which,
according to the PCT, includes ritual slaughter). What remained outside the scope of
adjudication was a number of matters, such as the end use of meat obtained through
ritual slaughter, the possibility of limiting the scale of such slaughter, and the export of
the meat obtained through the slaughter. Therefore, the PCT could have used the
opportunity to make a reference to the CJEU regarding the scope of the exception
provided for, namely the acceptance of the ritual slaughter carried out for export in light
of recitals 4 and 18 of the preamble of Council Regulation No 1099/2009. The answer
could have shaped both the sentence of the judgment (providing for a partial
unconstitutionality) and its effects (in a more detailed way delineating the future actions
of the Polish legislator, who would be either obliged or merely entitled to introduce
further restrictions on the ritual slaughter carried out in Poland). Nevertheless, the case
cannot be considered as an obvious example of an omission in referring for a preliminary
ruling. If anything, it is, rather, a missed opportunity to start a formal dialogue with the
CJEU.
E. Conclusions
Nowadays, EU law is increasingly becoming a benchmark in the process of constitutional
adjudication. Constitutional courts have started to apply EU law more actively, as they
recognize that "the isolationist doctrine" is not in their long-term interest.54 They may
refer to EU law in order to determine a "demarcation line" which separates the ECJ and
constitutional courts' fields of cognition, but they may also apply EU law while
interpreting constitutional standards in compliance with EU law. This results from the fact
that international law and EU law standards today heavily affect constitutional standards
and sometimes determine their modification (elevation or diminution). The procedural
cooperation with the ECJ in the form of preliminary references also helps constitutional
courts to effectively defend their political position vis-a-vis national courts, which
"(4) Animal welfare is a Community value that is enshrined in the Protocol (No 33) on protection and welfare
of animals annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (Protocol (No 33)). The protection of
animals at the time of slaughter or killing is a matter of public concern that affects consumer attitudes towards
agricultural products. In addition, improving the protection of animals at the time of slaughter contributes to
higher meat quality and indirectly has a positive impact on occupational safety in slaughterhouses."
"(18) Derogation from stunning in case of religious slaughter taking place in slaughterhouses was granted by
Directive 93/119/EC. Since Community provisions applicable to religious slaughter have been transposed
differently depending on national contexts and considering that national rules take into account dimensions that
go beyond the purpose of this Regulation, it is important that derogation from stunning animals prior to
slaughter should be maintained, leaving, however, a certain level of subsidiarity to each Member State. As a
consequence, this Regulation respects the freedom of religion and the right to manifest religion or belief in
worship, teaching, practice and observance, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union."
54 See Jan Komarek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 442 (2013).
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sometimes use their "Community mandate" to weaken the constitutional courts'
position.ss
All these factors have caused the recently observed significant shifts in the jurisprudence
of several constitutional courts concerning the application of the preliminary ruling
procedure. The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal (2011), the French Constitutional Council
(2013), and last but not least the FCC (2014), have all decided to refer to the ECJ their first
preliminary questions. Another piece of evidence for the aforementioned jurisprudential
shifts is the ICC's decision n. 207, dated 18 July 2013, in which the ICC, for the first time,
made a reference to the ECJ in the context of an incidental proceeding (via incidentale).
With this trend in mind, it is quite likely that the PCT will also refer to the CJEU in the not
too distant future. At the same time, there is still some doubt regarding the PCT's
reservations concerning the scope of such an obligation and the judicial "missed
opportunities." Therefore, the analysis of the PCT's present standpoint as regards the
preliminary ruling procedure is like reading tea leaves. The future is still blurred. In the
Accession Treaty judgment, the PCT accepted the obligation to make a reference to the
ECJ, at least when performing constitutional review of legislation. Yet, in the Act on excise
duty decision, the PCT suggested that it might not consider itself as a court within the
meaning of Article 267(3) TFEU in concrete review proceedings, as in this type of
proceedings there is always a judge a quo whose obligation is to ensure the effective
application of EU law in the national legal system. On the other hand, in the Supronowicz
judgment, the PCT acknowledged its status as "a court" under Article 267(3) TFEU in the
constitutional complaint procedure (which is a form of concrete constitutional review in
the Polish legal system). Two other judgments of the PCT-the Act on income tax
judgment and the Ritual slaughter judgment-serve as examples of missed opportunities
to refer. Thus, one thing is certain: the PCT is still looking for a "good case" to start the
direct dialogue with the CJEU.
Postscript:
The PCT formulated its first reference for a preliminary ruling-with two questions - in
the decision of 7 July 2015, case K 61/13.
The analysis of PCT judgments rendered in the Accession Treaty judgment (K 18/04) and
the Supronowicz judgment (SK 45/09), as presented in this paper, leads to the conclusion
that a reference for a preliminary ruling by the PCT may only occur if certain conditions
are satisfied. Firstly, the PCT considered itself a "court" within the meaning of Article
267(3) TFEU but only in respect of discharging its primary duty, that is controlling the
Daniel Sarmiento, Reinforcing the (Domestic) Constitutional Protection of Primacy of EU Law: Tribunal
Constitutional, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 890 (2013).
1565
German Law Journal
hierarchical conformity of legal norms (as opposed to, e.g., resolving disputes over
authority). Secondly, according to the PCT, such a reference may only be formulated in
cases of the PCT applying EU law. The final issue that needed to be resolved-at least
before the decision K 61/13 of 7 July 2015 was rendered-was the definition of what the
PCT's application of EU law means. Formerly, this condition could be interpreted in two
ways: narrowly (EU law being the direct object or a benchmark for judicial review), or
broadly (EU law as an element affecting the interpretation of domestic legal norms being
reviewed or used as a benchmark).
The decision of 7 July 2015 proves that the PCT has adopted the broad interpretation of
the meaning of "application of EU law." The case which served as the basis for the
reference for a preliminary ruling was heard by the PCT upon the Commissioner for
Citizens Rights' (Polish Ombudsman, hereafter: Commissioner) application for the
declaration of several provisions of the Act of 11 March 2004 on the goods and services
516 57tax (hereinafter, VAT Act). The provisions challenged by the Commissioner determine
which goods are taxed at a reduced VAT rate. The reduced rates of 5% and 8% may be
applied only to publications that are published in print or on carriers (disks, tapes, etc.)
but not to electronic publications, which are subject to the VAT rate of 23%. According to
the Commissioner, such a differentiation in the levying of a tax on publications with the
same relevant characteristics, namely identical content, violates the principle of tax
equality. As the PCT noted in the statement of reasons in the decision of 7 July 2015, the
provisions of the VAT Act challenged by the Commissioner implement Directive
2006/112/EC. Poland applies the base rate of VAT to deliveries of electronically provided
books because of the requirement to adhere to EU law. The base rate is different from
the reduced rate applied to books recorded on carriers.
The PCT held in the statement of reasons of the reference decision that as a court
applying indirectly (through provisions of the VAT Act) norms of EU law (Directive
2006/112/EC) it is obliged, first and foremost, to request that the ECJ issue a preliminary
ruling regarding the validity of Directive 2006/112/EC itself. This is necessary, the PCT
argues, because a decision on the constitutionality of the VAT Act provisions challenged
by the Commissioner depends on the ECJ ruling on the validity of the Directive.sa
6 Journal of Laws of 2011, No. 177, item 1054, as amended.
More precisely, the Commissioner applied for the declaration of Items 72, 73, 74 and 75 of Schedule 3 to the
VAT Act read in conjunction with Article 41(2) VAT Act, and Items 32, 33, 34 and 35 of Schedule 10 to the VAT Act
read in conjunction with Article 41(2) VAT Act, as incompatible with Article 32 of the Constitution read in
conjunction with Articles 84 and 2 of the Constitution, to the extent these provisions excluded the application of
reduced rates of VAT to digital books and other electronic publications.
5 Cf. para. 3.1.2 of the decision's statement of reasons.
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What is important here is the fact that, as early as in its first reference for a preliminary
ruling, the PCT decided to ask two questions on the validity-rather than interpretation-
of EU law. These were the following:
(1) Is point (6) of Annex Ill to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the
common system of value added taxs9 (hereinafter: Council Directive 2006/112/EC), in the
wording amended by the provisions of Council Directive 2009/47/EC of 5 May 2009
60
amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards reduced rates of value added tax
(hereinafter: Council Directive 2009/47/CE) invalid because a material procedural
requirement for consultation with the European Parliament was violated during the
lawmaking process?
(2) Is Article 98(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, read in conjunction with point (6) of Annex Ill
thereto, invalid because it violates the principle of tax neutrality as far as the said article
excludes the application of reduced tax rates to books published in a digital form and to
other electronic publications?
The PCT decision of 7 July 2015 reinforces the visible tendency for constitutional courts to
be increasingly more active in using the preliminary reference procedure. Still, this
arguably poses a valid question: Is the case in respect of which the PCT decided, 11 years
after Poland's accession to the EU, to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ
the basis for formulating jurisprudential arguments with far-reaching consequences for
the entire EU legal system? Or is this case of secondary importance? Was it a "good case"
to start the direct dialogue with the CJEU?
It remains to be seen whether the decision of 7 July 2015 will become a one-off gesture
towards judicial dialogue, or instead the starting point of a jurisprudential strategy that
puts stronger emphasis on a constitutional court's application of EU law.
"2006 O.J. (L 347) 1, as amended.
6o 2009 O.J. (L 116) 18.
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